Psychologism, Practical Reason and the Possibility of Error

Psychologism is the view that practical reasons are psychological states. It is widely thought that psychologism is supported by the following principle governing explanation:
TF. The difference between false and true beliefs on A's part cannot alter the form of the explanation which will be appropriate to A's actions. (TF) seems to imply that we always need to cite agents' beliefs when explaining their actions, no matter whether those beliefs are true or false. And this seems to vindicate psychologism. I argue, however, that the standard argument for psychologism which includes (TF) as a premise in fact fails to establish its intended conclusion. As a result, the overall case for psychologism is not as strong as it may initially seem.     

Psychologism as a style of reasoning and the study of persons

“Psychologism” is proposed as a “style of reasoning” dominant in psychology that has set the agenda for determining what counts as psychological phenomena, their nature, and how they are to be investigated and understood. The assumptions of psychologism and particularities of its procedure are detailed and, subsequently, illustrated by example using the psychological study of attitudes. The failure of psychologism is raised and an alternative to the conception of persons implicit in psychologism is discussed as an initial step in forging a style of reasoning adequate to psychological inquiry.     

Reply to Dr. Lambert

Psychologism in logic holds that logic is a branch of psychology. This view has been vigorously defended by John Stuart Mill and by a number of German philosophers of logic, notably Erdmann. Its chief critics have been Husserl and Frege and, to a lesser extent, Russell. Husserl set forth a profound and detailed critique of psychologism in Logical Investigations. This paper examines this critique. First, I explain why the psychologistic theory is attractive. Then I show that Husserl's critique is not convincing, partly because he does not take the theory in its most plausible form and partly because he ignores certain important distinctions (for example, between what a statement is about and what it is true in virtue of). Then I raise two new objections to the psychologistic theory. The purpose of this paper is to suggest that the psychologistic theory remains an important and serious position from which we can learn much about the status of logic.     

The long way to “extreme psychologism”

In “Clearing Space for Extreme Psychologism about Reasons”, Mitova argues against two main views about the ontology of reasons. Instead, she presents an argument by elimination for “extreme psychologism” as a prima facie superior alternative. I will argue for the following claims. First, the case against the Standard Story – the view that normative and motivating reasons are facts and psychological states, respectively – includes premises that are in need of support. Second, the critical examination of factualism – the view that normative and motivating reasons are facts – misses a relevant distinction between motivating and explanatory reasons. This distinction brings new resources to factualism to answer the raised worries. Third, the case for extreme psychologism rests on a requirement that is either too easy to threaten other alternatives, or so strong as to challenge extreme psychologism itself.     

Feminist Epistemology, Contextualism, and Philosophical Skepticism

Abstract: This essay explores the relation between feminist epistemology and the problem of philosophical skepticism. Even though feminist epistemology has not typically focused on skepticism as a problem, I argue that a feminist contextualist epistemology may solve many of the difficulties facing recent contextualist responses to skepticism. Philosophical skepticism appears to succeed in casting doubt on the very possibility of knowledge by shifting our attention to abnormal contexts. I argue that this shift in context constitutes an attempt to exercise unearned social and epistemic power and that it should be resisted on epistemic and pragmatic grounds. I conclude that skepticism is a problem that feminists can and should take up as they address the social aspects of traditional epistemological problems.     

Social Epistemology,scientific practice and the elusive social

Social Epistemology, as formulated by Steve Fuller, is based on the suggestion that rational knowledge policy must be held accountable to brute facts about the nature of our human cognitive pursuits, whatever these may be. One difficulty for Fuller concerns the conception of the social which underwrites social epistemology. I argue that social epistemology conflates the social with human psychological properties that are available for public scrutiny and, accordingly, that social epistemology is best viewed as a brand of psychologism. Though Fuller's proposal signifies an important step in the ongoing attempt by scholars to eradicate the last traces of Descartes' epistemological device of a disembodiedres cogitans, I conclude that his conception of the social is too weak to serve as the basis for a socially-embedded discipline in anything but name only.     

