Pervasiveness of framing effects among physicians and medical students

Researchers have been documenting the influence of framing upon decision making for more than two decades; decisions appear to change in response to superficial changes in the presentation of possible outcomes. Several studies of medical decision making have revealed; for instance, that clinical decisions differ when options are presented as gains (survival rates) rather than losses (mortality rates). However, most studies of framing effects in the medical domain have utilized a very limited number of clinical problems that have not allowed an adequate test of the prevalence of the phenomena. To extend previous studies, we presented three groups of subjects (experienced internists, residents, and third-year medical students) with booklets containing twelve hypothetical medical cases. Half of the subjects received gain versions and half received loss versions of the same cases. Chi-square analyses revealed that framing did not influence any of the decisions of medical students and influenced the decisions of residents and experienced physicians on only two of the clinical problems (the same two problems). It appears that the prevalence of framing effects in the clinical domain may be limited.     

Framing effects in decisions with completely and incompletely described alternatives

Earlier research has shown that a variety of judgments depend upon how key sources of information are framed. Framing effects have been extended to include relative evaluations of stimuli with complete and incomplete information. The present study was designed to see if these effects are predictive of discrete choices and to isolate the locus of the framing effect. In Experiment 1 subjects were asked to indicate whether they would take each of a series of gambles described by payoff and probability information or by only one of these values. As predicted, subjects in the positive condition were more apt than subjects in the negative condition to take gambles when probability information was included, but not when it was missing. Subjects in Experiment 2 chose between gambles with complete and incomplete information. Consistent with the earlier findings, subjects in the positive condition were less apt than subjects in the negative condition to choose the gamble with missing probability information. Experiment 3 replicated the results of Experiment 2 while eliminating various psychophysical factors as causes of the framing effect. The way stimuli are framed appears to affect their subjective scale values and this determines both how they are responded to in an absolute sense and how they are compared to other stimuli.     

Deep thoughts and shallow frames: on the susceptibility to framing effects

This paper examines the occurrence of framing effects when more thought is given to problems. In Study 1, participants were presented with one of two frames of several decision problems. Participants' Need for Cognition (NC) scores were obtained, and half the participants were asked to justify their choices. Substantial framing effects were observed, but the amount of thought purportedly given to a problem, whether manipulated by justification elicitation or measured by NC scores, did not reduce the incidence of framing effects. In Study 2, participants responded to both frames of problems in a within‐subjects design. Again, NC scores were unrelated to responses on the first frame encountered. However, high‐NC, compared to low‐NC, participants were more consistent across frames of a problem. More thought, as indexed here, does not reduce the proclivity to be framed, but does promote adherence to normative principles when the applicability of those principles is detectable. Copyright © 2003 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Persuading young car drivers to take part in a driving skills test: The influence of regulatory fit on informational-assessment value and persuasion

Two studies were conducted to examine the relative effectiveness of differently framed messages advising young car drivers to take part in a driving skills test. It was hypothesized that messages promoting such detection behaviour should be more persuasive when the message frame was compatible versus incompatible with the recipient’s level of perceived risk. It was also hypothesized that such effects would occur because the “feeling right” experience resulting from the compatibility effects based on regulatory fit could be transferred to the informational-assessment value of the proposed feedback. Consistently, moderate perceived driving skills (Experiment 1) and high perceived risk drivers (Experiment 2) found the driving skills test more valuable for assessment purposes after having read a loss versus gain framed message and consequently, were more interested in taking part in the test. Furthermore, low perceived risk drivers (Experiment 2) showed a reversed pattern of responses. Implications for message framing in the road safety area are discussed.     

The two sides of the mental clock: the Imaginal HemiSpatial Effect in the healthy brain

When subjects are asked to compare the mental images of two analog clocks telling different times (the mental clock test), they are faster to process angles formed by hands located in the right than in the left half of the dial. In the present paper, we demonstrate that this Imaginal HemiSpatial Effect (IHSE) can be also observed in two modified versions of the mental clock test: in Experiment 1 subjects had to imagine the position occupied by two numbers within a clock face and to judge if the subtended angle was smaller or greater than 90 degrees , while in Experiment 2 subjects were asked to match two imagined positions on a clock face with two visually presented locations. The finding of the IHSE in these tasks suggested that it is a genuine phenomenon related to spatial imagery tasks, and is consistent with recent neuroimaging evidence that the left parietal lobe is mainly involved in the generation of spatial mental images.     

