Thinking styles and risky decision‐making: Further exploration of the affect–probability weighting link

People usually overweight small probabilities and underweight large probabilities leading to the familiar inverse S‐shaped weighting function. This research explores the link between affect and the structure of probability weighting from the perspective of thinking dispositions, a concept central to dual system theories of reasoning. The effects of affective priming and cognitive load on both probability weighting and the value function are also examined. The evidence suggests that thinking styles do have predictive implications for risky decision‐making. Participants with a more affective thinking style tend to be more risk‐seeking in small probability gambles. However, increasing access to the affective system by affective priming or cognitive load manipulations tend to reduce risk‐seeking behavior in small probability gambles as well as reduce risk averse behavior in large probability gambles. Previous research, manipulating the affective nature of lottery outcomes, found evidence for an increase in curvature (more overweighting of small probabilities and more underweighting of large probabilities) of the weighting function for affect‐rich outcomes, lending support to a hope‐and‐fear deconstruction of probability weighting. The present research suggests that increased anticipatory emotions characterized by the elevation of the weighting function (more overweighting at all probabilities) is also important and could sometimes be more significant than hope‐and‐fear in decision‐making under risk. An integrated approach incorporating the impact of affect on all three, the elevation and curvature of probability weighting as well as the curvature of the value function explains the empirical findings. Copyright © 2010 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

What shapes the probability weighting function? Influence of affect,numeric competencies,and information formats

Research suggests that people are less sensitive to variations in probability in affect‐rich compared with affect‐poor risky choices. This effect is modeled by a more curved probability weighting function (PWF). We investigated the role of different numeric competencies and the effectiveness of several intervention strategies to decrease this affect‐laden probability distortion. In two experiments, we manipulated the affect‐richness of a risky prospect. In Experiment 1 (N = 467), we measured numeracy and symbolic‐number mapping (i.e., the ability to accurately map numbers onto their underlying magnitudes). The affect‐based manipulations showed the expected effects only in participants with more accurate symbolic‐number mapping, who also reported more differentiated emotional reactions to the various probabilities and displayed more linear PWFs. Instructions to focus on the probability information decreased probability distortion and revealed differences in the use of probability information on the basis of symbolic‐number mapping ability. In Experiment 2 (N = 417), we manipulated the format in which the probability information was presented: using visual aids versus no visual aids and a positive frame (e.g., one person wins) versus combined frame (e.g., one person wins and 99 persons do not win). The affect‐based manipulations had no effect but both the visual aids and combined frame decreased probability distortion. Whereas affect‐richness manipulations require further research, results suggest that probability weighting is at least partially driven by the inability to translate numerical information into meaningful and well‐calibrated affective intuitions. Visual aids and simple framing manipulations designed to calibrate these intuitions can help decision makers extract the gist and increase sensitivity to probabilities.     

How Affect Shapes Risky Choice: Distorted Probability Weighting Versus Probability Neglect

People's choices between prospects with relatively affect‐rich outcomes (e.g., medical side effects) can diverge markedly from their choices between prospects with relatively affect‐poor outcomes (e.g., monetary losses). We investigate the cognitive mechanisms underlying this “affect gap” in risky choice. One possibility is that affect‐rich prospects give rise to more distortion in probability weighting. Another is that they lead to the neglect of probabilities. To pit these two possibilities against each other, we fitted cumulative prospect theory (CPT) to the choices of individual participants, separately for choices between options with affect‐rich outcomes (adverse medical side effects) and options with affect‐poor outcomes (monetary losses); additionally, we tested a simple model of probability neglect, the minimax rule. The results indicated a qualitative difference in cognitive mechanisms between the affect‐rich and affect‐poor problems. Specifically, in affect‐poor problems, the large majority of participants were best described by CPT; in affect‐rich problems, the proportion of participants best described by the minimax rule was substantially higher. The affect gap persisted even when affect‐rich outcomes were supplemented by numerical information, thus providing no support for the thesis that choices in affect‐rich and affect‐poor problems diverge because the information provided in the former is nonnumerical. Our findings suggest that the traditional expectation‐based framework for modeling risky decision making may not readily generalize to affect‐rich choices. Copyright © 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Constructing emotion: the experience of fear as a conceptual act