DARWINISM: STILL A CHALLENGE TO PHILOSOPHY

Charles Darwin died in 1882—more than a hundred years ago. His doctrine, however, is still alive. Recently there has been particular interest in his ideas among philosophers. These ideas are indeed a challenge to (traditional) philosophy: To take Darwin seriously means to revise—or even to destroy—some positions in (traditional) philosophy. Among the philosophical disciplines which have been affected by Darwin's ideas are epistemology and moral philosophy (ethics). In the present paper I shall discuss the epistemological and ethical consequences of Darwin's doctrine from the point of view of contemporary philosophy of biology; I shall give a brief outline of evolutionary epistemology and evolutionary ethics which both have caused many controversies.     

External World Skepticism,Confidence and Psychologism about the Problem of Priors

In this paper, I will distinguish two varieties of external world skepticism: belief and confidence skepticism. I will argue that we can defang the intuitive motivations for confidence skepticism (though not a meeker “argument from might,” which got some attention in the twentieth century literature on external world skepticism) by adopting a partially psychologistic answer to the problem of priors. And I will argue that certain recent work in the epistemology of mathematics and logic provides independent support for such psychologism.     

How Could Chinese Thinking Modes Integrate into Contemporary Western Epistemology? —A Hybrid Perspective of Both AI and the Confucian Theory of the Rectification of Names

Post-Gettier contemporary epistemology is different from traditional epistemology in the sense that the former is concerned more with the normative dimension of knowledge, while the latter is concerned more with how knowledge is actually formed. Due to the cultural differences concerning how to understand key epistemological terms like “knowledge,” “belief,” and “justification,” the Chinese-speaking philosophical world, analytic thinkers precluded, has long been unable to appreciate the fruits of the post-Gettier epistemology. Two intermediate moves are proposed to take for filling the gap between post-Gettier epistemology and the Chinesespeaking intellectual community: Firstly, the fusion of AI and epistemology is encouraged, hence, such a move would provide a chance to double-check the putative universal applicability of specific conclusions of the post-Gettier epistemology from an engineering perspective; secondly, an algorithmoriented reconstruction of the Confucian theory of the rectification of names is also encouraged to bring new life to some traditional Chinese-based thoughts on the process of epistemic justification.     

Stances and Epistemology: Values,Pragmatics, and Rationality

Bas van Fraassen has argued that many philosophical positions should be understood as stances rather than factual beliefs. This paper discusses the vexed question of whether and how such stances can be rationally justified. It argues that stances may be justified pragmatically, in terms of both their epistemic fruits and their coherence with our values, both epistemic and non‐epistemic. It also examines van Fraassen's version of epistemological voluntarism, which has received considerable attention of late, and shows that it provides a theoretical framework, and approach to epistemology, within which the pragmatic and value‐based forms of justification appropriate to stance choice find a natural home.     

ON THE TRANSDISCIPLINARY NATURE OF THE EPISTEMOLOGY OF DISCOVERY

Abstract. Despite the by now historical tendency to demarcate scientific epistemology sharply from virtually all others, especially theological "epistemology ," it has recently been recognized that both enterprises share a great deal in common, at least as far as the epistemology of discovery is implicated. Such a claim is founded upon a psychological analysis of figuration, where, it is argued, metaphor plays a crucial role in the mediation of discovery, in the domains of science and religion alike. Thus, although the conventionally conceived scientific method is crucial to the enterprise, primacy must nonetheless be accorded to discovery , which drives virtually all disciplines.     

