Peirce's evolutionary pragmatic idealism

In this paper I synthesize a unified system out of Peirce's life work, and name it “Peirce's Evolutionary Pragmatic Idealism”. Peirce developed this philosophy in four stages:

1. His 1868–69 theory that cognition is a continuous and infinite social semiotic process, in which Man is a sign.
2. His Popular Science Monthly pragmatism and frequency theory of probabilistic induction.
3. His 1891–93 cosmic evolutionism of Tychism, Synechism, and Agapism.
4. Pragmaticism: The doctrine of real potentialities (“would-be's”), and Peirce's pragmatic program for developing concrete reasonableness.

Peirce's evolutionary conception of the cosmos is pantheistic, and he constructed it to reconcile religion with Darwinian evolution.     

Three stages of medical dialogue

The negative consequences of physicians' failure to establish and maintain personal relationships with patients are at the heart of the “humanistic crisis” in medicine. To resolve this crisis, a new model of doctor-patient interaction is proposed, based on the ideas of Martin Buber's philosophy of dialogue. This model shows how the physican may successfully combine the personal (I-Thou) and impersonal (I-It) aspects of medicine in three stages. These “Three Stages of Medical Dialogue” include:

1. An Initial Personal Meeting stage, which initiates the doctor-patient relationship and involves mutual confirmation;
2. An Examination stage, which requires a shift from a personal to an impersonal style of interaction;
3. An Integration Through Dialogue or “Healing Through Meeting’ Stage, which involves the integration of the impersonal medical data into the ongoing dialogue between doctor and patient, as a basis for shared decision-making.

The use of the model, as well as common failures of doctor-patient dialogue are discussed.     

Logical consequence: A defense of Tarski

In his classic 1936 essay “On the Concept of Logical Consequence”, Alfred Tarski used the notion of satisfaction to give a semantic characterization of the logical properties. Tarski is generally credited with introducing the model-theoretic characterization of the logical properties familiar to us today. However, in his book, The Concept of Logical Consequence, Etchemendy argues that Tarski's account is inadequate for quite a number of reasons, and is actually incompatible with the standard model-theoretic account. Many of his criticisms are meant to apply to the model-theoretic account as well. In this paper, I discuss the following four critical charges that Etchemendy makes against Tarski and his account of the logical properties:

1. Tarski's account of logical consequence diverges from the standard model-theoretic account at points where the latter account gets it right.
2. Tarski's account cannot be brought into line with the model-theoretic account, because the two are fundamentally incompatible.
3. There are simple counterexamples (enumerated by Etchemendy) which show that Tarski's account is wrong.
4. Tarski committed a modal fallacy when arguing that his account captures our pre-theoretical concept of logical consequence, and so obscured an essential weakness of the account.
5. Tarski's account depends on there being a distinction between the “logical terms” and the “non-logical terms” of a language, but (according to Etchemendy) there are very simple (even first-order) languages for which no such distinction can be made. Etchemendy's critique raises historical and philosophical questions about important foundational work. However, Etchemendy is mistaken about each of these central criticisms. In the course of justifying that claim, I give a sustained explication and defense of Tarski's account. Moreover, since I will argue that Tarski's account and the model-theoretic account really do come to the same thing, my subsequent defense of Tarski's account against Etchemendy's other attacks doubles as a defense against criticisms that would apply equally to the familiar model-theoretic account of the logical properties.

