Neural implementation of probabilistic models of cognition

Bayesian models of cognition hypothesize that human brains make sense of data by representing probability distributions and applying Bayes’ rule to find the best explanation for available data. Understanding the neural mechanisms underlying probabilistic models remains important because Bayesian models provide a computational framework, rather than specifying mechanistic processes. Here, we propose a deterministic neural-network model which estimates and represents probability distributions from observable events—a phenomenon related to the concept of probability matching. Our model learns to represent probabilities without receiving any representation of them from the external world, but rather by experiencing the occurrence patterns of individual events. Our neural implementation of probability matching is paired with a neural module applying Bayes’ rule, forming a comprehensive neural scheme to simulate human Bayesian learning and inference. Our model also provides novel explanations of base-rate neglect, a notable deviation from Bayes.     

Neural modeling,functional brain imaging,and cognition

The richness and complexity of data sets acquired from PET or fMRI studies of human cognition have not been exploited until recently by computational neural-modeling methods. In this article, two neural-modeling approaches for use with functional brain imaging data are described. One, which uses structural equation modeling, estimates the functional strengths of the anatomical connections between various brain regions during specific cognitive tasks. The second employs large-scale neural modeling to relate functional neuroimaging signals in multiple, interconnected brain regions to the underlying neurobiological time-varying activities in each region. Delayed match-to-sample (visual working memory for form) tasks are used to illustrate these models.     

Neural signatures of number processing in human infants: evidence for two core systems underlying numerical cognition

Behavioral research suggests two cognitive systems are at the foundations of numerical thinking: one for representing 1-3 objects in parallel and one for representing and comparing large, approximate numerical magnitudes. We tested for dissociable neural signatures of these systems in preverbal infants, by recording event-related potentials (ERPs) as 6-7.5 month-old infants (n = 32) viewed dot arrays containing either small (1-3) or large (8-32) sets of objects in a number alternation paradigm. If small and large numbers are represented by the same neural system, then the brain response to the arrays should scale with ratio for both number ranges, a behavioral and brain signature of the approximate numerical magnitude system obtained in animals and in human adults. Contrary to this prediction, a mid-latency positivity (P500) over parietal scalp sites was modulated by the ratio between successive large, but not small, numbers. Conversely, an earlier peaking positivity (P400) over occipital-temporal sites was modulated by the absolute cardinal value of small, but not large, numbers. These results provide evidence for two early developing systems of non-verbal numerical cognition: one that responds to small quantities as individual objects and a second that responds to large quantities as approximate numerical values. These brain signatures are functionally similar to those observed in previous studies of non-symbolic number with adults, suggesting that this dissociation may persist over vast differences in experience and formal training in mathematics.     

Musical experts recruit action-related neural structures in harmonic anomaly detection: Evidence for embodied cognition in expertise

Humans are extremely good at detecting anomalies in sensory input. For example, while listening to a piece of Western-style music, an anomalous key change or an out-of-key pitch is readily apparent, even to the non-musician. In this paper we investigate differences between musical experts and non-experts during musical anomaly detection. Specifically, we analyzed the electroencephalograms (EEG) of five expert cello players and five non-musicians while they listened to excerpts of J.S. Bach’s Prelude from Cello Suite No. 1. All subjects were familiar with the piece, though experts also had extensive experience playing the piece. Subjects were told that anomalous musical events (AMEs) could occur at random within the excerpts of the piece and were told to report the number of AMEs after each excerpt. Furthermore, subjects were instructed to remain still while listening to the excerpts and their lack of movement was verified via visual and EEG monitoring. Experts had significantly better behavioral performance (i.e. correctly reporting AME counts) than non-experts, though both groups had mean accuracies greater than 80%. These group differences were also reflected in the EEG correlates of key-change detection post-stimulus, with experts showing more significant, greater magnitude, longer periods of, and earlier peaks in condition-discriminating EEG activity than novices. Using the timing of the maximum discriminating neural correlates, we performed source reconstruction and compared significant differences between cellists and non-musicians. We found significant differences that included a slightly right lateralized motor and frontal source distribution. The right lateralized motor activation is consistent with the cortical representation of the left hand – i.e. the hand a cellist would use, while playing, to generate the anomalous key-changes. In general, these results suggest that sensory anomalies detected by experts may in fact be partially a result of an embodied cognition, with a model of the action for generating the anomaly playing a role in its detection.     

