On radicalizing behaviorism: A call for cultural analysis

Our culture at large continues many practices that work against the well-being of its members and its chances for survival. Our discipline has failed to realize its potential for contributing to the understanding of these practices and to the generation of solutions. This failure of realization is in part a consequence of the general failure of behavior analysts to view social and cultural analysis as a fundamental component of radical behaviorism. This omission is related to three prevailing practices of our discipline. First, radical behaviorism is characteristically defined as a "philosophy of science," and its concerns are ordinarily restricted to certain epistemological issues. Second, theoretical extensions to social and cultural phenomena too often depend solely upon principles derived from the analysis of behavior. Third, little attention has been directed at examining the relationships that do, or that should, exist between our discipline and related sciences. These practices themselves are attributed to certain features of the history of our field. Two general remedies for this situation are suggested: first, that radical behaviorism be treated as a comprehensive world view in which epistemological, psychological, and cultural analyses constitute interdependent components; second, that principles derived from compatible social-science disciplines be incorporated into radical behaviorism.     

Radical behaviorism: A productive and needed philosophy for education

Radical behaviorism is the philosophy of the science of behavior originating in the work of B. F. Skinner and elaborated over the years by a community of researchers, scholars, and practitioners. Radical behaviorism is a complete, or thoroughgoing behaviorism in that all human behavior, public and private, is explained in terms of its functional relations with environmental events. Radical behaviorism is often misrepresented in the literatures of education and psychology. Two fundamental misconceptions of radical behaviorism are that its followers (1) are logical positivists who require that a phenomenon be observed by two or more people before it qualifies for scientific analysis, and (2) either will not or cannot incorporate private events (e.g., thoughts, feelings) into their analyses of human behavior. This paper offers an advocacy perspective on contemporary radical behaviorism. In particular, we define radical behaviorism and briefly outline the history of the term's use in psychological literature, discuss the scientific practice of behavior analysts, explain the intolerance exhibited by radical behaviorists, and comment on the use of popularity as a criterion for good science. The paper concludes with a discussion of the recent shift in educational research and practice from empiricism and outcome-oriented intervention toward a holistic/constructivist philosophy described by its advocates as incompatible with behaviorally-based instruction.     

The case for praxics

Since the early 1900s a variety of names has been proposed for the scientific study of behavior, but none has come into general use. "Praxics," a recent entry, is defensible on several grounds. "Behaviorism," on the other hand, is the name of a school of philosophy. Though praxics has roots in behaviorism, the term "behaviorism" should not be applied to praxics. Confusion between the science and the philosophy has retarded the growth of the science immeasurably. Its growth has also been impeded by its association with psychology, which is still primarily the study of mind. Efforts are underway to establish praxics as an independent field.     

B. F. SKINNER'S RADICAL BEHAVIORISM Historical Misconstructions and Grounds for Feminist Reconstructions

Feminist critiques of traditional psychological approaches have generated feminist revisions, most notably in psychoanalytic and develop mental theory. Although behaviorism has attracted strong objections from feminist critics, claims of its antithetical positioning vis-à-vis feminist theory construction have generally remained unchallenged. A preliminary step in formulating grounds for a synthesis is to clarify multiple meanings of behaviorism. Specifically, the fusion of Watson's methodological behaviorism and Skinner's radical behaviorism in the literature must be disentangled in order to address the latter's potential as a conceptual framework for constructing feminist theory. Key conceptual features of radical behaviorism that suggest its potential as a vehicle for building a feminist epistemology include: radical behaviorism's contextualistic world view, its interpretation of agency, its treatment of private experience and self knowledge, and its understanding of the pivotal functions of the verbal community.     

Origins of the cognitive (r)evolution

The well documented cognitive "revolution" was, to a large extent, an evolving return to attitudes and trends that were present prior to the advent of behaviorism and that were alive and well outside of the United States, where behaviorism had not developed any coherent support. The behaviorism of the 1920 to 1950 period was replaced because it was unable to address central issues in human psychology, a failure that was inherent in part in J. B. Watson's founding manifesto with its insistence on the seamless continuity of human and nonhuman animal behavior. The "revolution" was often slow and piecemeal, as illustrated by four conferences held between 1955 and 1966 in the field of memory. With the realization that different approaches and concepts were needed to address a psychology of the human, developments in German, British, and Francophone psychology provided some of the fuel of the "revolution."     

