When the best appears to be saved for last: Serial position effects on choice

Decision‐makers often evaluate options sequentially due to constraints on attention, timing, or physical location of the options. Choosing the best option will therefore often depend on people's memories of the options. Because imperfect recall introduces uncertainty in earlier options, judgments of those options should regress toward the category mean as memory decays over time. Relatively desirable options will therefore tend to seem less desirable with time, and relatively undesirable options will tend to seem less undesirable with time. We therefore predicted that people will tend to select the first option in a set when choosing between generally undesirable options, and will tend to select the last when choosing between generally desirable options. We demonstrate these serial position effects in choices among paintings, American Idol audition clips, jellybeans, and female faces, provide evidence of its underlying mechanism, and explain how these findings build on existing accounts. Copyright © 2009 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Which is the compromise option? Information format and task format as determinants

When consumers must make a decision but are uncertain of their preferences, they often select a compromise choice. Early studies emphasized the relational properties of choice alternatives and indicated that the middle option, whose attribute values fall between the values of other alternatives, is always the compromise option. More recent studies have suggested that when consumers rate two attributes with the same metrics, the attribute–balance choice whose two attributes have equal ratings, might represent the compromise choice. We propose that the different characteristics of the middle and attribute–balance options—which may be compatible with certain determinants such as information and task formats—might be more salient and affect the relative attractiveness of each option. The results of three experiments confirmed this prediction: the middle option was more attractive in list‐by‐attributes and rejecting conditions, whereas the attribute–balance option was more attractive in list‐by‐alternatives and choosing conditions. Copyright © 2007 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Between a rock and a hard place: The failure of the attraction effect among unattractive alternatives

Many important decisions that consumers face involve choosing between options that are unattractive or undesirable—the proverbial “lesser of two evils.” Consumers, who face budget or geographical constraints, for example, end up with mostly undesirable consideration sets; yet a choice is necessary. We examine the role of option set desirability in the context of the well-established attraction effect. In five studies, we show that the attraction effect occurs in desirable domains but is eliminated when all the options are undesirable (Experiments 1–4). We further find that this asymmetric effect is consistent with a shift in decision makers' processing styles. Decision makers show more vigilant processing when making choices among undesirable (vs. desirable) domains (Experiments 3A and 3B), which results in an attenuated attraction effect (Experiment 4). Our results indicate that the attraction effect might not be as robust as generally thought and establishes (un)desirability as an important boundary condition.     

Consumer affects when making undesirable purchases to meet the minimum purchase requirement: Decision‐related variables as moderators

One common type of sales promotion involves a minimum purchase requirement (MinPR), where customers must purchase at least a minimum number of products to enjoy a discount. In the process of making purchases to qualify for the discount, consumers may find their first‐choice product options or have to settle for products that they did not originally prefer. Three between‐subjects experiments examines whether, in various decision situations, counterfactual thinking (CFT) might bias individuals' emotions in response to desirable versus undesirable purchases. Study 1 demonstrates that participants who made undesirable purchases to meet the MinPR felt less satisfied with the purchase outcome precipitated by upward CFT, whereas downward CFT led to feelings of pleasure in participants who could find their first‐choice product options. Studies 2 and 3 find that counterfactual emotions of undesirable purchases were more pronounced when participants experienced a difficult decision process because of a narrow promotion scope or when time pressure, manipulated in terms of explicit deadlines, is heavy rather than light, respectively. On the contrary, participants' responses to desirable purchases did not vary as a function of decision difficulty or time pressure.     

Heuristics and criterion setting during selective encoding in visual decision making: Evidence from eye movements

When making a decision, people spend longer looking at the option they ultimately choose compared to other options—termed the gaze bias effect—even during their first encounter with the options (Glaholt & Reingold, 2009a, 2009b; Schotter, Berry, McKenzie & Rayner, 2010). Schotter et al. (2010) suggested that this is because people selectively encode decision-relevant information about the options, online during the first encounter with them. To extend their findings and test this claim, we recorded subjects' eye movements as they made judgements about pairs of images (i.e., which one was taken more recently or which one was taken longer ago). We manipulated whether both images were presented in the same colour content (e.g., both in colour or both in black-and-white) or whether they differed in colour content and the extent to which colour content was a reliable cue to relative recentness of the images. We found that the magnitude of the gaze bias effect decreased when the colour content cue was not reliable during the first encounter with the images, but no modulation of the gaze bias effect in remaining time on the trial. These data suggest people do selectively encode decision-relevant information online.     

