The informational properties of the throwing arm for anticipation of goal-directed action

We examined the informational value of biological motion from the arm in predicting the location of a thrown ball. In three experiments, participants were classified as being skilled and less skilled based on their actual performance on the task (i.e., using a within-task criterion). We then presented participants with a range of stick figure representations and required them to predict throw direction. In Experiment 1, we presented stick figure movies of a full body throwing action, right throwing arm plus left shoulder and throwing arm only. Participants were able to anticipate throw direction above chance under all conditions irrespective of perceptual skill level, with the perceptually skilled participants excelling under full body conditions. In Experiment 2, we neutralized dynamical differences in motion to opposing throw directions from the shoulder, elbow and wrist of the throwing arm. Neutralizing the wrist location negatively affected anticipation performance in all participants reducing accuracy to below chance. In Experiment 3, we presented movies of the motion wrist location alone and the upper section of the throwing arm (shoulder-elbow). Participants were able to successfully anticipate above chance in these latter two conditions. Our findings suggest that motion of the throwing arm contains multiple sources of information that can help facilitate the anticipation of goal-directed action. Perceptually skilled participants were superior in extracting informational value from motion at both the local and global levels when compared to less skilled counterparts.     

Information underpinning anticipation of goal-directed throwing

We identified the information used to anticipate throw direction in handball. In two experiments, we examined how anticipation performance is affected when the information from one of five body areas (right arm, shoulders, hips, trunk, or total throw side) was either neutralized or decoupled from the motion of other body segments. In the first experiment, performance was significantly reduced when information from the throwing arm was neutralized, irrespective of skill levels. Skilled participants were negatively affected when the shoulders, hips, and trunk were neutralized, whereas less-skilled participants showed trends toward improvement under identical conditions. In the second experiment, partially disrupting relative motion via decoupling was not enough to reduce the anticipation performance among skilled participants to chance levels, whereas less-skilled participants lost their ability to anticipate in three conditions. Our findings suggest that skilled and less-skilled participants employ different information extraction strategies, yet information from the throwing arm is critical to anticipation for both groups. The two experiments suggest that relative motion mediated by both the absolute displacement trajectories of individual marker locations and their relative timings are important in informing anticipation, irrespective of skill level.     

Expert anticipation from deceptive action

Expertise in sports enhances the ability to anticipate forthcoming events from the observation of a player’s actions. In the present study, we investigated whether this ability is applicable to deceptive action. In three experiments, performance at anticipating the direction change of a running opponent was examined with experienced rugby players and novice counterparts. These experiments were conducted with reaction-time and temporal-occlusion tasks, in combination with eye movement recordings and the presentation of filmed actions and their point-light representations. The main finding was that the experienced players were superior to the novices in their anticipation of deceptive actions, although their performance was still impaired by the deception, in comparison with their anticipation of nondeceptive actions. We also found that the experienced players anticipated nondeceptive actions less accurately than the novices, suggesting that the players’ expectations of deceptive actions worked negatively on their judgments of nondeceptive actions. The results obtained with the point-light representations closely resembled those obtained with the filmed sequences, indicating that anticipation was based on the kinematics of the running action. These results are discussed in the context of recent developments in research on expertise and deception in sports.     

Intentional action arises from early reciprocal exchanges

Intentionality is defined as the cognitive ability to represent goals beyond the here and now of perception. First signs of intentionality appear by the second month after birth. A major mechanism responsible for such development might be the unique reciprocal and intentional ways humans communicate with each other, particularly their young progenies. I argue that starting in the second month, reciprocal exchanges, affective mirroring, and mutual imitations with others provide infants with the unique opportunity to differentiate as well as to compare and conjugate first (self) and third (others') person perspectives. This ability is a prerequisite not only for referential communication but also of intentionality. It corresponds to the emergence of a new contemplative and "meta" stance toward the world. An argument is made that the developmental origins of this stance are primarily social, not to be found in the individual infant interacting solely with physical objects.     

