The Scientific Impotence Excuse:Discounting Belief‐Threatening Scientific Abstracts

The scientific impotence discounting hypothesis predicts that people resist belief‐disconfirming scientific evidence by concluding that the topic of study is not amenable to scientific investigation. In 2 studies, participants read a series of brief abstracts that either confirmed or disconfirmed their existing beliefs about a stereotype associated with homosexuality. Relative to those reading belief‐confirming evidence, participants reading belief‐disconfirming evidence indicated more belief that the topic could not be studied scientifically and more belief that a series of other unrelated topics could not be studied scientifically. Thus, being presented with belief‐disconfirming scientific evidence may lead to an erosion of belief in the efficacy of scientific methods.     

The Role of Evidence Diversity and Explanation in 4- and 5-Year-Olds’ Resolution of Counterevidence

Three experiments examined whether 4- and 5-year-olds can explicitly revise uncertain beliefs in light of disconfirming evidence. We considered 2 factors that might influence belief revision: a) the type and variability of evidence provided, and b) whether children generated an explanation of their initial hypothesis. When provided with limited observed evidence, children revised their belief about their initial guess greater than chance expectations, but differences were not observed when the quality of the explanation was considered (Experiment 1). In a similar paradigm, children revised their beliefs more often than chance when asked to explain or describe their initial belief when shown more diverse counterevidence (Experiment 2) or when told that their initial belief was incorrect (Experiment 3). Overall, these data suggest that preschoolers have nascent capacities for explicit belief revision in light of counterevidence.     

Countering conspiracy theory beliefs: Understanding the conjunction fallacy and considering disconfirming evidence

Research suggests that a number of cognitive processes—including pattern perception, intentionality bias, proportionality bias, and confirmation bias—may underlie belief in a conspiracy theory. However, there are reasons to believe that conspiracy theory beliefs also depend in part on a failure to understand the probability of actual events allegedly supporting those conspiracy theories as well as a failure to entertain disconfirming evidence that may contradict those beliefs. Study 1 examines the relationships between general beliefs in conspiracy theories, belief in a novel conspiracy theory, conjunctive error propensity, and the propensity to consider disconfirming evidence. Study 2 investigates the roles of confronting both the propensity to make conjunctive errors and the failure to consider disconfirming evidence in changing conspiracy theory beliefs as well as attitudes associated with those beliefs. The results of both studies suggest that corrections to one's propensity to make conjunctive errors and mindful consideration of disconfirming evidence may serve as viable methods of self-persuasion pertaining to conspiracy theory beliefs.     

Mad enough to see the other side: Anger and the search for disconfirming information

The current research explored the effect of anger on hypothesis confirmation—the propensity to seek information that confirms rather than disconfirms one's opinion. We argued that the moving against action tendency associated with anger leads angry individuals to seek out more disconfirming information than sad individuals, attenuating the confirmation bias. We tested this hypothesis in two studies of experimentally primed anger and sadness on the selective exposure to hypothesis confirming and disconfirming information. In Study 1, participants in the angry condition were more likely to choose disconfirming information than those in the sad or neutral condition when given the opportunity to read more about a social debate, and reading the disconfirming information affected their subsequent attitude. Study 2 measured participants' opinions and information selection about the 2008 US Presidential Election and their desire to “move against” a person or object. Participants in the angry condition reported a greater tendency to oppose a person or object, which resulted in the attenuation of the confirmation bias.     

Cognitive Discrepancy,Dissonance, and Selective Exposure

Abstract

Although cognitive dissonance is regarded as one of the most recognized causes of selective exposure [N. J. Stroud, Niche News (Oxford University Press, 2011)], the mechanism for such causation is still unclear. By inducing dissonance in a web-based experiment, this study demonstrates how cognitive dissonance relates to information preferences—the intention to seek congruent information and the intention to seek incongruent information. The findings suggest that perceived hostility with respect to one’s belief (cognitive discrepancy) can enhance the intention to seek out for attitude-consistent information. More importantly, individuals were found to have the intention to avoid counterattitudinal information, but only when they experienced some sort of psychological discomfort (dissonance). In other words, while cognitive discrepancy leads individuals to crave for confirming information, only those who encounter negative emotions are likely to employ avoidance of disconfirming information as a dissonance-reduction strategy.     

