The tight coupling between category and causal learning

The main goal of the present research was to demonstrate the interaction between category and causal induction in causal model learning. We used a two-phase learning procedure in which learners were presented with learning input referring to two interconnected causal relations forming a causal chain (Experiment 1) or a common-cause model (Experiments 2a, b). One of the three events (i.e., the intermediate event of the chain, or the common cause) was presented as a set of uncategorized exemplars. Although participants were not provided with any feedback about category labels, they tended to induce categories in the first phase that maximized the predictability of their causes or effects. In the second causal learning phase, participants had the choice between transferring the newly learned categories from the first phase at the cost of suboptimal predictions, or they could induce a new set of optimally predictive categories for the second causal relation, but at the cost of proliferating different category schemes for the same set of events. It turned out that in all three experiments learners tended to transfer the categories entailed by the first causal relation to the second causal relation.     

The power of causal beliefs and conflicting evidence on causal judgments and decision making

In two experiments, we investigated the relative impact of causal beliefs and empirical evidence on both decision making and causal judgments, and whether this relative impact could be altered by previous experience. Participants had to decide which of two alternatives would attain a higher outcome on the basis of four cues. After completing the decision task, they were asked to estimate to what extent each cue was a reliable cause of the outcome. Participants were provided with instructions that causally related two of the cues to the outcome, whereas they received neutral information about the other two cues. Two of the four cues—a causal and a neutral cue—had high validity and were both generative. The remaining two cues had low validity, and were generative in Experiment 1, but almost not related to the outcome in Experiment 2. Selected groups of participants in both experiments received pre-training with either causal or neutral cues, or no pre-training was provided. Results revealed that the impact of causal beliefs and empirical evidence depends on both the experienced pre-training and cue validity. When all cues were generative and participants received pre-training with causal cues, they mostly relied on their causal beliefs, whereas they relied on empirical evidence when they received pre-training with neutral cues. In contrast, when some of the cues were almost not related to the outcome, participants’ responses were primarily influenced by validity and—to a lesser extent—by causal beliefs. In either case, however, the influence of causal beliefs was higher in causal judgments than in decision making. While current theoretical approaches in causal learning focus either on the effect of causal beliefs or empirical evidence, the present research shows that both factors are required to explain the flexibility involved in human inferences.     

Mechanisms of predictive and diagnostic causal induction

In predictive causal inference, people reason from causes to effects, whereas in diagnostic inference, they reason from effects to causes. Independently of the causal structure of the events, the temporal structure of the information provided to a reasoner may vary (e.g., multiple events followed by a single event vs. a single event followed by multiple events). The authors report 5 experiments in which causal structure and temporal information were varied independently. Inferences were influenced by temporal structure but not by causal structure. The results are relevant to the evaluation of 2 current accounts of causal induction, the Rescorla-Wagner (R. A. Rescorla & A. R. Wagner, 1972) and causal model theories (M. R. Waldmann & K. J. Holyoak, 1992).     

Egocentric organization of spatial activities in imagined navigation

Studies on spatial frameworks suggest that the way we locate objects in imagined environments is influenced by the physical and functional properties of the world and our body. The present study provides evidence that such an influence also characterizes imagined navigation. In Experiment 1, participants followed spatial directions to construct an imagined path, while either keeping constant or updating their orientation at each step. A pattern of step times diagnostic of spatial frameworks was obtained in the updated-orientation but not in the constant-orientation condition. In Experiment 2, participants performed the updated-orientation condition with two levels of external support for the reference frame being used. Step times conformed to the predictions of spatial frameworks in both conditions. Both experiments also provided support that the processes involved in imagined navigation exhibit the operator-operand dynamics of other mental skills previously documented in the mental arithmetic domain. These results reinforce Piaget's (1954) notion that spatial displacements and integer arithmetic share a set of structural characteristics     

Syntely: Paradigm for an inductive psychology of memory,perception, and thinking

Two experiments investigated the effects of stimulus structure and human memory on human expectancy and concept formation. Sequences of binary events, Xs and Os, were given for inductive prediction and continuation under conditions of discrete (Experiment 1) and continuous (Experiment 2) presentation. The results of both experiments supported an interpretation that people base their predictions on a specific kind of structure found in binary sequences calledsyntely: the proportion of all earlier subsequences that match the end subsequences and also support the continuation of the terminal run of a binary sequence. An analysis of the concept formation process in terms of inductive cues and evidence is provided     

The effect of actual event duration and event memory on the reconstruction of duration information

Two experiments investigated the effect of actual event duration and event memory on the retrospective estimation of public event duration. Experiment 1 provided a typicality score for each of 20 public events. The typicality score represents the degree to which the event's actual duration deviates from the typical duration of its category. Subjects in Experiment 2 estimated the duration of the events used in Experiment 1 and indicated whether they remembered the events. Typicality scores were found to be highly correlated with estimation accuracy, and to predict whether event duration was under- or over-estimated. Remembering an event slightly increased estimation accuracy. The results are discussed in terms of their implications for the assessment of eyewitness retrospective duration estimation abilities, and the reconstructive model of retrospective duration estimation proposed by Burt and Kemp (1991).     

