Rejoinder to Commentaries on Malevolent Creativity: A Functional Model of Creativity in Terrorism and Crime,Cropley, Kaufman,and Cropley

In this rejoinder Cropley et al. respond to commentaries made regarding the article “Malevolent Creativity: A Functional Model of Creativity in Terrorism and Crime.” Each commentary adds valuable additional insight into the issue of creativity that does harm.     

Rejoinder to Wall

Edmund Wall's criticism of the author's earlier analysis of Hare's consequentialism and Kantian ethics claims that the author overlooked Hare's commitment to preference satisfaction as an “ultimate good.” This rejoinder points out that Hare never uses the phrase in question, nor any equivalent phrase or concept, in presenting his own arguments and refers only to the standard of “universalizability” as ultimate, in contexts that support the author's original argument. Hence Wall has only given us yet another example of how Hare's views can be misunderstood by philosophers who fail to attend to the details of Hare's approach.     

Propositional epistemic luck,epistemic risk,and epistemic justification

If a subject has a true belief, and she has good evidence for it, and there’s no evidence against it, why should it matter if she doesn’t believe on the basis of the good available evidence? After all, properly based beliefs are no likelier to be true than their corresponding improperly based beliefs, as long as the subject possesses the same good evidence in both cases. And yet it clearly does matter. The aim of this paper is to explain why, and in the process delineate a species of epistemic luck that has hitherto gone unnoticed—what we call propositional epistemic luck—but which we claim is crucial to accounting for the importance of proper basing. As we will see, in order to understand why this type of epistemic luck is malignant, we also need to reflect on the relationship between epistemic luck and epistemic risk.     

Realism and Realism: Rejoinder to Gare and Smith

This is a response to comments by Gare and Smith (1984) on my critique of humanistic psychology (McMullen, 1982).     

Inductive systematization: Definition and a critical survey

In 1958, to refute the argument known as the theoretician's dilemma, Hempel suggested that theoretical terms might be logically indispensable for inductive systematization of observational statements. This thesis, in some form or another, has later been supported by Scheffler, Lehrer, and Tuomela, and opposed by Bohnert, Hooker, Stegmüller, and Cornman. In this paper, a critical survey of this discussion is given. Several different putative definitions of the crucial notion inductive systematization achieved by a theory are discussed by reference to the properties of inductive inference. The consequences of the following differences between deductive and inductive inference are emphasized: the lack of simple transitivity properties (even in a modified sense) of inductive inference, and the failure of the inductive analogue of the converse of The Deduction Theorem. The main conclusions are: (i) Hempel's original thesis may very well be right but his argument for it is unsatisfactory, (ii) theoretical terms can be logically indispensable for a non-Hempelian kind of inductive systematization, relative to both Craigian and Ramseyan elimination, (iii) Lehrer's attempt to prove the indispensability of theoretical terms for inductive-probabilistic systematization is, as a modification of Hempelian kind of inductive-deterministic systematization, unsatisfactory, and (iv) there does not seem to be much hope of escaping the conclusion (ii), if it is true, by extending the Craigian replacement programme along the lines suggested by Cornman.The work for this paper was initiated in a research group supported by The Emil Aaltonen Foundation (Emil Aaltosen Säätiö). I am greatly indebted to Professor Raimo Tuomela for many discussions concerning the subject-matter of this paper and earlier drafts of it.     

Correction to: The structure of epistemic probabilities

Philosophical Studies - The original version of this article was published with an error in the final equation in this sentence on page 20 (section 3.6.1).     

Questions of Strategy: Rejoinder to Jacob and Grounds

Perhaps the best way to respond to Jacob and Grounds' critique is to focus on the more important issues they raise and to clarify some of the apparent confusion. It seems there are several general classes of criticism that Jacob and Grounds have offered: arbitrariness in selection of studies, inconsistency in reporting findings, inaccuracies in the data reported, and an overly favorable conclusion with respect to the communication deviance literature. Each of these issues will be dealt with here, using as many specific illustrations and examples as space permits.     

Socialising epistemic risk: On the risks of epistemic injustice

Epistemic risk is of central importance to epistemology nowadays: one common way in which a belief can fail to be knowledge is by being formed in an epistemically risky way, that is, a way that makes it true by luck. Recently, epistemologists have been expanding this rather narrow conception of risk in every direction, except arguably the most obvious one—to enable it to accommodate the increasingly commonplace thought that knowledge has an irreducibly social dimension. This paper fills this lacuna by bringing issues of epistemic injustice to bear on epistemic risk. In particular, it draws on the phenomenon of white ignorance, to sketch a more social notion of epistemic risk, on which the interests of one's epistemic community partly determine whether a belief-forming procedure is epistemically risky.