Maintenance rehearsal affects knowing,not remembering; elaborative rehearsal affects remembering,not knowing

In a directed-forgetting paradigm, each word in a study list was followed by a cue designating that word as eitherlearn orforget. This cue appeared after either a short or a long delay. It was assumed that a long delay would increase maintenance rehearsal of all the words, and that only the words followed by a learn cue would be rehearsed elaboratively. Moreover, because the interval between the words was constant, a short cue delay should allow more time for elaborative rehearsal. In a subsequent test, subjects maderemember orknow responses to indicate whether recognition of each word was accompanied by conscious recollection or by feelings of familiarity in the absence of conscious recollection. The hypothesis was that remembering depends on elaborative rehearsal, and knowing depends on maintenance rehearsal. In accord with this hypothesis, the learn-versus-forget designation influenced remember but not know responses, and there were more remember responses after the short cue delay; cue delay influenced know responses, regardless of word designation.     

Dissociative effects of alcohol on recollective experience

This article reports a study comparing the effects of a single dose of alcohol with a matched placebo drink on recognition memory with and without conscious recollection. A double-blind, cross-over design was used with healthy volunteers who were all social drinkers. Processing depth at study was manipulated using generate versus read instructions. Conscious recollection at test was assessed using the remember-know-guess paradigm (Gardiner, 1988; Tulving, 1985). Alcohol significantly reduced conscious recollection (remember responses) but had no effect on recognition in the absence of conscious recollection (know responses). False alarms rates were low and unaffected by alcohol. Previous findings that generation effects are found only for remember responses were closely replicated. A further dissociation of the generation effect occurred between treatments in that deeper processing at study facilitated recognition on placebo but not on alcohol. That both alcohol and depth of processing produce dissociative effects on recollective experience provides further evidence that remembering and knowing reflect distinct memory systems.     

Investigating the attentional demands of recognition memory: Manipulating depth of encoding at study and level of attention at test

Two experiments investigated the effects of divided attention at test after manipulating levels of processing at study. In Experiment 1 items were studied either intact or as anagrams. In Experiment 2 items were studied with either full or divided attention (DA). In both experiments participants carried out a recognition test with either full or divided attention. Analysis of remember and know responses revealed that DA at test had no effect on remember responses to anagrams or to items studied with full attention. In contrast, Know responses decreased with DA at test, and this occurred for items studied in both deep and shallow encoding conditions. The present study confirms recent findings (Knott & Dewhurst, 2007a) that knowing can rely on more controlled retrieval processes, whereas remembering can rely on more automatic retrieval processes. Differences in the controlled processes associated with recollection and familiarity and remember and know responses are discussed.     

Remembering versus knowing during face recognition in unilateral temporal lobe epilepsy patients with or without hippocampal sclerosis

Recognition memory involves knowing an item was learned (familiarity) and remembering contextual details about the prior learning episode (recollection). We tested three competing hypotheses about the role of the hippocampus in recollection and familiarity. It mediates either recollection or familiarity, or serves both processes. We further tested whether the left temporal lobe mediates recollection and the right temporal lobe familiarity (modes of processing view), or whether the two temporal lobes mediate remembering material specifically (material specificity view). We investigated 24-h face recognition using the "remember-know" procedure. We studied 23 left and 24 right temporal lobe epilepsy (LTLE/RTLE) patients with and without hippocampal sclerosis (HS+/HS-) and 31 healthy participants. HS+ patients made fewer know responses than HS- patients or healthy participants. RTLE was related to fewer remember responses than LTLE. Our results suggest the hippocampus has a critical role in familiarity. Further, our findings support the material specificity hypothesis of laterality.     