Mad enough to see the other side: anger and the search for disconfirming information

The current research explored the effect of anger on hypothesis confirmation-the propensity to seek information that confirms rather than disconfirms one's opinion. We argued that the moving against action tendency associated with anger leads angry individuals to seek out more disconfirming information than sad individuals, attenuating the confirmation bias. We tested this hypothesis in two studies of experimentally primed anger and sadness on the selective exposure to hypothesis confirming and disconfirming information. In Study 1, participants in the angry condition were more likely to choose disconfirming information than those in the sad or neutral condition when given the opportunity to read more about a social debate, and reading the disconfirming information affected their subsequent attitude. Study 2 measured participants' opinions and information selection about the 2008 US Presidential Election and their desire to "move against" a person or object. Participants in the angry condition reported a greater tendency to oppose a person or object, which resulted in the attenuation of the confirmation bias.     

Contrast effects in stereotype formation and change: the role of comparative context

Two experiments investigated the way in which the presence of a comparative or inter-group context during stereotype formation affects stereotype change, induced by subsequent disconfirming information. Participants learned about a focal group, after learning about one of the two context groups. After reporting their stereotypes about both groups, participants learned additional information about the focal group. This information described new group members who either confirmed or disconfirmed the group stereotype. Consistent with previous research, participants formed more extreme stereotypes about the focal group on dimensions that distinguished it from the context group (i.e., a contrast effect). In response to the subsequently presented disconfirming group members, a greater stereotype change was observed on dimensions that distinguished the focal group from the context group than on dimensions it did not. We argue that these effects are due to differences in perceived typicality of disconfirming group members.     

No good deed goes unquestioned: Cynical reconstruals maintain belief in the power of self-interest

In four studies, we examined how people maintain beliefs that self-interest is a strong determinant of behavior, even in the face of disconfirming evidence. People reflecting on selfless behavior tend to reconstrue it in terms of self-interested motives, but do not similarly scrutinize selfish behaviors for selfless motives. Study 1 found that people react to new information that selfless behavior is common by interpreting it as more reflective of self-interest. Studies 2a and 2b, applying a Bayesian analysis, demonstrated that people see “too much” self-interest in seemingly selfless actions, given their prior beliefs, but see the predicted amount of self-interest in seemingly selfish actions. This demonstrates that people do not possess internally consistent belief systems, but rather undue cynicism. In Study 3, participants read about real philanthropists whose acts of generosity had been heralded by major news outlets. As participants spent more time considering why such philanthropy was performed, they formed more cynical impressions of the philanthropists' motives. Beyond offering insight into why belief in the norm of self-interest persists, these studies introduce a novel route by which beliefs resist disconfirmation.     

Cognitive models of stereotype change: (2) Perceptions of homogeneous and heterogeneous groups

The reported study compared change in stereotypic perceptions of homogeneous and heterogeneous groups, when subjects were presented with a pattern of stereotype-inconsistent information that was either concentrated in two extreme group members or dispersed across six members. Results pro vided some support for the ‘conversion’ model (in which stereotypes change in response to salient instances) in the case of a homogeneous group, where stereotypical responding was lower in concentrated than dispersed conditions. In the heterogeneous-group conditions, there was no effect of pattern. In addition, subjects' estimates of stereotype-consistent information were higher, and of inconsistent information were lower, and they perceived more members as typical, and fewer as atypical, when the target group was heterogeneous versus homogeneous. There was also support for the ‘subtyping’ model (in which disconfirming individuals are isolated from other group members) in the concentrated conditions. A theoretical account of these findings is given in terms of stereotype change via salience for homogeneous groups, and the need to integrate research on cognitive models of stereotype change and perceived group variability.     

The Content and Function of Religious and Spiritual Beliefs

Most work on religious beliefs has used a fixed research method that only allows confirming or disconfirming a priori notions of religious beliefs. This study used a flexible, data-driven research method to derive an inductive theory concerning the content and function of religious beliefs. Data from interviews with 28 undergraduates were content analyzed, yielding 7 distinct belief domains: higher power, creation, soul, life after death, spiritual connection with others, fate, and supernatural occurrences. Function domains for each content domain, and for belief systems as a whole, were preliminarily identified. Implications for future research and therapeutic interventions are discussed.     

The Affective Tipping Point: Do Motivated Reasoners Ever “Get It”?

