Predicting and postdicting the effects of word frequency on memory

In the experiments reported here, I replicate and extend recent results that reveal that judgments about the memorability of common and uncommon words differ qualitatively depending on whether they are made during study or elicited during a recognition test (Guttentag & Carroll, 1998). When assessing recognition ability for individual words, subjects predict superior performance for common words, but postdict better performance for uncommon words. This interaction suggests that subjects rely on different cues when making judgments during study than they do when making analogous judgments during the recognition test, and that the cues utilized during recognition lead judgments to be more accurate. The shift is then evident in later predictions Subjects who make postdictions consequently correctly predict superior recognition performance for uncommon words on a subsequent study list. When subjects are asked to make later predictions about recall performance, however, having made postdictions on a test of recognition does not mislead subjects into predicting superior recall performance for uncommon words.     

Are Causal Structure and Intervention Judgments Inextricably Linked? A Developmental Study

The application of the formal framework of causal Bayesian Networks to children’s causal learning provides the motivation to examine the link between judgments about the causal structure of a system, and the ability to make inferences about interventions on components of the system. Three experiments examined whether children are able to make correct inferences about interventions on different causal structures. The first two experiments examined whether children’s causal structure and intervention judgments were consistent with one another. In Experiment 1, children aged between 4 and 8 years made causal structure judgments on a three‐component causal system followed by counterfactual intervention judgments. In Experiment 2, children’s causal structure judgments were followed by intervention judgments phrased as future hypotheticals. In Experiment 3, we explicitly told children what the correct causal structure was and asked them to make intervention judgments. The results of the three experiments suggest that the representations that support causal structure judgments do not easily support simple judgments about interventions in children. We discuss our findings in light of strong interventionist claims that the two types of judgments should be closely linked.     

The role of elaborations in memory for prose

In two experiments, subjects read stories and were asked to make plausibility judgments about statements with respect to the stories. The inherent plausibility of the queried statements, the amount of attention subjects focused on information necessary for making a judgment, and the interval between presentation of the relevant story information and the test probe were varied orthogonally. The pattern of latencies obtained to make these judgments cast strong doubt on the notion that question answering is typically accomplished by searching for a single fact in memory. Rather, people seem to retrieve any relevant, available information and then use this to compute whether a statement seems true. The independent variables in these experiments can be interpreted according to whether they affect the retrieval or the judgment phase.     

Familiarity influences judgments of sex: the case of voice recognition

Two experiments are reported in which subjects made judgments about the sex or the familiarity of a voice. In experiment 1, subjects were fans of the BBC-radio soap opera, The Archers, and familiar voice clips were taken from this programme. Subjects showed a large reduction in response times when making sex judgments to familiar voices, despite the fact that sex judgments are generally much faster than familiarity judgments. In experiment 2, the same familiar clips were played to subjects unfamiliar with the soap opera, and no difference was observed in times to make sex judgments to Archers or non-Archers voices. We conclude that, unlike the case of face recognition, sex and identity processing of voices are not independent. The findings constrain models of person recognition across multiple modalities.     

Memory and age differences in spatial manipulation ability

Young and old adults were asked, in 3 experiments, to make decisions about the identity of line segment patterns after either adding or subtracting line segments from the original pattern. On some of the trials, the line segments from the initial display were presented again in the second display to minimize the necessity of remembering early information during the processing of later information. Although this manipulation presumably reduced the importance of memory in the tasks, it had little effect on the magnitude of the age differences in any of the experiments. Because the 2 groups were equivalent in accuracy of simple recognition judgments, but older adults were less accurate when the same types of decisions were required in the context of an ongoing task, the results suggested that older adults may be impaired in the ability to retain information while simultaneously processing the same or other information.     

