Computational Representation of Practical Argument

In this paper we consider persuasion in the context of practical reasoning, and discuss the problems associated with construing reasoning about actions in a manner similar to reasoning about beliefs. We propose a perspective on practical reasoning as presumptive justification of a course of action, along with critical questions of this justification, building on the account of Walton. From this perspective, we articulate an interaction protocol, which we call PARMA, for dialogues over proposed actions based on this theory. We outline an axiomatic semantics for the PARMA Protocol, and discuss two implementations which use this protocol to mediate a discussion between humans. We then show how our proposal can be made computational within the framework of agents based on the Belief-Desire-Intention model, and illustrate this proposal with an example debate within a multi agent system.     

More Rational or More Emotional Than Others? Lay Beliefs About Decision-Making Strategies

Research demonstrates that people utilize both reasoning and feeling in decision making and that both strategies can be advantageous. However, little is known about how people perceive their decision-making relative to others. Despite research findings and popular appeals supporting the use of affective decision processes, across a series of studies, we find that individuals believe they rely more on reasoning, and less on feelings, than others. These effects are driven by the motivation to self-enhance where, in most contexts, individuals believe the use of reasoning is superior, and self-enhancing, compared to the use of feelings. Consistent with this mechanism, beliefs that one’s decisions are more rational than others’ are as follows: (a) stronger for those who exhibit greater beliefs in the superiority of reasoning (vs. feeling), (b) attenuated when the decision context precludes motivational thinking about the self or the self is affirmed, and (c) reversed when the use of feelings is perceived as more self-enhancing. We demonstrate downstream consequences (e.g., decision delegation), rule out alternative explanations, and discuss practical implications of these lay beliefs.     

Naturalizing Moral Justification: Rethinking the Method of Moral Epistemology

The companion piece to this article, “Situating Moral Justification,” challenges the idea that moral epistemology's mission is to establish a single, all‐purpose reasoning strategy for moral justification because no reasoning practice can be expected to deliver authoritative moral conclusions in all social contexts. The present article argues that rethinking the mission of moral epistemology requires rethinking its method as well. Philosophers cannot learn which reasoning practices are suitable to use in particular contexts exclusively by exploring logical relations among concepts. Instead, in order to understand which reasoning practices are capable of justifying moral claims in different types of contexts, we need to study empirically the relationships between reasoning practices and the contexts in which they are used. The article proposes that philosophers investigate case studies of real‐world moral disputes in which people lack shared cultural assumptions and/or are unequal in social power. It motivates and explains the proposed case study method and illustrates the philosophical value of this method through a case study.     

"What if…": The Use of Conceptual Simulations in Scientific Reasoning

The term conceptual simulation refers to a type of everyday reasoning strategy commonly called "what if" reasoning. It has been suggested in a number of contexts that this type of reasoning plays an important role in scientific discovery; however, little direct evidence exists to support this claim. This article proposes that conceptual simulation is likely to be used in situations of informational uncertainty, and may be used to help scientists resolve that uncertainty. We conducted two studies to investigate the relationship between conceptual simulation and informational uncertainty. Study 1 was an in vivo study of expert scientists; the results suggest that scientists do use conceptual simulation in situations of informational uncertainty, and that they use conceptual simulation to make inferences from their data using the analogical reasoning process of alignment by similarity detection. Study 2 experimentally manipulated experts' level of uncertainty and provides further support for the hypothesis that conceptual simulation is more likely to be used in situations of informational uncertainty. Finally, we discuss the relationship between conceptual simulation and other types of reasoning using qualitative mental models.     

Children's patterns of reasoning about reading and addition concepts

Children's reasoning was examined within two educational contexts (word reading and addition) so as to understand the factors that contribute to relational reasoning in the two domains. Sixty‐seven 5‐ to 7‐year‐olds were given a series of related words to read or single‐digit addition items to solve (interspersed with unrelated items). The frequency, accuracy, and response times of children's self‐reports on the conceptually related items provided a measure of relational reasoning, while performance on the unrelated addition and reading items provided a measure of procedural skill. The results indicated that the children's ability to use conceptual relations to solve both reading and addition problems enhanced speed and accuracy levels, increased with age, and was related to procedural skill. However, regression analyses revealed that domain‐specific competencies can best explain the use of conceptual relations in both reading and addition. Moreover, a cluster analysis revealed that children differ according to the academic domain in which they first apply conceptual relations and these differences are related to individual variation in their procedural skills within these particular domains. These results highlight the developmental significance of relational reasoning in the context of reading and addition and underscore the importance of concept‐procedure links in explaining children's literacy and arithmetical development.     

