Neural signatures of number processing in human infants: evidence for two core systems underlying numerical cognition

Behavioral research suggests two cognitive systems are at the foundations of numerical thinking: one for representing 1-3 objects in parallel and one for representing and comparing large, approximate numerical magnitudes. We tested for dissociable neural signatures of these systems in preverbal infants, by recording event-related potentials (ERPs) as 6-7.5 month-old infants (n = 32) viewed dot arrays containing either small (1-3) or large (8-32) sets of objects in a number alternation paradigm. If small and large numbers are represented by the same neural system, then the brain response to the arrays should scale with ratio for both number ranges, a behavioral and brain signature of the approximate numerical magnitude system obtained in animals and in human adults. Contrary to this prediction, a mid-latency positivity (P500) over parietal scalp sites was modulated by the ratio between successive large, but not small, numbers. Conversely, an earlier peaking positivity (P400) over occipital-temporal sites was modulated by the absolute cardinal value of small, but not large, numbers. These results provide evidence for two early developing systems of non-verbal numerical cognition: one that responds to small quantities as individual objects and a second that responds to large quantities as approximate numerical values. These brain signatures are functionally similar to those observed in previous studies of non-symbolic number with adults, suggesting that this dissociation may persist over vast differences in experience and formal training in mathematics.     

Musical experts recruit action-related neural structures in harmonic anomaly detection: Evidence for embodied cognition in expertise

Humans are extremely good at detecting anomalies in sensory input. For example, while listening to a piece of Western-style music, an anomalous key change or an out-of-key pitch is readily apparent, even to the non-musician. In this paper we investigate differences between musical experts and non-experts during musical anomaly detection. Specifically, we analyzed the electroencephalograms (EEG) of five expert cello players and five non-musicians while they listened to excerpts of J.S. Bach’s Prelude from Cello Suite No. 1. All subjects were familiar with the piece, though experts also had extensive experience playing the piece. Subjects were told that anomalous musical events (AMEs) could occur at random within the excerpts of the piece and were told to report the number of AMEs after each excerpt. Furthermore, subjects were instructed to remain still while listening to the excerpts and their lack of movement was verified via visual and EEG monitoring. Experts had significantly better behavioral performance (i.e. correctly reporting AME counts) than non-experts, though both groups had mean accuracies greater than 80%. These group differences were also reflected in the EEG correlates of key-change detection post-stimulus, with experts showing more significant, greater magnitude, longer periods of, and earlier peaks in condition-discriminating EEG activity than novices. Using the timing of the maximum discriminating neural correlates, we performed source reconstruction and compared significant differences between cellists and non-musicians. We found significant differences that included a slightly right lateralized motor and frontal source distribution. The right lateralized motor activation is consistent with the cortical representation of the left hand – i.e. the hand a cellist would use, while playing, to generate the anomalous key-changes. In general, these results suggest that sensory anomalies detected by experts may in fact be partially a result of an embodied cognition, with a model of the action for generating the anomaly playing a role in its detection.     

Quantum structure in cognition

The broader scope of our investigations is the search for the way in which concepts and their combinations carry and influence meaning and what this implies for human thought. More specifically, we examine the use of the mathematical formalism of quantum mechanics as a modeling instrument and propose a general mathematical modeling scheme for the combinations of concepts. We point out that quantum mechanical principles, such as superposition and interference, are at the origin of specific effects in cognition related to concept combinations, such as the guppy effect and the overextension and underextension of membership weights of items. We work out a concrete quantum mechanical model for a large set of experimental data of membership weights with overextension and underextension of items with respect to the conjunction and disjunction of pairs of concepts, and show that no classical model is possible for these data. We put forward an explanation by linking the presence of quantum aspects that model concept combinations to the basic process of concept formation. We investigate the implications of our quantum modeling scheme for the structure of human thought, and show the presence of a two-layer structure consisting of a classical logical layer and a quantum conceptual layer. We consider connections between our findings and phenomena such as the disjunction effect and the conjunction fallacy in decision theory, violations of the sure thing principle, and the Allais and Elsberg paradoxes in economics.     