In order to update candidate evaluations voters must acquire information and determine whether that new information supports or opposes their candidate expectations. Normatively, new negative information about a preferred candidate should result in a downward adjustment of an existing evaluation. However, recent studies show exactly the opposite; voters become more supportive of a preferred candidate in the face of negatively valenced information. Motivated reasoning is advanced as the explanation, arguing that people are psychologically motivated to maintain and support existing evaluations. Yet it seems unlikely that voters do this ad infinitum. To do so would suggest continued motivated reasoning even in the face of extensive disconfirming information. In this study we consider whether motivated reasoning processes can be overcome simply by continuing to encounter information incongruent with expectations. If so, voters must reach a tipping point after which they begin more accurately updating their evaluations. We show experimental evidence that such an affective tipping point does in fact exist. We also show that as this tipping point is reached, anxiety increases, suggesting that the mechanism that generates the tipping point and leads to more accurate updating may be related to the theory of affective intelligence. The existence of a tipping point suggests that voters are not immune to disconfirming information after all, even when initially acting as motivated reasoners.     

Changing social stereotypes: The case of the information seeker

Previous research has shown that stereotype-based judgements can be attenuated through the attribution of disconfirming information to individual group members. Typically in these studies, subjects are forced to process all the available in formation, including disconfirming information, before providing their impressions of the group. In the reported research, in contrast, we attempted to create a more naturalistic paradigm by allowing subjects to control the amount and nature of information they received about individual group members. Under these conditions, we expected subjects to instigate a biased information-seeking strategy and display a preference for stereotype-matching rather than stereotype-mismatching information. Our results supported this prediction. When subjects could control the nature and amount of information they received about a target group they showed: (i) a preference for stereotype-matching information and (ii) no change in their stereotypic impressions of the group. When, however, subjects were forced to process all the available information, their stereotypic evaluation of the group diminished. These findings demonstrate the general resistance of stereotypes to change in naturalistic, information-seeking settings.     

Children''s understanding of belief and disconfirming visual evidence

Data from 3- to 5-year-old children show that even the youngest have an understanding that a story character cannot think an object is in a box when the character looks into the empty box. This understanding is, however, limited to the case where children share the same visual perspective with the character. When visual perspectives are different the relevant knowledge develops shortly after 4 years at about the time that children master the false belief task. These results are interpreted as young children using an implicit constraint that “think” cannot be applied in view of disconfirming visual evidence. This implicit knowledge becomes explicit and, thus, perspective independent with some delay.     

Reporting ethical practices in journal articles

Little attention has focused on the reporting of ethical research practices in journal articles. In Study 1, published articles in 2 psychopathology journals were reviewed to ascertain the types of ethical research information that were reported. In Study 2, a survey was sent to authors in Study 1 to determine which ethical practices they engaged in, if they reported this information, and reasons for not including this information in their article. In general, there is a great variability regarding the types of ethical research practices reported in journal articles. Commonly cited reasons for not including ethical research practice information in the articles included the need for brevity, belief that it was common practice, and lack of relevance for the project. These results suggest that there is no standard practice for reporting research practices in journal articles and great variability in the implementation of procedures that are generally considered standard.     

The Moderating Effect of Ecphoric Experience on Post‐identification Feedback: A Critical Test of the Cues‐based Inference Conceptualization

Confidence inflation from confirming post‐identification feedback is greater when the eyewitness is inaccurate than when the eyewitness is accurate, which is evidence that witnesses infer their confidence from feedback only to the extent that their internal cues are weak. But the accurate/inaccurate asymmetry has alternative interpretations. A critical test between these interpretations was conducted by including disconfirming feedback conditions. Student participants (n = 404) witnessed a mock crime, had either a strong or weak ecphoric experience when making their line‐up identifications, and subsequently received no feedback, confirming feedback, or disconfirming feedback. Consistent with a cues‐based conceptualization of the feedback effect, disconfirming feedback influenced witnesses with weak ecphoric experiences more than witnesses with strong ecphoric experiences, ironically increasing the confidence‐accuracy relation. Copyright © 2011 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Resisting change: information-seeking and stereotype change

Despite recent laboratory successes in demonstrating stereotype change in response to disconfirming information, stereotypes remain resistant to change or modification. The reported research employed an information gathering methodology in which perceivers could control the amount and nature of the information they received about members of a stereotyped group prior to evaluating the group on a number of stereotype-relevant characteristics. Perceivers showed a stereotype-preservation bias in their information gathering (Experiments 1 and 2) and, consequently, showed no modification of existing stereotypic beliefs. Experiment 3 manipulated the salient processing goals under which perceivers gathered information and found that, under certain conditions, the stereotype preservation bias could be overcome and stereotypes moderated.     