     

The world,the flesh and the argument from design

In the the passage just quoted from theDialogues concerning Natural Religion, David Hume developed a thought-experiment that contravened his better-known views about “chance” expressed in hisTreatise and firstEnquiry. For among other consequences of the ‘eternal-recurrence’ hypothesis Philo proposes in this passage, it may turn out that what the vulgar call cause is nothing but a secret and concealed chance. (In this sentence, I have simply reversed “cause” and “chance” in a well-known passage fromHume's Treatise, p. 130). In the first eight sections of this essay, I develop one topological and model-theoretic analogue of Hume's thought-experiment, in which ‘most’ (‘A-generic’) modelsM of a ‘scientific’ theoryU are both ‘eternally recurrent’ and topologically random (in a sense which will be made precise), even though they are ‘inductively’ defined, via a step-by-step (‘empirical’?) procedure that Hume might have been inclined to endorse. The last aspect of this model-theoretic thought-experiment also serves to distinguish it from simpler measure-theoretic prototypes that are known to follow from Kolmogorov's Zero-One Law (cf. the Introduction, 5.2, 6.1 and 6.7 below). In the last three sections, I will argue more informally

1. that the metamathematical thought-experiments just mentioned do have a genuine metaphysical relevance, and that this relevance is predominantly skeptical in its implications;
2. that such ‘nonstandard’ instances of semantic underdetermination and ‘pathology’ seem to be the metatheoretic rule rather than the exception; and therefore,
3. that metamathematical and metatheoretic ‘malign-genius’ arguments are quite coherent, contrary (e.g.) to assertions such as that of Putnam (1980), pp. 7–8.

In the essay's conclusion, finally, I assimilate (2) and (3) to the familiar datum that ‘simplicity’, rather than ‘pathology’, has more often than not turned out to be an anomalous ‘special case’ in the historical development of scientific and mathematical ontology.     

Framework for a new dialogue between psychoanalysis and neurosciences: is the combined neuro-psychoanalytic approach the missing link?

Freud's legacy deriving from his work The project for a scientific psychology (1895) could give a new impetus to the dialogue between psychoanalysis and neurosciences. A rapproachment phase is warrented. Based on the work of psychoanalysts who are themselves neuroscientists (such as Mauro Mancia, Martha Koukkou and Harold Shevrin) or have a long term dialogue with neuroscientists (Arnold Modell), three points of epistemological congruence are described:

1. dualism is no longer a satisfactory solution
2. cautions for the centrality of interpretation (hermeneutics)
3. the self-criticism of neuroscientists

     

Quasivarieties of Modules Over Path Algebras of Quivers

Let FΛ be a finite dimensional path algebra of a quiver Λ over a field F. Let L and R denote the varieties of all left and right FΛ-modules respectively. We prove the equivalence of the following statements.

• The subvariety lattice of L is a sublattice of the subquasivariety lattice of L.
• The subquasivariety lattice of R is distributive.
• Λ is an ordered forest.

     

Evidenzbasierte Psychotherapie der Panikst?rung mit und ohne Agoraphobie

From the evidence reported in the recent guidelines [Heinrichs et al. (2009) Evidenzbasierte Leitlinie zur Psychotherapie der Panikst?rung mit und ohne Agoraphobie. Hogrefe, G?ttingen] the following conclusions can be drawn with respect to the treatment of panic disorder with or without agoraphobia, as well as for agoraphobia without panic disorder:

1. Every psychotherapy should be preceded by suitable diagnostics and a case formulation.
2. The effectiveness of every psychotherapy should be evaluated with well established measures.
3. For the treatment of panic disorder without agoraphobia, cognitive behavioral treatment (CBT) and applied relaxation have been shown to be effective (evidence grade 1).
4. For panic disorder with agoraphobia, CBT, combination treatment (CBT plus medication), as well as panic-focused psychodynamic psychotherapy in the outpatient setting have shown short-term effectiveness (evidence grade 1). Longer lasting effects have been documented for CBT (evidence grade 1).
5. For agoraphobia without panic disorder, CBT with a focus on situational exposure can be recommended (evidence grade 1).

     

II. Symposium für Empirische Forschung in der Forensischen Psychiatrie, Psychologie und Psychotherapie am 25. und 26. Oktober 2012 in Hamburg

The Second Symposium for Empirical Research in Forensic Psychiatry, Psychology and Psychotherapy was held on 25th–26th of October 2012 in Hamburg. The symposium offers young scientists in the field the opportunity to present their research studies. In total 15 papers were presented at the symposium which will be briefly described in this article. The following four topics were discussed:

1. Innovative measurement tools for violent and sexual offenders,
2. Risk assessment tools for violent and sexual offenders,
3. Physiological and neuropsychological assessment of violent and sexual offenders,
4. Treatment approaches for violent and sexual offenders.

