Creating coherence in real‐life decision processes: Reasons,differentiation and consolidation

Svenson, O. & Jakobsson, M. (2009). Creating coherence in real‐life decision processes: Reasons, differentiation and consolidation. Scandinavian Journal of Psychology, 51, 93–102. Differentiation and Consolidation Theory describes human decision making as a process in which attractiveness values are restructured in order to reach a decision and support the decision made. Here, the theory was developed to include reasons pro and con alternatives and tested on students making decisions between two university psychotherapy training programs (cognitive‐behavioral and psychodynamic therapy). Before and also after the decision, the attractiveness of the chosen alternative was upgraded and the non‐chosen alternative downgraded. Different measures of evaluations of an alternative, such as “best” or “worse” converged over time until shortly after the decision. The number of reasons pro and con alternatives give a more complete picture than attractiveness and increased from the first to the last session. The reasons supporting the chosen alternative increased in strength, but reasons against the non‐chosen alternative decreased. In informal comments participants reported that the study also served as a decision aid.     

Salad = success and fries = failure? Conceptualizing and assessing self‐control outcome measures in food decision‐making research

Researchers studying decisions about food utilize a wide variety of measures to assess self‐control outcomes in experimental studies. However, it is often unclear whether or not the chosen dependent variables truly implicate self‐regulatory mechanisms in decision making. In the present research, we provide a conceptual framework for evaluating self‐control outcome measures, concentrating specifically on the domain of food and eating self‐control decisions. We propose and empirically examine the essential characteristics [i.e., (i) recognized as self‐control relevant by study population, (ii) related to individual differences in self‐control, and (iii) recognized as self‐control relevant by individual] of good self‐control outcome measures and provide specific methodological recommendations (including the “rank‐then‐choose” method) for capturing exhibited self‐control in the domain of food decision making. Our conceptual developments and recommendations seek to enhance the consistency, efficiency, and effectiveness of food‐related decision research. Copyright © 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Trade‐off ranking method for multi‐criteria decision analysis

Multi‐criteria decision analysis presumes trade‐off between different criteria. As a result, the optimal solution is not unique and can be represented by the Pareto frontier in the objective space. Each Pareto solution is a compromise between different objectives. Despite a limited number of Pareto optimal solutions, the decision‐maker eventually has to choose only one option. Such a choice has to be made with the use of additional preferences not included in the original formulation of the optimization problem. The paper represents a new approach to an automatic ranking that can help the decision‐maker. In contrast to the other methodologies, the proposed method is based on the minimization of trade‐off between different Pareto solutions. To be realized, the approach presumes the existence of a well‐distributed Pareto set representing the entire Pareto frontier. In the paper, such a set is generated with the use of the directed search domain algorithm. The method is applied to a number of test cases and compared against two existing alternative approaches.     

High‐Stakes Decision‐Making Within Complex Social Environments: A Computational Model of Belief Systems in the Arab Spring

People experiencing similar conditions may make different decisions, and their belief systems provide insight about these differences. An example of high‐stakes decision‐making within a complex social context is the Arab Spring, in which large numbers of people decided to protest and even larger numbers decided to stay at home. This study uses qualitative analyses of interview narratives and social media addressing individual decisions to develop a computational model tracing the cognitive decision‐making process. The model builds on work by Abelson and Carroll (1965), Schank and Abelson (1977), and Axelrod (1976) to systematically trace the inferences connecting beliefs to decisions. The findings show that protest decisions were often based on positive emotions such as pride, hope, courage, and solidarity, triggered by beliefs about successful protest and self‐sacrifice. By contrast, decisions to stay at home were triggered by beliefs about safety, state approval, and living conditions. As one participant said, “When I heard about the revolution in Tunisia, my heart was filled with solidarity for the people.” In the words of a non‐participant: “When people are killed, we must be careful. There are more important things than protest: safety and stability.” This study of individual explanations about events identifies the role of emotions in high‐stakes decision‐making within complex social environments.     

