Ontic Structural Realism and the Principle of the Identity of Indiscernibles

Recently, there has been a debate as to whether or not the principle of the identity of indiscernibles (the PII) is compatible with quantum physics. It is also sometimes argued that the answer to this question has implications for the debate over the tenability of ontic structural realism (OSR). The central aim of this paper is to establish what relationship there is (if any) between the PII and OSR. It is argued that one common interpretation of OSR is undermined if the PII turns out to be false, since it is committed to a version of the bundle theory of objects, which implies the PII. However, if OSR is understood as the physical analogue of (sophisticated) mathematical structuralism then OSR does not imply the PII. It is further noted that it is (arguably) a virtue of OSR that it is compatible with a version of the PII for possible worlds.     

On some putative graph-theoretic counterexamples to the Principle of the Identity of Indiscernibles

Recently, several authors have claimed to have found graph-theoretic counterexamples to the Principle of the Identity of Indiscernibles (PII). In this paper, I argue that their counterexamples presuppose a certain view of what unlabeled graphs are, and that this view is optional at best.     

Why the Principle of the Identity of Indiscernibles is not contingently true either

Faced with strong arguments to the effect that Leibniz'sPrinciple of the Identity of Indiscernibles (PII) is not a necessary truth, many supporters of the Principle have staged a strategic retreat to the claim that it is contingently true in this, the actual, world. The purpose of this paper is to examine the status of the various forms of PII in both classical and quantum physics, and it is concluded that this latter view is at best doubtful, at worst, simply wrong.I would like to thank Michael Redhead and an anonymous referee for several useful suggestions and criticisms relating to the earlier version of this paper. I must also acknowledge the support given by the Centre of Logic, Epistemology and History of Science of the University of Campinas and the Brazilian National Council for Scientific and Technological Development in the later stages of the preparation of this work.     

Two caricatures,II: Leibniz's best world

Leibniz's best-of-all-possible worlds solution to the problem of evil isdefended. Enlightenment misrepresentations are removed. The apparentobviousness of the possibility of better worlds is undermined by the muchbetter understanding achieved in modern mathematical sciences of howglobal structure constrains local possibilities. It is argued that alternativeviews, especially standard materialism, fail to make sense of the problem ofevil, by implying that evil does not matter, absolutely speaking. Finally, itis shown how ordinary religious thinking incorporates the essentials ofLeibniz's view.     

Leibniz's non-tensed theory of time

Leibniz's philosophy of time, often seen as a precursor to current forms of relationalism and causal theories of time, has rightly earned the admiration of his more recent counterparts in the philosophy of science. In this article, I examine Leibniz's philosophy of time from a new perspective: the role that tense and non-tensed temporal properties/relations play in it. Specifically, I argue that Leibniz's philosophy of time is best (and non-anachronistically) construed as a non-tensed theory of time, one that dispenses with tensed temporal properties such as past, present, and future. In arguing for this thesis, I focus on the three facets of Leibniz's philosophy most relevant for evaluating his commitment to a B-theory of time: (1) the nature of change, (2) the reality of the future, and (3) the truth-conditions for tensed temporal statements. Despite prima facie evidence to the contrary, I show that a close examination of Leibniz's views on these topics provides compelling evidence for interpreting his philosophy of time as a B-theory of time.     

Cognitive penetrability,context, and aesthetics: Nanay and Danto on the Gallery of Indiscernibles

Nanay has recently argued, on the basis of the cognitive penetrability of experience, that the attribution of aesthetically relevant properties (ARPs) supervenes on perceptual experience. I argue that this claim is false as stated and cannot be salvaged. I provide a series of thought experiments as counterexamples, showing that the title of an artwork can influence its ARPs, its meaning or value, and the accurate attributions of ARPs while the character of the perceptual experience of the piece remains constant. I introduce the notions of context and appropriate context, and I argue that ARPs supervene on observable properties and appropriate contexts; there is no difference in ARPs without a difference in appropriate context or a difference in observable properties. Two paintings may share all of their observable properties and all of their context-relative perceptual properties but be ARP distinct, since each has a different appropriate context, and contexts are not usually determined or instantiated by perceptual properties.     

论莱布尼茨本体论的二阶性

罗素于1900年发表了《对莱布尼茨哲学的批判性解释》,尝试把莱布尼茨哲学当作一个完整的系统来解释。这种解释是逻辑主义的,声称莱布尼茨的整个形而上学都建立在其逻辑学的基础上。尽管这种观点在近几十年受到了一些挑战,但至今仍是英美学界对莱布尼茨的主流解释之一。本文试图