Tests of an indifference rule in variable‐delay and double‐reward choice procedures with humans

Four hundred and fifty participants were recruited from Amazon Mechanical Turk across 3 experiments to test the predictions of a hyperbolic discounting equation in accounting for human choices involving variable delays or multiple rewards (Mazur, 1984, 1986). In Experiment 1, participants made hypothetical choices between 2 monetary alternatives, 1 consisting of a fixed delay and another consisting of 2 delays of equal probability (i.e., a variable‐delay procedure). In Experiment 2, participants made hypothetical monetary choices between a single, immediate reward and 2 rewards, 1 immediate and 1 delayed (i.e., a double‐reward procedure). Experiment 3 also used a double‐reward procedure, but with 2 delayed rewards. Participants in all 3 experiments also completed a standard delay‐discounting task. Finally, 3 reward amounts were tested in each type of task ($100, $1000, and $5000). In the double‐reward conditions (Experiments 2 and 3), the results were in good qualitative and quantitative agreement with Mazur's model (1984, 1986). In contrast, when participants made choices involving variable delays (Experiment 1), there was relatively poor qualitative and quantitative agreement with this model. These results, along with our previous findings, suggest the structure of questions in hypothetical tasks with humans can be a strong determinant of the choice pattern.     

Individual Differences in Delay Discounting: Differences are Quantitative with Gains,but Qualitative with Losses

Research on delay discounting and inter‐temporal choice has yielded significant insights into decision making. Although research has focused on delayed gains, the discounting of losses is potentially important in precisely those areas where the discounting of gains has proved informative (e.g., substance use and abuse). Participants in the current study completed both a questionnaire consisting of choices between immediate and delayed gains and an analogous questionnaire consisting of choices between immediate and delayed losses. For almost all participants, the likelihood of choosing the delayed gain decreased with increases in the wait until it would be received. In contrast, when losses (i.e., payments) were involved, different participants showed quite different patterns of choices. More specifically, although the majority of the participants became increasingly likely to choose to pay later as the delay was increased, some participants appeared to be debt averse, in that they were more likely to choose the immediate payment option when the delay was long than when it was brief. These debt‐averse participants also were more likely to choose to wait for a larger delayed gain than other participants and scored lower on Impulsiveness than those who showed the typical pattern of discounting delayed losses. Taken together, these results suggest that in the case of delayed gains, people differ only quantitatively (i.e., in how steeply they discount), whereas in the case of delayed losses, people differ qualitatively as well as quantitatively, contrary to the common assumption that a single impulsivity trait underlies choices between immediate and delayed outcomes. Copyright © 2016 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

How green defaults promote environmentally friendly decisions: Attitude‐conditional default acceptance but attitude‐unconditional effects on actual choices

Defaults (i.e., options that become effective without an active choice) have been found to be powerful tools to influence decision‐making in a range of behavioral domains. However, seemingly conflicting assumptions have been expressed regarding the interplay of defaults with individual attitudes. Whereas some expect attitude‐conditional effects (i.e., a statistical default‐by‐attitude interaction), others assume an attitude‐unconditional effectiveness of defaults (i.e., statistically additive effects). Integrating both assumptions, we argue that the interplay of defaults and attitudes depends on what is considered a default effect. Specifically, whereas default acceptance is likely to be attitude‐conditional, we predicted that defaults and attitudes would add up in explaining people's actual choices. We tested these hypotheses in an online shopping scenario presenting environmentally friendly or conventional default products to 231 participants. Participants’ environmental attitude was assessed with the General Ecological Behavior scale and actual product choices were identified if participants rejected a given default product. In line with our hypotheses, default acceptance was predicted by a default‐by‐attitude interaction. In contrast, actual environmentally friendly product choices were found to be an additive function of defaults and participants’ environmental attitude. From an applied perspective, our findings suggest that defaults can readily be applied even in attitude‐heterogeneous target populations. Concurrently, however, our findings also speak of the importance of people's attitudes for understanding individual decision‐making.     