Choice-Process Satisfaction: The Influence of Attribute Alignability and Option Limitation

This research investigates how choice-process satisfaction is influenced by limitation of choice option and by the types of features used to represent the options. Studies of choice satisfaction have focused on how satisfied the decision maker feels about the choice that has been made and have overlooked the importance of the process through which the decision maker makes a choice, i.e., choice-process satisfaction. We show that the comparability of choice options through alignable features increases choice-process satisfaction, whereas option limitation (i.e., making one option unavailable from a set of equally attractive options) decreases choice-process satisfaction. Further, this decrease in satisfaction, relative to all options being available, occurs for people who are given a set of options in which the difference features are alignable (i.e., differences of a corresponding dimension) but not for people who are given a set of options in which the difference features are nonalignable (i.e., differences of unique dimensions). We propose that alignable differences are easier to compare and have more weight in people's attribute processing, and thus give rise to a perception of a greater amount of information about the option set that is relevant for choice. Making an option unavailable in this case would have a bigger impact than in a situation in which all options have nonalignable differences. Nonalignable differences are difficult to process and are less likely to make people aware that there is very much information about the options for decision making. This explanation and the interaction effect between option limitation and feature alignability are tested in four experiments.     

Self‐Control Moderates Decision‐Making Behavior When Minimizing Losses versus Maximizing Gains

We examined (1) whether people would be more responsive to the delayed consequences of their decisions when attempting to minimize losses than when attempting to maximize gains in a history‐dependent decision‐making task and (2) how trait self‐control would moderate such an effect. In two experiments, participants performed a dynamic decision‐making task where they chose one of two options on each trial. The increasing option always gave a smaller immediate reward but caused future rewards for both options to increase. The decreasing option always gave a larger immediate reward but caused future rewards for both options to decrease. In Experiment 1 where the two options had equivalent expected value in the long run, participants were more prone to select the increasing option, which yielded larger benefits on future trials, in the loss‐minimization condition than in the gain‐maximization condition. Trait self‐control moderated the effect of losses by enhancing the effect for low self‐control participants while attenuating it for high self‐control participants. In Experiment 2 where selecting the increasing option was suboptimal, low self‐control participants still attempted to reduce losses on future trials by selecting the increasing option more often than high self‐control participants. These results suggest that decision makers value delayed consequences of their actions more in a losses domain relative to a gains domain and low self‐control individuals are more susceptible to such an effect. Copyright © 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Magnitude: An Important Dimension of Self‐Efficacy1

According to Bandura (1977a. 1977b). self‐efficacy for a particular task varies along 3 dimensions: magnitude, strength, and generality. Although the magnitude of a task influences one's degree of self‐efficacy, researchers have seldom tapped this dimension. We explicitly examined the magnitude dimension, and whether magnitude and confidence represent operationally distinct dimensions. A sample of undergraduates (n= 221) rated how confident they were that they could perform 22 behaviors comprising 3 domains of protective sexual behaviors (refusing sexual intercourse, questioning potential sexual partners, using condoms). Each participant also rank‐ordered the difficulty of performing each item within each domain. Data analyses revealed considerable overlap between the dimensions of confidence and magnitude, but also substantial differences. Thus, researchers may want to include this dimension when including self‐efficacy.     

Interdependence in negotiation: effects of exit options and social motive on distributive and integrative negotiation

This study extends past research on the impact of alternatives in dyadic negotiation by (a) providing negotiators with the mere possibility to negotiate with an outside party and (b) examining the moderating role of the negotiators' social motive. Business students engaged in face‐to‐face negotiations, which were audio‐taped and transcribed. None, one, or both dyad members were provided with an exit option—the possibility to leave the current negotiation and start new negotiations with someone else. Dyads were also given instructions to maximize own outcomes (egoistic motive) or to consider both own and the other's outcomes (prosocial motive). Results showed that, as expected, dyads with a one‐sided exit option engaged in more distributive and less integrative behavior, and obtained lower joint outcomes than dyads having either two‐sided or no exit options. However, this effect occurred only under an egoistic rather than a prosocial motive. No differences were found for negotiations with two‐sided exit options compared to negotiations without exit options, suggesting one's own exit option is counterbalanced by the other's escape possibility. Our results indicate that negotiators who wish to maximize personal as well as joint outcomes should try to combine a power advantage in terms of exit options with a shared prosocial orientation. Copyright © 2000 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Using the regulation of accuracy to study performance when the correct answer is not known

We examined memory performance in multiple‐choice questions when correct answers were not always present. How do participants answer when they are aware that the correct alternative may not be present? To answer this question we allowed participants to decide on the number of alternatives in their final answer (the plurality option), and whether they wanted to report or withhold their answer (report option). We also studied the memory benefits when both the plurality and the report options were available. In two experiments participants watched a crime and then answered questions with five alternatives. Half of the questions were presented with the correct alternative and half were not. Participants selected one alternative and rated confidence, then selected three alternatives and again rated confidence, and finally indicated whether they preferred the answer with one or with three alternatives (plurality option). Lastly, they decided whether to report or withhold the answer (report option). Results showed that participants’ confidence in their selections was higher, that they chose more single answers, and that they preferred to report more often when the correct alternative was presented. We also attempted to classify a posteriori questions as either presented with or without the correct alternative from participants’ selection. Classification was better than chance, and encouraging, but the forensic application of the classification technique is still limited since there was a large percentage of responses that were incorrectly classified. Our results also showed that the memory benefits of both plurality and report options overlap.     

