You are not what you feel you are

Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences -     

Different standards are not double standards: all elective surgical patients are not alike

Testa and colleagues argue that evaluation for suitability for living donor surgery is rooted in paternalism in contrast with the evaluation for most operative interventions, which is rooted in the autonomy of patients. We examine two key ethical concepts that Testa and colleagues use: paternalism and autonomy, and two related ethical concepts: moral agency and shared decision making. We show that by moving the conversation from paternalism, negative autonomy, and informed consent to moral agency, relational autonomy, and shared decision making, one better understands why the arguments given by Testa and colleagues fail. We argue (1) why the hurdles that one must overcome to become a living donor are appropriate; and (2) that the similarities between living donor transplant surgery and cosmetic plastic surgery that the authors describe are inaccurate. Finally, we consider the recommendation to treat plastic surgery patients and living donors more similarly. We argue that any change should not be in the direction of becoming less protective of living donors, but more protective of cosmetic plastic surgery candidates.     

Preachers who are not believers

There are systemic features of contemporary Christianity that create an almost invisible class of non-believing clergy, ensnared in their ministries by a web of obligations, constraints, comforts, and community. Exemplars from five Protestant denominations, Southern Baptist, United Church of Christ, Presbyterian, Methodist and Church of Christ, were found and confidentially interviewed at length about their lives, religious education and indoctrination, aspirations, problems and ways of coping. The in-depth, qualitative interviews formed the basis for profiles of all five, together with general observations about their predicaments and how they got into them. The authors anticipate that the discussion generated on the Web (at On Faith, the Newsweek/Washington Post website on religion, http://newsweek.washingtonpost.com/onfaith//2010/03/disbelief_in_the_pulpit/all.html) and on other websites will facilitate a larger study that will enable the insights of this pilot study to be clarified, modified, and expanded.     

Changes are not localized before they are explicitly detected

Change detection is in many ways analogous to visual search. Yet, unlike search, successful detection depends not on the salience of features within a scene, but on the difference between the original and modified scene. If, as in search, pre-attentive mechanisms guide attention to the change location, the change itself must produce a preattentively detectable signal. Despite recent evidence for implicit representation of change in the absence of conscious detection, few studies have yet explored whether attention is guided to a change location prior to explicit detection. In four “change blindness” experiments using several variants of the “flicker” task, we tested the hypothesis that implicit or preattentive mechanisms guide change localization prior to explicit detection. None of the experiments revealed improved localization of changes prior to explicit reports of detection, suggesting that implicit detection of change does not contribute to the eventual explicit localization of a change. Instead, change localization is essentially arbitrary, driven by the salience of features within scenes.     

Why religious nationalists are not fundamentalists

J. W. Nicholas, Psience—a general theory of existence, Reality revealed—the theory of multidimensional reality Call Adonoi—manual of practical cabalah and gestalt mysticism The Expanding Force in Newton's Cosmos D. Vogt &; G. Sultan, Vector Associates, San Jose (California), 1977, 460 pp;

A. L. Schutz, Quantal, Goleta (California), 1980, 100 pp; D. Castillejo, Ediciones de Arte y Bibliofilia, Madrid, 1981, 125 pp     

Why metrical properties are not powers

What has the dispositional analysis of properties and laws (e.g. Molnar, Powers, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2003; Mumford, Laws in nature, Routledge London, 2004; Bird, Nature’s metaphysics, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 2007) to offer to the scientific understanding of physical properties?—The article provides an answer to this question for the case of spacetime points and their metrical properties in General Relativity. The analysis shows that metrical properties are not ‘powers’, i.e. they cannot be understood as producing the effects of spacetime on matter with metaphysical necessity. Instead they possess categorical characteristics which, in connection with specific laws, explain those effects. Thus, the properties of spacetime do not favor the metaphysics of powers with respect to properties and laws.     

Emotions in cognitive conflicts are not aversive but are task specific

It has been suggested that cognitive conflicts require effortful processing and, therefore, are aversive (Botvinick, 2007). In the present study, we compared conflicts emerging from the inhibition of a predominant response tendency in a go/no-go task with those between incompatible response activations in a Simon task in a within-subjects design, using the same type of stimuli. Whereas no-go trials elicited reduced skin conductance and pupillometric responses, but prolonged corrugator muscle activity, as compared with go trials, incompatible and compatible Simon trials were indistinguishable with respect to these parameters. Furthermore, the conflictsensitive N2 components of the event-related brain potential were similar in amplitude, but showed significantly different scalp distributions, indicating dissociable neural generator systems. The present findings suggest the involvement of different emotional and cognitive processes in both types of cognitive conflicts—none being aversive, however. In addition, the N2 findings call into question claims of common monitoring systems for all kinds of cognitive conflicts.     

Cance and luck are not the same

In the mind of many people chance and luck act as real but different causes of events. Even in strictly defined situations as casino gambling, people may perceive influences of luck that help to overcome the negative expectancy defined by the rules of chance. Interviews with gamblers in casinos confirmed this idea. In two experiments it was established that the distinction between chance and luck are also made by ordinary subjects in everyday situations. The results revealed that chance is perceived to operate when an event is surprising, an unexpected coincidence. Luck is perceived when an event implies the escape from negative consequences, or the achievement of something that is important and difficult. The distinction between chance and luck can explain why people are trapped by the illusion of control, even when it is clear that they have no influence on the physical causation determining the outcomes of events. They cannot change the outcome of the roulette wheel, but they can employ their luck, which helps them to place their bets on the winning number.     

Plucks and bows are not categorically perceived

Letter-like targets (a circle and a square) were presented in one of two fixed and cued visual field locations and were shown alone, flanked by a noise stimulus on the peripheral side (side of target farthest from fixation), on the central side, or on both sides simultaneously. The adjacent target and noise stimulus borders had similar featural properties (both curved or both straight lines) or dissimilar properties (one being a curved line and one a straight line). Each of 10 subjects made a go, no-go response only when his or her designated target appeared in a display. The results showed: (1) single targets were discriminated more accurately and more rapidly than were targets shown simultaneously with noise stimuli, (2) targets having dissimilar border relationships with noise items were discriminated more accurately than were targets having similar border relationships, (3) targets in central-noise displays were discriminated more accurately and rapidly than were targets in peripheral-noise displays, and (4) there was no interaction between border relationships and noise position. The principal result relating to target-noise border featural relationship was consistent with predictions derived from models which place the locus of noise effects at the stage of stimulus feature extraction. Aspects of the results were, however, seen to be consistent with both feature extraction and response competition conceptualizations.     

On not having what you are given

The statement, that these or those philosophers do not accept the distinction between what is, and what is not, ‘given’ in perception, has very little content; and should receive only a corresponding degree of emphasis.