The conference is organized annually either by the University Medical Center Hamburg-Eppendorf (Institute for Sex Research and Forensic Psychiatry), the Saarland University Medical Center (Institute for Forensic Psychology and Psychiatry) or the Asklepios Medical Center Göttingen (Ludwig-Meyer-Institute for Forensic Psychiatry and Psychotherapy). The best three research presentations are honoured with the Ludwig Meyer Award of the Asklepios Psychiatry Niedersachsen GmbH, the Eberhard Schorsch Award of the German Society for Sex Research and the Hermann Witter Award of the Southwest German Academy of Forensic Psychiatry. The proceedings of the conference are expected to be published in autumn 2013 by the Wissenschaftliche Verlagsgesellschaft Berlin.     

Interpolation properties of superintuitionistic logics

A family of prepositional logics is considered to be intermediate between the intuitionistic and classical ones. The generalized interpolation property is defined and proved is the following. Theorem on interpolation. For every intermediate logic L the following statements are equivalent:

1. Craig's interpolation theorem holds in L,
2. L possesses the generalized interpolation property,
3. Robinson's consistency statement is true in L.

There are just 7 intermediate logics in which Craig's theorem holds. Besides, Craig's interpolation theorem holds in L iff all the modal companions of L possess Craig's interpolation property restricted to those formulas in which every variable is proceeded by necessity symbol.     

A conjunction in closure spaces

This paper is closely related to investigations of abstract properties of basic logical notions expressible in terms of closure spaces as they were begun by A. Tarski (see [6]). We shall prove many properties of ω-conjunctive closure spaces (X is ω-conjunctive provided that for every two elements of X their conjunction in X exists). For example we prove the following theorems:

1. For every closed and proper subset of an ω-conjunctive closure space its interior is empty (i.e. it is a boundary set).
2. If X is an ω-conjunctive closure space which satisfies the ω-compactness theorem and \(\hat P\) [X] is a meet-distributive semilattice (see [3]), then the lattice of all closed subsets in X is a Heyting lattice.
3. A closure space is linear iff it is an ω-conjunctive and topological space.
4. Every continuous function preserves all conjunctions.

     

Has the sanctity of life law ‘gone too far’?: analysis of the sanctity of life doctrine and English case law shows that the sanctity of life law has not ‘gone too far’

The medical profession consistently strives to uphold patient empowerment, equality and safety. It is ironic that now, at a time where advances in technology and knowledge have given us an increased capacity to preserve and prolong life, we find ourselves increasingly asking questions about the value of the lives we are saving. A recent editorial by Professor Raanan Gillon questions the emphasis that English law places on the sanctity of life doctrine. In what was described by Reverend Nick Donnelly as a “manifesto for killing patients”, Professor Gillon argues that the sanctity of life law has gone too far because of its disregard for distributive justice and an incompetent person’s previously declared autonomy. This review begins by outlining the stance of the sanctity of life doctrine on decisions about administering, withholding and withdrawing life-prolonging treatment. Using this as a foundation for a rebuttal, a proposal is made that Professor Gillon’s assertions do not take the following into account:

1. 1)
   A sanctity of life law does not exist since English Common Law infringes the sanctity doctrine by tolerating quality of life judgements and a doctor’s intention to hasten death when withdrawing life-prolonging treatment.
    
2. 2)
   Even if a true sanctity of life law did exist:

   1. a)
      The sanctity of life doctrine allows for resource considerations in the wider analysis of benefits and burdens.
       
   2. b)
      The sanctity of life doctrine yields to a competent person’s autonomous decision.
       
