The effect of combined arousal states on attitude change

An experiment was devised in which subjects either were given a choice or were given no choice to listen to a counter-attitudinal communication. For half the subjects (Interrupt condition) the tape of the communication broke during the concluding sentence of the speech. The other half of the subjects (No Interrupt condition) heard the speech in its entirety. A recall measure indicated that subjects in the Interrupt condition recalled significantly more arguments made in the communication than subjects who heard the complete speech. This was interpreted as being a Zeigarnik effect caused by arousal created by the interruption. The choice manipulation should have created dissonance and motivated attitude change. Consistent with dissonance theory, measures of attitude change showed that greater attitude change toward the position of the speech occurred in the Choice condition than in the No Choice condition. In addition, an interaction in which significantly greater change occurred in the Choice-Interrupt condition than any of the other conditions was obtained. Since both the choice and interruption manipulations were hypothesized to be arousing, it was speculated that, in the Choice-Interrupt condition, the arousal created by the cognitive inconsistency and by the interrupted task may have combined to yield the increased attitude change. The conditions under which arousal states might combine were discussed.     

Evaluative language,cognitive effort and attitude change

The present article deals with the effects of the use of evaluatively biased language on attitudes, and with the role of cognitive effort. We tested whether active information processing — formulating arguments on the basis of evaluatively biased language — was a necessary condition for attitude change. Results of the present study support the prediction that using evaluative language can infuence attitudes, but that these effects depend on the amount of cognitive effort.     

Self-generated attitude change: A person by situation analysis of attitude polarization and attenuation

The potential moderating effects of differences in the need for cognition on the attitude polarization process were explored. Based on putative schematabased differences in information processing, it was predicted that an increased opportunity for thought would result in (a) more attitude polarization for low need for cognition persons than for high need for cognition persons and (b) more attitude attenuation for high need for cognition persons than for low need for cognition persons. Participants completed the Need for Cognition scale and were given either little or ample time to think about issues toward which they previously held moderate attitudes. Attitudes were reassessed following thought about the issues. The results were consistent with the predicted moderating effects of individual differences in the need for cognition on thought-induced attitude polarization. Implications of and alternative explanations for the findings are discussed.     

The effect of self-attribute relevance on how self-esteem moderates attitude change in dissonance processes

An experiment was conducted to examine the conditions under which self-esteem operates as an expectancy, as a resource, or does not influence cognitive dissonance processes. Based on the self-standards model of dissonance (Stone & Cooper, 2001), it was predicted that following a high-choice counter-attitudinal behavior: (a) priming positive self-attributes that were relevant to the discrepant behavior would cause participants with high self-esteem to report more attitude change as compared to participants with low self-esteem, (b) priming positive self-attributes that were irrelevant to the behavior would cause participants with high self-esteem to report less attitude change as compared to participants with low self-esteem, and (c) priming neutral self-attributes would eliminate self-esteem moderation of attitude change. The results of the attitude change measure supported the predictions. The discussion explores different processes by which the accessibility of cognitions about the self mediate dissonance arousal and reduction.     

The cognitive attitude of rational trust

I provide an account of the cognitive attitude of trust that explains the role trust plays in the planning of rational agents. Many authors have dismissed choosing to trust as either impossible or irrational; however, this fails to account for the role of trust in practical reasoning. A can have therapeutic, coping, or corrective reasons to trust B to ${\phi}$ , even in the absence of evidence that B will ${\phi}$ . One can choose to engage in therapeutic trust to inspire trustworthiness, coping trust to simplify one’s planning, or corrective trust to avoid doing a testimonial injustice. To accommodate such types of trust, without accepting doxastic voluntarism, requires an account of the cognitive attitude of trust broader than belief alone. I argue that trust involves taking the proposition that someone will do something as a premise in one’s practical reasoning, which can be a matter of believing or accepting the proposition. I defend this account against objections that it (i) provides insufficient rational constraints on trust, (ii) conflates trust and pretense of trust, and (iii) cannot account for the rationality of back-up planning.     

Psychopathic personality traits and cognitive dissonance: Individual differences in attitude change

In a study using a classic cognitive dissonance paradigm, 164 undergraduate participants were induced to deceive a fellow student; half were directly instructed to lie whereas the other half were politely requested but not instructed to lie. Participants were assessed for psychopathic traits using the Psychopathic Personality Inventory-Revised: Short Form and the Levenson Self-Report Psychopathy Scale, and for Machiavellianism using the MACH-IV. As predicted, participants low in psychopathic traits exhibited classic cognitive dissonance effects following their lie whereas participants high in psychopathic traits did not. Results for Machiavellianism were nonsignificant. These results indicate that cognitive dissonance effects in an induced compliance paradigm are reduced or eliminated among individuals with high levels of psychopathic traits.     

Conceptual complexity,environment complexity,communication salience and attitude change

Hypotheses derived from the Harvey, Hunt and Schroder personality organization system were tested in an attitude change situation. Female subjects selected for extremeness of conceptual structure and negative attitude toward women's equality were subjected to a sensory deprivation, a normal control or an overstimulation environment in which a high salience (HS) or a low salience (LS) communication was presented. The main prediction of a three-way interaction among conceptual structure, communication salience and environmental complexity received some support. Concrete individuals who received the HS communication showed significantly more change than those who received the LS communication. The expected reversal of this effect for abstract individuals was not found. The HS communication produced significantly greater change than the LS communication, and this difference was significantly related to environmental complexity. These findings were discussed in terms of McGuire's and Berlyne's respective proposals concerning comprehension-yielding, and arousal reduction.     