Are cognitive symptoms of schizophrenia mediated by abnormalities in emotional arousal?

We tested 28 individuals with schizophrenia (SZ) and 16 healthy individuals on a test of logical reasoning and "cognitive gating," defined as the ability to discriminate between relevant and irrelevant information in confirming or disconfirming a given belief. The Logical Reasoning and Cognitive Gating Task tests both processes under neutral and affect-laden conditions. This is done by presenting formally identical constructs using benign and emotionally arousing language. When separated by symptom profiles, we found statistically significant differences for performance and arousal response between patients with delusions, patients with formal thought disorder, and patients with neither delusions nor formal thought disorder, as well as between patients and healthy controls. When analyzed by error type, we found that nearly all errors by delusional patients were caused by overly restrictive information choice, a pattern that may be related to a delusional patient's tendency to "jump to conclusions" on Bayesian probabilistic tasks. This is in contrast to patients with formal thought disorder, whose low performance resulted also from overly extensive information choice. The tendencies towards restriction were exacerbated by arousal, which is consistent with studies on cognition and arousal in healthy individuals. After briefly examining research on emotional arousal and SZ, and the interaction between emotional arousal and restriction of perceptual cues in healthy individuals, we conclude by suggesting a model which accounts for the distinctive cognitive characteristics of delusional patients by their possessing distinct vulnerabilities to emotional arousal. Specifically, these results suggest the possibility that delusional patients process information in a manner that is essentially intact. However, delusional patients may possess an acute vulnerability to emotional arousal that might cause delusional individuals to behave cognitively as if they were healthy individuals under significantly more severe forms of stress.     

Subtyping and social consensus: the role of the audience in the maintenance of stereotypic beliefs

Two studies investigated the effect of stereotypes held by a prospective audience on participants' reactions to a stereotype‐disconfirming member. In Study 1, participants formed an impression of a positive disconfirming gay in order to communicate it to an audience known to hold a negative versus positive stereotype about gays. As predicted, participants subtyped the deviant more in the former than in the latter case. Moreover, participants' stereotype at the end of the study mirrored the audience's assumed stereotypes about gays. In Study 2, participants learned about a stereotype allegedly held by an ingroup or an outgroup audience about Belgians and then received information about a Belgian who disconfirmed the stereotype. As predicted, the deviant was seen as less typical when he violated the stereotype held by an ingroup than by an outgroup audience. Also, participants' stereotype about Belgians was more similar to the one held by the ingroup audience. A mediational analysis confirmed that participants subtyped the disconfirming member in order to embrace the stereotype advocated by the ingroup audience. Results are discussed in light of recent models of stereotype change. Copyright © 2006 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

MASS COMMUNICATION AND BELIEF CHANGE: A TEST OF THREE MATHEMATICAL MODELS

Three mathematical models of communication and belief change were proposed and tested: a proportional change model, a belief certainty model, and an accumulated information model. A quick correlational check of the three models suggested that the accumulated information model was the superior with the belief certainty model being the most inferior of the three. Stronger support for the accumulated information model obtained using a more stringent test: a nonlinear bivariate regression which produced visual “plots” of empirical data that nearly duplicated the visual “plots” produced by the theoretical model. The accumulated information model states that belief change is proportional to the discrepancy between the original belief and the belief communicated in the message, and inversely proportional to the amount of information which the receiver has about the topic at the time the message is received. The belief certainty model was the most inferior of the three indicating that the degree to which a receiver is certain in conviction is unrelated to the communication-belief change relationship.     

Extinction of conservation and transitivity of weight

This study attempted to determine whether children will relinquish their belief in Piagetian concepts upon presentation of disconfirming evidence. Two age groups were tested: third- and fourth-grade, and sixth-grade. Conservation of weight and transitivity of weight were the concepts examined; the discrepant feedback consisted of three trials with either non-conservation or nontransitivity outcomes. Resistance or extinction was inferred from the subject's explanations for the outcomes, his responses on subsequent trials, and his performance on a one-month delayed posttest. Conservation subjects showed only moderate resistance by any of these measures; furthermore, there was no evidence of a developmental increase in resistance. Transitivity subjects, in contrast, were much less likely than conservers to change their judgments on either the initial or the delayed test; they also showed the expected developmental increase in resistance to extinction. The results are interpreted as indicating that Piagetian concepts may vary in the extent to which they entail feelings of logical necessity.