Source memory in the absence of successful cued recall

Five experiments were conducted to address the question of whether source information could be accessed in the absence of being able to recall an item. The authors used a paired-associate learning paradigm in which cue-target word pairs were studied, and target recall was requested in the presence of the cue. When target recall failed, participants were asked to make a source judgment of whether a man or woman spoke the unrecalled item. In 3 of the 5 experiments, source accuracy was at or very close to chance. By contrast, if cue-target pairs were studied multiple times or participants knew in advance of learning that a predictive judgment would be required, then predictive source accuracy was well above chance. These data are suggestive that context information may not play a very large role in metacognitive judgments such as feeling-of-knowing ratings or putting one into a tip-of-the-tongue state without strong and specific encoding procedures. These same results also highlight the important role that item memory plays in retrieving information about the context in which an item was experienced.     

Recollection can be weak and familiarity can be strong

The remember-know procedure is widely used to investigate recollection and familiarity in recognition memory, but almost all of the results obtained with that procedure can be readily accommodated by a unidimensional model based on signal-detection theory. The unidimensional model holds that remember judgments reflect strong memories (associated with high confidence, high accuracy, and fast reaction times), whereas know judgments reflect weaker memories (associated with lower confidence, lower accuracy, and slower reaction times). Although this is invariably true on average, a new 2-dimensional account (the continuous dual-process model) suggests that remember judgments made with low confidence should be associated with lower old-new accuracy but higher source accuracy than know judgments made with high confidence. We tested this prediction--and found evidence to support it--using a modified remember-know procedure in which participants were first asked to indicate a degree of recollection-based or familiarity-based confidence for each word presented on a recognition test and were then asked to recollect the color (red or blue) and screen location (top or bottom) associated with the word at study. For familiarity-based decisions, old-new accuracy increased with old-new confidence, but source accuracy did not (suggesting that stronger old-new memory was supported by higher degrees of familiarity). For recollection-based decisions, both old-new accuracy and source accuracy increased with old-new confidence (suggesting that stronger old-new memory was supported by higher degrees of recollection). These findings suggest that recollection and familiarity are continuous processes and that participants can indicate which process mainly contributed to their recognition decisions.     

Effects of categorical labels on similarity judgments: a critical analysis of similarity-based approaches

Our goal in the present study was to evaluate the claim that category labels affect children's judgments of visual similarity. We presented preschool children with discriminable and identical sets of animal pictures and asked them to make perceptual judgments in the presence or absence of labels. Our findings indicate that children who are asked to make perceptual judgments about identical items judge discriminable items less accurately when making subsequent similarity judgments. Thus, labels do not generally affect children's perceptual similarity judgments; rather, children's reliance on labels to make similarity judgments appears to be attributable to flaws in the methodological approaches used in prior studies. These results have implications for the role of perceptual and conceptual information in children's categorization and induction.     

Holistic processing underlies gender judgments of faces

In three experiments, we investigated whether holistic processing underlies gender judgments about faces. Chinese participants were asked to make gender judgments for inverted, scrambled, or composite faces. Results showed that judgments were dramatically impaired by these manipulations (as compared with performance for normal upright faces), demonstrating three hallmark effects of holistic face processing that have been observed in perception of face identity. Whether the test faces were Chinese or Caucasian showed no effect on holistic processing of gender perception, in contrast to studies of identity analysis. These results suggest that holistic processing is a general mechanism for different aspects of face perception and are consistent with the idea that physiognomic properties that determine the gender of a face are universal, rather than race specific.     

Combating Co‐witness contamination: Attempting to decrease the negative effects of discussion on eyewitness memory

Witnesses who discuss an event with others often incorporate misinformation encountered during the discussion into their memory of the event. Two experiments were conducted to establish whether this memory conformity also occurs in the context of an interview and whether it is possible to reduce the effect. Participants viewed a crime‐video which they then discussed with a co‐witness. Some participants were warned they may have been exposed to misinformation during the discussion before all were interviewed individually. In Experiment 1, participants made remember/know judgments about each component of their free recall, and in Experiment 2 they were asked to indicate the source of their memories. Co‐witness information was incorporated into participants' testimony, and this effect could not be significantly reduced using warnings and source‐monitoring instructions. Remember/know judgments may be useful in distinguishing ‘real’ memories from false memories. We make some recommendations regarding the interviewing of witnesses. Copyright © 2009 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Strategy use in question-answering: Memory strength and task constraints on fan effects