Perspective effects in nondeontic versions of the Wason selection task

Perspective effects in the Wason four-card selection task occur when people choose mutually exclusive sets of cards depending on the perspective they adopt when making their choice. Previous demonstrations of perspective effects have been limited to deontic contexts--that is, problem contexts that involve social duty, like permissions and obligations. In three experiments, we demonstrate perspective effects in nondeontic contexts, including a context much like the original one employed by Wason (1966, 1968). We suggest that perspective effects arise whenever the task uses a rule that can be interpreted biconditionally and different perspectives elicit different counterexamples that match the predicted choice sets. This view is consistent with domain-general theories but not with domain-specific theories of deontic reasoning--for example, pragmatic reasoning schemas and social contract theory--that cannot explain perspective effects in nondeontic contexts.     

Heuristic thinking and human intelligence: a commentary on Marewski,Gaissmaier and Gigerenzer

Marewski, Gaissmaier and Gigerenzer (2009) present a review of research on fast and frugal heuristics, arguing that complex problems are best solved by simple heuristics, rather than the application of knowledge and logical reasoning. We argue that the case for such heuristics is overrated. First, we point out that heuristics can often lead to biases as well as effective responding. Second, we show that the application of logical reasoning can be both necessary and relatively simple. Finally, we argue that the evidence for a logical reasoning system that co-exists with simpler heuristic forms of thinking is overwhelming. Not only is it implausible a priori that we would have evolved such a system that is of no use to us, but extensive evidence from the literature on dual processing in reasoning and judgement shows that many problems can only be solved when this form of reasoning is used to inhibit and override heuristic thinking.     

Multiple layers of information processing in deductive reasoning: combining dual strategy and dual-source approaches to reasoning

The idea that inferential performance cannot be analyzed within a single model has been suggested within two theoretical contexts. The dual strategy model suggests that people reason using different approaches to processing statistical information. The dual-source model suggests that people reason probabilistically using both statistical information and some intuition about logical form. Each model suggests that people have different approaches to processing information while making inferences. The following studies examined whether these different forms of information processing were equally present during reasoning. Participants were given a series of problems designed to distinguish counterexample from statistical reasoners. They were then given a series of MP or AC inferences for which identical statistical information was provided. Results show that MP inferences were considered to be deductively valid more often than equivalent AC inferences. The effect of logical form was independent of reasoning strategy, and of relatively equivalent size for both counterexample and statistical reasoners. The second study examined explicitly probabilistic inferences, and showed smaller effects of logical form and of reasoning strategy, although with a complex set of interactions. These results show that understanding the way that people use information when making inferences requires a multidimensional approach.     

The effect of contextual factors on the judgement of informal reasoning fallacies

Informal reasoning fallacies are arguments that are psychologically persuasive but not valid. In order to judge the validity of these arguments one has to be sensitive to the context in which they appear. However, there is no empirical study that examines students' sensitivity to contextual factors and whether contextual factors actually influence their ability to identify informal reasoning fallacies. We hypothesized that when explicitly presented with different argumentative contexts, students' performance would reflect their sensitivity to the contextual nature of informal reasoning fallacies. The two experiments that we conducted support this hypothesis and emphasize the mediating role of perspective taking in students' ability to identify fallacious arguments.     

What makes relational reasoning smart? Revisiting the perceptual‐to‐relational shift in the development of generalization

Development of reasoning is often depicted as involving increasing use of relational similarities and decreasing use of perceptual similarities (‘the perceptual‐to‐relational shift’). We argue that this shift is a special case of a broader developmental trend: increasing sensitivity to the predictive accuracy of different similarity types. To test this hypothesis, we asked participants (3‐, 4‐, 5‐year‐olds and adults) to generalize novel information on two types of problems – offspring problems, where relational matches yield accurate generalizations, and prey problems, where perceptual matches yield accurate generalizations. On offspring problems, we replicated prior findings of increasing relational matches with age. However, we observed decreasing relational matches on prey problems. Provided feedback on their responses, 3‐year‐olds showed the same trend. Findings suggest that the relational shift commonly observed in categorization and analogical reasoning may reflect a general increase in children's sensitivity to cue validity rather than an overall preference to generalize over perceptual similarity.     