Strategy Selection in Risky Choice: The Impact of Numeracy,Affect, and Cross‐Cultural Differences

Real‐world decisions often involve options with outcomes that are uncertain and trigger strong affect (e.g., side effects of a drug). Previous work suggests that when choosing among affect‐rich risky prospects, people are rather insensitive to probability information, potentially compromising decision quality. We modeled the strategies of less and more numerate participants in the United States and in Germany when choosing between affect‐rich prospects and between monetarily equivalent affect‐poor prospects. Using large probabilistic national samples (n = 1047 from the United States and Germany), Study 1 showed that compared with more numerate participants, less numerate participants chose the normatively better option (i.e., the one with the higher expected value) less often, guessed more often, and relied more on a simple risk‐minimizing strategy. U.S. participants—although less numerate—selected the normatively better option more frequently and were more consistent across affect‐rich and affect‐poor problems than the German participants. Using a targeted quota sample (n = 118 from Germany), Study 2 indicated that although both more and less numerate participants paid less attention to probability information in affect‐rich than in affect‐poor problems, the two numeracy groups relied on different outcome‐based heuristics: More numerate participants often followed the minimax heuristic, and less numerate participants the affect heuristic. The observed strategy differences suggest that attempts to improve decision‐making need to take into account individual differences in numeracy as well as cultural‐specific experiences in making trade‐offs. Copyright © 2012 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

A Comparison of Within- and Across-Activity Choices for Reducing Challenging Behavior in Children with Autism Spectrum Disorders

Offering children with autism spectrum disorders (ASD) choices between activities (e.g., working on math or English), instructional materials (e.g., using a pen or pencil), or environmental arrangements (e.g., where to sit) has been shown to reduce challenging behavior maintained by escape from task demands. However, the majority of research investigating choice-based interventions for challenging behavior has examined across-activity choices (i.e., choosing between activities) and relatively few studies have examined within-activity choice (i.e., choosing between instructional materials or environmental arrangements). The purpose of this study is to replicate and extend previous research on choice-based challenging behavior interventions by comparing the effects of across-activity choices and within-activity choices on the escape-maintained challenging behavior of 4 children with ASD. An alternating treatment design was embedded within the “B” phase of an ABAB design in which the “A” phase represented a no-choice baseline condition. Both choice formats resulted in less challenging behavior than the baseline condition for all participants. Across-activity choice resulted in less challenging behavior than within-activity choice for 3 participants. Implications for research and practice are discussed.     

Effects of Attribute Scales on Process and Performance in Multiattribute Choice

The type of scale used to represent the attributes of decision alternatives has received little attention in previous research, despite the pervasive presence of this issue in decision making. In two process tracing experiments we investigated how the type of scale used affects choices and choice processes. We hypothesized that scales affect the ease of accomplishing various component processes in choice. Experiment 1 used scales that differed in two ways: (1) whether all attributes were on the same scale (i.e., commonality) and (2) whether the scales were in units that were meaningful in the problem domain (i.e., context-relevance). We also manipulated economic incentives to favor speed over accuracy or the converse. Participants made more accurate decisions with common, context-independent scales but faster decisions with context-relevant scales. In addition, choice processes mediated the effects of scaling on both speed and accuracy. Experiment 2 replicated the results of Experiment 1 with decision contexts that differed in familiarity. Both experiments demonstrate that the scales used to present attributes can influence both the speed and accuracy of decision making, despite the presence of explicit economic incentives. Designers of choice studies and information displays are therefore advised to exercise care in choosing attribute scales.     

