On decision making without likelihood judgment

Subjective expected utility, prospect theory and most other formal models of decision making under uncertainty are probabilistic: they assume that in making choices people judge the likelihood of relevant uncertainties. Clearly, in many situations people do indeed judge likelihood. However, we present studies suggesting that there are also many situations in which people do not judge likelihood and instead base their decisions on intuitively generated, non-probabilistic rules or rationales. Thus, we argue that real-world situations are of two types. In situations eliciting a probabilistic mindset, people rely on judgments of likelihood. In situations eliciting a non-probabilistic mindset, they neglect judgments of likelihood. We suggest three factors that may influence the tendency towards either probabilistic or non-probabilistic mindsets. We also outline how extant probabilistic theories may be complemented by non-probabilistic models.     

The dud-alternative effect in memory for associations: Putting confidence into local context

When participants are asked to provide confidence judgments for each provided alternative in a multiple-choice memory task, such judgments are inflated if the assessed alternatives are accompanied by an implausible (dud) alternative. This finding, termed the dud-alternative effect, has been recently documented in a memory setting with a lineup procedure (Charman, Wells, & Joy, Law & Human Behavior 35:479–500 2011). In the present study, we developed a novel paradigm to investigate the dud-alternative effect in memory. The paradigm utilizes a multiple-choice associative recognition task in which dud alternatives can be rejected on the basis of their unfamiliarity. In two experiments, we demonstrated a reliable dud-alternative effect with our novel procedure. The results demonstrated that the dud-alternative effect in episodic memory is not limited to tasks based on perceptual factors, but is a general phenomenon concerning confidence judgments.     

The revelation effect in frequency judgment

In three experiments, we explored the revelation effect in a frequency judgment task. Participants estimated the frequency of words that had been presented one, two, four, or eight times. At test, half the words were revealed by completing word fragments, and half were presented intact. Estimated frequencies were reliably higher for revealed than for intact words, and in two of the three experiments, the revelation effect became larger as actual frequency increased. A revelation effect was obtained whether the revealed word was the same as (Experiment 1) or different from (Experiment 2) the word judged for frequency. Frequency estimates were higher for more distorted test items (Experiment 3).     

决策与判断中的分解效应

分解效应是人类主观判断中的一种较稳固的行为偏差,并且判断结果会对随后的决策产生重要影响,因此,对该领域研究成果的全面梳理具有重要的理论意义和实际价值。本文主要介绍了支持理论中的分解效应,总结梳理了概率判断与时间判断中分解效应的研究,综述了其他社会判断中的分解效应研究成果,展望了决策与判断中的分解效应的未来研究方向。通过上述内容的阐述,希望能为该领域研究者提供新的思路,推动国内相关领域研究的发展。     

Regression effect in psychophysical judgment

Psychophysical judgment, like all other kinds of judgment, involves a matching or equating of two different domains. When the judgment involves the mate hing of values on two perceptual continua, the observer tends, on the average, to constrict the range of his adjustments on whichever variable is placed under his control. When the observer adjusts each variable in turn, two different regression lines are produced. This regression effect presumably occurs whenever the results of the matching judgments yield less than a perfect correlation. Illustrative examples are given for the continua, loudness, vibration, brightness, and duration.     

Regression effect in psychophysical judgment

Psychophysical judgment, like all other kinds of judgment, involves a matching or equating of two different domains. When the judgment involves the matching of values on two perceptual continua, the observer tends, on the average, to constrict the range of his adjustments on whichever variable is placed under his control. When the observer adjusts each variable in turn, two different regression lines are produced. This regression effect presumably occurs whenever the results of the matching judgments yield less than a perfect correlation. Illustrative examples are given for the continua, loudness, vibration, brightness, and duration.     

Corpus-based estimates of word association predict biases in judgment of word co-occurrence likelihood

This paper draws a connection between statistical word association measures used in linguistics and confirmation measures from epistemology. Having theoretically established the connection, we replicate, in the new context of the judgments of word co-occurrence, an intriguing finding from the psychology of reasoning, namely that confirmation values affect intuitions about likelihood. We show that the effect, despite being based in this case on very subtle statistical insights about thousands of words, is stable across three different experimental settings. Our theoretical and empirical results suggest that factors affecting traditional reasoning tasks are also at play when linguistic knowledge is probed, and they provide further evidence for the importance of confirmation in a new domain.     

The effect of temporal setting on likelihood estimates

In a series of experiments, subjects judged the likelihood of events set either in the past or the future. No consistent differences were found in either the central tendency or the dispersion of subjects' likelihood judgments regarding past and future events which differed solely in their temporal setting. Temporal setting was, however, found to affect the production of possible event outcomes. These results contradict a “sure past” hypothesis, advanced by a number of observers, according to which judges are more confident in dealing with past than future events. They also eliminate a possible source of methodological difficulty in the interpretation of existing judgmental studies and provide some insight into the use of judgmental heuristics. Belief in the “sure past” hypothesis is discussed as the result of confusion between temporal setting and its ecological correlates.     

The effect of attribute order on judgment in Chinese and English

The authors found that the order of attribute presentation had a stronger effect on judgment in English than in Chinese. In Experiment 1, with a sample of 102 female and 63 male bilingual Singaporeans, the authors found that participants' memory-based judgments showed a stronger primacy effect in English than in Chinese that was mediated by recall from long-term memory. In contrast, participants' online (immediate) judgments showed a primacy effect in both languages that was unmediated by recall from short-term memory. In Experiment 2, with a sample of 67 female and 53 male bilingual Singaporeans, the authors found that participants' online judgments were more influenced by the attribute order of a previously seen competitive advertisement in English than in Chinese. A cross-cultural field study in Mainland China and the United Kingdom provided external validity for the experimental results.     