Prospective cognition in rats

Efforts to develop animal models of memory are critical for understanding the neural substrate of memory. Memory is essential for daily life and enables information to be stored and retrieved after seconds to years. The ability to remember episodes from the past is thought to be related to the ability to plan for the future. Here we focus on a particular aspect of prospective cognition, namely the ability to remember to take action when a future scenario occurs. This review focuses on a recently developed method to evaluate prospective memory in the rat. Available evidence suggests that rats remember to take action in the future, but little is known about the temporal specificity of such memories or about the flexibility and limitations of prospective memories. Recent studies that suggest that rats remember a specific past episode are reviewed to underscore potential approaches that may be used to explore the range and limits of prospective cognition. The review highlights some directions to explore, including the temporal specificity of prospective cognition, the range of flexibility or creativity within prospective cognition, and the constraints imposed by multiple motivational systems.     

Exploring the space of cognitive architectures

Production systems have been proposed as a candidate for the basic architecture of the human information processor. We consider a number of dimensions along which production systems can vary, and we discuss PRISM, a production system formalism designed to aid cognitive modelers in their exploration of the space of architectures. Examples of PRISM settings are presented in the context of particular models. Finally, some heuristics are suggested for efficiently searching the space of possible architectures.     

The primacy of cognition in schizophrenia

Cognitive tasks and concepts are used increasingly in schizophrenia science and treatment. Recent meta-analyses show that across a spectrum of research domains only cognitive measures distinguish a majority of schizophrenia patients from healthy people. Average effect sizes derived from common clinical tests of attention, memory, language, and reasoning are twice as large as those obtained in structural magnetic resonance imaging and positron emission tomography studies. Chronic stress, genes, brain disturbances, task structure, gender, and sociocultural background may all enhance the sensitivity of cognitive performance to schizophrenia. At the same time, disease heterogeneity and the presence of endophenotypes and subtypes within the patient population may place upper limits on the strength of any specific cognitive finding. Schizophrenia is a complex biobehavioral disorder that manifests itself primarily in cognition.     

Frames of reference in social cognition

How is mindreading affected by social context? It is often implicitly assumed that there is one single way to understand others, whatever the situation or the identity of the person. In contrast, I emphasize the duality of functions of mindreading depending on the context (social interaction and social observation), as well as the duality of social frames of reference (egocentric and allocentric). I argue in favour of a functional distinction between knowledge-oriented mindreading and interaction-oriented mindreading. They both aim at understanding other people's behaviour. But they do so using different strategies. However, to say that mindreading has two functions does not suffice to show that there are two kinds of mindreading. One and the same ability could accomplish different functions. Unfortunately, there has been almost no experimental data on a possible dissociation between two kinds of mindreading abilities. Nonetheless, I discuss a few results that point towards a dual ability.     

Optimal predictions in everyday cognition

Human perception and memory are often explained as optimal statistical inferences that are informed by accurate prior probabilities. In contrast, cognitive judgments are usually viewed as following error-prone heuristics that are insensitive to priors. We examined the optimality of human cognition in a more realistic context than typical laboratory studies, asking people to make predictions about the duration or extent of everyday phenomena such as human life spans and the box-office take of movies. Our results suggest that everyday cognitive judgments follow the same optimal statistical principles as perception and memory, and reveal a close correspondence between people's implicit probabilistic models and the statistics of the world.     

Modeling individual differences in cognition

Many evaluations of cognitive models rely on data that have been averaged or aggregated across all experimental subjects, and so fail to consider the possibility of important individual differences between subjects. Other evaluations are done at the single-subject level, and so fail to benefit from the reduction of noise that data averaging or aggregation potentially provides. To overcome these weaknesses, we have developed a general approach to modeling individual differences using families of cognitive models in which different groups of subjects are identified as having different psychological behavior. Separate models with separate parameterizations are applied to each group of subjects, and Bayesian model selection is used to determine the appropriate number of groups. We evaluate this individual differences approach in a simulation study and show that it is superior in terms of the key modeling goals of prediction and understanding. We also provide two practical demonstrations of the approach, one using the ALCOVE model of category learning with data from four previously analyzed category learning experiments, the other using multidimensional scaling representational models with previously analyzed similarity data for colors. In both demonstrations, meaningful individual differences are found and the psychological models are able to account for this variation through interpretable differences in parameterization. The results highlight the potential of extending cognitive models to consider individual differences.     