Is Change Bad? Personality Change Is Associated with Poorer Psychological Health and Greater Metabolic Syndrome in Midlife

Personality change is emerging as an important predictor of health and well‐being. Extending previous research, we examined whether two types of personality change, directional and absolute, are associated with both subjective and objective indicators of health. Utilizing the longitudinal Midlife in the United States survey (MIDUS) data, we examined whether both types of change over 10 years were associated with psychological well‐being, self‐reported global health, and the presence of metabolic syndrome (MetS) components and diagnosis. Socially undesirable personality change (e.g., becoming less conscientious and more neurotic) and absolute personality change were independently associated with worse perceived health and well‐being at Time 2. Notably, absolute personality change, regardless of the direction, was also associated with having a greater number of MetS components and a greater probability of diagnosis at Time 2. In sum, too much personality change may be bad for one's health: Socially undesirable and absolute personality change were both associated with worse psychological health and worse metabolic profiles over 10 years. These findings suggest that personality change may contribute to psychological and physical health, and provide initial insight into potential intermediate links between personality change and distal outcomes such as mortality.     

Take-the-best and the influence of decision-inconsistent attributes on decision confidence and choices in memory-based decisions

Take-the-best (TTB) is a decision strategy according to which attributes about choice options are sequentially processed in descending order of validity, and attribute processing is stopped once an attribute discriminates between options. Consequently, TTB-decisions rely on only one, the best discriminating, attribute, and lower-valid attributes need not be processed because they are TTB-irrelevant. Recent research suggests, however, that when attribute information is visually present during decision-making, TTB-irrelevant attributes are processed and integrated into decisions nonetheless. To examine whether TTB-irrelevant attributes are retrieved and integrated when decisions are made memory-based, we tested whether the consistency of a TTB-irrelevant attribute affects TTB-users’ decision behaviour in a memory-based decision task. Participants first learned attribute configurations of several options. Afterwards, they made several decisions between two of the options, and we manipulated conflict between the second-best attribute and the TTB-decision. We assessed participants’ decision confidence and the proportion of TTB-inconsistent choices. According to TTB, TTB-irrelevant attributes should not affect confidence and choices, because these attributes should not be retrieved. Results showed, however, that TTB-users were less confident and made more TTB-inconsistent choices when TTB-irrelevant information was in conflict with the TTB-decision than when it was not, suggesting that TTB-users retrieved and integrated TTB-irrelevant information.     

Collecting information: Optimizing outcomes, screening options, or facilitating discrimination?

Collection of information prior to a decision may be integrated into a compensatory choice process; if it is, the information packet that is collected should be the one that produces the highest net gain. Alternatively,information may be collected in order to screen out options that fail to meet minimum standards; if this is the case, people should not choose options on which they have not collected available information. We tested these and other predictions from the two approaches in four experiments. Participants were given specific information about three attributes of each choice option but only probabilistic information about a fourth one. They rated attractiveness of options, decidedwhether to collect specific information about the fourth attribute of each one, rated options again, and then selected one of them. Data were consistent with neither of the above approaches. Instead they suggested that people collect information in order to facilitate their ability to discriminate between the attractiveness of options.     

A generalized distance function for preferential choices

Many cognitive theories of judgement and decision making assume that choice options are evaluated relative to other available options. The extent to which the preference for one option is influenced by other available options will often depend on how similar the options are to each other, where similarity is assumed to be a decreasing function of the distance between options. We examine how the distance between preferential options that are described on multiple attributes can be determined. Previous distance functions do not take into account that attributes differ in their subjective importance, are limited to two attributes, or neglect the preferential relationship between the options. To measure the distance between preferential options it is necessary to take the subjective preferences of the decision maker into account. Accordingly, the multi‐attribute space that defines the relationship between options can be stretched or shrunk relative to the attention or importance that a person gives to different attributes describing the options. Here, we propose a generalized distance function for preferential choices that takes subjective attribute importance into account and allows for individual differences according to such subjective preferences. Using a hands‐on example, we illustrate the application of the function and compare it to previous distance measures. We conclude with a discussion of the suitability and limitations of the proposed distance function.     