The time taken to recognize a studied fact increases as a function of the number of other previously studied facts sharing concepts with the test fact. The phenomenon, known as the “fan effect,” has been shown to disappear and sometimes even reverse itself when the set of facts are thematically related. The shift from interference toward facilitation occurs only when subjects can use a plausibility-like strategy. In this experiment, subjects learned variously sized sets of rehted facts about fictitious people. Subjects were asked to make either recognition judgments (“Did you study this fact?”) or consistency judgments (“Is this fact consistent with what you studied7”). Subjects made these judgments both the day the material was acquired and 2 days later. The research reported here supports the hypothesis that, with delay, there is a shift in tendency toward more use of the plausibility strategy, away from the careful strategy of searching for an exact match that produces the fan effect. The plausibility strategy produced either a speedup with greater fan or an increase in error rates when the strategy was inappropriate. Plausibility effects were larger at a delay, in both reaction time and error patterns, regardless of whether subjects were asked to make consistency judgments or recognition judgments. Also as predicted, response times became faster as the tendency to adopt the plausibility strategy without first trying direct retrieval increased.     

Some linguistic determinants of Swedish word recognition

Native Swedish words and words of foreign origin were studied in a word fill-in task (Experiment 1), in a task in which words were explicitly classified as being native or loan words (Experiment 2), and in a lexical decision task in which a small onset asynchrony was introduced in displaying a word's letter pattern (Experiment 3). The findings obtained show that, both in simple printed word recognition and when asked to make explicit judgments about origin, readers are sensitive to phonological features of words not marked in Swedish orthography. It was further found that previewing a substring of word-initial letters which determines a word's root morpheme will prime recognition, whereas previewing a randomly selected pattern of letters inhibits recognition.     

Disambiguation by community membership

To interpret utterances in conversations, listeners must often make reference to the common ground they share with speakers. For example, when faced with an utterance such as "That game was a disaster," listeners must decide whether they share common assumptions about what outcome would be disastrous. In our experiments, we examine how common ground, as encoded in community membership, is used to constrain judgments about the interpretations of ambiguous utterances. In Experiment 1, subjects were sensitive to community membership when they were asked to evaluate the interpretations at a leisurely pace. Experiment 2 replicated this result with greater time pressure. Experiment 3 demonstrated that judgments based on assessments of community membership were equivalent to those based on certain knowledge, except when the judgements were challenged. The results suggest that models of memory retrieval during language comprehension should make mention of access to common ground.     

Children's differentiation between beliefs about matters of fact and matters of opinion

Two experiments investigated children's implicit and explicit differentiation between beliefs about matters of fact and matters of opinion. In Experiment 1, 8- to 9-year-olds' (n = 88) explicit understanding of the subjectivity of opinions was found to be limited, but their conformity to others' judgments on a matter of opinion was considerably lower than their conformity to others' views regarding an ambiguous fact. In Experiment 2, children aged 6, 8, or 10 years (n = 81) were asked to make judgments either about ambiguous matters of fact or about matters of opinion and then heard an opposing judgment from an expert. All age groups conformed to the opposing judgments on factual matters more than they did to the experts' views on matters of opinion. However, only the oldest children explicitly recognized that opinions are subjective and cannot be "wrong." Implications of these results for models of children's reasoning about epistemic states are discussed.     

Cause and covariate: Development of two related concepts

This study used a rule-analytic technique to investigate the role of event covariation in causal judgment. Junior high school and college subjects were shown information about the co-occurrences of two potentially related events and were asked to make either causal or covariation judgments about the two events. Subjects often failed to identify covariates as causes or identified as causes events which were either unrelated or related in the opposite direction to the event to be explained. Rule analyses indicated that use of mathematically flawed strategies resulted in erroneous covariation and causal judgments. Comparisons between the junior high and college samples showed parallel improvement with increasing age for the two judgments. Strategy analyses of the covariation and causal judgments showed that males defined causes and covariates by similar rules, but that females used different rules to make the two judgments.     

