Parallel distributed processing and lexical-semantic effects in visual word recognition: are a few stages necessary?

D. C. Plaut and J. R. Booth (2000) presented a parallel distributed processing model that purports to simulate human lexical decision performance. This model (and D. C. Plaut, 1995) offers a single mechanism account of the pattern of factor effects on reaction time (RT) between semantic priming, word frequency, and stimulus quality without requiring a stages-of-processing account of additive effects. Three problems are discussed. First, no evidence is provided that this model can discriminate between words and nonwords with the same orthographic structure and still produce the pattern of factor effects on RT it currently claims to produce. Second, the level of representation used by the model to make a lexical decision is inconsistent with what is known about how skilled readers with damage to their semantic system make word/nonword discriminations. Finally, there are a number of results that are difficult to reconcile with the single mechanism account. The authors' preference is to retain the stages-of-processing account.     

Detection of changes in spatial position: Short-term visual memory or motion perception?

The limiting conditions for short-term visual memory were explored for materials which are not readily codable. Two fields of random dots were presented successively in time. On half of the observations, the second display was identical to the first, and on the other half, a fraction of the dots was displaced relative to the first display. The task of the S was to indicate if any of the dots had moved (displacement detection), and in separate tests, if any of the dots had not moved (stationarity detection). Stationarity and displacement detection are largely related to the same variables, although performance is somewhat better with displacement detection. Discrimination of small displacements is critically dependent upon the interval between displays, with maximum accuracy in the region of 64 msec for briefly presented displays. Maximum accuracy is obtained under conditions which yield good apparent motion. By contrast, displacement discrimination is, within limits, relatively independent of the number of dots displayed, of the fraction of displaced dots.     

Why is it difficult to see in the fog? How stimulus contrast affects visual perception and visual memory

Processing visually degraded stimuli is a common experience. We struggle to find house keys on dim front porches, to decipher slides projected in overly bright seminar rooms, and to read 10th-generation photocopies. In this research, we focus specifically on stimuli that are degraded via reduction of stimuluscontrast and address two questions. First, why is it difficult to process low-contrast, as compared with high-contrast, stimuli? Second, is the effect of contrastfundamental in that its effect is independent of the stimulus being processed and the reason for processing the stimulus? We formally address and answer these questions within the context of a series of nested theories, each providing a successively stronger definition of what it means for contrast to affect perception and memory. To evaluate the theories, we carried out six experiments. Experiments 1 and 2 involved simple stimuli (randomly generated forms and digit strings), whereas Experiments 3–6 involved naturalistic pictures (faces, houses, and cityscapes). The stimuli were presented at two contrast levels and at varying exposure durations. The data from all the experiments allow the conclusion that some function of stimulus contrast combines multiplicatively with stimulus duration at a stage prior to that at which the nature of the stimulus and the reason for processing it are determined, and it is the result of this multiplicative combination that determines eventual memory performance. We describe a stronger version of this theory— the sensory response, information acquisition theory—which has at its core, the strong Bloch’s-law-like assumption of a fundamental visual system response that is proportional to the product of stimulus contrast and stimulus duration. This theory was, as it has been in the past, highly successful in accounting for memory for simple stimuli shown at short (i.e., shorter than an eye fixation) durations. However, it was less successful in accounting for data from short-duration naturalistic pictures and was entirely unsuccessful in accounting for data from naturalistic pictures shown at longer durations. We discuss (1) processing differences between short- and long-duration stimuli, (2) processing differences between simple stimuli, such as digits, and complex stimuli, such as pictures, (3) processing differences between biluminant stimuli (such as line drawings with only two luminance levels) and multiluminant stimuli (such as grayscale pictures with multiple luminance levels), and (4) Bloch’s law and a proposed generalization of the concept ofmetamers.     

What happens to an individual visual working memory representation when it is interrupted?