Whole and part comparisons of words and nonwords

Under conditions of sequential presentation, two words are matched more quickly than are a single letter and the first letter of a word. An exception to this whole-word advantage was reported in 1980 by Umansky and Chambers, who used word pairs as stimuli, and asked subjects to compare the entire words or the words’ first letters. Experiment 1 showed that the stimulus lists used by Umansky and Chambers may not have constrained subjects to process the displays differently for wholistic and component comparisons. In those studies, the two words were identical onsame trials for both wholistic and first-letter comparisons, so that first-letter decisions could have been based on wholistic information. In the present study, lists were constructed so that first-letter decisions could not be determined correctly by wholistic information (e.g., BLAME/BEACH), and the whole-word advantage was replicated. Experiment 2 tested whether wholistic comparisons are generally superior to component comparisons. For consonant strings, first-letter comparisons were made more quickly than were whole-string comparisons. These results are interpreted as support for hierarchical models of visual word processing.     

Forest before trees: The precedence of global features in visual perception

The idea that global structuring of a visual scene precedes analysis of local features is suggested, discussed, and tested. In the first two experiments subjects were asked to respond to an auditorily presented name of a letter while looking at a visual stimulus that consisted of a large character (the global level) made out of small characters (the local level). The subjects' auditory discrimination responses were subject to interference only by the global level and not by the local one. In Experiment 3 subjects were presented with large characters made out of small ones, and they had to recognize either just the large characters or just the small ones. Whereas the identity of the small characters had no effect on recognition of the large ones, global cues which conflicted with the local ones did inhibit the responses to the local level. In Experiment 4 subjects were asked to judge whether pairs of simple patterns of geometrical forms which were presented for a brief duration were the same or different. The patterns within a pair could differ either at the global or at the local level. It was found that global differences were detected more often than local differences.     

Influencing Risk Preference in Decision Making: The Effects of Framing and Salience

Prospect theory predicts that people tend to prefer the sure option when choosing between two alternative courses of action framed in terms of gains and prefer the risky option when choosing between two alternatives framed as losses. Related research investigated the impact of emphasizing the probability of the positive outcome of a risky option versus emphasizing the probability of the negative outcome on preference. Most of these studies on the effects of "outcome salience" related their findings to prospect theory′s framing effect. It will be argued that most of these studies inaccurately applied prospect theory to explain the obtained effects and that these might be better understood in terms of salience. In four experiments we test the predictions that (1) choosing between two options in a gain problem will lead to decreased risk preference as compared to loss problems and (2) emphasizing the probability of positive outcomes of a risky option leads to increased preference for this option compared to emphasizing the probability of negative outcomes. Results confirm the impact of both prospect framing and outcome salience and indicate that these effects should be understood in terms of distinct, independent processes.     

Exposition Effects on Decision Making: Choice and Confidence in Choice

Many of us believe that, after writing about a subject, we understand it more deeply. Studies in education indicate that writing does indeed enhance comprehension. Three experiments examined whether similar “exposition effects” exist for decision making. In these experiments, subjects were confronted with standard framing problems. Positive exposition effects would require that the influence of alternative frames on subjects' choices be diminished by exposition demands. Control subjects made choices under customary, non-exposition instructions. Others chose after writing rationales for their selections (exposition), after explicitly planning to write such rationales, or merely in anticipation of writing the rationales. Exposition reduced framing effects in each of the experiments. The magnitudes of the effects were greatest for subjects who wrote before choosing. Also, exposition markedly increased subjects' confidence that their choices were appropriate. Theoretical and practical implications are discussed.     

Framing effects in judgment tasks with varying amounts of information

Subjects were asked to make evaluations in each of three tasks—a gambling task, a consumer judgment task, and a student evaluation task. Each task involved two important attributes, but information about one attribute was missing on some trials. Half of the subjects received a version of the task in which a key attribute was presented in positive terms (e.g., probability of winning a gamble) and half received a version in which that same attribute was presented in negative terms (e.g., probability of losing a gamble). Even though the information was objectively equivalent in the two versions of each task, there were two significant framing effects. (1) In all tasks, responses to two-attribute stimuli were more favorable in the positive condition than in the negative condition. (2) When the key attribute was missing, evaluations of one-attribute stimuli relative to evaluations of two-attribute stimuli were lower in the positive condition than in the negative condition. Results were discussed in terms of the constructs of prospect theory and information integration theory.     