Evidentiality in language and cognition

What is the relation between language and thought? Specifically, how do linguistic and conceptual representations make contact during language learning? This paper addresses these questions by investigating the acquisition of evidentiality (the linguistic encoding of information source) and its relation to children's evidential reasoning. Previous studies have hypothesized that the acquisition of evidentiality is complicated by the subtleness and abstractness of the underlying concepts; other studies have suggested that learning a language which systematically (e.g. grammatically) marks evidential categories might serve as a pacesetter for early reasoning about sources of information. We conducted experimental studies with children learning Korean (a language with evidential morphology) and English (a language without grammaticalized evidentiality) in order to test these hypotheses. Our experiments compared 3- and 4-year-old Korean children's knowledge of the semantics and discourse functions of evidential morphemes to their (non-linguistic) ability to recognize and report different types of evidential sources. They also compared Korean children's source monitoring abilities to the source monitoring abilities of English-speaking children of the same age. We found that Korean-speaking children have considerable success in producing evidential morphology but their comprehension of such morphology is very fragile. Nevertheless, young Korean speakers are able to reason successfully about sources of information in non-linguistic tasks; furthermore, their performance in these tasks is similar to that of English-speaking peers. These results support the conclusion that the acquisition of evidential expressions poses considerable problems for learners; however, these problems are not (necessarily) conceptual in nature. Our data also suggest that, contrary to relativistic expectations, children's ability to reason about sources of information proceeds along similar lines in diverse language-learning populations and is not tied to the acquisition of the linguistic markers of evidentiality in the exposure language. We discuss implications of our findings for the relationship between linguistic and conceptual representations during development.     

Socio-spatial cognition in vervet monkeys

Safety in numbers is thought to be the principal advantage of living in groups for many species. The group can only provide protection against predators, however, when group cohesion is maintained. Vocalisations are used to monitor inter-individual distances, especially under conditions of poor visibility, but should be avoided in the presence of predators. Mentally tracking the movements of silent and invisible group members would allow animals foraging in dense vegetation to stay close to their group members while reducing the use of vocal contact. We tested the socio-spatial cognitive abilities of wild vervet monkeys (Chlorocebus pygerythrus) by comparing their reactions to plausible and implausible displacements of group members simulated by sound playbacks. Our methods are comparable to those used in studies of ‘object permanence’ and ‘invisible displacements’ of inanimate objects. Our results show that vervets can track the whereabouts of invisibly and silently moving group members, at least over short periods of time.     

Precocious quantitative cognition in monkeys

Basic quantitative abilities are thought to have an innate basis in humans partly because the ability to discriminate quantities emerges early in child development. If humans and nonhuman primates share this developmentally primitive foundation of quantitative reasoning, then this ability should be present early in development across species and should emerge earlier in monkeys than in humans because monkeys mature faster than humans. We report that monkeys spontaneously make accurate quantity choices by 1 year of age in a task that human children begin to perform only at 2.5 to 3 years of age. Additionally, we report that the quantitative sensitivity of infant monkeys is equal to that of the adult animals in their group and that rates of learning do not differ between infant and adult animals. This novel evidence of precocious quantitative reasoning in infant monkeys suggests that human quantitative reasoning shares its early developing foundation with other primates. The data further suggest that early developing components of primate quantitative reasoning are constrained by maturational factors related to genetic development as opposed to learning experience alone.     

Retrieval processes in distance cognition

Two studies were performed to evaluate the role of information retrieval in the cognition of traversed distance. In Study 1, subjects walked a pathway containing intersections that were labeled with either high-frequency or low-frequency proper names. The pathway with high-frequency names was estimated as longer than the pathway with low-frequency names. Subsequent tests of memory for names indicated that high- and low-frequency names were recognized equally well, but that the former were recalled more easily. Prompting subjects with intersection names eliminated the difference in distance estimation between highand low-frequency name conditions. A second study demonstrated that category prompts that increased information recall also increased estimated distance. Results were interpreted as suggesting a significant role of information retrieval in distance cognition.     

Sex differences in face cognition

Although there is abundant evidence for female superiority in Face Cognition (FC), a number of questions regarding sex differences remain to be addressed. Here we report a reanalysis of data on the level of latent factors, modeled on the basis of an extensive test battery applied to three samples of over 800 adults in all. In independent samples the measurement structure of FC was invariant for both sexes, indicating that the measurement of the construct does not depend on the context variable sex, and investigating mean performance differences will not be biased by measurement issues — a neglected aspect in previous studies. We confirmed female superiority for face perception (FP) and face memory (FM). For the first time we could show that these sex differences prevailed after accounting for sex differences in broadly measured general cognitive functioning and in object perception. Across adult age, sex differences in FM increased due to the rapid decline of this ability in men, whereas performance in women remained stable across adult age. Self-reported social involvement and things-oriented activities moderated sex-differences in FM. Results show that sex differences are salient at the level of specific FC constructs and that they can be partially explained by social involvement.