This study examined the hypothesis that emotion is a psychological event constructed from the more basic elements of core affect and conceptual knowledge. Participants were primed with conceptual knowledge of fear, conceptual knowledge of anger, or a neutral prime and then proceeded through an affect-induction procedure designed to induce unpleasant, high-arousal affect or a neutral affective state. As predicted, only those individuals for whom conceptual knowledge of fear had been primed experienced unpleasant core affect as evidence that the world was threatening. This study provides the first experimental support for the hypothesis that people experience world-focused emotion when they conceptualize their core affective state using accessible knowledge about emotion.     

Affect Regulation During Learning: The Enhancing Effect of Cognitive Reappraisal

Affective experiences routinely occur during learning and need to be successfully regulated. In two experiments, we used an intervention that combined elements of utility value and cognitive reappraisal to gauge its effects on engagement and performance. We predicted that participants using the reappraisal strategy would experience more engagement and higher learning outcomes than controls. Ethnically diverse adult learners ranging from 18 to 58 years of age (Experiment 1, N = 93; Experiment 2: N = 138) used affect regulation strategies or no strategy (control) in an online learning environment. Engagement and learning outcomes were measured throughout the experiment. Participants who used reappraisal generally reported more engagement and achieved higher learning outcomes than controls. A mediation analysis revealed evidence of a partial mediation effect of affective engagement between reappraisal and learning outcomes in Study 2. We discuss the implications of these findings for understanding the role of affect regulation during learning. Copyright © 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

认知重评对负性效价的抑制促进条件性恐惧消退

认知重评能有效降低个体对情感刺激的负性情绪体验, 但指导性认知重评在恐惧记忆治疗中效果存在争议。本文将认知重评范式与辨别式条件恐惧反应范式结合, 以效价和US预期值为指标, 探讨指导性认知重评训练对恐惧情绪习得和消退的影响效果。以低认知重评能力个体为被试, 在实验前24 h进行指导性认知重评训练。条件性恐惧任务为期2天, 第一天完成条件性恐惧的习得和消退任务, 第二天完成条件性恐惧的再消退任务。结果显示, 经过重评训练后个体在条件性恐惧任务中的恐惧情绪效价显著较低, 说明认知重评有效降低低认知重评能力个体在急性应激状态下的负性情绪体验。所有被试均成功完成辨别式条件性恐惧的习得和消退任务, 因此重评训练并不削弱个体对危险或者安全信息的辨别能力。但在条件性恐惧的消退过程中, 认知重评指导训练加快了恐惧消退, 且24 h后测得的条件性恐惧程度显著较低, 说明指导性重评提高了条件性恐惧记忆的消退效率, 并减弱了条件性恐惧的消退返回。     

Money, Kisses, And Electric Shocks: On the Affective Psychology of Risk

Prospect theory's S-shaped weighting function is often said to reflect the psychophysics of chance. We propose an affective rather than psychophysical deconstruction of the weighting function resting on two assumptions. First, preferences depend on the affective reactions associated with potential outcomes of a risky choice. Second, even with monetary values controlled, some outcomes are relatively affect-rich and others relatively affect-poor. Although the psychophysical and affective approaches are complementary, the affective approach has one novel implication: Weighting functions will be more S-shaped for lotteries involving affect-rich than affect-poor outcomes. That is, people will be more sensitive to departures from impossibility and certainty but less sensitive to intermediate probability variations for affect-rich outcomes. We corroborated this prediction by observing probability-outcome interactions: An affect-poor prize was preferred over an affect-rich prize under certainty, but the direction of preference reversed under low probability. We suggest that the assumption of probability-outcome independence, adopted by both expected-utility and prospect theory, may hold across outcomes of different monetary values, but not different affective values.     