    

This review attempts to demonstrate that at present, and with the legal precedent that restricts it, a sanctity of life law cannot go too far.     

Axiomatic extensions of the constructive logic with strong negation and the disjunction property

We study axiomatic extensions of the propositional constructive logic with strong negation having the disjunction property in terms of corresponding to them varieties of Nelson algebras. Any such varietyV is characterized by the property: (PQWC) ifA,B εV, thenA×B is a homomorphic image of some well-connected algebra ofV. We prove:

• each varietyV of Nelson algebras with PQWC lies in the fibre σ^?1(W) for some varietyW of Heyting algebras having PQWC,
• for any varietyW of Heyting algebras with PQWC the least and the greatest varieties in σ^?1(W) have PQWC,
• there exist varietiesW of Heyting algebras having PQWC such that σ^?1(W) contains infinitely many varieties (of Nelson algebras) with PQWC.

     

Can Teleosemantics Deflect the EAAN?

Alvin Plantinga’s Evolutionary Argument Against Naturalism aims to show that the conjunction of contemporary evolutionary theory (E) with the claim that there is no God (N) cannot be rationally accepted. Where R is the claim that our cognitive faculties are reliable, the argument is:

1. The probability of R given N and E is low or inscrutable.
2. Anyone who sees (1) and accepts (N&E) has a defeater for R, and this defeater cannot be defeated or deflected.
3. Anyone who has an undefeated, undeflected defeater for R has an undefeated, undeflected defeater for everything she believes.
4. Therefore she has an undefeated, undeflected defeater for (N&E).

Plantinga (2011) defends the second premise. It examines and rejects several candidate defeater defeaters and defeater deflectors. One candidate is Millikan’s teleosemantics. I show that Plantinga’s motives for rejecting teleosemantics as a defeater deflector are inadequate. I then show that teleosemantics is not on its own an adequate defeater deflector. Then I offer an additional premise that constitutes a defeater deflector in conjunction with teleosemantics.     

Sentimentalism: Its Scope and Limits

The subject of this paper is sentimentalism. In broad terms this is the view that value concepts, moral concepts, practical reasons—some or all of these—can be analysed in terms of feeling, sentiment or emotion. More specifically, the paper discusses the following theses:

1. there are reasons to feel (‘evaluative’ reasons) that are not reducible to practical or epistemic reasons
2. value is analysable in terms of these reasons to feel.
3. all practical reasons are in one way or another grounded in evaluative reasons.

(i) and (ii) are accepted while (iii) is rejected.     

A free IPC is a natural logic: Strong completeness for some intuitionistic free logics

IPC, the intuitionistic predicate calculus, has the property

1. Vc(Γ?A ^c /x) ? Γ??xA.Furthermore, for certain important Γ, IPC has the converse property
2. Γ??xA ? Vc(Γ?A ^c /x).
3. may be given up in various ways, corresponding to different philosophic intuitions and yielding different systems of intuitionistic free logic. The present paper proves the strong completeness of several of these with respect to Kripke style semantics. It also shows that giving up (i) need not force us to abandon the analogue of (ii).

     

Why objects exist but events occur

I distinguish between sentences like

1. Last Thursday we drove from Wellington to Waikanae and
2. Last Thursday my copy of Aspects of the Theory of Syntax remained on my bookshelf.

Sentence (2) has the subinterval property. If it is true at an interval t it is true at every subinterval of t. (1) lacks this property. (1) reports an event. (2) reports a state. Events do not have the subinterval property but states do have it, and so do objects. If something is a linguist at an interval t then that person is a linguist at all subintervals of t. I argue that ‘exists’ applies to things which have the subdinterval property, and ‘occurs’ applies to things which lack it.     

Semantics for Higher Level Attacks in Extended Argumentation Frames Part 1: Overview

In 2005 the author introduced networks which allow attacks on attacks of any level. So if a → b reads a attacks b, then this attack can itself be attacked by another node c. This attack itself can attack another node d. This situation can be iterated to any level with attacks and nodes attacking other attacks and other nodes. In this paper we provide semantics (of extensions) to such networks. We offer three different approaches to obtaining semantics.