Narrative expectations in financial forecasting

How do people form expectations about the future? We use amateur and expert investors' expectations about financial asset prices to study this question. Three experiments contrast the rational expectations assumption from neoclassical economics (investors forecast according to neoclassical financial theory) against two psychological theories of expectation formation—behaviorally informed expectations (investors understand empirical market anomalies and expect these anomalies to occur) and narrative expectations (investors use narrative thinking to predict future prices). Whereas neoclassical financial theory maintains that past public information cannot be used to predict future prices, participants used company performance information revealed before a base price quotation to project future price trends after that quotation (Experiment 1), contradicting rational expectations. Importantly, these projections were stronger when information concerned predictions about a company's future performance rather than actual data about its past performance, suggesting that people not only rely on financially irrelevant (but narratively relevant) information for making predictions but erroneously impose temporal order on that information. These biased predictions had downstream consequences for asset allocation choices (Experiment 2), and these choices were driven in part by affective reactions to the company performance news (Experiment 3). There were some mild effects of expertise, but overall the effects of narrative appear to be consistent across all levels of expertise studied, including professional financial analysts. We conclude by discussing the prospects for a narrative theory of choice that provide new microfoundational insights about economic behavior.     

期望、体验和回忆: 当消费者不能从体验中学习

人们对消费体验的期望、回忆与真实体验时常发生分离, 而且人们很少从真实体验中得到学习。本研究认为原因之一是期望、体验和回忆三者基于不同的输入信息, 以及三者特殊的交互关系。本研究首先提出了一个关于消费者期望、体验和回忆的理论框架, 系统阐述了消费者何时不能从体验中学习以及如何能促进学习, 然后在一个消费情景中通过3×2混合实验设计考察了三者的关系。实验比较了在“预期(无体验)”、“体验后即时评价”和“体验后延迟评价”三种评价方式下被试对两种品牌火腿肠的口味评价和偏好选择。结果发现: 消费者对口味体验的期望和回忆相似, 但两者都和真实体验发生分离。最后, 本研究还讨论了这一理论框架在消费者行为中的应用、未来研究拓展等。     

Introducing the Expectations and Preference Scales for Couple Therapy (EPSCT): Development,Psychometric Evaluation,and Suggested Use in Practice and Research

While it is known that client factors account for the largest proportion of outcome variance across treatment modalities, little is known about how clients’ characteristics affect the process and effectiveness of couple therapy. To further knowledge in this area, we created a brief, practice‐friendly measure, the Expectation and Preference Scales for Couple Therapy (EPSCT). Three self‐report scales assess clients’ Outcome expectations (e.g., I expect our relationship to improve as a result of couple therapy) and role expectations for Self (e.g., I expect to listen to my partner's concerns) and Partner (e.g., I expect my partner to blame me). Three Cognitive‐Behavioral, Emotionally Focused, and Family Systems preference scales use a forced‐choice format to measure the comparative strength of respondents’ preferences for interventions broadly reflective of each approach. A large item pool was developed from relevant literature and clinical experience and refined based on face and content analyses with two panels of experienced couple therapists and researchers. Across four studies with 1,175 participants, the scales’ internal consistency reliabilities were similar and their construct validity was supported with confirmatory factor analyses and significant correlations with several established measures, including expectation measures developed for individual psychotherapy and measures of attitudes toward professional help seeking and valuing personal growth. Across all studies, participants had stronger role expectations for themselves than their partners, although gender effects differed by sample. We discuss how to use the 15‐item EPSCT in clinical practice and in future research as a predictor of couple therapy processes and outcomes.     