Inductive reasoning about causally transmitted properties

Different intuitive theories constrain and guide inferences in different contexts. Formalizing simple intuitive theories as probabilistic processes operating over structured representations, we present a new computational model of category-based induction about causally transmitted properties. A first experiment demonstrates undergraduates’ context-sensitive use of taxonomic and food web knowledge to guide reasoning about causal transmission and shows good qualitative agreement between model predictions and human inferences. A second experiment demonstrates strong quantitative and qualitative fits to inferences about a more complex artificial food web. A third experiment investigates human reasoning about complex novel food webs where species have known taxonomic relations. Results demonstrate a double-dissociation between the predictions of our causal model and a related taxonomic model [Kemp, C., & Tenenbaum, J. B. (2003). Learning domain structures. In Proceedings of the 25th annual conference of the cognitive science society]: the causal model predicts human inferences about diseases but not genes, while the taxonomic model predicts human inferences about genes but not diseases. We contrast our framework with previous models of category-based induction and previous formal instantiations of intuitive theories, and outline challenges in developing a complete model of context-sensitive reasoning.     

The effect of contextual factors on the judgement of informal reasoning fallacies

Informal reasoning fallacies are arguments that are psychologically persuasive but not valid. In order to judge the validity of these arguments one has to be sensitive to the context in which they appear. However, there is no empirical study that examines students' sensitivity to contextual factors and whether contextual factors actually influence their ability to identify informal reasoning fallacies. We hypothesized that when explicitly presented with different argumentative contexts, students' performance would reflect their sensitivity to the contextual nature of informal reasoning fallacies. The two experiments that we conducted support this hypothesis and emphasize the mediating role of perspective taking in students' ability to identify fallacious arguments.     

Imagination,distributed responsibility and vulnerable technological systems: the case of Snorre A

An influential approach to engineering ethics is based on codes of ethics and the application of moral principles by individual practitioners. However, to better understand the ethical problems of complex technological systems and the moral reasoning involved in such contexts, we need other tools as well. In this article, we consider the role of imagination and develop a concept of distributed responsibility in order to capture a broader range of human abilities and dimensions of moral responsibility. We show that in the case of Snorre A, a near-disaster with an oil and gas production installation, imagination played a crucial and morally relevant role in how the crew coped with the crisis. For example, we discuss the role of scenarios and images in the moral reasoning and discussion of the platform crew in coping with the crisis. Moreover, we argue that responsibility for increased system vulnerability, turning an undesired event into a near-disaster, should not be ascribed exclusively, for example to individual engineers alone, but should be understood as distributed between various actors, levels and times. We conclude that both managers and engineers need imagination to transcend their disciplinary perspectives in order to improve the robustness of their organisations and to be better prepared for crisis situations. We recommend that education and training programmes should be transformed accordingly.     

Solving small spaces: investigating the use of landmark cues in brown capuchins (Cebus apella)

Some researchers have recently argued that humans may be unusual among primates in preferring to use landmark information when reasoning about some kinds of spatial problems. Some have explained this phenomenon by positing that our species’ tendency to prefer landmarks stems from a human-unique trait: language. Here, we test this hypothesis—that preferring to use landmarks to solve such tasks is related to language ability—by exploring landmark use in a spatial task in one non-human primate, the brown capuchin monkey (Cebus apella). We presented our subjects with the rotational displacement task, in which subjects attempt to relocate a reward hidden within an array of hiding locations which are subsequently rotated to a new position. Over several experiments, we varied the availability and the salience of a landmark cue within the array. Specifically, we varied (1) visual access to the array during rotation, (2) the type of landmark, (3) the consistency of the landmark qualities, and (4) the amount of exposure to the landmark. Across Experiments 1 through 4, capuchins did not successfully use landmarks cues, suggesting that non-linguistic primates may not spontaneously use landmarks to solve some spatial problems, as in this case of a small-scale dynamic spatial task. Importantly, we also observed that capuchins demonstrated some capacity to learn to use landmarks in Experiment 4, suggesting that non-linguistic creatures may be able to use some landmarks cues in similar spatial tasks with extensive training.     

