Limiting logical pluralism

In this paper I argue that pluralism at the level of logical systems requires a certain monism at the meta-logical level, and so, in a sense, there cannot be pluralism all the way down. The adequate alternative logical systems bottom out in a shared basic meta-logic, and as such, logical pluralism is limited. I argue that the content of this basic meta-logic must include the analogue of logical rules Modus Ponens (MP) and Universal Instantiation (UI). I show this through a detailed analysis of the ‘adoption problem’, which manifests something special about MP and UI. It appears that MP and UI underwrite the very nature of a logical rule of inference, due to all rules of inference being conditional and universal in their structure. As such, all logical rules presuppose MP and UI, making MP and UI self-governing, basic, unadoptable, and (most relevantly to logical pluralism) required in the meta-logic for the adequacy of any logical system.

     

Supervision in marriage counseling

Abstract

The objective of this research was to explore the impact of having a schizophrenic sibling. Fourteen siblings, aged 24 to 46, were interviewed. As a group, the subjects were functioning at high levels of adjustment. All had had a period in late adolescence in which they were separated from their families in surroundings that facilitated personal growth. Among older subjects, there followed a period of reinvolvement, including assuming responsibility for the ill sibling. Guilt was a predominant emotion in their lives. Variations in the intensity of guilt were most often related to ordinal position. Younger siblings, particularly if same-sexed, expressed guilt over being well, whereas older siblings expressed guilt over earlier sibling rivalry.