Spectral information for detection of acoustic time to arrival

The exponential increase of intensity for an approaching sound source provides salient information for a listener to make judgments of time to arrival (TTA). Specifically, a listener will experience a greater rate of increasing intensity for higher than for lower frequencies during a sound source’s approach. To examine the relative importance of this spectral information, listeners were asked to make judgments about the arrival times of nine 1-octave-band sound sources (the bands were consecutive, nonoverlapping single octaves, ranging from 40–80 Hz to ~10–20 kHz). As is typical in TTA tasks, listeners tended to underestimate the arrival time of the approaching sound source. In naturally occurring and independently manipulated amplification curves, bands with center frequencies between 120 and 250 Hz caused the least underestimation, and bands with center frequencies between 2000 and 7500 Hz caused the most underestimation. This spectral influence appears to be related to the greater perceived urgency of higher-frequency sounds.     

False recognition occurs more frequently during source identification than during old-new recognition

A number of recent reports have investigated false memories using variants of the Deese-Roediger-McDermott (DRM) paradigm. Because these false memories have been difficult to eliminate, this study investigated whether false recognition could be reduced by incorporating source-monitoring criteria into decision processes. Making claims about the manner in which items were learned should require more careful scrutiny of memories, and therefore false recognition should be minimized with source instructions as compared with old-new recognition instructions. In 3 experiments that varied the combination of sources, false recognition was increased rather than reduced by applying source-monitoring processes. The theoretical implications of these counterintuitive results are discussed in terms of the old-new detection component of source judgments.     

Are you sure you forgot? Feeling of knowing in directed forgetting.

One significant issue in metamemory is how variables increasing memorability affect metamemory. Previous research has produced inconsistent results. The effect of directed forgetting on the magnitude and accuracy of feeling-of-knowing (FOK) judgments was investigated. Participants were presented with word pairs, some to be remembered and some to be forgotten, and then were asked to recall all target words regardless of initial instructions. For unrecalled items, they were asked to give FOK judgments about performance in a future memory task: a cued stem-completion task (Experiment 1) or a recognition test (Experiment 2). This encoding manipulation increased both the memory performance and the magnitude of FOK judgments. However, no such effect on the accuracy of FOK judgments was observed.     

Elaborative processing and conjunction errors in recognition memory

Four experiments were conducted in order to examine the influence of elaborative processing at encoding on recognition memory conjunction lure errors. In these experiments, participants generated cues for compound words as wholes (e.g., haywire) or as separate entities (e.g., hay, wire). Studied words were re-presented in exact form (old) or recombined to form conjunction lures on the recognition test. Participants were asked to make old-new judgments and to indicate whether they had rejected items judged to be new because of recall of a studied item or because of lack of familiarity with an item. The results suggested that recall-to-reject processing and conjunction lure familiarity increased with both types of generation, although generation of cues for compound words as a whole did not influence conjunction lure error rates. An emphasis on processing each constituent of a compound word during encoding increased the familiarity of those constituents more than generation of a compound word as a whole, resulting in an increase in conjunction lure errors. These results suggest that both familiarity and recollection-based monitoring processes influence conjunction lure errors, and therefore support dual-process theories of recognition memory.     

The Deep Self Model and asymmetries in folk judgments about intentional action

Recent studies by experimental philosophers demonstrate puzzling asymmetries in people’s judgments about intentional action, leading many philosophers to propose that normative factors are inappropriately influencing intentionality judgments. In this paper, I present and defend the Deep Self Model of judgments about intentional action that provides a quite different explanation for these judgment asymmetries. The Deep Self Model is based on the idea that people make an intuitive distinction between two parts of an agent’s psychology, an Acting Self that contains the desires, means-end beliefs, and intentions that are the immediate causal source of an agent’s actions, and a Deep Self, which contains an agent’s stable and central psychological attitudes, including the agent’s values, principles, life goals, and other more fundamental attitudes. The Deep Self Model proposes that when people are asked to make judgments about whether an agent brought about an outcome intentionally, in addition to standard criteria proposed in traditional models, people also assess an additional ‘Concordance Criterion’: Does the outcome concord with the psychological attitudes of the agent’s Deep Self? I show that the Deep Self Model can explain a very complex pattern of judgment asymmetries documented in the experimental philosophy literature, and does so in a way that has significant advantages over competing models.