This study tested the hypothesis that even the simplest cognitive tasks require the storage of information in working memory (WM), distorting any information that was previously stored in WM. Experiment 1 tested this hypothesis by requiring observers to perform a simple letter discrimination task while they were holding a single orientation in WM. We predicted that performing the task on the interposed letter stimulus would cause the orientation memory to become less precise and more categorical compared to when the letter was absent or when it was present but could be ignored. This prediction was confirmed. Experiment 2 tested the modality specificity of this effect by replacing the visual letter discrimination task with an auditory pitch discrimination task. Unlike the interposed visual stimulus, the interposed auditory stimulus produced little or no disruption of WM, consistent with the use of modality‐specific representations. Thus, performing a simple visual discrimination task, but not a simple auditory discrimination task, distorts information about a single feature being maintained in visual WM. We suggest that the interposed task eliminates information stored within the focus of attention, leaving behind a WM representation outside the focus of attention that is relatively imprecise and categorical.     

What you say matters: Exploring visual–verbal interactions in visual working memory

The aim of this study was to explore whether the content of a simple concurrent verbal load task determines the extent of its interference on memory for coloured shapes. The task consisted of remembering four visual items while repeating aloud a pair of words that varied in terms of imageability and relatedness to the task set. At test, a cue appeared that was either the colour or the shape of one of the previously seen objects, with participants required to select the object's other feature from a visual array. During encoding and retention, there were four verbal load conditions: (a) a related, shape–colour pair (from outside the experimental set, i.e., “pink square”); (b) a pair of unrelated but visually imageable, concrete, words (i.e., “big elephant”); (c) a pair of unrelated and abstract words (i.e., “critical event”); and (d) no verbal load. Results showed differential effects of these verbal load conditions. In particular, imageable words (concrete and related conditions) interfered to a greater degree than abstract words. Possible implications for how visual working memory interacts with verbal memory and long-term memory are discussed.     

What kind of memory supports visual marking?

In visual search tasks, if a set of items is presented for 1 s before another set of new items (containing the target) is added, search can be restricted to the new set. The process that eliminates old items from search is visual marking. This study investigates the kind of memory that distinguishes the old items from the new items during search. Using an accuracy paradigm in which perfect marking results in 100% accuracy and lack of marking results in near chance performance, the authors show that search can be restricted to new items not by visual short-term memory (VSTM) of old locations but by a limited capacity and slow-decaying VSTM of new locations and a high capacity and fast-decaying memory for asynchrony.     

Switching between memory and perception: Moving attention or memory retrieval?

Weber, Burt, and Noll (1986) estimated that the time needed to switch attention between memory and perception was around 300 msec. The first two experiments in the present paper estimated switching time using a variation of their task. Subjects reported aloud lists of six items. The items were read off a computer screen (perception), recited from memory, or reported alternately from the two sources. The data show that the switching-time estimate is influenced by input/output compatibility, response-initiation times, and memory load. When these factors were controlled, estimated switching time dropped to around 100-150 msec. The data suggest, however, that the switch from perception to memory might be slower than the switch from memory to perception, which would invalidate the formula used to compute switching time. Experiment 3 tested the time for a single switch from perception to memory and a single switch from memory to perception by restricting report to one pair of items in the list. When the to-be-reported pair was precued, estimated switching time dropped to zero. When the pair was not precued, the memory-to-perception switching time remained at zero, but the perception-to-memory time was more than 400 msec. The pattern of results forced a reconceptualization of the task in terms of memory retrieval rather than attention switching. The attention-switching times appear to reflect processes required to select items from memory.     

‘What’ and ‘where’ in the human visual system: Two hierarchies of visual modules

In this paper we focus on the modularity of visual functions in the human visual cortex, that is, the specific problems that the visual system must solve in order to achieve recognition of objects and visual space. The computational theory of early visual functions is briefly reviewed and is then used as a basis for suggesting computational constraints on the higher-level visual computations. The remainder of the paper presents neurological evidence for the existence of two visual systems in man, one specialized for spatial vision and the other for object vision. We show further clinical evidence for the computational hypothesis that these two systems consist of several visual modules, some of which can be isolated on the basis of specific visual deficits which occur after lesions to selected areas in the visually responsive brain. We will provide examples of visual modules which solve information processing tasks that are mediated by specific anatomic areas. We will show that the clinical data from behavioral studies of monkeys (Ungerleider and Mishkin 1984) supports the distinction between two visual systems in monkeys, the what system, involved in object vision, and the where system, involved in spatial vision.I thank Carole Graybill for editorial help.     