Intentional action first

The paper motivates a novel research programme in the philosophy of action parallel to the ‘Knowledge First’ programme in epistemology. It is argued that much of the grounds for abandoning the quest for a reductive analysis of knowledge in favour of the Knowledge First alternative is mirrored in the case of intentional action, inviting the hypothesis that intentional action is also, like knowledge, metaphysically basic. The paper goes on to demonstrate the sort of explanatory contribution that intentional action can make once it is no longer taken to be a target for reductive analysis, in explaining other, non-intentional kinds of action and voluntariness.     

Effect anticipation and action control

According to the authors' 2-phase model of action control, people first incidentally acquire bidirectional associations between motor patterns and movement-contingent events and then intentionally use these associations for goal-directed action. The authors tested the model in 4 experiments, each comprising an acquisition phase, in which participants experienced co-occurrences between left and right keypresses and low- and high-pitched tones, and a test phase, in which the tones preceded the responses in forced- and free-choice designs. Both reaction time and response frequency in the test phase depended on the learned associations, indicating that presenting a tone activated the associated response. Results are interpreted as evidence for automatic action-outcome integration and automatic response priming through learned action effects. These processes may be basic for the control of voluntary action by the anticipation of action goals.     

Intentional action: conscious experience and neural prediction

Intentional action involves both a series of neural events in the motor areas of the brain, and also a distinctive conscious experience that "I" am the author of the action. This paper investigates some possible ways in which these neural and phenomenal events may be related. Recent models of motor prediction are relevant to the conscious experience of action as well as to its neural control. Such models depend critically on matching the actual consequences of a movement against its internally predicted effects. However, it remains unclear whether our conscious experience of action depends on a precise matching process, or a retrospective inference that "I" must have been responsible for a particular event. We report an experiment in which normal subjects judged the perceived time of either intentional actions, involuntary movements, or subsequent effects (auditory tones) of these. We found that the subject's intention to produce the auditory tone produced an intentional binding between the perceived times of the subject's action and the tone. However, if the intention was interrupted by an imposed involuntary movement, followed by the identical tone, no such binding occurred. The phenomenology of intentional action requires an appropriate predictive link between intentions and effects, rather than a retrospective inference that "I" caused the effect.     

Enjoying goal-directed action: the role of regulatory fit

We propose that the fit between an action's strategic orientation and the actor's regulatory state can influence the amount of enjoyment the action provides. In two studies using different methods of manipulating regulatory states and of gauging action evaluations, high regulatory fit increased participants' anticipations of action enjoyability. In a third study, high regulatory fit increased participants' enjoyment of, perceived success at, and willingness to repeat a novel laboratory task, and these effects were independent of participants' actual success on the task. Across the three studies, participants in a regulatory state oriented toward accomplishment experienced eagerness-related actions more favorably than vigilance-related actions, whereas participants in a regulatory state oriented toward responsibility experienced vigilance-related actions more favorably than eagerness-related actions. These findings' implications for understanding task interest and motivation are discussed.     

Intentional action and the frame-of-mind argument: new experimental challenges to Hindriks

Based on a puzzling pattern in our judgements about intentional action, Knobe [(2003). “Intentional Action and Side-Effects in Ordinary Language.” Analysis 63: 190–194] has claimed that these judgements are shaped by our moral judgements and evaluations. However, this claim goes directly against a key conceptual intuition about intentional action – the “frame-of-mind condition”, according to which judgements about intentional action are about the agent’s frame-of-mind and not about the moral value of his action. To preserve this intuition Hindriks [(2008). “Intentional Action and the Praise-Blame Asymmetry.” The Philosophical Quarterly 58: 630–641; (2014). “Normativity in Action: How to Explain the Knobe Effect and its Relatives.” Mind & Language 29: 51–72] has proposed an alternate account of the Knobe Effect. According to his “Normative Reason account of Intentional Action”, a side-effect counts as intentional only when the agent thought it constituted a normative reason not to act but did not care. In this paper, I put Hindriks’ account to test through two new studies, the results of which suggest that Hindriks’ account should be rejected. However, I argue that the key conceptual insight behind Hindriks’ account can still be saved and integrated in future accounts of Knobe’s results.     