Social cues and verbal framing in risky choice

We examined how people use social and verbal cues of differing priorities in making social decisions. In Experiment 1, formally identical life – death choice problems were presented in different hypothetical group contexts and were phrased in either a positive or negative frame. The risk‐seeking choice became more dominant as the number of kin in an endangered group increased. Framing effects occurred only in a heterogeneous group context where the lives at risk were a mixture of kin and strangers. No framing effect was found when the same problem was presented in the context of a homogeneous group consisting of either all kin or all strangers. We viewed the framing effects to be a sign of indecisive risk preference due to the differential effects of a kinship cue and a stranger cue on choice. In Experiment 2, we presented the life – death problem in two artificial group contexts involving either 6 billion human lives or 6 billion extraterrestrial lives. A framing effect was found only in the human context. Two pre‐conditions of framing effects appear to be social unfamiliarity of a decision problem and aspiration level of a decision maker. In Experiment 3, we analyzed the direction of the framing effect by balancing the framing. The direction of the framing effect depended on the baseline level of risk preference determined by a specific decision context. Copyright © 2001 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

The Humpty Dumpty blues: Disaggregation bias in the evaluation of tax systems

Three experiments carried out on the World Wide Web assessed the consistency of attitudes toward various tax regimes that differed in their overall levels and degrees of tax rate graduation in the presence of framing manipulations. The regimes had two components: an income and a payroll tax. One frame involved aggregation. Subjects were asked either to design a single, global tax system or to vary one component of a tax system (payroll or income tax) with the other component held constant. The idea was to replicate the effects of income tax reform given a constant payroll tax system. Consistent with the experimental hypothesis—though not with “rational” decision making—subjects focused on the component they were asked to manipulate and did not respond fully to changes in the other component, across conditions, reflecting an under-adjustment bias as well as a framing effect. The results are akin to Thaler’s “mental account” model for personal financial behavior. A second manipulation involved a “metric” frame: whether putative tax burdens were given in dollars or percent terms. Once again consistent with the experimental hypothesis, subjects preferred higher rates of graduation when matters were stated in percent terms. The results point to the lability of public opinion about important questions of public finance, and they illustrate a specific category of biases concerning disaggregation.     

On the relation between justification of solution method and correctness of solution in statistical problem solving

The relation between the justification of a choice of solution method and the correctness of that choice in statistical problem solving was investigated. In the first of two studies 16 subjects were asked to think aloud while solving two statistical problems. The results showed that an incorrect choice of solution method was more common when subjects did not justify their choice of solution as compared to when they justified their choice with domain-specific knowledge. Study 2 employed an experimental design. A group of 20 subjects were instructed to provide a justification for each choice of solution method, while another group of 20 subjects received no such instructions. The results showed no difference between the groups with respect to number of correct choices of solution method. A qualitative analysis of the justifications in the instructed group showed that the justifications for incorrect solution methods were more often incorrect than subjects' justifications for correct solution methods. The results in Study 2 suggested that the association found between incorrect choice of solution method and lack of justification in Study 1 was not in the first place due to a strategical deficiency on the part of the subjects but due to a lack of domain-specific knowledge.     

Demonstrations of a generation effect in context memory

Generation often leads to increased memorability within a laboratory context (see, e.g., Slamecka & Graf, 1978). Of interest in the present study is whether the benefits of generation extend beyond item memory to context memory. To investigate this question, in three experiments, we asked subjects to remember in which of two contexts they had read or generated words. In Experiment 1, the contexts were two different rooms; in Experiment 2A, the contexts were two different computer screens; in Experiment 2B, the contexts were different perceptual characteristics of the to-be-remembered words. In all experiments, subjects were better at remembering the context of generated words than of read words.     

The Influence of Framing on Risky Decisions: A Meta-analysis

In framing studies, logically equivalent choice situations are differently described and the resulting preferences are studied. A meta-analysis of framing effects is presented for risky choice problems which are framed either as gains or as losses. This evaluates the finding that highlighting the positive aspects of formally identical problems does lead to risk aversion and that highlighting their equivalent negative aspects does lead to risk seeking. Based on a data pool of 136 empirical papers that reported framing experiments with nearly 30,000 participants, we calculated 230 effect sizes. Results show that the overall framing effect between conditions is of small to moderate size and that profound differences exist between research designs. Potentially relevant characteristics were coded for each study. The most important characteristics were whether framing is manipulated by changing reference points or by manipulating outcome salience, and response mode (choice vs. rating/judgment). Further important characteristics were whether options differ qualitatively or quantitatively in risk, whether there is one or multiple risky events, whether framing is manipulated by gain/loss or by task-responsive wording, whether dependent variables are measured between- or within- subjects, and problem domains. Sample (students vs. target populations) and unit of analysis (individual vs. group) was not influential. It is concluded that framing is a reliable phenomenon, but that outcome salience manipulations, which constitute a considerable amount of work, have to be distinguished from reference point manipulations and that procedural features of experimental settings have a considerable effect on effect sizes in framing experiments.     