Test context affects recollection and familiarity ratings: implications for measuring recognition experiences

The binary remember/know task requires participants to dichotomize their subjective recognition experiences into those with recollection and those only with familiarity. Many variables have produced dissociative effects on remember/know judgments. In contrast, having participants make independent recollection/familiarity ratings has consistently produced parallel effects, suggesting the dissociations may be artifacts of using binary judgments. Bodner and Lindsay (2003) reported a test-list context effect with binary judgments: Increased remembering but decreased knowing for a set of critical items tested with a set of less-memorable (vs. more-memorable) items. Here we report a parallel effect of test-list context on recollection and familiarity ratings, induced by a shift in response bias. We argue that independent ratings are preferable to binary judgments because they allow participants to directly report the co-occurrence of recollection and familiarity for each item. Implications for the measurement of self-reported recognition experiences, and for accounts of recognition memory, are discussed.     

Components of recollective experience in cued recall

Components of recollective experience were examined in relation to cue effectiveness by presenting subjects with their own or someone else's associations as retrieval cues. When recalling an item, subjects indicated whether they consciously recollected its prior occurrence ("remembering") or recalled it on some other basis, in the absence of conscious recollection ("knowing"). The results showed that cue compatibility (self-generated vs. someone else's cues) and retention interval (immediate vs. delayed test) selectively impaired retention accompanied by recollective experience, as measured by remember responses, but had reduced effects in the absence of recollective experience, as measured by know responses. The results are discussed in terms of variables dissociating judgments of recollective experience.     

ON REPORTING RECOLLECTIVE EXPERIENCES AND "DIRECT ACCESS TO MEMORY SYSTEMS"

Abstract— Strack and Förster (1995) showed that, unlike remember responses, know responses in recognition memory were influenced by manipulating response bias. We describe and experiment that replicated theirs but additionally allowed subjects to report guesses. Only guess responses were influenced by this manipulation. Response bias had no effects on either know or remember responses. This outcome suggests that manipulating response bias influence know responses only when guessing is encouraged but not reported as such. More-over, though know responses reflected memory for the study events, guess responses did not.     

Memory awareness following speeded compared with unspeeded picture recognition

A remember-know paradigm was used to assess memory awareness following speeded and unspeeded yes/no picture recognition. The beneficial effects of picture size congruency at study and test occurred with speeded as well as with unspeeded recognition. In each case, they were associated with remembering, not with knowing, which remained invariant. Thus, size congruency effects were associated with remembering even when recognition occurred more automatically and hence may be more dependent on a relatively fast familiarity process. In a second experiment, speeded remember responses were compared with remember responses that followed speeded yes/no recognition. There was more remembering when it was the remember responses that were speeded, contrary to what might be expected if remembering reflects a relatively slow recollection process. These results have implications for the ability of dual-process models of recognition memory to account for memory awareness.     

Analysis of RT distributions in the remember—know paradigm

Do remembering and knowing differ qualitatively (reflecting distinct underlying processes) or quantitatively (reflecting different levels of strength)? Broadly speaking, models of remember—know judgments based on these alternatives have been tested by examining the proportion of remember and know responses that are made across conditions or levels of confidence. Here, we consider reaction time (RT) data. We replicate Dewhurst and Conway’s (1994) observation that old judgments followed by remember responses are faster, on average, than those followed by know decisions, but show that this effect is largely due to differing distributions of remember and know responses across confidence levels. In addition, fits of ex-Gaussian distributions of hit RTs followed by either remember or know judgments yield similar parameter values when confidence level is controlled. Thus, these RT data do not provide strong support for the idea that remembering and knowing depend on different processes.     

Examining the basis for illusory recollection: The role of remember/know instructions

Curiously, studies using the remember/know paradigm to measure recollective experience show that people often vividly remember events that never occurred, a phenomenon referred to asillusory recollection. Two experiments tested the hypothesis that false remember responses in the converging associates, or Deese/Roediger-McDermott (DRM) paradigm, reflect accurate memory for the study episode, rather than false recollection of critical lures. To test this hypothesis, we used standard remember instructions that emphasized recollection of the study context by allowing participants to use memory of surrounding list items as evidence for recollection, or we used modified instructions that did not include memory for surrounding list items as a basis for recollection. Results showed that, as compared with the standard instruction condition, the modified instructions selectively reduced reports of false remember responses to critical lures, but did not affect remember responses to studied items. By contrast, remember responses to critical lures were unaffected by an instruction condition that excluded the use of voice information as evidence for remembering. These results suggest that remember responses to falsely recognized items are driven partly by retrieval of studied items, rather than illusory recollection of the critical lures themselves. They further point to the importance of instructions in influencing subjective reports.     