Tracing Attitude Expressions: An Eye‐Tracking Study

Attitudes represent object evaluations, comprising complex underlying cognitive and affective knowledge structures. When people are asked to judge an object, they can use their primary response (i.e., the immediate object‐evaluation linkage) or underlying affective and cognitive knowledge structures. In many situations, a primary response satisfices, but if not, more elaboration is required. Both processes are fundamentally different but may lead to the same attitude. For monitoring underlying processes during attitude expression, we developed an innovative eye‐tracking procedure using eye‐gaze on response scale options. This procedure was applied in three studies to identify the extent to which elaboration differs for attitude objects with weak or strong, univalent or mixed object evaluations (i.e., univalent, neutral and ambivalent). In Study 1, the overall judgment preceded processing of more specific affective and cognitive linkage evaluations. In Studies 2 and 3, the order was reversed, and affective and cognitive bases were assessed prior to overall attitude outcomes. For attitude objects with strong univalent or strong mixed object evaluations, we found similar outcomes on underlying processes. For weak object evaluations, cognition was found to be more predictive and easily accessible if an overall judgment was required first; affect for these objects was more predictive if people had to elaborate on affect and cognition first. We concluded that both affective and cognitive attitudes may require substantial elaboration, albeit in different situations. Copyright © 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Strategy Selection in Risky Choice: The Impact of Numeracy,Affect, and Cross‐Cultural Differences

Real‐world decisions often involve options with outcomes that are uncertain and trigger strong affect (e.g., side effects of a drug). Previous work suggests that when choosing among affect‐rich risky prospects, people are rather insensitive to probability information, potentially compromising decision quality. We modeled the strategies of less and more numerate participants in the United States and in Germany when choosing between affect‐rich prospects and between monetarily equivalent affect‐poor prospects. Using large probabilistic national samples (n = 1047 from the United States and Germany), Study 1 showed that compared with more numerate participants, less numerate participants chose the normatively better option (i.e., the one with the higher expected value) less often, guessed more often, and relied more on a simple risk‐minimizing strategy. U.S. participants—although less numerate—selected the normatively better option more frequently and were more consistent across affect‐rich and affect‐poor problems than the German participants. Using a targeted quota sample (n = 118 from Germany), Study 2 indicated that although both more and less numerate participants paid less attention to probability information in affect‐rich than in affect‐poor problems, the two numeracy groups relied on different outcome‐based heuristics: More numerate participants often followed the minimax heuristic, and less numerate participants the affect heuristic. The observed strategy differences suggest that attempts to improve decision‐making need to take into account individual differences in numeracy as well as cultural‐specific experiences in making trade‐offs. Copyright © 2012 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

The dimensionality of anticipated affective reactions to risky and certain decision outcomes

In three experiments, anticipated affective reactions to risky and certain decision outcomes were investigated. It was shown that the two affect dimensions, valence and activation, describe anticipated affective reactions. When combined in a nonlinear dimension ranging from elation to disappointment, the results were found to replicate previous research showing that anticipated affective reactions are influenced by both sign (loss or gain), magnitude, and probability of outcomes. Preference for the anticipated affective reactions was furthermore related to both affect dimensions.     

Additivity neglect in probability estimates: Effects of numeracy and response format

When people are asked to estimate the probabilities for an exhaustive set of more than two events, they often produce probabilities that add up to more than 100%. Potential determinants for such additivity neglect are explored in four experiments. Additive responses vary between experimental conditions, mainly as a result of response format, with a scale format leading to fewer additive responses than a list format with self-generated, written probabilities. Participants with high numeracy scores produced more additive responses, especially after being primed with a numeracy scale. Additivity neglect for 100% sums appears to be unrelated to other subadditive judgments, like non-additive disjunctions. We conclude that additivity neglect is caused by a case-based approach, which comes natural in real-life situations where the full set of outcomes is not available.     

Unpacking cognitive reappraisal: goals, tactics, and outcomes

Studies of emotion regulation typically contrast two or more strategies (e.g., reappraisal vs. suppression) and ignore variation within each strategy. To address such variation, we focused on cognitive reappraisal and considered the effects of goals (i.e., what people are trying to achieve) and tactics (i.e., what people actually do) on outcomes (i.e., how affective responses change). To examine goals, we randomly assigned participants to either increase positive emotion or decrease negative emotion to a negative stimulus. To examine tactics, we categorized participants' reports of how they reappraised. To examine reappraisal outcomes, we measured experience and electrodermal responding. Findings indicated that (a) the goal of increasing positive emotion led to greater increases in positive affect and smaller decreases in skin conductance than the goal of decreasing negative emotion, and (b) use of the reality challenge tactic was associated with smaller increases in positive affect during reappraisal. These findings suggest that reappraisal can be implemented in the service of different emotion goals, using different tactics. Such differences are associated with different outcomes, and they should be considered in future research and applied attempts to maximize reappraisal success.     