Protected values: No omission bias and no framing effects

Previous studies have suggested that people holding protected values (PVs) show a bias against harmful acts, as opposed to harmful omissions (omission bias). In the present study, we (1) investigated the relationship between PVs and acts versus omissions in risky choices, using a paradigm in which act and omission biases were presented in a symmetrical manner, and (2) examined whether people holding PVs respond differently to framing manipulations. Participants were given environmental scenarios and were asked to make choices between actions and omissions. Both the framing of the outcomes (positive vs. negative) and the outcome certainty (risky vs. certain) were manipulated. In contrast to previous studies, PVs were linked to preferences for acts, rather than for omissions. PVs were more likely to be associated with moral obligations to act than with moral prohibitions against action. Strikingly, people with strong PVs were immune to framing; participants with few PVs showed robust framing effects.     

两位数的整体与局部加工

关于两位数的加工方式有整体加工说和局部加工说,实验证据主要来自数字数量控制/主动加工任务。本研究主要考察在数字数量自动加工任务中两位数的加工方式。实验一要求被试完成数量大小比较和物理大小比较两个任务,实验二只要求被试完成物理大小比较任务。结果是在数量比较任务和物理比较任务中都存在显著的个位十位一致性效应和数量物理一致性效应,这表明在两位数的数量主动和自动加工任务中均存在整体加工和局部加工两种方式。     

Error, falsification and scientific inference: An experimental investigation

This paper reports the results of four experiments designed to test the methodological falsificationist's assumption that replication is sufficient to prevent the possibility of error from being used to immunize hypotheses against disconfirmation. The first three experiments compare the performance of subjects on tasks that simulate scientific reasoning under two conditions: (1) where there is a 0-20% possibility of error in experimental results, but no actual error; and (2) a control condition.

All experiments used Wason's 2-4-6 task, in which subjects propose triples and are told whether each corresponds to a rule. In Experiment 1, subjects in the possible-error condition proposed significantly more triples than control subjects. Experiment 2 added colour and letter dimensions to the 2-4-6 task; possible-error subjects proposed significantly more triples and replicated the same triple more often than control subjects. Experiment 3 made replication more difficult by limiting the number of experiments subjects could perform and by altering the rule to make the results of the current trial dependent on previous ones. Control subjects solved this problem significantly more often than possible-error subjects.

Experiment 4 was run in a manner very similar to Experiment 1, except that an actual 20% error condition was added. Subjects in this condition solved the rule significantly less often than subjects in other conditions, and also took more time and replicated more often. Implications of these results for the methodological falsificationist's position are discussed.     

A neuropsychological dimension for anchoring effects

Previous research has shown that strength of handedness predicts differences in sensory illusions, Stroop interference, episodic memory, and beliefs about body image and the origin of species. Recent evidence also suggests handedness differences in the susceptibility to information framing and persuasion. The present paper extends this line of work to decision anchoring effects. In Experiment 1, 131 introductory psychology students responded to 12 real‐world knowledge questions after being given random, uninformative high or low anchors. Results indicated that “strong‐handers” showed larger anchoring effects than “mixed‐handers.” In Experiment 2, 89 introductory psychology students responded to 6 real‐world knowledge questions in a modified, two‐step anchoring task in which participants were given a credible source for the anchored information and asked to give pre‐ and post‐anchor estimates. In contrast to Experiment 1, results revealed that mixed‐ and strong‐handers were affected similarly by anchoring. In Experiment 3, 158 students were asked to estimate the answer to one of two versions of 8! (8 × 7 × 6 × 5 × 4 × 3 × 2 × 1 or 1 × 2 × 3 × 4 × 5 × 6 × 7 × 8)—a multiplication problem in which the high and low anchors are inherently informative. Here, mixed‐handers showed larger anchoring effects than strong‐handers. A theory centered around the notion of hemispheric specialization and the communication between the two halves of the brain as well as arguments about the informativeness of anchors, metacognition, and recent theorizing in the anchoring literature are used to account for these data. Copyright © 2005 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.