反思的、批判的、重构的当代中国伦理学

当代中国伦理学面临广度拓展和深度发掘两大理论任务,前者属于问题域的开显,后者属于伦理学自身的深化。为摆脱成果多、质量低的窘境,当代中国伦理学必须在“不再是”“正在是”和“尚未是”三个维度上拓展和深化。在“不再是”的框架内,从发生学视角深化道德观念史与道德实践史、文化的伦理性的研究;在“正在是”的视阈中,公共性危机的伦理省思、制度与体制伦理学、德性论困境与规范论难题、不同道德范型之间的冲突与通约,将成为亟待深入分析和论证的问题与难题;朝向“尚未是”的当代中国伦理学,必须关注现代技术的二重性、基于构建人类命运共同体之上的人类伦理学的滥觞和走向心灵深处的道德哲学。而完成以上理论任务的思维能力正是判断力、思索和意愿,而这些能力只有在“实际性”生活的体验和沉思中才能培养起来。     

奥古斯丁的基督教幸福观辨正

“德性论”与“幸福论”构成了西方伦理学中的一个争论焦点。“幸福论”认为,德性取决于幸福,幸福即德性。“德性论”则认为“幸福取决于德性”。苏格拉底、斯宾诺莎和康德都对“德性即幸福”这一原则进行了理智主义的辩护和论证。中世纪伦理学(或基督教伦理学)作为西方伦理学史上一个重要阶段,幸福问题无疑也是其核心问题。那么,基     

自主与有利:必要的张力——儒家伦理的进路

自主与有利是生命伦理学的重要原则,均可得到道德原则的辩护.然而,基于自主与有利冲突的必然性,西方解决冲突的“自主模式”、“基于信任的有利”模式均存在不足,决定了我国生命伦理实践必须保持二者的张力.儒家生命伦理学中“仁爱”、“经权”与“家庭”是儒家生命伦理学的重要特色,分别为二者张力的可能提供了德性基础、实践条件与重要条件.     

德性与学问

中国古哲把“学问道德”、“道德文章”、“学术道德”视为一事,视为“做人”的“第一着”。主张“君子尊德性而道学问”。凡言诸学,均论及道德。西方也有“知识即道德”、“美德即知识”的历史传统。先师们的“知行合一”(做学问必与做人相结合)主张,细细思来,不能不说是抓住了做人之大道和为学之总纲。学伦理学的人,伦理学研究者一定要有道德,委实不下于科学家要有智力。伦理学研究一旦和人的道德生活相脱离,不仅使人们怀疑其科学性,而且将引起人们“实践精神” 的紊乱、伦理角色的“错位”和道德生活的“颠倒”。因此,从世界观(智慧)的角度,探究     

伦理学基本问题刍议

什么是伦理学的基本问题,目前学术界主要存在如下四种不同看法:第一种看法认为伦理学的基本问题是“道德与社会历史条件的关系问题”;第二种看法认为“善恶问题是道德的特殊矛盾,也是伦理学的基本问题”;第三种看法认为“伦理学的基本问题应是道德的性质、起源与标准的问题”;第四种意见认为伦理学的基本问题是利益和道德的关系问题。我们认为对这些问题开展讨论,求得比较一致的意见是很有必要,也是很有意义的。     

道德的困惑与伦理学的使命——江苏省伦理学会年会综述

江苏省伦理学会1988年11月14日至17日,在江苏省灌南县汤沟酒厂宾馆召开年会和道德理论讨论会。与会代表围绕着道德的困惑与伦理学的使命这一中心议题,进行了自由热烈的讨论。 一、道德的困惑与伦理学的使命 陈延斌认为,道德的困惑归根结底是道德观念的冲突。第一,三种义利观即“义利并重”与“重义轻利”、“义利并重”与“重利轻义”、“重利轻义”与“重义轻利”的冲突;第二,新旧观念的冲突,如安贫乐道与勤劳致富,竞争上进和与世无争;第三,平等、公正观与封建等级、特权观的冲突;第四,人的价值观的冲突,表现为忘我与重我     

一本、二本与实践理性的困境

墨子确立了墨家伦理的功利主义基本走向,并把兼爱作为不偏不倚的程序性原则。但是,片面强调兼爱(或不偏不倚)导致忽略了个体利益的理性发展。故而夷之就对墨子思想予以了明确化与局部修正。夷之的做法遭到了孟子的反击而被贬称为"二本"。孟子关于一本与二本的划分引起了广泛关注,朱子认为二本的实质是爱无差等,故而二本同时适用于墨子和夷之。汉学家则多从伦理学角度去解读二本,认为夷之面临两个道德方向相互冲突的困境。从道德哲学角度去看,墨子、孟子的伦理学都是一本,只有夷之的才是二本。实际上,夷之和古典功利主义的集大成者西季威克面临着相同的实践理性的困境:即功利主义与利己主义的自爱之间的冲突。     