What is the relationship between phonological short-term memory and speech processing?

Traditionally, models of speech comprehension and production do not depend on concepts and processes from the phonological short-term memory (pSTM) literature. Likewise, in working memory research, pSTM is considered to be a language-independent system that facilitates language acquisition rather than speech processing per se. We discuss couplings between pSTM, speech perception and speech production, and we propose that pSTM arises from the cycling of information between two phonological buffers, one involved in speech perception and one in speech production. We discuss the specific role of these processes in speech processing, and argue that models of speech perception and production, and our understanding of their neural bases, will benefit from incorporating them.     

Mental imagery and dyslexia: a deficit in processing multipart visual objects?

Dyslexic and normal control subjects memorized simple line patterns inside a grid and subsequently judged whether an "X" would have fallen on the pattern had it been present in an empty grid. The patterns were letters and novel shapes. The grids were presented to the left visual field, to the right visual field, or in central vision. Dyslexic subjects had difficulty generating images of multipart patterns, but this deficit was limited to letters. The findings suggest that dyslexics may have selective difficulty integrating visual information stored in long-term memory.     

Life-span development of visual working memory: when is feature binding difficult?

We asked whether the ability to keep in working memory the binding between a visual object and its spatial location changes with development across the life span more than memory for item information. Paired arrays of colored squares were identical or differed in the color of one square, and in the latter case, the changed color was unique on that trial (item change) or was duplicated elsewhere in the array (color-location binding change). Children (8-10 and 11-12 years old) and older adults (65-85 years old) showed deficits relative to young adults. These were only partly simulated by dividing attention in young adults. The older adults had an additional deficiency, specifically in binding information, which was evident only when item- and binding-change trials were mixed together. In that situation, the older adults often overlooked the more subtle, binding-type changes. Some working memory processes related to binding undergo life-span development in an inverted-U shape, whereas other, bias- and salience-related processes that influence the use of binding information seem to develop monotonically.     

Attention shifts or volatile representations: What causes binding deficits in visual working memory?

The current study tested two hypotheses of feature binding memory: The attention hypothesis, which suggests that attention is needed to maintain feature bindings in visual working memory (VWM) and the volatile representation hypothesis, which suggests that feature bindings in memory are volatile and easily overwritten, but do not require sustained attention. Experiment 1 tested the attention hypothesis by measuring shifts of overt attention during the study array of a change detection task; serial shifts of attention did not disrupt feature bindings. Experiments 2 and 3 encouraged encoding of more volatile (Experiment 2) or durable (Experiment 3) representations during the study array. Binding change detection performance was impaired in Experiment 2, but not in Experiment 3, suggesting that binding performance is impaired when encoding supports a less durable memory representation. Together, these results suggest that although feature bindings may be volatile and easily overwritten, attention is not required to maintain feature bindings in VWM.     

Incidental and intentional visual memory: What memories are and are not affected by encoding tasks?

Prior research into the impact of encoding tasks on visual memory (Castelhano & Henderson, 2005) indicated that incidental and intentional encoding tasks led to similar memory performance. The current study investigated whether different encoding tasks impacted visual memories equally for all types of objects in a conjunction search (e.g., targets, colour distractors, object category distractors, or distractors unrelated to the target). In sequences of pictures, participants searched for prespecified targets (e.g., green apple; Experiment 1), memorized all objects (Experiment 2), searched for specified targets while memorizing all objects (Experiment 3), searched for postidentified targets (Experiment 4), or memorized all objects with one object prespecified (Experiment 5). Encoding task significantly improved visual memory for targets and led to worse memory for unrelated distractors, but did not influence visual memory of distractors that were related to the target's colour or object category. The differential influence of encoding task indicates that the relative importance of the object both positively and negatively influences the memory retained.     