A Note on the Power of Multiattribute One‐switch Utility Functions

One‐switch utility functions model situations in which the preference between two alternatives switches only once as the outcome of one attribute of both alternatives changes from low to high. Recent research cites evidence that the sum of exponential functions (sumex) is the most convincing type for modelling one‐switch utility functions. Sumex functions allow to model exactly one preferential switch and they are convenient for estimating one‐switch utility functions. However, it is unclear so far if sumex functions are suitable to model preferential switches that are perceivable by a decision maker. This paper first analyses how different the utility of two alternatives before and after a preferential can be modelled with sumex functions given that the preferential switch is caused by a particular attribute outcome improvement. It thereafter investigates how accurately decision makers perceive such utility differences. Copyright © 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Differentiation and consolidation theory of human decision making: A frame of reference for the study of pre- and post-decision processes

Differentiation and Consolidation Theory of decision making models human decision making as an active process in which one alternative is gradually differentiated from other available alternatives. The theory is based on the assumption that it is not sufficient to choose the best alternative, but that a decision involves the selection and creation of a candidate that is sufficiently superior for a decision. This is achieved in differentiation processes which are wholistic, structural or process related. To exemplify, structural differentiation includes both facts and attractiveness restructuring. Following a decision, the theory predicts consolidation processes which work in favor of the chosen alternative. Both differentiation and consolidation are driven by the fact that through experience with the impredictability of the future, a decision maker has learned to prepare for threats against the chosen alternatives. The further this alternative has been differentiated and consolidated, the less the risk of post-decision ambiguity, regret or decision reversal. The study is concluded with references to othee decision theories some of which are viewed as subtheories of Differentiation and Consolidation Theory.     

Pre‐outcome regret: Widespread and overlooked

Many real‐life decisions (e.g. promises, plans and agreements) involve a time interval between when the decision is made and the main outcome is revealed. Nearly all regret studies focus on anticipated or experienced post‐outcome regret. We argue that regret is also frequently experienced in the pre‐outcome period, and that this ‘pre‐outcome regret’ has other sources than regret experienced after the outcome is known. Regret experienced in the pre‐outcome period has an important function post‐outcome regret (usually) cannot have, namely to motivate the decision maker to reconsider the ongoing decision process and reverse the initial decision. Pre‐outcome regret should for these reasons be distinguished from post‐outcome regret, and studied separately. In two scenario studies, participants were asked to imagine their regret after agreeing to perform an inconvenient task. In both, more regret was reported before than after the event, even when they had imagined a ‘worst case’ outcome. In the third study, participants described a difficult choice from their own life. Again, regret was perceived as higher in the pre‐outcome period than afterwards. In a fourth study, participants reported regret ‘online’ during an economic game (a version of the ultimatum game). They regretted their decisions more before than after they knew the outcome. We conclude that experienced pre‐outcome regret is often stronger than post‐outcome regret, and typically increases during the pre‐outcome period. We suspect that the absence of JDM studies of pre‐outcome regret is a legacy of the dominant gambling metaphor within decision research. Copyright © 2010 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Choosing an inferior alternative

We show how decision makers can be induced to choose a personally inferior alternative, a strong violation of rational decision making. First, the inferior alternative is installed as the leading option by starting with information that supports this alternative. Then, the decision maker uses the natural process of distorting new information to support whichever alternative is leading. This leader-supporting distortion overcomes the inherent advantages of the superior alternative. The end result is a tendency to choose the self-identified inferior alternative. We trace the choice process to reveal the amount of distortion and its influence on preference. Self-reported awareness of distortion to support the inferior alternative is not related to the amount of distortion. The absence of valid awareness suggests that the manipulation that produces this preference violation is unlikely to be detected and that the distortion is unlikely to be corrected by the decision maker. As expected, given the lack of awareness, final confidence is just as high when the inferior alternative is chosen as when the superior one is. The discussion considers how to prevent an adversary from manipulating one's decisions using this technique.     