The effects of promotion and prevention cues on creativity.

This study tested whether cues associated with promotion and prevention regulatory foci influence creativity. The authors predicted that the "risky," explorative processing style elicited by promotion cues, relative to the risk-averse, perseverant processing style elicited by prevention cues, would facilitate creative thought. These predictions were supported by two experiments in which promotion cues bolstered both creative insight (Experiment 1) and creative generation (Experiment 2) relative to prevention cues. Experiments 3 and 4 provided evidence for the process account of these findings. suggesting that promotion cues, relative to prevention cues, produce a riskier response bias (Experiment 3) and bolster memory search for novel responses (Experiment 4). A final experiment provided evidence that individual differences in regulatory focus influence creative problem solving in a manner analogous to that of incidental promotion and prevention cues.     

Non-bayesian inference: causal structure trumps correlation

The study tests the hypothesis that conditional probability judgments can be influenced by causal links between the target event and the evidence even when the statistical relations among variables are held constant. Three experiments varied the causal structure relating three variables and found that (a) the target event was perceived as more probable when it was linked to evidence by a causal chain than when both variables shared a common cause; (b) predictive chains in which evidence is a cause of the hypothesis gave rise to higher judgments than diagnostic chains in which evidence is an effect of the hypothesis; and (c) direct chains gave rise to higher judgments than indirect chains. A Bayesian learning model was applied to our data but failed to explain them. An explanation-based hypothesis stating that statistical information will affect judgments only to the extent that it changes beliefs about causal structure is consistent with the results.     

空间转换在记叙文阅读情境模型建构中的作用

采用探测词和事件分割范式探讨了空间转换与事件转换分离的情况下, 空间转换在记叙文情境模型建构中的作用。实验1a重复前人研究, 探讨空间转换对阅读时间和情境模型更新的影响, 并验证在空间转换对情境模型的影响的研究中, 采用多指标探测范式的合理性。实验1b探讨在空间转换与事件转换相分离的条件下, 空间转换对情境模型更新的影响; 实验2a探讨空间转换对事件分割的影响, 并验证在空间转换对情境模型的影响的研究中, 采用事件分割范式的合理性; 实验2b探讨空间转换与事件转换相分离的条件下, 空间转换对事件分割的影响, 从而验证空间转换对情境模型更新的影响。结果表明, 当空间转换与事件转换相分离时, 不引起情境模型的更新, 事件单元是建构记叙文心理表征的核心单元, 空间转换只有在标识事件转换的情况下, 才能引发读者更新情境模型。     

Causal Induction in the Presence of a Perfect Negative Cue: Contrasting Predictions from Associative and Statistical Models

Two experiments on human causal induction with multiple candidate causes are reported. Experiment 1 investigated the influence of a perfect preventive cause on the ratings of a less contingent cause. Whereas the Rescorla-Wagner model (RWM) and Cheng's probabilistic contrast model predict that the less contingent cause should be completely discounted, the Pearce model predicts, in most cases, an enhancement of that cause's perceived importance. Results corresponded more closely tothe predictions of the Pearce model.The predictions of both the RWM and the Pearce model rely on a constant context cue acquiring associative strength, yet no such cue was explicitly identified in the task scenario employed in Experiment 1. Experiment 2 replicated a number of key conditions of Experiment 1 with a task scenario that afforded ratings of the causal importance of the context in which the effectiveness of the discrete candidate causes was evaluated. In addition, the number of trials was increased to test the possibility that the ratings in Experiment 1 were the product of incomplete learning. The results of the first experiment were replicated and the ratings of the effectiveness of the context cue were anticipated by both the RWM and the Pearce model. Overall, the Pearce model offers a more comprehensive account of the causal inferences recorded in this study.     

Magical thinking in judgments of causation: Can anomalous phenomena affect ontological causal beliefs in children and adults?

In four experiments, 4‐, 5‐, 6‐ and 9‐year‐old children and adults were tested on the entrenchment of their magical beliefs and their beliefs in the universal power of physical causality. In Experiment 1, even 4‐year‐olds showed some understanding of the difference between ordinary and anomalous (magical) causal events, but only 6‐year‐olds and older participants denied that magic could occur in real life. When shown an anomalous causal event (a transformation of a physical object in an apparently empty box after a magic spell was cast on the box), 4‐ and 6‐year‐olds accepted magical explanations of the event, whereas 9‐year‐olds and adults did not. In Experiment 2, the same patterns of behaviour as above were shown by 6‐ and 9‐year‐olds who demonstrated an understanding of the difference between genuine magical events and similarly looking tricks. Testing the entrenchment of magical beliefs in this experiment showed that 5‐year‐olds tended to retain their magical explanations of the anomalous event, even after the mechanism of the trick had been explained to them, whereas 6‐ and 9‐year‐olds did not. In Experiment 3, adult participants refused to accept magical explanations of the anomalous event and interpreted it as a trick or an illusion, even after this event was repeated 4 times. Yet, when in Experiment 4 similar anomalous causal events were demonstrated without reference to magic, most adults acknowledged, both in their verbal judgments and in their actions, that the anomalous effects were not a fiction but had really occurred. The data of this study suggest that in the modern industrialized world, magical beliefs persist but are disguised to fit the dominant scientific paradigm.     