Psychological behaviorism and behaviorizing psychology

Paradigmatic or psychological behaviorism (PB), in a four-decade history of development, has been shaped by its goal, the establishment of a behaviorism that can also serve as the approach in psychology (Watson's original goal). In the process, PB has become a new generation of behaviorism with abundant heuristic avenues for development in theory, philosophy, methodology, and research. Psychology has resources, purview and problem areas, and nascent developments of many kinds, gathered in chaotic diversity, needing unification (and other things) that cognitivism cannot provide. Behaviorism can, within PB's multilevel framework for connecting and advancing both psychology and behaviorism.     

Psychopathology according to behaviorism: a radical restatement

This article is a radical restatement of the predominant psychopathology, which is characterized by nosological systems and by its approach towards a neurobiological conception of the so-called mental disorders. The "radical" sense of this restatement is that of radical behaviorism itself. As readers will recall, "radical" applied to behaviorism means total (not ignoring anything that interests psychology), pragmatic (referring to the practical sense of knowledge), and it also derives from the Latin word for "root" (and thus implies change beginning at a system's roots or getting to the root of things, in this case, of psychological disorders). Based on this, I introduce the Aristotelian distinction of material and form, which, besides being behaviorist avant la lettre, is used here as a critical instrument to unmask the hoax of psychopathology as it is presented. The implications of this restatement are discussed, some of them already prepared for clinical practice.     

Barking up the wrong tree? Industry funding of academic research

This case raises ethical issues involving conflicts of interest arising from industrial funding of academic research; ethical responsibilities of laboratories to funding agencies; ethical responsibilities in the management of a research lab; ethical considerations in appropriate research design; communication in a research group; communication between advisor and graduate student; responsibilities of researchers for the environment; misrepresentation or withholding of scientific results.     

Behaviorism in 1942: A Précis of Tilquin's Le Behaviorisme: Origine et Développement de la Psychologie De Réaction en Amérique

Book-length treatments of behaviorism from a philosophical and historical perspective are few in number. Tilquin''s (1942) is one of these, but its publication in French during World War II and the limited number of available copies make for difficult access. In this paper, I summarize the contents of the book for a general audience of behavior analysts. Tilquin''s work is a useful tour of the behaviorism of its time, and most of the topics discussed in it remain relevant to behavior analysis.     

W. I. Thomas,behaviorist ethnologist

Over the course of his academic career in the anthropology wing of the University of Chicago's Department of Sociology and Anthropology, W. I. Thomas rejected the influence of Herbert Spencer, became skeptical of the instinctual explanations for human behavior, and became increasingly Boasian. His study of Polish peasant acculturation to American cities is Boasian in its focus on texts and on culture. After his dismissal by the University of Chicago in 1918 Thomas was influenced by John B. Watson. In the national interdisciplinary conferences of the 1920s, Thomas was an advocate for behaviorism and critical of Freudian doctrines and other subjectivist approaches to human science. Recalling Thomas's behaviorism and his long-running interest in comparing cross-cultural data should call into question the enlistment of Thomas as a father of subjectivist traditions of symbolic interactionism.     

Barking up the wrong tree? Industry funding of academic research. A case study with commentaries

This case raises ethical issues involving conflicts of interest arising from industrial funding of academic research; ethical responsibilities of laboratories to funding agencies; ethical responsibilities in the management of a research lab; ethical considerations in appropriate research design; communication in a research group; communication between advisor and graduate student; responsibilities of researchers for the environment; misrepresentation or withholding of scientific results.     

On privacy, causes, and contingencies

Radical behaviorism may be distinguished from other varieties of behaviorism, notably methodological behaviorism, by the way it accommodates private events in causal explanations of behavior. That is, in an operational sense, radical behaviorism accommodates private phenomena in the context of the three term contingency of reinforcement with regard to their discriminative function, their nature as responses, or their reinforcing function. In any case, any contribution of a private phenomenon is presumably linked at some point to a prior public event that has endowed the private phenomenon with its functional significance.     

Is talking to yourself thinking?