An exploratory factor analysis of action responses to stuttering anticipation

PurposeWe previously introduced theStuttering Anticipation Scale (SAS; Jackson, E. S., Gerlach, H., Rodgers, N. H., & Zebrowski, P. M. (2018). My Client Knows That He’s About to Stutter: How Can We Address Stuttering Anticipation during Therapy with Young People Who Stutter? Seminars in Speech and Language, 39, 356–370) – a non-standardized self-report measure for children, teens, and adults who stutter (CWS, TWS, AWS) that quantifies how often they engage in 25 commonly reported action responses to anticipation. The purpose of this study was to leverage the SAS to explore the factor structure of action responses to stuttering anticipation.MethodsA total of 121 people who stutter completed the SAS online (27 CWS, 40 TWS, 54 AWS). We used exploratory factor analysis (EFA) to determine the underlying latent variables within the 25 SAS items that characterize how people who stutter respond to anticipation.ResultsA three-factor model was most appropriate for the data with regard to factor loadings and other model fit indices. The three factors were named: avoidance (17 items), physical change (4 items), and approach (4 items).ConclusionUnderstanding these three types of action responses to anticipation can help guide clinical decision-making by providing a novel framework for clinicians and their clients who stutter to discuss how the client tends to respond to anticipation, and explore ways to facilitate productive responses to anticipation.     

Habits as knowledge structures: automaticity in goal-directed behavior

This study tested the idea of habits as a form of goal-directed automatic behavior. Expanding on the idea that habits are mentally represented as associations between goals and actions, it was proposed that goals are capable of activating the habitual action. More specific, when habits are established (e.g., frequent cycling to the university), the very activation of the goal to act (e.g., having to attend lectures at the university) automatically evokes the habitual response (e.g., bicycle). Indeed, it was tested and confirmed that, when behavior is habitual, behavioral responses are activated automatically. In addition, the results of 3 experiments indicated that (a) the automaticity in habits is conditional on the presence of an active goal (cf. goal-dependent automaticity; J. A. Bargh, 1989), supporting the idea that habits are mentally represented as goal-action links, and (b) the formation of implementation intentions (i.e., the creation of a strong mental link between a goal and action) may simulate goal-directed automaticity in habits.     

Intentional action and nearly certain success

Many philosophers have argued that a necessary condition on an action's being intentional is that the agent has the ability to alter the probabilities of the relevant outcome. These philosophers would hold that this condition is what allows us to deny that an agent, for example, intentionally rolls something other than five fives with a set of dice, despite that agent's being virtually sure that this will be the outcome of the roll. The current paper uses some examples to cast this explanation, and the necessity of the associated condition, into doubt. It then suggests that what actually differentiates intentional from unintentional action – in the examples that falsify the hypothesis about control – is to be found in the agent's representation of the processes by which the relevant outcomes are produced. In particular, the agent must represent the outcome as happening because of what she does.     

The construction of career through goal-directed action

The thesis of this article is that occupational career is constructed through a system of intentional, goal-directed processes in the form of actions and projects as well as other careers, such as the family career and relationship careers. A contextual action theory of career is proposed as an approach that reflects a constructionist stance and at the same time addresses fundamental issues raised by social constructionism, such as issues of meaning, interpretation, and agency. The discussion is illustrated by reference to a research program on the family career-development project that examines the joint action of parents and adolescents relative to the adolescent’s future. It is further suggested that this approach leads constructionism beyond its epistemological critique to a positive formulation of professional and everyday activity.     