Cognitive emotion regulation in adulthood and old age: positive gaze preferences across two strategies

While positive emotional functioning may be enhanced across adulthood and old age, research is mixed as to the types of regulatory strategies that are more or less beneficial for facilitating well-being. The goal of the present study was to examine how specific cognitive emotion regulation strategies assumed to rely on varying levels of effortful processing (selective attention vs. reappraisal) would impact regulatory behaviors (via eye gaze deployment) and resultant affective outcomes. Participants viewed a series of positive, negative, and neutral film clips while their eyes were tracked across three conditions: passive viewing, selective attention, and reappraisal. Results revealed that (a) both younger and older adults displayed positive fixation preferences and showed mood improvement across both regulatory conditions and (b) there was a marginal association between positive fixation and post-regulation mood. Implications for linking positivity to emotion regulation and well-being across adulthood are discussed.     

A cognitive‐emotional account of the shape of the probability weighting function

Research has shown a tendency of decision makers to overweight small probabilities and to underweight moderate and large probabilities. In standard treatments this is graphically modeled by an inverse S‐shaped probability weighting function. We suggest that emotions play a significant role in the shaping of the probability weighting function. In particular, the weighting function is proposed to be some function of objective probability, expected elation, and expected disappointment. The overweighting of small probabilities results from the anticipated elation after having won, given that winning was very unlikely. The underweighting of large probabilities results from anticipated disappointment after having failed to win, given that winning was very likely. Hence, probability is assumed to influence utility. Three experiments investigate these hypotheses. Experiments 1 and 2 show that a convex function relates probability to surprise. Experiment 3 elicits choice data and further supports the proposed hypotheses. The model adds to the understanding of the cognitive and emotional processes underlying the shape of the probability weighting function. Copyright © 2002 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Healthy and unhealthy emotion regulation: personality processes, individual differences, and life span development

Abstract Individuals regulate their emotions in a wide variety of ways. Are some forms of emotion regulation healthier than others? We focus on two commonly used emotion regulation strategies: reappraisal (changing the way one thinks about a potentially emotion‐eliciting event) and suppression (changing the way one responds behaviorally to an emotion‐eliciting event). In the first section, we review experimental findings showing that reappraisal has a healthier profile of short‐term affective, cognitive, and social consequences than suppression. In the second section, we review individual‐difference findings, which show that using reappraisal to regulate emotions is associated with healthier patterns of affect, social functioning, and well‐being than is using suppression. In the third section, we consider issues in the development of reappraisal and suppression and provide new evidence for a normative shift toward an increasingly healthy emotion regulation profile during adulthood (i.e., increases in the use of reappraisal and decreases in the use of suppression).     

Precision of probability information and prominence of outcomes: A description and evaluation of decisions under uncertainty

Information about event probability upon which decisions depend may be more or less precise. The first section of this paper reports three experiments that investigated the relationship between this type of imprecision and the prominence that outcomes obtain in decisions. Participants had to rank order sets of six lotteries according to attractiveness. While the lotteries’ values were always precisely known precision of information about lottery chances varied. These experiments showed that increasing ambiguity tied decisions closer to lottery values. The second section shows that modeling participants’ decisions with the contingent weighting model suggests that this outcome prominence effect was not necessarily caused by any change in the respective weighting of probability and outcome information, but that it had probably occurred for purely mathematical reasons. The third part of this paper explores, by means of a computer simulation, (i) which weighting strategy is optimal when probabilities are imprecise and (ii) how participants’ decision behavior compared to a simple, but better adapted strategy. It shows that the weighting of probability information should not change with decreasing precision and it implies that participants’ performance suffered most from a lack of strategic consequence. Implications for decision making policy in general are discussed.     