Judging the accuracy of a likelihood judgment: the case of smoking risk

A standard method for assessing whether people have appropriate internal representations of an event's likelihood is to check whether their subjective probability or frequency estimates for the event correspond with the assumed objective value for that event. When a person's estimate for the event exceeds its assumed objective probability or frequency, the person's expectancy for the event is concluded to be greater than warranted. This paper describes three lines of reasoning as to why conclusions of this sort can be problematic. Recently published findings as well as data from two new experiments are described to support this main thesis. The case of smoking risk is used to illustrate the more general problem, and issues that must be considered to avoid or contend with the problem are discussed. Copyright © 2002 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

大小判断任务中正负号及其异同对SNARC效应的影响

SNARC效应(Spatial-Numerical Association of Response Codes)是指被试对数字做按键反应时,对于较小的数字,按左键的速度快于按右键;对于较大的数字,按右键的速度快于按左键。本研究以ERP作为测量手段,采用修正的大小判断任务,旨在探究数字正负号及其异同对SNARC效应的影响。行为结果发现,在反应时上,当目标数字与基线数字正负号相同且基线数字为+5时,一致条件显著快于不一致条件。ERP结果发现,当目标数字与基线数字正负号相同时,无论基线数字为+5还是–5,在反应选择阶段,不一致都比一致条件更负且均诱发了P3。当目标数字与基线数字正负号相异时,若基线数字为+5,一致比不一致条件在刺激呈现阶段诱发了波幅显著更小的N300;若基线数字为–5,一致比不一致条件在反应执行阶段诱发了更正的LPP。无论目标数字与基线数字正负号相同还是相异,在反应选择阶段,不一致都比一致条件更负且均诱发了P3,表明出现了SNARC效应。同时,SNARC效应的出现激活了额叶头皮位置,负数加工伴随左额叶的激活,而正数加工伴随右额叶的激活,溯源分析结果进一步表明SNARC效应定位于额叶与顶叶。这些结果说明负数按实际大小表征在心理数字线上,支持了负数空间表征的个体发展论假说;表明符号捷径机制会改变SNARC效应的发生时间;同时证明了负数与正数的空间表征具有不同的优势半球。     

The effect of representations of binary variables on judgment of influence

Studies concerned with judgments of contingency between binary variables have often ignored what the variables stand for. The two values of a binary variable can be represented as a prevailing state (nonevent) or as an active state (event). Judgments under the four conditions resulting from the combination of a binary input variable that can be represented as event-nonevent or event-event with an outcome variable that can be represented in the same way were obtained. It is shown in Experiment 1, that judgments of data sets which exhibit the same degree of covariation depend upon how the input and output variables are represented. In Experiment 2 the case where both the input and output variables are represented as event-nonevent is examined. Judgments were higher when the pairing of the input event was with the output event and the input nonevent with the output nonevent that when the pairing was of event with nonevent, suggesting a causal compatibility of event-event pairings and a causal incompatibility of event-nonevent pairings. Experiment 3 demonstrates that judgments of the strength of the relation between binary input and output variables is not based on the appropriate statistical measure, the difference between two conditional probabilities. The overall pattern of judgments in the three experiments is mainly explicable on the basis of two principles: (1) judgments tend to be based on the difference between confirming and disconfirming cases and (2) causal compatibility in the representation of the input and output variables plays a critical role.     

味觉对判断与决策的影响及其机制

味觉作为人类生存必不可少的感觉之一, 早已超越“舌尖”的直接感受, 潜在地影响了个体对人际关系及伦理道德的知觉与判断, 改变着个体对冒险与消费等行为的决策。情绪中介假说、具身隐喻假说、进化假说以及社会建构假说从不同视角试图阐明味觉对判断与决策的影响机制。当前研究存在味觉感受存在个体差异、味觉测量难以保证效度、味觉实验缺乏统一研究范式等问题, 未来可继续进行味觉隐喻的验证并将其应用于感官营销、心理治疗等领域, 从生理、心理及社会等多个层面出发, 全方位探讨味觉对判断、决策的影响及其机制。     

The effect of divided attention on global judgment of learning accuracy

This study examined the effect of divided attention (DA) on global judgment of learning (JOL) accuracy in a multitrial list learning paradigm. A word monitoring task was used to divide attention. Participants were assigned to an attention condition (DA at encoding, DA at judgment, DA at retrieval, or focused attention) and completed 4 learning trials, each comprising a study, judgment, and recall phase. Participants showed greater overconfidence in the DA at encoding (Trial 2) and DA at retrieval (Trials 1 and 2) conditions than in the focused attention condition. DA atjudgment did not affect JOL accuracy, and there was no effect of DA in Trials 3 and 4 on JOL accuracy across all attention conditions. Results indicate that participants consider conditions of encoding and retrieval but do not engage in recall when forming global JOLs. These findings suggest that people rely on extrinsic cues when making repeated, global metamemoryjudgments.     

The implicit sense of agency is not a perceptual effect but is a judgment effect

Cognitive Processing - The sense of agency (SoA) is characterized as the sense of being the causal agent of one's own actions, and it is measured in two forms: explicit and implicit. In the...