Job search as goal-directed behavior: Objectives and methods

This study investigated the relationship between job search objectives (finding a new job/turnover, staying aware of job alternatives, developing a professional network, and obtaining leverage against an employer) and job search methods (looking at job ads, visiting job sites, networking, contacting employment agencies, contacting employers, and submitting applications). In a sample of 205 employed individuals from Belgium and Romania, job search objectives were significantly related to job search methods even after job satisfaction was controlled. Furthermore, particular objectives predicted specific methods. While the finding a new job/turnover objective predicted all search methods, staying aware of alternatives predicted using job ads and sites; the network objective predicted networking and contacting employers; and the leverage objective predicted contacting employers. Results suggest that search objectives are important for understanding job seekers’ search behavior and support the view that job search is a self-regulatory process that begins with objectives which activate search behavior.     

Counseling for the transition to adulthood as joint, goal-directed action

Transition is important in the career literature as it identifies times at which people are often likely to consult counselors about issues for which they need help. However, the counseling literature has not provided a conceptualization of, or research on, the joint, goal-directed actions and projects of the counselor and the client, which explicitly reflect the goal-directed nature of the transition itself. To address this issue, 12 counseling dyads, representing 37 counseling sessions, were studied. In these dyads, counseling was observed as the joint, goal-directed action between professional counselors and youth who sought assistance with their transition to adulthood. The data were collected using the action-project method. The counseling sessions were video-recorded, then immediately played back for the counselor and client separately to gather their recalled thoughts and feeling during counseling. Detailed qualitative analysis of the data set addressed the research question, “What are the goal-directed projects that counselors and their clients jointly construct, articulate, and enact relevant to the transition to adulthood?” The findings indicated the relationship and identity are intertwined goal-directed projects within counseling as well as outside of it. These projects contributed to the reframing and reorganization of clients' transition projects outside of counseling in occupational, educational, and familial domains. The findings suggest important implications for counseling youth in transition, that is, counselors and clients explicitly address their joint relationship and identity goals in an effort to realize a mutually satisfactory and important transition to adulthood.     

A test for children's goal-directed behavior: a pilot study

A test for children's goal-directed behavior was developed, based on neuropsychological executive function research of Vilkki and Holst and on the framework of Lewin's level-of-aspiration research. 46 12-yr.-old children were participants. Fluid Intelligence was expected to be linked to goal-directed behavior and a commonly used executive function task, the Wisconsin Card-sorting Test. A child was asked to set personal goals in a short-term memory task without prior knowledge about performance. Four different task versions were developed employing both verbal (memorizing series of words) and visuospatial (memorizing block sequences) material. The child set an individual goal for each memory trial. Goal-setting after successful and failed trials was investigated. Usually, the children lowered their goals after failures and set their goals higher or did not change them after successful trials. Compared to goal on a previous trial, Inadequate Responses included setting a goal higher after a failed trial and setting it lower after success. Fluid Intelligence was related to goal-directed behavior, viz., Inadequate Responses. It also correlated with scores on the Wisconsin Card-sorting Test. The results are in concordance with previous research. In addition to experimental executive function research, the novel test might be useful in research concerning children's motivation, self-efficacy, and self-regulated learning.     

Impaired acquisition of goal-directed action in healthy aging

According to dual-system theories, instrumental learning is supported by dissociable goal-directed and habitual systems. Previous investigations of the dual-system balance in healthy aging have yielded mixed results. To further investigate this issue, we compared performance of young (17–24 years) and older (69–84 years) adults on an instrumental learning task. Following the initial learning phase, the behavioral autonomy of the motivational significance of the instrumental outcome was assessed with an outcome-devaluation test and slips-of-action test. The present study provides evidence for a disrupted dual-system balance in healthy aging, as reflected in reduced outcome-induced conflict during acquisition, as well as in impaired performance during the test stage, during which participants had to flexibly adjust their actions to changes in the current desirability of the behavioral outcome. These findings will be discussed in relation to previous aging studies into habitual and goal-directed control, as well as other cognitive impairments, challenges that older adults may face in everyday life, and to the neurobiological basis of the developmental pattern of goal-directed action across the lifespan.