The effects of an implemental mind-set on attitude strength

The authors investigated whether an implemental mind-set fosters stronger attitudes. Participants who made a decision about how to act (vs. those who held off) expressed a more extreme attitude toward an issue unrelated to the decision (Experiment 1). Participants who planned the implementation of a decision (vs. deliberated vs. control) exhibited less ambivalent (Experiment 2) and more accessible (Experiment 3) attitudes toward various objects unrelated to the decision. Moreover, an attitude reported by planning participants better predicted self-reported behavior 1 week later (Experiment 4). Finally, results suggest that the effect of an implemental mind-set on attitude strength toward unrelated objects is driven by a focus on information that supports an already-made decision (Experiment 5). Implications for attitudes, goals, and mind-sets are discussed.     

The impact of affective and cognitive focus on attitude formation

We examined the effects of unobtrusive affective and cognitive focus on attitude formation. To induce focus, participants worked on a word-search puzzle consisting of either affective (e.g., emotion) or cognitive (e.g., reasoning) words. They then read positive and negative affective and cognitive information about a new attitude object. In the affective focus condition, evaluations were more congruent with the valence of the affective information than they were in the cognitive focus condition, where evaluations were more congruent with the valence of the cognitive information than they were in the affective focus condition. Affective focus also resulted in enhanced recall of affective information. The effects on evaluations remained stable over time, whereas effects on memory disappeared. Finally, affective focus was associated with faster response times, suggesting enhanced accessibility of affect-based attitudes. The present research shows that an affective or cognitive focus leads to the formation of different attitudes.     

Age differences in attitude change: influences of cognitive resources and motivation on responses to argument quantity

This study examined the influences of cognitive resources and motivation on how young and older adults process different quantities of persuasive arguments. In the first experiment session, both young and older adults rated their attitudes toward marijuana legalization and capital punishment. After a week, they read either 3 or 9 similar-quality arguments supporting marijuana legalization and capital punishment. Half of participants were assigned to the high-involvement condition (i.e., told that they were going to discuss the arguments later with the experimenter) and the other half were assigned to the low-involvement condition (i.e., given no instructions). After reading the arguments, participants rated their attitudes toward those 2 social issues again. Highly involved young adults changed their attitudes regardless of the quantity of arguments, whereas lowly involved young adults' attitude change was influenced by the argument quantity. Older adults in both high-involvement and low-involvement conditions changed their attitudes according to the argument quantity. Working memory was found to mediate the age effects on attitude change. This finding demonstrated the importance of a cognitive mechanism in accounting for age differences in attitude change.     

The influence of incentive-aroused ambivalence on overjustification effects in attitude change

Rewarding people to advocate a position with which they already agree can undermine their attitudinal positivity. This research tests a novel explanation of this example of the overjustification phenomenon. The hypothesis holds that the provision of an unnecessary incentive gives rise to an ambivalent response: the positive reaction to the reinforcement is accompanied by a sense of uneasiness, or apprehension, regarding the legitimacy of the induced behaviors. Attitude change is expected only in circumstances that confirm the apprehension. Results consistent with this expectation were discovered. In Study 1, respondents asked to play the role of a subject in an overjustification experiment reported greater levels of ambivalence regarding their (role-played) proattitudinal action as a function of payment. Contrary to alternative interpretations of the phenomenon, no incentive-related differences were found in subjects' ratings of the reprehensibility of the requested action, or in their beliefs that future activities of the type requested be undertaken only for payment. In Study 2, subjects paid to read a proattitudinal speech were found subsequently to be less in favor of their original positions only if they also had been given a counterattitudinal communication. The presence or absence of the countercommunication had no influence on the attitudes of unpaid respondents. Subjects for whom the payment was made to appear incidental to the experiment did not demonstrate the usual overjustification effect. These results supported the incentive-aroused ambivalence hypothesis. Psychological mechanisms that might underlie the effect were discussed.     

Dissonance averted: Self-concept organization moderates the effect of hypocrisy on attitude change

The current work explored how self-concept representation affects how experiencing dissonance results in changing one’s attitudes in response to acknowledging hypocrisy. We found a relation between self-complexity and attitude change after admitting past hypocritical actions. Specifically, people lower in self-complexity changed their attitudes to bring them more in line with their transgressions (presumably to quell the especially strong feelings of unpleasantness resulting from their acknowledging behavior-belief discrepancies) whereas those greater in self-complexity showed more bolstering of their attitudes following hypocrisy. This relation between self-complexity and attitude change following hypocrisy was eliminated when participants were given a chance to reaffirm their sense of personal value and integrity through other means (i.e., self-affirmation). Implications for how self-concept representation may play a role in moderating a number of psychological phenomena, ranging from goal attainment to stereotype threat, are discussed.     

The oblique effect in a vernier acuity situation

Observers viewed either vertical or obliquely oriented vernier targets from either an upright position or with their heads tilted. Vernier acuity was consistently better for retinally vertical than for gravitationally vertical targets, even when presented against a background context of vertical stripes designed to aid veridical perception of gravitational orientation. These results indicate that vernier acuity depends on retinal image orientation rather than on perceived orientation. The high contrast of the vernier lines ensures that their gravitational orientation is clearly perceived. Thus the present results provide a stronger basis for ruling out the effects of perceptual orientation than previous studies involving grating contrast-threshold measurements. Since the vernier targets were presented as brief flashes, it is unlikely that the measured oblique effect is attributable to differences in eye-movement patterns.