Building and solving odd-one-out classification problems: A systematic approach

Classification problems (“find the odd-one-out”) are frequently used as tests of inductive reasoning to evaluate human or animal intelligence. This paper introduces a systematic method for building the set of all possible classification problems, followed by a simple algorithm for solving the problems of the R-ASCM, a psychometric test derived from this method. The average Hamming distance finds repetitions of features between and within the problems' sets; it manages to solve 97% of such problems. This performance is equaled only by superior human adults. Finally, these results demonstrate that a simple two-step algorithm can improve categorical case-based reasoning and k-NN algorithms while clarifying the cognitive basis of classification.     

Reasoning serves argumentation in children

The argumentative theory of reasoning (Mercier & Sperber, in press-c) claims that reasoning evolved for argumentation: to find and evaluate arguments in dialogic contexts. The theory has drawn most of its supportive evidence from work with adults, leaving open the possibility that argumentive features of reasoning are in fact entirely learned. Evidence is reviewed here suggesting that the special relation between reasoning and argumentation holds at all ages. More specifically, it is argued that (a) children possess at least rudimentary argument skills, (b) they are able to reap the benefits of social reasoning from very early on, (c) confirmation bias is present as soon as they start to argue, and (d) children can be victims of the same biases that affect adults when they use reasoning in the wrong contexts. These claims strengthen the argumentative theory of reasoning and support a call for more research on the interactive features of reasoning in both adults and children.     

Reflexive Principlism as an Effective Approach for Developing Ethical Reasoning in Engineering

An important goal of teaching ethics to engineering students is to enhance their ability to make well-reasoned ethical decisions in their engineering practice: a goal in line with the stated ethical codes of professional engineering organizations. While engineering educators have explored a wide range of methodologies for teaching ethics, a satisfying model for developing ethical reasoning skills has not been adopted broadly. In this paper we argue that a principlist-based approach to ethical reasoning is uniquely suited to engineering ethics education. Reflexive Principlism is an approach to ethical decision-making that focuses on internalizing a reflective and iterative process of specification, balancing, and justification of four core ethical principles in the context of specific cases. In engineering, that approach provides structure to ethical reasoning while allowing the flexibility for adaptation to varying contexts through specification. Reflexive Principlism integrates well with the prevalent and familiar methodologies of reasoning within the engineering disciplines as well as with the goals of engineering ethics education.     

A Study of Real Dilemmas in Adulthood

The aim of this work is to study real contextualised dilemmas and relevant events of the biographies offered by a group of adult men and women, in order to analyse the contextual and personal factors that influence moral reasoning during this stage of the life cycle. To this end, we interviewed 60 adults who were asked to recount real contextualised dilemmas. The themes of the real dilemmas were later categorised in relation to the stage of moral reasoning reached and then linked to the ecological contexts in which they took place. The results show that the themes related to proximal processes and contexts (family, parenthood) are the most frequent and are related to the conventional level of moral reasoning. However, in relation to social themes and coherence, the reasoning level obtained is more mature. Finally, there are contextual differences regarding the contents of the real dilemmas related to local conflicts or socio-political concern for one??s own community.     

Simple mechanisms for gathering social information

Social contexts are notoriously complex, yet decisions are nevertheless made by using simple strategies. We argue that the concept of fast and frugal heuristics provides a promising framework for understanding how we gather social information to make decisions in social environments. That is, we assume that under limitations of time, energy, and computational resources people use cognitively based shortcuts that rely on information from social environments to solve different types of real problems. We review three successful applications of heuristics to the social arena. We first introduce some commonly faced social inference problems (e.g., selecting a mate or deciding whether to cooperate with someone) and then discuss how individuals can use simple strategies to solve such problems. For each problem, we consider how social environments are structured, and how we take advantage of this structure when using heuristics to make inferences and decisions.     

Gist another panacea? Or just the illusion of inclusion

In this article, we call for a formal approach to modeling the development of reasoning. We discuss the need to operationalize the nature of encoding and processing. These problems are reviewed in the context of fuzzy-trace theory with particular emphasis on class-inclusion reasoning experiments. We argue that salience manipulations (perceptual or linguistic) give the illusion of inclusion by promoting subclass-subclass comparisons. We present an alternate, mathematical model of class-inclusion reasoning in which memory and reasoning parameters are estimated and integrated in a skills analysis of performance. We conclude that without similar formal modeling efforts, the nature of children's reasoning will remain elusive.