Can Subjects Be Proper Parts of Subjects? The De‐Combination Problem

Growing concern with the panpsychist's ostensive inability to solve the ‘combination problem’ has led some authors to adopt a view titled ‘Cosmopsychism’. This position turns panpsychism on its head: rather than many tiny atomic minds, there is instead one cosmos‐sized mind. It is supposed that this view voids the combination problem, however I argue that it does not. I argue that there is a ‘de‐combination problem’ facing the cosmopsychist, which is equivalent to the combination problem as they are both concerned with subjects being proper parts of other subjects. I then propose two methods for both theorists to avoid the problem of subject‐subject proper parthood relations: a distinction between absolute and relative phenomenal unity, and a modification of the essential nature of subjects. Of these two options, I find the latter option wanting and propose that the first should be adopted.     

Differential weighting in choice versus advice: I’ll do this,you do that

We propose that when individuals make a decision for themselves they weight attributes more uniformly compared to when they give advice. In Study 1, 138 participants were given a hypothetical choice between two jobs varying on two dimensions and asked either to choose for themselves, offer advice to a best friend, or offer advice to an acquaintance. We hypothesized that respondents offering advice would favor the option with the higher value on the more important dimension. More participants in the acquaintance condition recommended the job with a higher value on the important dimension than participants making the choice for themselves. Study 2 (N=62) tested the hypothesis in a situation where the options consisted of three dimensions. One option was relatively high on two of the three dimensions and the other option was relatively high on the remaining ‘socially important’, or ‘prominent’, dimension. The uniform weighting hypothesis for self‐choice predicts higher frequency of choice for the former option. Data were consistent with this prediction. Study 3 (N=170) tested the hypothesis in students' choice of major at the university. We made use of an actual event, a pending university budget cut, that would require some students to change majors. Participants either made the decision for themselves, made a recommendation to a student in their same department, or made a recommendation to a student in another department facing the analogous dilemma. Replicating the findings of the first two studies, participants offering advice to a student in another department suggested staying with their current major significantly more than participants making the choice for themselves. Copyright © 1999 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

The effects of option framing on consumer choices: Making decisions in rational versus experiential processing modes

• In the marketplace, consumers often encounter framed scenarios for optional product features, whereby they can add desired product options to a base model or delete undesired product options from a fully loaded model. The results of two experiments show that such option framing can influence consumers' decision making regarding the total number of finally chosen product options. Also, consumers' processing modes – rational versus experiential, can influence their choice behavior under option framing. Specifically, consumers choose a higher number of options in the delete (versus add) frame, and the effect is magnified when making decisions in an experiential mode, and it is diminished when making decisions in a rational mode. Moreover, cognitive constraints further moderate these effects.

Copyright © 2009 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

The dynamics of choice in a changing world: Effects of full and partial feedback

We explored the dynamics of choice behavior while the values of the options changed, unannounced, several times. In particular, choice dynamics were compared when the outcome values of all available options were known (full feedback) and when the outcome value of only the chosen option was known (partial feedback). The frequency of change, the values of the options, and the difference between them were also manipulated. In an experiment with N = 427, we found that the patterns of choices were different for the two levels of feedback. Whereas behavior in the full-feedback condition showed a tendency to switch choices following a missed opportunity—replicating previous findings—the behavior in the partial-feedback condition was different. It was sensitive to the outcome value of the chosen option in comparison to some memory of the last-experienced outcome value of the unchosen option. However, the comparison of these two values influenced choice behavior only when the outcome of the currently chosen option was satisfactory and the last outcome of the unchosen one was not. As expected, the other manipulated variables (change frequency, the options’ values, and the difference between them) had no effect on the dynamics of behavior.     

Conforming to coordinate: Children use majority information for peer coordination

Humans are constantly required to coordinate their behaviour with others. As this often relies on everyone's convergence on the same strategy (e.g., driving on the left side of the road), a common solution is to conform to majority behaviour. In this study, we presented 5‐year‐old children with a coordination problem: To retrieve some rewards, they had to choose the same of four options as a peer partner – in reality a stooge – whose decision they were unable to see. Before making a choice, they watched a video showing how other children from their partner's peer group had behaved; a majority chose the same option and a minority chose a different one. In a control condition, children watched the same video but could then retrieve the reward irrespective of their partner's choice (i.e., no coordination was necessary). Children followed the majority more often when coordination was required. Moreover, conformers mostly justified their choices by referring to the majority from the video demonstration. This study is the first to show that young children are able to strategically coordinate decisions with peers by conforming to the majority.