“幸福论伦理学”的张力与调适 ——以斯多亚伦理学为典例

古典“幸福论伦理学”本身蕴含着深刻的张力,这在斯多亚伦理学当中表现得 尤为典型。斯多亚德性幸福论伦理学被视为在古代捍卫道德的至高地位的主要旗手。但 它究竟是某种道德中立的幸福论还是严格意义上的道德学,仍是一个极具争议的问题。 斯多亚伦理学所推崇的“德性”的真实内涵是主体的自足强大意义上的幸福,这在关注对象 、情感的地位、道德义务的排序等几个方面 都与以人际道德为核心的伦理学不一致。思想史上可以看到各种在二者之间寻求一致性的努 力,然而更多的调适工作还有待于学术界进一步进行。     

军人德性冲突及选择原则

军人德性冲突特指军人两种或多种美德之间的冲突，它是军人道德生活中无法回避的难题。走出军人德性冲突的困境必须遵循三条原则：职业价值优先、全面打赢高于一切和集体高于个人，这三者共成一个有机整体共同发挥作用。     

“知”“德”之辨——苏格拉底与王阳明比较研究

文章采用中西比较研究的方法 ,对于苏格拉底和王阳明伦理学的基本命题———“德性即知识”与“致良知” ,从德性的根据、德性认识的方法、德性的实现三个方面 ,围绕着“知”与“德”这一核心问题 ,进行了分析阐述和比较研究 ,并透过这一个案试图揭示中西两种伦理学传统的重大差异。     

Aristotle On Well-Being And Intellectual Contemplation: David Charles

Aristotle, it appears, sometimes identifies well-being (eudaimonia) with one activity (intellectual contemplation), sometimes with several, including ethical virtue. I argue that this appearance is misleading. In the Nicomachean Ethics , intellectual contemplation is the central case of human well-being, but is not identical with it. Ethically virtuous activity is included in human well-being because it is an analogue of intellectual contemplation. This structure allows Aristotle to hold that while ethically virtuous activity is valuable in its own right, the best life available for humans is centred around, but not wholly constituted by, intellectual contemplation.     

Acting virtuously as an end in Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics

ABSTRACT

Sometimes, in the Nicomachean Ethics (NE), Aristotle describes virtuous actions as the sorts of actions that are ends; it is important for Aristotle to do so if he wants to maintain, as he seems to at least until NE 10.7–8, that virtuous actions are a constituent of eudaimonia. At other times, he claims that virtuous actions are the sorts of actions that are for the sake of ends beyond themselves; after all, no one would choose to go into battle or give away a significant portion of their wealth if it did not realize some good end. In this paper, I review the familiar problem raised by Aristotle’s discussion of the nature of virtuous actions, propose a solution to this problem by appealing to a distinction between virtuous actions and ‘acting virtuously’, and sketch the significance of this solution for understanding the relationship between virtue and human happiness.     

Phronēsis in Aristotle: Reconciling Deliberation with Spontaneity

A standard thesis of contemporary Aristotelian virtue ethics and some recent Heideggerian scholarship is that virtuous behavior can be performed immediately and spontaneously without engaging conscious processes of deliberative thought. It is also claimed that phronēsis either enables or is consistent with this possibility. In the Nicomachean Ethics, however, Aristotle identifies phronēsis as the excellence of the calculative part of the intellect, claims that calculation and deliberation are the same and that it is the mark of the phronimos to be able to deliberate well. He also insists that for an action to count as virtuous it must issue from rational choice, which he characterizes as determined by deliberation. It thus seems that any exegetically respectable attempt to explain virtuous action within an Aristotelian framework would need to integrate with some account of deliberative choice. This creates a tension in Aristotelian scholarship. In this paper, I shall formalize this tension in terms of an apparently inconsistent triad of claims and shall examine the merits of at least one prominent interpretation of phronēsis with respect to its reconciliation.     

Hylomorphic virtue: cosmology,embryology, and moral development in Aristotle

Aristotle is traditionally read as dividing animal souls into three parts (nutritive, perceptive, and thinking), while dividing human souls into four parts (a rational part, with theoretical and practical subparts, and non-rational part, with nutritive and desiderative subparts). But careful reading of Nicomachean Ethics 1.13 suggests that he divides the human soul into three parts – the nutritive, the theoretical, and the “practical” – but allows that the “practical” part is sometimes divided, as in akratic and other non-virtuous agents. In a fully virtuous agent, practical reason is the proper form of – and so in the hylomorphic sense one with – the desiring part of soul. It is thus contingent how many parts a given soul has, three being the norm, but four being common. Reading Aristotle this way is supported by appeal to his cosmology, where the superlunary world provides the unitary norm, and his embryology, where male offspring are the norm (in which menstrual fluid is fully mastered by the male principle) but female offspring commonly occur when the menstrual fluid (analogous to desire) is only partially mastered by the male principle (analogous to practical reason).     