Ostracism Reduces Reliance on Poor Advice from Others during Decision Making

Decision making is rarely context‐free, and often, both social information and non‐social information are weighed into one's decisions. Incorporating information into a decision can be influenced by previous experiences. Ostracism has extensive effects, including taxing cognitive resources and increasing social monitoring. In decision making situations, individuals are often faced with both objective and social information and must choose which information to include or filter out. How will ostracism affect the reliance on objective and social information during decision making? Participants (N = 245) in Experiment 1 were randomly assigned to be included or ostracized in a standardized, group task. They then performed a dynamic decision making task that involved the presentation of either non‐social (i.e. biased reward feedback) or social (i.e., poor advice from a previous participant) misleading information. In Experiment 2, participants (N = 105) completed either the ostracism non‐social condition or social misleading information condition with explicit instructions stating that the advice given was from an individual who did not partake in the group task. Ostracized individuals relied more on non‐social misleading information and performed worse than included individuals. However, ostracized individuals discounted misleading social information and outperformed included individuals. Results of Experiment 2 replicated the findings of Experiment 1. Across two experiments, ostracized individuals were more critical of advice from others, both individuals who may have ostracized them and unrelated individuals. In other words, compared with included individuals, ostracized individuals underweighted advice from another individual but overweighed non‐social information during decision making. We conclude that when deceptive objective information is present, ostracism results in disadvantageous decision making. Copyright © 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

How Affect Shapes Risky Choice: Distorted Probability Weighting Versus Probability Neglect

People's choices between prospects with relatively affect‐rich outcomes (e.g., medical side effects) can diverge markedly from their choices between prospects with relatively affect‐poor outcomes (e.g., monetary losses). We investigate the cognitive mechanisms underlying this “affect gap” in risky choice. One possibility is that affect‐rich prospects give rise to more distortion in probability weighting. Another is that they lead to the neglect of probabilities. To pit these two possibilities against each other, we fitted cumulative prospect theory (CPT) to the choices of individual participants, separately for choices between options with affect‐rich outcomes (adverse medical side effects) and options with affect‐poor outcomes (monetary losses); additionally, we tested a simple model of probability neglect, the minimax rule. The results indicated a qualitative difference in cognitive mechanisms between the affect‐rich and affect‐poor problems. Specifically, in affect‐poor problems, the large majority of participants were best described by CPT; in affect‐rich problems, the proportion of participants best described by the minimax rule was substantially higher. The affect gap persisted even when affect‐rich outcomes were supplemented by numerical information, thus providing no support for the thesis that choices in affect‐rich and affect‐poor problems diverge because the information provided in the former is nonnumerical. Our findings suggest that the traditional expectation‐based framework for modeling risky decision making may not readily generalize to affect‐rich choices. Copyright © 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Met expectations and the wellbeing of diaspora immigrants: A longitudinal study

Previous research has pointed to the importance of expectations for the adaptation of immigrants. However, most studies have been methodologically retrospective with only limited possibilities to show the optimal relationship between migrants’ expectations and actual acculturation experiences for their wellbeing and other aspects of psychological adaptation. Moreover, previous research has been conducted mostly among sojourners and students. This longitudinal study focused on the relationship between premigration expectations and postmigration experiences of diaspora immigrants from Russia to Finland (N = 153). We examined how the fulfillment of premigration expectations in social (i.e., family relations, friendships, and free time) and economic (i.e., occupational position, working conditions, and economic and career situation) domains affects immigrants’ wellbeing (i.e., satisfaction with life and general mood) after migration. Three alternative models of expectation confirmation (i.e., disconfirmation model, ideal point model, and the importance of experiences only) derived from previous organizational psychological research were tested with polynomial regression and response surface analysis. In the economic domain, immigrants’ expectations, experiences, and their interrelationship did not affect wellbeing in the postmigration stage. However, in the social domain, the more expectations were exceeded by actual experiences, the better were life satisfaction and the general mood of immigrants. The results underline the importance of social relationships and the context‐dependent nature of immigrants’ wellbeing. Interventions in the preacculturation stage should create positive but realistic expectations for diaspora immigrants and other groups of voluntary (re)migrants. Furthermore, policies concerning the postmigration stage should facilitate the fulfillment of these expectations and support the social adaptation of immigrants.     

