道德焦虑:一种不可或缺的道德情感

道德焦虑在本质上是一种道德情感.道德焦虑与羞耻感以及内疚感相比是更为基本的道德情感,它所需的条件更少.根据人类在远古时期以及幼年时期的情形,我们发现道德焦虑在产生与维持伦理秩序的过程中有重要作用.当进入伦理世界之后,道德焦虑则在主体行为净化和人格升华等方面具有重要的价值.     

The Dual Moral Self: Moral Centrality and Internal Moral Motivation

In this study, the relationship between two aspects of the moral self, moral centrality and internal moral motivation, was analyzed. It is argued that these 2 aspects are conceptually distinct but nonetheless empirically related. Based on a cross-sectional study of 205 adolescents (M age = 14.83 years, SD = 2.21 years) it was found that moral centrality and internal moral motivation, even though substantially correlated, interacted in predicting moral emotion expectancies. Even though moral centrality was unrelated to adolescents’ age it predicted a longitudinal increase in internal moral motivation over a 1-year interval. Overall, the findings call for a differentiation of moral centrality and internal moral motivation as 2 distinct but interrelated aspects of moral self-development that follow different developmental trajectories and are differentially related to age. At the same time, the study points out that adolescence may be less important for the development of the moral self than commonly assumed.     

Complex Moral Injury: Shattered Moral Assumptions

Journal of Religion and Health - An infographic model of moral injury (MI) is introduced in this conceptual paper that distinguishes the development of a worldview discrepancy-induced genus of MI,...     

道德情绪：道德行为的中介调节

道德情绪是心理学的一个重要研究主题。道德情绪是个体根据一定的道德标准评价自己或他人的行为和思想时所产生的一种情绪体验。它是一种复合情绪, 主要包括厌恶、移情、内疚, 羞耻等。道德情绪影响下人类会产生某些典型行为, 这主要包括道德洁净行为和道德补偿行为。心理学研究道德情绪的实验范式很多, 主要有行为回忆范式、实物或图片刺激范式、情境设置范式等。有关道德情绪的未来研究主要应注重于探讨正性道德情绪在道德发展中的作用, 探讨道德情绪对群体行为的影响, 以及探讨道德情绪在不同文化背景下的价值意义。     

当代道德教育指向:从道德顺从到道德选择的理路

我国的道德教育有着悠久的历史,其主体流质是道德顺从教育,原因有:伦理本位的思想传统;群体本位的教育倾向和道德教育的政治统治功能强化。当代道德教育的时代背景的变迁即社会结构的转型和多元化社会的形成以及当代道德教育人本倾向和生活世界的实践回归,标示着道德选择教育成为了道德教育的内在要求和指向。     

Moral Responses and Moral Theory: Socially-based Externalist Ethics

The paper outlines a view called social (or two-level) response-dependency as an addition to standard alternatives in metaethics that allows for a position intermediate between standard versions of internalism and externalism on the question of motivational force. Instead of taking psychological responses as either directly supplying the content of ethics (as on emotivist or sentimentalist accounts) or as irrelevant to its content (as in classical versions of Kantian or utilitarian ethics), the view allows them an indirect role, as motivational props to moral teaching and thus to the general institution of moral discourse. However, they are not implied by any particular moral judgment (or speaker), so that amoralism comes out as possible. The response that defines the distinctively moral notion of wrong on this account is the second-level (social) response of forbidding some behavior; but this is ultimately to be understood in terms of (variable) individual reactions. Natural human emotion tendencies thereby constrain the content of ethics, while allowing for some degree of social variation in moral codes.     

Moral Sentimentalism in Counterfactual Contexts: Moral Properties Are Response-Enabled

According to moral sentimentalism, there are close connections between moral truths and moral emotions. Emotions largely form our moral attitudes. They contribute to our answerability to moral obligations. We take them as authoritative in guiding moral judgement. This role is difficult to understand if one accepts a full-blown moral realism, according to which moral truths are completely independent of our emotional response to them. Hence it is tempting to claim that moral truths depend on our emotional responses. I outline a problem for this view: we are adamant that, if our moral sentiments were different, things would be the same, morally speaking. Moral truth does not seem to counterfactually depend on moral sentiments. I show how this independence can be reconciled with the role of moral sentiments in guiding our moral outlook. I draw on Yablo’s distinction between response-dependent and response-enabled properties. I propose that moral truths are response-enabled: their supervenience base does not include anything about our emotions. Hence they do not counterfactually depend on changes in our emotional response. However, their factual supervenience base being naturally ineligible, it is ultimately our response that enables them to play their role as an independent moral compass.     