1. The translation approach This uses the methodology of ‘Logic by translation’. We translate faithfully the new networks into ordinary Dung networks with more nodes and extract the semantics from the translation.
2. The labelling approach This method regards the arrows as additional entities to be attacked and to mount attacks and applies a variation of the usual machinery of Camindada like labelling to the network. The new concept we need to employ here is that of ‘joint attacks’.
3. The logic programming approach We translate the higher level network into a logic program and obtain semantics for it through known semantics for logic programs.

We then compare our methods with those of S. Modgil and P. M. Dung et al.     

When “All the Five Circles” are Four: New Exercises in Domain Restriction

The domain of a quantifier is determined by a variety of factors, which broadly speaking fall into two types. On the one hand, the context of utterance plays a role: if the focus of attention is on a particular collection of kangaroos, for example, then “Q kangaroos” is likely to range over the individuals in that set. On the other hand, the utterance itself will help to establish the quantificational domain, inter alia through presuppositions triggered within the sentence. In this paper, we concentrate our attention on constructions like the following, in which “the square to which ... ” is the critical presupposition trigger:

1. (i)
   Q circles ...
    
2. (ii)
   Q of these circles ...
    
3. (iii)
   Q of these five circles ... ... have the same colour as the square to which they are connected.
    

Many theories predict that all instances of these schemata will give rise to the presupposition that every circle is connected to a square. We present an analysis which predicts that these sentences should generally be accepted in a context in which not all the circles are connected to a square, with one exception only: if a quantified sentence is of type (iii) and Q is non-intersective, then the sentence should be more likely to be rejected. Furthermore, we predict that manipulating the context so as to make the connected circles more or less salient should have an effect on statements with non-intersective quantifiers only. These predictions were tested in a series of experiments.     

“Beyond Frontiers of Traditional Project Management”: The Concept of “Project Management Second Order (PM-2)” as an Approach of Evolutionary Management

Fundamental changes in sciences offer new perspectives for the management of complexity. Increased complexity in society, economics, and technology requires a new and suitable organization and management. What are the consequences and results for project management? That is the theme of this article. First of all it will given a short introduction to project management, which will be later called “traditional project management” or “project management 1st order (PM-1).” Then, the challenges by the fundamental changes in sciences and the increased complexity in society, economics, and technology will be discussed. It will state that traditional project management cannot solve these challenges. The widespread working-themes and results of the research program “Beyond Frontiers of Traditional Project Management” as an answer to these challenges will be presented at a glance. Subsequently, it will discuss some selected results of the research program:

• The principle-definition and foundation of “Evolution of 1st and 2nd Order.”

• The Evolution of 1st Order and the impact on Project Management methods and processes.

• Evolution of 2nd Order and the Grand Evolutionary Systems Theory (GEST) of E. Laszlo as also the impact on Project Management methods and processes.

• Management of crisis: turn a change to advantage or risk-assurance?

Thereafter, the concept of “Project Management Second Order (PM-2)” is presented as a highlighted result of the research program, as a new paradigm in project management, and as an answer to the challenges, described earlier will be explained in detail. Finally, a real example of transfer evolutionary and self-organizational management principles in a real project life will be demonstrated.     

On the extension of intuitionistic propositional logic with Kreisel-Putnam's and Scott's schemes

LetSKP be the intermediate prepositional logic obtained by adding toI (intuitionistic p.l.) the axiom schemes:S = ((? ?α→α)→α∨ ?α)→ ?α∨ ??α (Scott), andKP = (?α→β∨γ)→(?α→β)∨(?α→γ) (Kreisel-Putnam). Using Kripke's semantics, we prove:

1. SKP has the finite model property;
2. SKP has the disjunction property.

In the last section of the paper we give some results about Scott's logic S = I+S.