Walking through doorways differentially affects recall and familiarity

Previous research has reported that walking through a doorway to a new location makes memory for objects and events experienced in the previous location less accurate. This effect, termed the location updating effect, has been used to suggest that location changes are used to mark boundaries between events in memory: memories for objects encountered within the current event are more available than those from beyond an event boundary. Within a computer‐generated memory task, participants navigated through virtual rooms, walking through doorways, and interacting with objects. The accuracy and their subjective experience of their memory for the objects (remember/know and confidence) were assessed. The findings showed that shifts in location decreased accurate responses associated with the subjective experience of remembering but not those associated with the experience of knowing, even when considering only the most confident responses in each condition. These findings demonstrate that a shift in location selectively impacts recollection and so contributes to our understanding of boundaries in event memory.     

The mere exposure effect and recognition memory

This investigation explores the relationship between liking ratings and recognition performance for obscure classical and Russian music melodies. Past studies have explored if awareness of stimulus presentation affects the mere exposure effect (MEE) (Bornstein, 1989; Bornstein & D'Agostino, 1992). We investigate if the type of awareness (i.e., "remembering" an actual occurrence of hearing the melody vs. "knowing" that one is familiar with the melody in a more general, less contextualised sense; Tulving, 1985) affects the MEE. In Experiment 1, we administered the liking test and the recognition test within the same test block and found that liking ratings for "remembered" melodies were on average higher than those for melodies that were merely "known". Although the recognition data replicate the findings of Gardiner, Kaminska, Dixon, and Java (1996) whereby remember and know responses to a given stimulus react differently to repetition from one to three trials, liking data did not vary with the degree of exposure. In addition, our adoption of the recognition category "guess" resulted in a pattern of results that is not only different from previous studies but illustrates the importance of judged, instead of true, old/new status in determining liking. The basic findings of Experiment 1 were replicated in Experiment 2 in which the liking test was conducted prior to the recognition test. Implications of these findings for theories of MEE are discussed.     

Perceptual effects and recollective experience in face recognition

Four experiments were conducted investigating the effect of size congruency on facial recognition memory, measured by remember, know and guess responses. Different study times were employed, that is extremely short (300 and 700 ms), short (1,000 ms), and long times (5,000 ms). With the short study time (1,000 ms) size congruency occurred in knowing. With the long study time the effect of size congruency occurred in remembering. These results support the distinctiveness/ fluency account of remembering and knowing as well as the memory systems account, since the size congruency effect that occurred in knowing under conditions that facilitated perceptual fluency also occurred independently in remembering under conditions that facilitated elaborative encoding. They do not support the idea that remember and know responses reflect differences in trace strength.     

Divided attention at retrieval disrupts knowing but not remembering

The view that remember and know responses can be explained within a dual-process framework has recently been questioned (e.g., Gardiner, Konstantinou, Karayianni, & Gregg, 2005). The aims of the present study were to investigate further discrepancies between remember/know (R/K) studies and dual-process models of recognition memory. In two experiments participants were required to make old/new and R/K decisions under full and divided attention conditions. Experiment 1 used a two-step R/K procedure and showed that attention during retrieval reduced overall recognition performance. Experiment 2 used a one-step R/K procedure and showed that dividing attention at retrieval only affected know responses, suggesting that knowing but not remembering relies on controlled retrieval processes. These findings and findings from recent research provide evidence that is inconsistent with the dual-process explanation for R/K research.     

Recognition memory and awareness: A high-frequency advantage in the accuracy of knowing

The well-established advantage of low-frequency words over high-frequency words in recognition memory has been found to occur in remembering and not knowing. Two experiments employed remember and know judgements, and divided attention to investigate the possibility of an effect of word frequency on know responses given appropriate study conditions. With undivided attention at study, the usual low-frequency advantage in the accuracy of remember responses, but no effect on know responses, was obtained. Under a demanding divided attention task at encoding, a high-frequency advantage in the accuracy of know responses was obtained. The results are discussed in relation to theories of knowing, particularly those incorporating perceptual and conceptual fluency.     