Affect regulation and temporal discounting: interactions between primed, state, and trait affect

Previous research has largely focused on the influence of experienced affect on decision making; however, other sources of affective information may also shape decisions. In two studies, we examine the interacting influences of affective information, state affect, and personality on temporal discounting rates (i.e., the tendency to choose small rewards today rather than larger rewards in the future). In Study 1, participants were primed with either positive or negative affect adjectives before making reward choices. In Study 2, participants underwent either a positive or negative affect induction before making reward choices. Results in both studies indicate that neuroticism interacts with state unpleasant affect and condition (i.e., positive or negative primes or induction) to predict discounting rates. Moreover, the nature of the interactions depends on the regulatory cues of the affective information available. These results suggest that irrelevant (i.e., primes) and stable (i.e., personality traits) sources of affective information also shape judgments and decision making. Thus, current affect levels are not the only source of affective information that guides individuals when making decisions.     

Treatment of resistance to change in children with autism

“Resistance to change” represents a core symptom of autism that we conceptualized and assessed as resulting in part due to factors known to govern free‐operant choice. During a free‐choice baseline, participants chose between problematic, resistive responses and an appropriate alternative response. During the asymmetrical‐choice condition, we delivered their most highly preferred item if the participant chose the alternative response (i.e., differential reinforcement of alternative behavior [DRA]). During the guided‐ (Experiment 1) and singular‐ (Experiment 2) choice conditions, we prompted participants to choose the alternative response and then delivered their most highly preferred item (i.e., DRA with escape extinction). All participants learned to tolerate (Experiment 1) or choose (Experiment 2) the alternative response when we combined DRA with escape extinction. After exposure to escape extinction, two participants showed strong maintenance effects with DRA alone. We discuss these finding relative to the effects of DRA and escape extinction on resistance to change.     

Power and Gender Influences on Responsibility Attributions: The Case of Disagreements in Relationships

Abstract

In a sample of 156 college students (74 men and 82 women), the authors examined the influences of power status and gender on responsibility attributions and resolution choices during disagreements in personal relationships. The participants read vignettes in which relationship partners disagreed; then the participants placed themselves in the situations depicted and reported their perceived responsibility and resolution choices. The participants were randomly assigned to 1 of 2 power-status conditions (you have/your partner has greater power in the situation). Power status was based on resource power (i.e., a monetary inheritance) or on perceived power (i.e., financial knowledge). The authors tested 2 alternative power-status hypotheses (justified benefits/rights and ability/accountability) and 1 gender hypothesis. The results supported both power-status hypotheses. In addition, the men's and the women's responsibility attributions and resolution choices (i.e., adhering to their own wishes or deferring to their partner's wishes) revealed differential dependence on the type of power held by the person with greater situational power. The authors suggest issues further research concerning how situational differences in socially based expectations (e.g., power status and gender) may affect conflicts within relationships.     

Making choices impairs subsequent self-control: a limited-resource account of decision making, self-regulation, and active initiative

The current research tested the hypothesis that making many choices impairs subsequent self-control. Drawing from a limited-resource model of self-regulation and executive function, the authors hypothesized that decision making depletes the same resource used for self-control and active responding. In 4 laboratory studies, some participants made choices among consumer goods or college course options, whereas others thought about the same options without making choices. Making choices led to reduced self-control (i.e., less physical stamina, reduced persistence in the face of failure, more procrastination, and less quality and quantity of arithmetic calculations). A field study then found that reduced self-control was predicted by shoppers' self-reported degree of previous active decision making. Further studies suggested that choosing is more depleting than merely deliberating and forming preferences about options and more depleting than implementing choices made by someone else and that anticipating the choice task as enjoyable can reduce the depleting effect for the first choices but not for many choices.     

