History and Persons

The non‐identity problem is usually considered in the forward‐looking direction but a version of it also applies to the past, due to the fact that even minor historical changes would have affected the whole subsequent sequence of births, dramatically changing who comes to exist next. This simple point is routinely overlooked by familiar attitudes and evaluative judgments about the past, even those of sophisticated historians. I shall argue, however, that it means that when we feel sadness about some historical tragedy, or think of one possible course of history as better than another, these judgments and attitudes can be understood in terms of two opposing perspectives on the past: an impersonal standpoint concerned only with how much value each course of history contains, and a person‐centred standpoint concerned with harms and benefits to the people who had actually existed. In this paper, I will set out these radically different visions of what matters in history and point out some of their surprising implications.     

Persons and Substances

I have argued elsewhere that the psychological criterion of personalidentity entails that a person is not an object, but a series ofpsychological events. As this is somewhat counter-intuitive,I consider whether the psychological theorist can argue that a person, while not a substance, exists in a way that is akin to theway that substances exist. I develop ten criteria that such a`quasi-substance' should meet, and I argue that a reasonablecase can be made to show that the psychological theorist's conception of a person meets these criteria.     

Persons and their Properties

According to what I call 'the asymmetry thesis', persons, though they are the direct bearers of the properties expressed by mental predicates, are not the direct bearers of properties such as those expressed by 'weighs 135 pounds' or 'has crossed legs'. A number of different views about persons entail the asymmetry thesis. I first argue that the asymmetry thesis entails an error theory about our discourse involving person-referring terms. I then argue that it is further threatened by consideration of the grounds we have for self-ascribing mental and physical predicates.     

Day Persons,Night Persons,and Time of Birth: Preliminary Findings

Abstract

The authors conducted 2 surveys to determine the relationship between time of birth and being a day person or a night person. Day persons are most alert during daylight hours; night persons are most alert during hours of darkness. In Survey 1, the authors asked U.S. high school students to complete the Alertness Questionnaire (B. Wallace, 1993) and to respond to other items related to daytime or nighttime activity. In Survey 2, the authors administered the same items to a U.S. college population. In both surveys, time of birth was significantly related to being a day person or a night person. The results suggest that a critical period for setting the biological clock for alertness may be the moment of birth.