The question whether talking to yourself is thinking is considered from two viewpoints: radical behaviorism and teleological behaviorism. For radical behaviorism, following Skinner (1945), mental events such as ‘thinking’ may be explained in terms of private behavior occurring within the body, ordinarily unobservable by other people; thus, radical behaviorism may identify talking to yourself with thinking. However, to be consistent with its basic principles, radical behaviorism must hold that private behavior, hence thinking, is identical with covert muscular, speech movements (rather than proprioception of those movements). For teleological behaviorism, following Skinner (1938), all mental terms, including ‘thinking,’ stand for abstract, temporally extended patterns of overt behavior. Thus, for teleological behaviorism, talking to yourself, covert by definition, cannot be thinking.     

Skinner on cognition

One of the most controversial, if not the most controversial, aspect of behaviorism is its claims (actual and putative) concerning cognition. Part of this controversy is caused by egregious exegetical errors on the part of Skinner's critics. Critics can then easily refute behaviorism by attributing these problematic claims to Skinner. This paper attempts to faithfully describe Skinner's claims regarding cognition. Skinner advances several arguments regarding the role of cognitions in human behavior and in the science of human behavior. We suggest that there are two distinct kinds of claims in this web: 1) claims regarding the proper relation between science and cognitions and 2) claims regarding the status of cognitions as natural events. Due to the multiplicity and interdependence of many of these arguments, it is best to view Skinner's position on cognition as consisting of a web of interdependent claims.     

Higher-order theories of consciousness and what-it-is-like-ness

Ambitious higher-order theories of consciousness aim to account for conscious states when these are understood in terms of what-it-is-like-ness. This paper considers two arguments concerning this aim, and concludes that ambitious theories fail. The misrepresentation argument against HO theories aims to show that the possibility of radical misrepresentation—there being a HO state about a state the subject is not in—leads to a contradiction. In contrast, the awareness argument aims to bolster HO theories by showing that subjects are aware of all their conscious states. Both arguments hinge on how we understand two related notions which are ubiquitous in discussions of consciousness: those of what-it-is-like-ness and there being something it is like for a subject to be in a mental state. This paper examines how HO theorists must understand the two crucial notions if they are to reject the misrepresentation argument but assert the awareness argument. It shows that HO theorists can and do adopt an understanding—the HO reading—which seems to give them what they want. But adopting the HO reading changes the two arguments. On this reading, the awareness argument tells us nothing about those states there is something it is like to be in, and so offers no support to ambitious HO theories. And to respond to the misrepresentation understood according to the HO reading is to simply ignore the argument presented, and so to give no response at all. As things stand, we should deny that HO theories can account for what-it-is-like-ness.     

Valuable, but not maximal: it's time behavior therapy attend to its behaviorism

The field of behavior therapy is not in touch with itself in terms of its overarching behaviorism. Many erroneously consider its basic behaviorism to have been radical behaviorism and continue to look to develop behavior therapy (including behavior analysis and behavioral assessment) within that framework. But that approach turns out to be much less than maximal because there is a more advanced, better developed behaviorism within which to conduct and project the field. There is much that behavior therapy is not doing in practice and research because it is not making full use of that behaviorism foundation.     

Radical behaviorism and the subjective-objective distinction

The distinction between subjective and objective domains is central to traditional psychology, including the various forms of mediational stimulus-organism-response neobehaviorism that treat the elements of a subjective domain as hypothetical constructs. Radical behaviorism has its own unique perspective on the subjective-objective distinction. For radical behaviorism, dichotomies between subjective and objective, knower and known, or observer and agent imply at most unique access to a part of the world, rather than dichotomous ontologies. This perspective leads to unique treatments of such important philosophical matters as (a) dispositions and (b) the difference between first- and third-person psychological sentences.     

George A. Miller, language, and the computer metaphor of mind

This article asks why the analogy between humans and computers was understood by cognitive psychologists to mean that "minds exist and that it is our job as psychologists to study them". Earlier psychologists, such as Clark Hull, used analogies between humans and complex machines such as telephone switchboards to defend a rigorous behaviorism. How, then, did the computer metaphor of mind come to be seen as the root concept underlying a paradigm shift from behaviorism to cognitivism? To answer this question, this article examines the life and work of George A. Miller, one of the most prominent of a generation of psychologists who began their careers as "good behaviorists" but later came to embrace cognitivism.