Aquinas's Replication of the Acquired Moral Virtues: Rethinking the Standard Philosophical Interpretation of Moral Virtue in Aquinas

Aquinas is often presented as following Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics when treating moral virtue. Less often do philosophers consider that Aquinas's conception of the highest good and its relation to the functional character of human activity led him to break with Aristotle by replicating each of the acquired moral virtues on an infused level. The author suggests that we can discern reasons for this move by examining Aquinas's commentary on the Sententiae of Peter the Lombard and the Summa theologiae within their historical context. The author's thesis is that Dominican pastoral and intellectual concerns led Aquinas to argue that moral virtue must necessarily be ordered toward the highest good. Understanding this purpose helps to explain his presentation of moral virtue and its implications for standard philosophical interpretations of his work.     

What's Aristotelian about neo‐Aristotelian Virtue Ethics?

It is commonly assumed that Aristotle's ethical theory shares deep structural similarities with neo‐Aristotelian virtue ethics. I argue that this assumption is a mistake, and that Aristotle's ethical theory is both importantly distinct from the theories his work has inspired, and independently compelling. I take neo‐Aristotelian virtue ethics to be characterized by two central commitments: (i) virtues of character are defined as traits that reliably promote an agent's own flourishing, and (ii) virtuous actions are defined as the sorts of actions a virtuous agent reliably performs under the relevant circumstances. I argue that neither of these commitments are features of Aristotle's own view, and I sketch an alternative explanation for the relationship between virtue and happiness in the Nicomachean Ethics. Although, on the interpretation I defend, we do not find in Aristotle a distinctive normative theory alongside deontology and consequentialism, what we do find is a way of thinking about how prudential and moral reasons can come to be aligned through a certain conception of practical agency.     

Three Different Approaches to Virtue in Business- Aristotle,Confucius, and Lao Zi

The proposed paper presents an overview on the matter of virtue from different philosophical angles. It concentrates on three different schools of thought coming from the West and the East and their respective concepts of virtue. These schools of thought and the therewith-associated personalities and works discussed in this paper are Aristotelian virtue ethics, Confucianism and Daoism. The paper focuses specifically on the Nicomachean Ethics (NE) by Aristotle, the Analects belonging to Confucianism, and the Dao De Jing coming from Daoism. The paper is divided into three major parts. First, the concept of virtue of each school is outlined. In the second part, the concrete virtues as such according to each school are explained. In the third part, these virtues are then applied in specific business contexts like business practice, corporate culture and leadership, illuminating each school’s characteristic approach. The paper closes with a summary and conclusion. In the conclusion the paper outlines differences as well as similarities between Aristotelian and Confucian virtue ethics. Yet, the author generally takes a critical stance towards comparisons merely for the sake of finding similarities. Particularly between Aristotelian and Confucian virtue ethics there is a significant difference when it comes to the cultural and historical background of these schools, which should not be ignored. Besides, even within Chinese philosophy there are already significant differences when it comes to concepts and practice.     

Virtue Ethics and Situationist Personality Psychology

In this paper I examine and reply to a deflationary challenge brought against virtue ethics. The challenge comes from critics who are impressed by recent psychological evidence suggesting that much of what we take to be virtuous conduct is in fact elicited by narrowly specific social settings, as opposed to being the manifestation of robust individual character. In answer to the challenge, I suggest a conception of virtue that openly acknowledges the likelihood of its deep, ongoing dependence upon particular social relationships and settings. I argue that holding this conception will indeed cause problems for some important strands of thought in virtue ethics, most notably in the tradition of Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics. But an approach to virtue ethics modeled on David Hume's treatment of virtue and character in A Treatise of Human Nature promises to escape these problems.     

Right Action and the Non‐Virtuous Agent

According to qualified‐agent virtue ethics, an action is right if and only if it is what a virtuous agent would characteristically do in the circumstances. I discuss two closely related objections to this view, both of which concern the actions of the non‐virtuous. The first is that this criterion sometimes gives the wrong result, for in some cases a non‐virtuous agent should not do what a virtuous person would characteristically do. A second objection is it altogether fails to apply whenever the agent, through previous wrongdoing, finds herself in circumstances that a virtuous person cannot be in. I focus on Rosalind Hursthouse's account of right action, and argue that it can provide a satisfactory response to both these objections. I do so by drawing attention to the distinction between action guidance and action assessment, and arguing that while the above criterion is adequate as a means of action assessment, we should turn to the virtue‐ and vice‐rules (v‐rules) for action guidance.