Naturalizing Moral Justification: Rethinking the Method of Moral Epistemology

The companion piece to this article, “Situating Moral Justification,” challenges the idea that moral epistemology's mission is to establish a single, all‐purpose reasoning strategy for moral justification because no reasoning practice can be expected to deliver authoritative moral conclusions in all social contexts. The present article argues that rethinking the mission of moral epistemology requires rethinking its method as well. Philosophers cannot learn which reasoning practices are suitable to use in particular contexts exclusively by exploring logical relations among concepts. Instead, in order to understand which reasoning practices are capable of justifying moral claims in different types of contexts, we need to study empirically the relationships between reasoning practices and the contexts in which they are used. The article proposes that philosophers investigate case studies of real‐world moral disputes in which people lack shared cultural assumptions and/or are unequal in social power. It motivates and explains the proposed case study method and illustrates the philosophical value of this method through a case study.     

培育道德精神:道德教育之本

道德精神,就是人们敬畏道德、向往道德、享受道德、坚守道德的心理意识,也就是儒家所说的"诚"的精神.培育人们的道德精神是道德教育的内在要求和根本旨归.当今社会,培育人们的道德精神是十分重要的.     

文艺的信念:反抗道德虚假与道德虚无

在人类生活中,审美艺术创造发挥着重要的作用,它激发着人们的想象,显现着生命的形象力量。从价值论意义上说,人类生命活动的审美反恩,就是要探索生命的自由伦理,反抗道德虚假与道德虚无。道德虚假的盛行,是公正价值不畅的必然结果;道德虚无的兴起,是怀疑主义思潮作用的后果。现代文艺伦理学必须重建新型价值伦理,通过生命自由形象的创造,表达我们时代的内在呼声。     

Situating Moral Justification: Rethinking the Mission of Moral Epistemology

This is the first of two companion articles drawn from a larger project, provisionally entitled Undisciplining Moral Epistemology. The overall goal is to understand how moral claims may be rationally justified in a world characterized by cultural diversity and social inequality. To show why a new approach to moral justification is needed, it is argued that several currently influential philosophical accounts of moral justification lend themselves to rationalizing the moral claims of those with more social power. The present article explains how discourse ethics is flawed just in this way. The article begins by identifying several conditions of adequacy for assessing reasoning practices designed to achieve moral justification and shows that, when used in contexts of cultural diversity and social inequality, discourse ethics fails these conditions. It goes on to argue that the failure of discourse ethics is rooted in its reliance on a broader conception of moral epistemology that is invidiously idealized. It concludes by pointing to the need to rethink both the mission and the method of moral epistemology.     

Perceptions of Religious Hypocrisy: When Moral Claims Exceed Moral Action

In this study, we investigated perceptions of hypocrisy among Christian and non-Christian individuals. Specifically, participants (N = 121) were asked to evaluate people of different religious orientations in terms of perceptions of both claimed morality, actual behavior, and general hypocrisy. Across all designations, perceptions of moral hypocrisy were determined to be greater to the extent that moral claims exceeded actual behavior. Among non-Christian participants, perceptions of hypocrisy were highest with respect to “devout” and “evangelical” Christian targets. In contrast, among Christian participants, the highest ratings of hypocrisy were reserved for “casual” Christians (i.e., Christians who do not incorporate their faith into their daily life). Our findings have both theoretical implications regarding the nature of religious hypocrisy perceptions, as well as real-world implications for understanding inter-faith perceptions and interactions.     

Moral Responsibility and the Moral Community: Another Reply to Zimmerman

Michael Zimmerman has recently argued against the twofold Strawsonian claim that there can be no moral responsibility without a moral community and that, as a result, moral responsibility is essentially interpersonal. I offered a number of objections to Zimmerman’s view, to which Zimmerman responded. In this article, I respond to Zimmerman’s responses to my criticisms.