The role of causal models in multiple judgments under uncertainty

Two studies examined a novel prediction of the causal Bayes net approach to judgments under uncertainty, namely that causal knowledge affects the interpretation of statistical evidence obtained over multiple observations. Participants estimated the conditional probability of an uncertain event (breast cancer) given information about the base rate, hit rate (probability of a positive mammogram given cancer) and false positive rate (probability of a positive mammogram in the absence of cancer). Conditional probability estimates were made after observing one or two positive mammograms. Participants exhibited a causal stability effect: there was a smaller increase in estimates of the probability of cancer over multiple positive mammograms when a causal explanation of false positives was provided. This was the case when the judgments were made by different participants (Experiment 1) or by the same participants (Experiment 2). These results show that identical patterns of observed events can lead to different estimates of event probability depending on beliefs about the generative causes of the observations.     

MINERVA‐DM and subadditive frequency judgments

There is considerable evidence that frequency (and probability) judgments are often subadditive. That is, the frequency judgment assigned to an event is often less than the sum of the frequency judgments assigned to the mutually exclusive component events that together form it. Explanations for subadditive judgments have typically relied on relatively high‐level cognitive constructs such as the availability and representativeness heuristics. A lower‐level explanation of subadditivity is presented in this paper through a model of memory and judgment processes, MINERVA‐DM. Under MINERVA‐DM, subadditivity is influenced by the similarity of the representations of the judged component events in memory to one another and by the placement of decision criteria. Results from two experiments support the model predictions. The first examines the effects of component event similarity on subadditivity. The second replicates the first and also provides support for the model's prediction of the effects of payoffs on similarity criteria. Copyright © 2004 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Infants' Perception of Causal Chains

Three experiments examined infants' and adults' perception of causal sequences of events. In a causal-chain sequence, the first action causes a second action that then causes a final outcome; in a temporal-chain sequence, the first two actions are independent and the second action causes a final outcome. Infants and adults were shown the same event sequences; infants were tested using a visual habituation paradigm, whereas adults were given a questionnaire. Experiment 1 indicated that 15-month-old infants perceive the primary cause of the final outcome to be the first action in a causal chain but the second action in a temporal chain. Experiment 2 showed that adults interpret the causal sequences in a manner similar to that of 15-month-olds. Finally, Experiment 3 showed that 10-month-old infants do not yet perceive causal sequences in the same manner as 15-month-olds and adults. These results are interpreted in terms of both infants' developing knowledge of causal events and adults' attributions of causality in complex events.     

说明文阅读中因果序列的表征

结合自定步调阅读与句子启动再认范式, 探讨说明文阅读过程中因果序列的表征问题。研究包括3个实验, 实验1的文本提供一个包括4个概念的因果链(如, A－B－C－D), 文本最后设置包含概念A或概念B或概念C的句子, 对概念D进行探测, 结果发现, 对于概念D的再认启动作用, 概念C＞概念B＞概念A; 实验2改变因果链的说明顺序, 使之与因果链本身次序不一致, 结果与实验1一致; 实验3的文本分别介绍两条独立的因果链(如A－B－C; D－E－F), 最后呈现包含概念A或概念D的句子, 对概念C进行探测, 结果发现, 包含概念A的句子理解启动了相关因果链, 使读者对随后呈现的概念C的再认反应加快。基于本研究结果, 结合相关研究, 本文尝试提出说明文文本表征的建构模式。     

Seeing versus doing: two modes of accessing causal knowledge

The ability to derive predictions for the outcomes of potential actions from observational data is one of the hallmarks of true causal reasoning. We present four learning experiments with deterministic and probabilistic data showing that people indeed make different predictions from causal models, whose parameters were learned in a purely observational learning phase, depending on whether learners believe that an event within the model has been merely observed ("seeing") or was actively manipulated ("doing"). The predictions reflect sensitivity both to the structure of the causal models and to the size of their parameters. This competency is remarkable because the predictions for potential interventions were very different from the patterns that had actually been observed. Whereas associative and probabilistic theories fail, recent developments of causal Bayes net theories provide tools for modeling this competency.     

Temporal and causal order effects in thinking about what might have been

When people think counterfactually about what might have been different for a sequence of events, they are influenced by the order in which the events occurred. They tend to mentally undo the most recent event in a temporal sequence of two events. But they tend to mentally undo the first event in a causal sequence of four events. We report the results of two experiments that show that the temporal and causal order effects are not dependent on the number of events in the sequence. Our first experiment, with 300 participants, shows that the temporal order effect occurs for sequences with four events as well as for sequences with two events. Our second experiment, with 372 participants, shows that the causal order effect occurs for sequences with two events as well as for sequences with four events. We discuss the results in terms of the mental representations that people construct of temporal and causal sequences.