From negation to “notion”: Cognitive processes and argumentative strategies

Summary This article deals with the role of negation as a language and cognitive operation. Such a topic is treated here within the framework of the argumentative strategies which consist in making certain cognitive landmarks of the discourse flip over with the intent of imposing the necessity to choose between two types of notions, aiming at the transformation of this choice into an implication. The reference here to the Aristotelian logic of Prior Analytics appears to be more efficient than any other contemporary logic and the author intends to give account of the role of negation as contrary coming into play on an operational and cognitive basis in all the argumentative strategies which oscillate reciprocally from universal to particular.     

Reading paradigms: From lab to cyberspace?

Computer-controlled display procedures useful for doing reading research are discussed. The procedures used in the present research vary the text unit size (from single words to half-sentences), the amount of context available (no context and varying amounts of prior text), text movement (centered words or successive left-to-right placement), and use of text highlighting (present, absent). The data suggest links between the display attributes and the subjects’ coding strategies during reading of mathematical word problems. Display attributes can influence the time course of processing, the subjectively coded unit size, and the nature of linguistic processing. The data also have implications for display attributes that may make reading in cyberspace more user friendly for both novice and expert readers.     

Mirror-reflecting a picture of an object: what happens to the shape percept?

Although a two-dimensional picture never fully specifies the actual layout of the depicted three-dimensional scene, one is still able to make a three-dimensional interpretation. When a picture is mirror-reflected, the range of plausible scenes possibly corresponding with the depicted scene has not changed with respect to the original depiction. We were curious to find out whether the inherent picture ambiguities would be solved the same way or differently. Participants performed local attitude settings on three sets of pictures: (1) original pictures, (2) left-right mirrored pictures, and (3) up-down mirrored pictures. Pairwise comparison of the pictorial reliefs of the depicted object, reconstructed from the raw settings, revealed dissimilarities. The differences, however, could be drastically diminished by conducting an affine transformation correction taking into account not only the depths, but also the picture plane coordinates. The inherent ambiguities seemed thus to be solved differently between conditions. By factoring out different solutions to the ambiguities, the pictorial reliefs were found to be equivalent.     

Lifelong Education: From Conflict to Consensus?

The concept of lifelong education received wide criticism and rejection in many educational circles in the 1970s. Recent developments in educational research and the increasing influence of postmodernist thought, the paper argues, are major factors in the return to favour of lifelong education. While a postmodern society is one characterised more by conflict than by consensus, the paper suggests that consensus on the importance of lifelong education might be one precondition for such a society.     

Understanding phenomena: From social to collective?

In making sense of the world, we typically cooperate, join forces, and draw on one another's competence and expertise. A group or community in which there is a well-functioning division of cognitive-epistemic labor can achieve levels of understanding that a single agent who relies exclusively on her own capacities would probably never achieve. However, is understanding also collective? I.e., is understanding something that can be possessed by a group or community rather than by individuals? In this paper, I develop an account of understanding phenomena according to which understanding a phenomenon requires reasonably endorsing an adequate and intelligible epistemic mediator that accounts for this phenomenon. I then show that understanding, conceived along these lines, can be attributed to collective entities. An important result of my arguments will be that a collective entity's understanding cannot (always) be reduced to the sum of the understandings of the individuals belonging to it. This is because a collective entity can sometimes be rightfully claimed to understand a phenomenon while none of its individual members understands it.     

Can false memories be created through nonconscious processes?

Presentation times of study words presented in the Deese/Roediger and McDermott (DRM) paradigm varied from 20 to 2000 ms per word in an attempt to replicate the false memory effect following extremely short presentations reported by. Both in a within-subjects design (Experiment 1) and in a between-subjects design (Experiment 2) subjects showed memory for studied words as well as a false memory effect for related critical lures in the 2000-ms condition. However, in the conditions with shorter presentation times (20 ms in Experiment 1; 20 and 40 ms in Experiment 2) no memory for studied words, nor a false memory effect was found. We argue that there is at present no strong evidence supporting the claim for a nonconscious basis of the false memory effect.     

Can young preschool children be trained to perform percept deprivation tasks?

Young preschool children aged 2 and 3 years were exposed to a novel paradigm designed to train visual perception skills. The results indicate that children of this age can be trained to perform a percept deprivation task that requires a sophisticated understanding of attention not normally mastered until 3.5-4 years. Results are discussed with reference to engagement, a precursor to an adult-like understanding of perception.     

From Essence to Metaphysical Modality?

Axiomathes - How can we acquire knowledge of metaphysical modality? How can someone come to know that he could have been elsewhere right now, or an accountant rather than a philosophy teacher, but...     

Distinguishing common and task-specific processes in word identification: a matter of some moment?

The same 500 words were presented in 6 different word identification tasks (Experiment 1: lexical decision, semantic categorization, and 3 speeded naming tasks; Experiment 2: delayed naming). Reaction time (RT) distributions were estimated for each task and analyses tested for the effects of word frequency and animacy on various parameters of the RT distribution. Low frequency words yielded more skewed distributions than high frequency words in all tasks except delayed naming. The differential skew was most marked for tasks that required lexical discrimination. The semantic categorization task yielded highly skewed distributions for all words, but the word frequency effect was due to shifts in the location of the RT distributions rather than changes in skew. The results are used to evaluate the relative contributions of a common lexical access process and task-specific processes to performance in lexical discrimination and naming tasks.     