The self and social cognition: the role of cortical midline structures and mirror neurons

Recent evidence suggests that there are at least two large-scale neural networks that represent the self and others. Whereas frontoparietal mirror-neuron areas provide the basis for bridging the gap between the physical self and others through motor-simulation mechanisms, cortical midline structures engage in processing information about the self and others in more abstract, evaluative terms. This framework provides a basis for reconciling findings from two separate but related lines of research: self-related processing and social cognition. The neural systems of midline structures and mirror neurons show that self and other are two sides of the same coin, whether their physical interactions or their most internal mental processes are examined.     

Quantum structure in cognition

The broader scope of our investigations is the search for the way in which concepts and their combinations carry and influence meaning and what this implies for human thought. More specifically, we examine the use of the mathematical formalism of quantum mechanics as a modeling instrument and propose a general mathematical modeling scheme for the combinations of concepts. We point out that quantum mechanical principles, such as superposition and interference, are at the origin of specific effects in cognition related to concept combinations, such as the guppy effect and the overextension and underextension of membership weights of items. We work out a concrete quantum mechanical model for a large set of experimental data of membership weights with overextension and underextension of items with respect to the conjunction and disjunction of pairs of concepts, and show that no classical model is possible for these data. We put forward an explanation by linking the presence of quantum aspects that model concept combinations to the basic process of concept formation. We investigate the implications of our quantum modeling scheme for the structure of human thought, and show the presence of a two-layer structure consisting of a classical logical layer and a quantum conceptual layer. We consider connections between our findings and phenomena such as the disjunction effect and the conjunction fallacy in decision theory, violations of the sure thing principle, and the Allais and Elsberg paradoxes in economics.     

Sex differences in cognition

Sex differences in cognitive skills, grouped into three areas — motor, spatial, and linguistic — are assessed in the context of current notions of cerebral lateralization (Buffery and Gray, 1972). There are few convincing sex differences, either overall, or in interactions with (putative) functional localization. There are several qualifying criteria (nature of further interactions with age, birth order, culture, sex of experimenter, sex role pressure) which would have to be met, but these are as yet inadequately documented. Serious caution is urged on the proliferating number of researchers in this area.     

Prospective cognition in rats

Efforts to develop animal models of memory are critical for understanding the neural substrate of memory. Memory is essential for daily life and enables information to be stored and retrieved after seconds to years. The ability to remember episodes from the past is thought to be related to the ability to plan for the future. Here we focus on a particular aspect of prospective cognition, namely the ability to remember to take action when a future scenario occurs. This review focuses on a recently developed method to evaluate prospective memory in the rat. Available evidence suggests that rats remember to take action in the future, but little is known about the temporal specificity of such memories or about the flexibility and limitations of prospective memories. Recent studies that suggest that rats remember a specific past episode are reviewed to underscore potential approaches that may be used to explore the range and limits of prospective cognition. The review highlights some directions to explore, including the temporal specificity of prospective cognition, the range of flexibility or creativity within prospective cognition, and the constraints imposed by multiple motivational systems.     

Exploring the space of cognitive architectures

Production systems have been proposed as a candidate for the basic architecture of the human information processor. We consider a number of dimensions along which production systems can vary, and we discuss PRISM, a production system formalism designed to aid cognitive modelers in their exploration of the space of architectures. Examples of PRISM settings are presented in the context of particular models. Finally, some heuristics are suggested for efficiently searching the space of possible architectures.     

The primacy of cognition in schizophrenia

Cognitive tasks and concepts are used increasingly in schizophrenia science and treatment. Recent meta-analyses show that across a spectrum of research domains only cognitive measures distinguish a majority of schizophrenia patients from healthy people. Average effect sizes derived from common clinical tests of attention, memory, language, and reasoning are twice as large as those obtained in structural magnetic resonance imaging and positron emission tomography studies. Chronic stress, genes, brain disturbances, task structure, gender, and sociocultural background may all enhance the sensitivity of cognitive performance to schizophrenia. At the same time, disease heterogeneity and the presence of endophenotypes and subtypes within the patient population may place upper limits on the strength of any specific cognitive finding. Schizophrenia is a complex biobehavioral disorder that manifests itself primarily in cognition.     

Frames of reference in social cognition

How is mindreading affected by social context? It is often implicitly assumed that there is one single way to understand others, whatever the situation or the identity of the person. In contrast, I emphasize the duality of functions of mindreading depending on the context (social interaction and social observation), as well as the duality of social frames of reference (egocentric and allocentric). I argue in favour of a functional distinction between knowledge-oriented mindreading and interaction-oriented mindreading. They both aim at understanding other people's behaviour. But they do so using different strategies. However, to say that mindreading has two functions does not suffice to show that there are two kinds of mindreading. One and the same ability could accomplish different functions. Unfortunately, there has been almost no experimental data on a possible dissociation between two kinds of mindreading abilities. Nonetheless, I discuss a few results that point towards a dual ability.