Recognition memory and awareness: A high-frequency advantage in the accuracy of knowing

The well-established advantage of low-frequency words over high-frequency words in recognition memory has been found to occur in remembering and not knowing. Two experiments employed remember and know judgements, and divided attention to investigate the possibility of an effect of word frequency on know responses given appropriate study conditions. With undivided attention at study, the usual low-frequency advantage in the accuracy of remember responses, but no effect on know responses, was obtained. Under a demanding divided attention task at encoding, a high-frequency advantage in the accuracy of know responses was obtained. The results are discussed in relation to theories of knowing, particularly those incorporating perceptual and conceptual fluency.     

Automatic processing influences free recall: converging evidence from the process dissociation procedure and remember-know judgments

Dual-process theories of retrieval suggest that controlled and automatic processing contribute to memory performance. Free recall tests are often considered pure measures of recollection, assessing only the controlled process. We report two experiments demonstrating that automatic processes also influence free recall. Experiment 1 used inclusion and exclusion tasks to estimate recollection and automaticity in free recall, adopting a new variant of the process dissociation procedure. Dividing attention during study selectively reduced the recollection estimate but did not affect the automatic component. In Experiment 2, we replicated the results of Experiment 1, and subjects additionally reported remember–know–guess judgments during recall in the inclusion condition. In the latter task, dividing attention during study reduced remember judgments for studied items, but know responses were unaffected. Results from both methods indicated that free recall is partly driven by automatic processes. Thus, we conclude that retrieval in free recall tests is not driven solely by conscious recollection (or remembering) but also by automatic influences of the same sort believed to drive priming on implicit memory tests. Sometimes items come to mind without volition in free recall.     

Divided attention at retrieval disrupts knowing but not remembering

The view that remember and know responses can be explained within a dual-process framework has recently been questioned (e.g., Gardiner, Konstantinou, Karayianni, & Gregg, 2005). The aims of the present study were to investigate further discrepancies between remember/know (R/K) studies and dual-process models of recognition memory. In two experiments participants were required to make old/new and R/K decisions under full and divided attention conditions. Experiment 1 used a two-step R/K procedure and showed that attention during retrieval reduced overall recognition performance. Experiment 2 used a one-step R/K procedure and showed that dividing attention at retrieval only affected know responses, suggesting that knowing but not remembering relies on controlled retrieval processes. These findings and findings from recent research provide evidence that is inconsistent with the dual-process explanation for R/K research.     

The role of decision processes in remembering and knowing

Participants in recognition memory studies are now often asked to partition recognized items into ones that are accompanied by some recollective experience (those they remember) and ones that are not so accompanied (but which they know were previously encountered). Rather than detecting separate memory systems, such attempts to distinguish between remembering and knowing are better understood as a division of positive recognition responses into those that lie above a second decision criterion (remember) and those that do not (know). As such, the amount of memory associated with knowing is strongly dependent on the placement of the decision criteria. A meta-analysis of published data and a simple experiment tested predictions from the decision process analysis of remember/know responses.     

Measuring the speed of the conscious components of recognition memory: remembering is faster than knowing

Three experiments investigated response times (RTs) for remember and know responses in recognition memory. RTs to remember responses were faster than RTs to know responses, regardless of whether the remember-know decision was preceded by an old/new decision (two-step procedure) or was made without a preceding old/new decision (one-step procedure). The finding of faster RTs for R responses was also found when remember-know decisions were made retrospectively. These findings are inconsistent with dual-process models of recognition memory, which predict that recollection is slower and more effortful than familiarity. Word frequency did not influence RTs, but remember responses were faster for words than for nonwords. We argue that the difference in RTs to remember and know responses reflects the time taken to make old/new decisions on the basis of the type of information activated at test.