I. Psychologism,Functionalism, and the modal status of logical Laws

In a recent article (Inquiry, Vol. 19 [1976]), J. W. Meiland addresses the issue of psychologism in logic, which holds that logic is a branch of psychology and that logical laws (such as the Principle of Non‐Contradiction) are contingent upon the nature of the mind. Meiland examines Husserl's critique of psychologism, argues that Husserl is not convincing, and offers two new objections to the psychologistic thesis. In this paper I attempt to rebut those objections. In question are the acceptable criteria for determining the possibility or impossibility of systems of logic significantly different from our own. I argue that a criteriological application of our accepted laws of logic to this question commits a circular fallacy. I then argue that, even if we accept logical consistency as a criterion for possibility, a plausible argument for the possibility of valid alternative logics can be constructed by using the functionalist analogy between minds and automata. Finally, I attempt to rebut the claim that in logic the only changes possible are conceptual changes that would not permit a proposition to be both true and false.     

TOPICAL EPISTEMOLOGIES

Abstract: What is the point of developing an epistemology for a topic—for example, morality? When is it appropriate to develop the epistemology of a topic? For many topics—for example, the topic of socks—we see no need to develop a special epistemology. Under what conditions, then, does a topic deserve its own epistemology? I seek to answer these questions in this article. I provide a criterion for deciding when we are warranted in developing an epistemological theory for a topic. I briefly apply this criterion to moral epistemology and argue that some approaches to moral epistemology should be abandoned. I also argue that we can develop an epistemology for a topic without committing ourselves to a specific substantive theory of justification, such as reliabilism or coherentism, if we work within a suitably neutral framework.     

Abduction by Philosophers: Reorienting Philosophical Methodology

A reorientation is needed in methodological debate about the role of intuitions in philosophy. Methodological debate has lost sight of the reason why it makes sense to focus on questions about intuitions when thinking about the methods or epistemology of philosophy. The problem is an approach to methodology that focuses almost exclusively on questions about some evidential role that intuitions may or may not play in philosophers’ arguments. A new approach is needed. Approaching methodological questions about the role of intuitions in philosophy with an abductive model of philosophical inquiry in mind will help ensure the debate doesn't lose sight of what motivates the debate.     

Traditional Epistemology Reconsidered A Reply to Eflin

In this article, I reply to Juli Eflin's "Epistemic Presuppositions and Their Consequences." I query Eflin's construal of the aims, scope and method of traditional epistemology, and go on to evaluate several of the central characteristics of Eflin's positive account – pluralistic virtue epistemology.     

Traditional Epistemology Reconsidered A Reply to Eflin

In this article, I reply to Juli Eflin's "Epistemic Presuppositions and Their Consequences." I query Eflin's construal of the aims, scope and method of traditional epistemology, and go on to evaluate several of the central characteristics of Eflin's positive account – pluralistic virtue epistemology.     

Elaborate reflections on a simple manifesto

In an earlier article (^{McFall, 1991}), I urged clinical psychologists to work toward the goal of integrating science and practice and proposed the adoption of a principle and two corollaries aimed at achieving this goal. In general, I argued that all aspects of clinical psychology must be guided by the highest scientific and ethical standards, that clinical practice be limited to empirically supported procedures, and that clinical training be devoted to producing clinical scientists. In the present article, I elaborate and defend these points by offering reflections on a number of submitted questions provoked by the earlier article. I address four major issues: the philosophical foundations for a scientific epistemology, the implications of this epistemology for clinical practice, the implications for clinical training, and the likely impact of adopting this epistemology on the field of clinical psychology.     

Elaborate reflections on a simple manifesto

In an earlier article (^{McFall, 1991}), I urged clinical psychologists to work toward the goal of integrating science and practice and proposed the adoption of a principle and two corollaries aimed at achieving this goal. In general, I argued that all aspects of clinical psychology must be guided by the highest scientific and ethical standards, that clinical practice be limited to empirically supported procedures, and that clinical training be devoted to producing clinical scientists. In the present article, I elaborate and defend these points by offering reflections on a number of submitted questions provoked by the earlier article. I address four major issues: the philosophical foundations for a scientific epistemology, the implications of this epistemology for clinical practice, the implications for clinical training, and the likely impact of adopting this epistemology on the field of clinical psychology.