Decision Space Structure and its Influence upon Post-Decisional Confidence

All decisions are inevitably accompanied by a certain degree of confidence. It is assumed that during a compensatory-multi-attribute utility decision process, a cognitive structure, named Decision Space (DS) is formed. This includes cognitive representations of the offered alternatives and of an “ideal” alternative in the form of sets of meaning values. Psychological distances can be “calculated” among all the alternatives. It is hypothesized that Post-Decisional Confidence (PDC) is dependent upon DS structure. PDC is higher when the distance of the chosen alternative from the “ideal” alternative (δ) is minimal, and when the distances of the non-chosen alternatives from the “ideal” alternative (δ) is maximal. 46 subjects participated in a decision-making experiment designed to test this hypothesis. The results supported our hypothesis. It was also found that d and δ have differing degrees of influence on PDC, and that this differential influence is dependent upon the relevance of each for the specific decision. Some theoretical implications of DS were discussed.     

Enhanced Cardiac Perception Is Associated With Increased Susceptibility to Framing Effects

Previous studies suggest in line with dual process models that interoceptive skills affect controlled decisions via automatic or implicit processing. The “framing effect” is considered to capture implicit effects of task‐irrelevant emotional stimuli on decision‐making. We hypothesized that cardiac awareness, as a measure of interoceptive skills, is positively associated with susceptibility to the framing effect. Forty volunteers performed a risky‐choice framing task in which the effect of loss versus gain frames on decisions based on identical information was assessed. The results show a positive association between cardiac awareness and the framing effect, accounting for 24% of the variance in the framing effect. These findings demonstrate that good interoceptive skills are linked to poorer performance in risky choices based on ambivalent information when implicit bias is induced by task‐irrelevant emotional information. These findings support a dual process perspective on decision‐making and suggest that interoceptive skills mediate effects of implicit bias on decisions.     

A parameter analysis method for the weight‐set to satisfy preference orders of alternatives in additive multi‐criteria value models

In the context of the additive multi‐criteria value model, this paper investigates how the set of criteria weights (weight‐set hereafter) can be determined according to the preference orders of alternatives given by the decision maker. A construction method is proposed for the weight‐set for different intervals of β, where β is a differential amount of value between the preference information on two alternatives. The results of this paper are important for sensitivity analysis in multi‐criteria decision making (MCDM) problems and multi‐criteria group decision analysis. Copyright © 2000 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Analytic Confidence and Political Decision‐Making: Theoretical Principles and Experimental Evidence From National Security Professionals

When making decisions under uncertainty, it is important to distinguish between the probability that a judgment is true and the confidence analysts possess in drawing their conclusions. Yet analysts and decision‐makers often struggle to define “confidence” in this context, and many ways that scholars use this term do not necessarily facilitate decision‐making under uncertainty. To help resolve this confusion, we argue for disaggregating analytic confidence along three dimensions: reliability of available evidence, range of reasonable opinion, and responsiveness to new information. After explaining how these attributes hold different implications for decision‐making in principle, we present survey experiments examining how analysts and decision‐makers employ these ideas in practice. Our first experiment found that each conception of confidence distinctively influenced national security professionals' evaluations of high‐stakes decisions. Our second experiment showed that inexperienced assessors of uncertainty could consistently discriminate among our conceptions of confidence when making political forecasts. We focus on national security, where debates about defining “confidence levels” have clear practical implications. But our theoretical framework generalizes to nearly any area of political decision‐making, and our empirical results provide encouraging evidence that analysts and decision‐makers can grasp these abstract elements of uncertainty.     

Taking the easy way out: preference diversity, decision strategies, and decision refusal in groups

It has often been argued and found that preference diversity is beneficial for the quality of group decisions. However, this literature has neglected the fact that in many situations, it is also possible not to choose. Further, preference diversity can be based on attractions, aversions, or both. The authors argue that some types of preference diversity can lead to biased discussions and choice refusal (i.e., the group refuses to choose any of the available options). In a laboratory experiment, three different patterns were observed. When group members held different aversions before discussion, discussions were aversion driven and group members quickly agreed to refuse all alternatives. When each alternative had both a proponent and an adversary, discussions were longer and unbiased but still often led to refusal, which was accompanied by relatively low levels of outcome satisfaction. Only when preference diversity was based only on attractions did it lead to unbiased discussion, low prevalence of refusal, and high outcome satisfaction. Implications for group decision making are discussed.     