Strategic and Automatic Threat Processing in Chronic Musculoskeletal Pain: A Startle Probe Investigation

Attentional bias research with chronic pain samples has yielded conflicting results. In the present investigation the startle paradigm was used to test the postulate that fear‐based mechanisms play an important role in attentional biases for pain‐related threat in chronic pain. Participants, including 31 individuals with chronic musculoskeletal pain and 20 healthy controls, completed a startle task designed to measure attention to different types of words (neutral vs sensory pain vs affective pain vs health catastrophe) presented at different levels of cognitive processing (strategic vs automatic). Measures of fear‐based individual difference variables, including anxiety sensitivity and fear of pain, were also completed. Startle amplitudes and latencies to acoustic startle probes that followed word presentations were recorded. Data were analyzed with repeated measures ANOVAs and correlational analysis. Significant between‐group differences were found indicating that, relative to chronic pain participants, healthy controls had higher startle amplitude index scores for health catastrophe words. There was also a trend among patients with chronic pain for greater startle amplitude index scores for strategic presentations of sensory pain words. In the automatic condition, all participants demonstrated a lower startle latency index for sensory words relative to both affect and health catastrophe words, suggesting participants had more difficulty disengaging from affect and health catastrophe words or were more avoidant of sensory words. Correlational analyses indicated that startle response indices for words related to health catastrophe became more pronounced for chronic pain patients as anxiety sensitivity and fear of pain increased. Implications and directions for future research are discussed.     

The Influence of Positive Affect on the Decision Rule in Risk Situations: Focus on Outcome (and Especially Avoidance of Loss) Rather Than Probability

Two experiments examined the influence of positive affect on probability estimation and choice. Participants in whom positive affect had been induced, as well as no-manipulation controls, were asked to make both numerical evaluations of verbal probabilities in three-outcome gambles and actual betting decisions about similar gambles. Results from Experiment 1 showed the phenomenon labeledcautious optimism:Positive affect participants significantly overestimated the probabilities associated with phrases for winning relative to their estimates of probability of losing for the same phrases (optimism), while participants in a control condition did not; yet, in actual gambling situations, affect condition participants were much less likely to gamble than were controls when a real loss was possible (caution). Results of the betting task from Experiment 2 further indicated that affect participants used a betting-decision rule that was different from that of controls: They bet less than controls in gambles where potential losses were large, even though probability of loss was small, and they bet more than controls in gambles where the amount of the potential loss was small, even though the probability of loss was moderate or large. These findings suggest that positive affect can promote an overt shift from a decision rule focusing primarily on probabilities to one focusing on utilities or outcome values, especially for losses. Taken together, the results are compatible with an interpretation of the influence of positive affect in terms of an elaboration of positive cognitive material, and purposive behavior in decisions, rather than in terms of mere response bias.     

What if I am the one? Measuring individual differences in emotional sensitivity to probability and emotional reactivity to possibility

Current theories of risk perception point to the powerful role of emotion and the neglect of probabilistic information in the face of risk, but these tendencies differ across individuals. We propose a method for measuring individuals' emotional sensitivity to probability to assess how feelings about probabilities, rather than the probabilities themselves, influence decisions. Participants gave affective ratings (worry or excitement) to 14 risky events, each with a specified probability ranging from 1 in 10 to 1 in 10,000,000. For each participant, we regressed these emotional responses against item probabilities, estimating a slope (the degree to which emotional responses change with probability) and an intercept (the emotional reaction to an event with a fixed probability). These two parameters were treated as individual difference scores and included in models predicting reactions to several health risk scenarios. Both emotional sensitivity to probability (slope) and emotional reactivity to possibility (intercept) significantly predicted responses to these scenarios, above and beyond the predictive power of other well‐established individual difference measures.     

风险决策的概率权重偏差：心理机制与优化策略

概率权重偏差指人对事件发生的主观概率估计与客观概率的差异。它影响投资、投保、医患沟通等方面。“重结果轻概率”的非补偿性策略和参照点诱发的情绪波动会引发概率权重偏差; 改变“概率”的描述形式、“结果”的情绪体验、“损益”的参照点、风险的心理距离等可调整权重偏差、优化决策。未来需深究权重偏差的适用情境、机制关联及偏差辨别等问题。