Revision: is visual perception a requisite for visual imagery?

Vision is the most highly developed sense in man and represents the doorway through which most of our knowledge of the external world arises. Visual imagery can be defined as the representation of perceptual information in the absence of visual input. Visual imagery has been shown to complement vision in this acquisition of knowledge--it is used in memory retrieval, problem solving, and the recognition of properties of objects. The processes underlying visual imagery have been assimilated to those of the visual system and are believed to share a neural substrate. However, results from studies in congenitally and cortically blind subjects have opposed this hypothesis. Here I review the currently available evidence.     

Short-term memory limitations in children: Capacity or processing deficits?

This paper evaluates the assertion that short-term memory (STM) capacity increases with age. Initially an analysis is made of the STM system in terms of its parameters and control processes. No evidence was found that can suggest conclusively that either the capacity or the rate of information loss from STM varies with age. On the other hand, substantial evidence exists to show that the processing strategies used by adults are unavailable or deficient in children. Furthermore, considerable differences in the contents and complexity of the long-term memory (LTM) knowledge base (semantic and recognition networks can produce grossly different STM performance between age groups. The second half of this paper reviews three STM-related paradigms-memory span, serial probed recall, and recognition under limited exposure-that have consistently shown performance deficits in children. These deficits are explained in terms of the lack of proper control processes (or processing strategies), as well as an impoverished LTM knowledge base rather than a limitation in STM capacity.     

What do eye movements reveal about the role of memory in visual search?

Horowitz and Wolfe (1998, 2003) have challenged the view that serial visual search involves memory processes that keep track of already inspected locations. The present study used a search paradigm similar to Horowitz and Wolfe's (1998), comparing a standard static search condition with a dynamic condition in which display elements changed locations randomly every 111 ms. In addition to measuring search reaction times, observers' eye movements were recorded. For target-present trials, the search rates were near-identical in the two search conditions, replicating Horowitz and Wolfe's findings. However, the number of fixations and saccade amplitude were larger in the static than in the dynamic condition, whereas fixation duration and the latency of the first saccade were longer in the dynamic condition. These results indicate that an active, memory-guided search strategy was adopted in the static condition, and a passive “sit-and-wait” strategy in the dynamic condition.     

What do eye movements reveal about the role of memory in visual search?

Horowitz and Wolfe (1998, 2003) have challenged the view that serial visual search involves memory processes that keep track of already inspected locations. The present study used a search paradigm similar to Horowitz and Wolfe's (1998), comparing a standard static search condition with a dynamic condition in which display elements changed locations randomly every 111 ms. In addition to measuring search reaction times, observers' eye movements were recorded. For target-present trials, the search rates were near-identical in the two search conditions, replicating Horowitz and Wolfe's findings. However, the number of fixations and saccade amplitude were larger in the static than in the dynamic condition, whereas fixation duration and the latency of the first saccade were longer in the dynamic condition. These results indicate that an active, memory-guided search strategy was adopted in the static condition, and a passive “sit-and-wait” strategy in the dynamic condition.     

What do infants remember when they forget? Location and identity in 6-month-olds' memory for objects

What does an infant remember about a forgotten object? Although at age 6 months, infants can keep track of up to three hidden objects, they can remember the featural identity of only one. When infants forget the identity of an object, do they forget the object entirely, or do they retain an inkling of it? In a looking-time study, we familiarized 6-month-olds with a disk and a triangle placed on opposite sides of a stage. During test trials, we hid the objects one at a time behind different screens, and after hiding the second object, we removed the screen where the first object had been hidden. Infants then saw the expected object, the unexpected other object, or the empty stage. Bayes factor analysis showed that although the infants did not notice when the object changed shape, they were surprised when it vanished. This finding indicates that infants can represent an object without its features.