An Approach to Multi‐Criteria Decision Problems Under Severe Uncertainty

Solving complex decision problems is a demanding task; it requires determining and evaluating the consequences of decision alternatives. To this end, uncertain factors that can only partly be influenced by the decision makers, and their interdependencies need to be considered. Scenarios focus on this part of the decision problem; they enable a systematic exploration of a multitude of possible future developments that are relevant for the decision including external events and decisions made. Scenarios are particularly useful when the problem is pervaded by severe uncertainties that cannot be quantified. For the evaluation of alternatives, multiple objectives and the potentially diverging preferences of the involved actors need to be respected. Multi‐criteria decision analysis aims at structuring the problem, evaluating the alternatives and supporting decision makers pursuing multiple goals. We propose an approach integrating scenarios and multi‐criteria decision analysis that focuses on the robustness of alternatives in complex, dynamic, uncertain and time‐bound situations. In this integrated framework, the scenarios provide the basis for evaluating a set of alternatives. Ideally, the set of scenarios considered captures all possible future developments. To appropriately explore this set, formal or analytical approaches to scenario construction generate a large number of scenarios. This challenges the decision makers' information‐processing capacity. To support them in managing the richness of information, a two‐fold approach that uses selection and aggregation is presented. By using a selection method, the scenarios that are deemed most relevant are identified, and their evaluations are presented in detail to decision makers. This approach is complemented by an aggregation of scenario evaluations on the basis of the decision makers' preferences. We present two approaches to facilitate the preference elicitation process. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

A Self‐regulation Perspective on Hidden‐profile Problems: If–Then Planning to Review Information Improves Group Decisions

In hidden‐profile (HP) problems, groups squander their potential to make superior decisions because members fail to capitalize on each other's unique knowledge (unshared information). A new self‐regulation perspective suggests that hindrances in goal striving (e.g., failing to seize action opportunities) contribute to this problem. Implementation intentions (if–then plans) are known to help deal with hindrances in goal striving; therefore, supporting decision goals with if–then plans should improve the impact of unshared information on group decisions. Indeed, in line with past research, control participants in two experiments rarely identified the best alternative despite monetary incentives and setting decision goals. In contrast, simply adding if–then plans to review advantages of the non‐preferred alternatives before making the final decision significantly increased solution rates. Process manipulations (Experiment 1) and measures (Experiment 2) indicate that conceptualizing HP problems as a self‐regulation challenge provides explanatory power beyond existing accounts. Copyright © 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Preference‐based Learning of Ideal Solutions in TOPSIS‐like Decision Models

Combining established modelling techniques from multiple‐criteria decision aiding with recent algorithmic advances in the emerging field of preference learning, we propose a new method that can be seen as an adaptive version of TOPSIS, the technique for order preference by similarity to ideal solution decision model (or at least a simplified variant of this model). On the basis of exemplary preference information in the form of pairwise comparisons between alternatives, our method seeks to induce an ‘ideal solution’ that, in conjunction with a weight factor for each criterion, represents the preferences of the decision maker. To this end, we resort to probabilistic models of discrete choice and make use of maximum likelihood inference. First experimental results on suitable preference data suggest that our approach is not only intuitively appealing and interesting from an interpretation point of view but also competitive to state‐of‐the‐art preference learning methods in terms of prediction accuracy. Copyright © 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Good Moral Judgment and Decision‐Making Without Deliberation