Advances Toward Evidence-Based Practice: Where to From Here?

Evidence-based practice has a long history; however, attempts to bridge the gap between science and practice have been only partially effective and much work remains to be done. Part of the problem has been the unilateral approach associated with dissemination of research findings to clinical practitioners. In this special series, Goldfried and colleagues (2014--this issue) suggest a two-way bridge, in which practitioners are afforded the opportunity to disseminate their rich clinical experiences to researchers as well. In this manner, a more collaborative working relationship is espoused. Surveys of practitioners on the use of CBT procedures in the treatment of panic disorder, social anxiety disorder, and generalized anxiety disorder are described. The findings are reviewed and limitations associated with the surveys are noted. Finally, future directions are suggested for rapprochement, hopefully resulting in a greater synthesis of research and practice.     

From Desire to Civility: Is Xunzi a Hobbesian?

This article argues that, contrary to conventional wisdom, Xunzi’s and Hobbes’s understandings of human nature are qualitatively different, which is responsible for the difference in their respective normative political theory of a civil polity. This article has two main theses: first, where Hobbes’s deepest concern was with human beings’ unsocial passions, Xunzi was most concerned with human beings’ appetitive desires (yu 欲), material self-interest, and resulting social strife; second, as a result, where Hobbes strove to transform the pathological (anti-)politics of resentment into the politics of recognition by creating rational egalitarian citizenship under the all-encompassing constitutional sovereign power, Xunzi attempted to nourish human beings’ basic appetitive desires (yu 欲) by instituting a li 禮 ordered civil entity. This article concludes by showing how Confucian civility that Xunzi reconstructed by means of the li 禮 can effectively deal with unsocial passions.     

Visual adaptation to tilt and displacement: Sameor different processes?

Visual adaptation to tilt and displacement were compared to test whether they were dependent on the same or different processes. Although interocular transfer was essentially complete for both transforms, marked differences occurred between the two kinds of optical transforms in terms of rate of adaptation as a function of exposure time and transform magnitude, level of compensation, and rate of decay. Tilt and displacement appear to be quantitatively different, consistent with the idea of a different locus for each adaptation effect. This conclusion was supported by the absence of a correlation between individual performance under the two transforms. The possibility is discussed that displacement and tilt adaptation involve independent visual systems for the perception of location and form.     

Adaptation to uniocular image magnification: Is the underlying shift proprioceptive?

Ss wore a 4% overall size lens (OSL) before one eye while they engaged in 20 min of binocular exploration of a typical indoor environment. Tests before and after the exposure period were conducted to determine whether or not OSL exposure leads to shifts in depth judgments based on binocular disparity. No significant shifts were observed. These results were applied to an evaluation of two contrasting hypotheses that have been proposed to explain adaptation to meridional size lens (MSL).     

From Nonhuman to Human Mind: What Changed and Why?

ABSTRACT— Two questions regarding the human mind challenge evolutionary theory: (a) What features of human psychology have changed since humans' lineage split from that of the other apes such as chimpanzees and bonobos? And (b) what was the process by which such derived psychological features evolved (e.g., what were the selection pressures)? I review some of the latest research on chimpanzee and canine psychology that allows inferences to be made regarding these questions.     

Speech-specific auditory processing: where is it?

Are speech-specific processes localized in dedicated cortical regions or do they emerge from developmental plasticity in the connections among non-dedicated regions? Here we claim that all the brain regions activated by the processing of auditory speech can be re-classified according to whether they respond to non-verbal environmental sounds, pitch changes, unfamiliar melodies, or conceptual processes. We therefore argue that speech-specific processing emerges from differential demands on auditory and conceptual processes that are shared by speech and non-speech stimuli. This has implications for domain- vs. process-specific cognitive models, and for the relative importance of segregation and integration in functional anatomy.     

From method to hermeneutics: which epistemological framework for narrative medicine?

The past 10 years have seen considerable developments in the use of narrative in medicine, primarily through the emergence of the so-called narrative medicine. In this article, I question narrative medicine’s self-understanding and contend that one of the most prominent issues is its lack of a clear epistemological framework. Drawing from Gadamer’s work on hermeneutics, I first show that narrative medicine is deeply linked with the hermeneutical field of knowledge. Then I try to identify which claims can be legitimately expected from narrative medicine, and which ones cannot be. I scrutinize in particular whether narrative medicine can legitimately grasp the patient’s lived experience of his or her illness. In the last section of this article, I begin to explore the potential usefulness of this epistemological clarification. This analysis allows for a further understanding of what is really at stake with narrative medicine, and thus to identify when it may be convenient, and when it may not. Furthermore, this clarification opens up promising new possibilities of dialogue with critics of the field. I conclude that narrative medicine finds its proper place as a possible tool available to mediate dialogue, which is at the heart of the clinical encounter in medical practice.