Previously acquired cue–outcome structural knowledge guides new learning: Evidence from the retroactive-interference-between-cues effect

The effect of retroactive interference between cues predicting the same outcome (RIBC) occurs when the behavioral expression of a cue–outcome association (e.g., A→O1) is reduced due to the later acquisition of an association between a different cue and the same outcome (e.g., B→O1). In the present experimental series, we show that this effect can be modulated by knowledge concerning the structure of these cue–outcome relationships. In Experiments 1A and 1B, a pretraining phase was included to promote the expectation of either a one-to-one (OtO) or a many-to-one (MtO) cue–outcome structure during the subsequent RIBC training phases. We hypothesized that the adoption of an OtO expectation would make participants infer that the previously learned A→O1 relationship would not hold any longer after the exposure to B→O1 trials. Alternatively, the adoption of an MtO expectation would prevent participants from making such an inference. Experiment 1B included an additional condition without pretraining, to assess whether the OtO structure was expected by default. Experiment 2 included control conditions to assess the RIBC effect and induced the expectation of an OtO or MtO structure without the addition of a pretraining phase. Overall, the results suggest that participants effectively induced structural expectations regarding the cue–outcome contingencies. In turn, these expectations may have potentiated (OtO expectation) or alleviated (MtO expectation) the RIBC effect, depending on how well these expectations could accommodate the target A→O1 test association. This pattern of results poses difficulties for current explanations of the RIBC effect, since these explanations do not consider the incidence of cue–outcome structural expectations.     

I see into your mind too well: working memory adjusts the probability judgment of others' mental states

Although an increasing number of studies on adults have indicated that working memory (WM) contributes to the ability to understand the mental states of others (i.e., theory of mind), the detailed mechanism by which WM contributes to successful reasoning has not previously been revealed. This study shows that WM modulates the degree of attribution of one's own knowledge to others' mental states. Participants were asked to read a story twice (Experiment 2) or as carefully as possible (Experiment 3) and to estimate the probability percentages of possible choices for a naive protagonist's behavior. The participants were then asked to maintain either a two- or seven-letter alphabet string (i.e., a light or heavy WM load, respectively) during the probability estimation but not during the story comprehension. The results showed that compared to the participants with a light WM load, those with a heavy WM load estimated a significantly higher probability of the choice indicating that the protagonist would behave on the basis of a fact that the participants knew but the protagonist did not. This result indicates that WM moderates the extent to which adults attribute their own knowledge to others' mental states. The role of WM in theory of mind and in heuristic strategy for making probability judgments was then discussed.     

Mood and judgments based on sequential sampling

Different adaptive styles characterize cognition and behavior in different affective states. Whereas negative affect supports accommodation (i.e., stimulus‐driven bottom‐up processing), positive affect supports assimilation (i.e., self‐determined top‐down processing). Applying this well‐established rule to binary choices after self‐truncated information sampling, we predicted that positive mood should render choices less dependent on large samples than negative mood. Consequently, the potential primacy advantage underlying Wald's ( 1947 ) sequential testing (i.e., quick and correct decisions from the first few items in a sample) was exploited more efficiently when participants were in positive rather than negative mood. This efficient utilization of small samples in positive mood was obtained under the very conditions derived on a priori ground from a statistical model, namely, when a response criterion or threshold was high and when the true difference between choice options was relatively small. Copyright © 2009 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

A COMPARISON OF THE EFFECTS OF BRIEF RULES, A TIMER, AND PREFERRED TOYS ON SELF-CONTROL

Some children make impulsive choices (i.e., choose a small but immediate reinforcer over a large but delayed reinforcer). Previous research has shown that delay fading, providing an alternative activity during the delay, teaching participants to repeat a rule during the delay, combining delay fading with an alternative activity, and combining delay fading with a countdown timer are effective for increasing self‐control (i.e., choosing the large but delayed reinforcer over the small but immediate reinforcer). The purpose of the current study was to compare the effects of various interventions in the absence of delay fading (i.e., providing brief rules, providing a countdown timer during the delay, or providing preferred toys during the delay) on self‐control. Results suggested that providing brief rules or a countdown timer during the delay was ineffective for enhancing self‐control. However, providing preferred toys during the delay effectively enhanced self‐control.