It is widely accepted in psychology and cognitive science that there are two “systems” in the mind: one system (System 1) is characterized as quick, intuitive, perceptive, and perhaps more primitive, while the other (System 2) is described as slower, more deliberative, and responsible for our higher‐order cognition. I use the term “reflectivism” to capture the view that conscious reflection—in the “System 2” sense—is a necessary feature of good moral judgment and decision‐making. This is not to suggest that System 2 must operate alone in forming our moral decisions, but that it plays a normatively ineliminable role. In this paper, I discuss arguments that have been offered in defense of reflectivism. These arguments fit into two broad categories; let us think of them as two sides of a coin. On the first side are arguments about the efficaciousness of conscious reasoning—for example, without conscious deliberation we will make bad moral judgments and decisions. On the other side of the coin are arguments about the centrality of conscious deliberation to normative actions—for example, without conscious deliberation we are no more agential than animals or automatons. Despite their attractiveness, I argue that these arguments do not successfully establish that reflection is a necessary component of good moral judgment and decision‐making. If I am right, the idea that good moral judgment and decision‐making can result from entirely automatic and subconscious processes gains traction. My goal in this paper is to show that reflectivism fails to include the full range of cases of moral decision‐making and that a theory of automaticity may do a better job. I briefly discuss at the end of the paper how an account of successful automatic moral judgment and decision‐making might begin to take shape.     

Testing take-the-best in new and changing environments

Take-the-best is a decision-making strategy that chooses between alternatives, by searching the cues representing the alternatives in order of cue validity, and choosing the alternative with the first discriminating cue. Theoretical support for take-the-best comes from the “fast and frugal” approach to modeling cognition, which assumes decision-making strategies need to be fast to cope with a competitive world, and be simple to be robust to uncertainty and environmental change. We contribute to the empirical evaluation of take-the-best in two ways. First, we generate four new environments—involving bridge lengths, hamburger prices, theme park attendances, and US university rankings—supplementing the relatively limited number of naturally cue-based environments previously considered. We find that take-the-best is as accurate as rival decision strategies that use all of the available cues. Secondly, we develop 19 new data sets characterizing the change in cities and their populations in four countries. We find that take-the-best maintains its accuracy and limited search as the environments change, even if cue validities learned in one environment are used to make decisions in another. Once again, we find that take-the-best is as accurate as rival strategies that use all of the cues. We conclude that these new evaluations support the theoretical claims of the accuracy, frugality, and robustness for take-the-best, and that the new data sets provide a valuable resource for the more general study of the relationship between effective decision-making strategies and the environments in which they operate.     

Evaluating Decision Makers: The Role of Choice Congruence and Outcome

Two studies were conducted in which decision makers were evaluated by subjects who had agreed or disagreed with the decision maker's choice. Subjects read one of two vignettes describing the alternatives available to the decision maker, indicated which alternative they personally favored, and then learned about the decision maker's choice and the outcome that occurred. Study 1 varied whether the outcomes of the decision maker's choice were positive or negative, and whether the subject's preferred option matched (congruent choice) or did not match (incongruent choice) that of the decision maker. Subjects rated the extent to which they thought the decision maker was worthy of praise (in the case of positive outcomes) or blame (in the case of negative outcomes), and the decision maker's likableness and competence. Results revealed a strong effect of congruence on attributions of praise and blame: More praise was ascribed to an agreeing decision maker and more blame to a disagreeing decision maker. The degree to which the decision maker was seen as likable was affected by congruence only, whereas perceived competence was influenced by both outcome and congruence. Study 2 addresses some methodological issues that were unresolved in Study 1 and replicated the results of the first study, using new stimulus materials and an expanded set of dependent measures.     

Attribute‐based differentiation of alternatives

An intermediate step is introduced to the dialogue decision process for decision analysis. Alternatives are refined after they have been generated within a strategy table but before they are subject to more detailed evaluation. Two or more judges create a subjective mapping from alternatives to attributes that will later be mapped to criteria. In strategy tables, each of the alternative strategies consists of a coherent set of choices made across several decisions that are to be coordinated. These strategic alternatives are modified so as to increase their differentiation in the attribute space, rather than in the decision space alone. When criteria weights are unknown, the best alternative from the modified set may be superior to the best alternative from the original set. Furthermore, analysis of the resulting alternatives may yield a better mapping of the value response surface for the action space, in the sense that this mapping leads to eventual construction of a higher value alternative. Results are reported for a consulting engagement incorporating the proposed step. Copyright © 2003 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.