What kind of bias is hindsight bias?

When people are asked to recollect a former response after having received feedback information, their recollection tends to approach the feedback answer. This phenomenon is referred to as hindsight bias. Recently, Erdfelder and Buchner proposed a multinomial model designed to independently measure the contributions of reconstruction and recollection processes. On its basis, they only found firm evidence for the contribution of reconstruction biases to hindsight effects. In the present study, we tried to experimentally enhance the probability of recollection biases by (a) reducing the depth of processing of the original estimate, (b) minimizing the distinctness of the original estimate and feedback, and (c) combining both treatments. The empirical data were analyzed using a variant of the Erdfelder and Buchner model which allows for the experimental manipulation of the feedback answer. This model is shown to adequately describe the data of our experiment. Moreover, although both treatments were effective in that the first one reduced correct recollections in general and the second one diminished differences between original estimates and recalled estimates, the parameter estimates indicate that the probability of recollecting the original estimate is not hampered by feedback information, even under conditions which are thought to enhance memory impairments. Received: 10 December 1995 / Accepted: 29 October 1997     

Individual differences and weight bias: Do people with an anti-fat bias have a pro-thin bias?

While levels of weight bias vary among individuals, it is not clear why one person possesses stronger anti-fat attitudes than another person. This investigation examined whether individual differences commonly associated with greater anti-fat bias are also associated with a greater preference for thinness among people of varying levels of weight. Young adults (62% women; 84% Caucasian) recruited from psychology classes (N = 308) rated four male and female figures with approximate BMIs of 18.5, 25, 30, and 40, on measures of dislike and personality characteristics and completed measures assessing weight controllability, attitudes toward the obese, and perceptual reliance. Greater negative attitudes, weight controllability beliefs, and perceptual reliance were positively associated with greater dislike and negative personality attributes among obese/severely obese figures, but inversely related among low normal weight figures. Individuals who judge others based on physical features or who view obesity as controllable evidence greater weight bias and a stronger preference for thin body types.     

Is handedness just response bias?

Although most people prefer to use the right hand for unimanual tasks, it is unknown whether handedness arises from response bias. Whether it does is a question inspired by signal detection theory. We drew on the framework of signal detection theory to assess bias and sensitivity in hand choice by asking right-handers to choose between two tasks—one performed with the left hand, and one performed with the right. For some participants, the left-hand task stayed constant while the right-hand task was varied. For other participants, the right-hand stayed constant while the left-hand task was varied. We reasoned that if hand preference only reflected bias, participants would choose the generally preferred hand to the same degree, regardless of whether its task was constant or varied. Our participants followed this strategy only to some extent, suggesting that bias and sensitivity both contribute to hand preference.     

Does anxiety-linked attentional bias to threatening information reflect bias in the setting of attentional goals,or bias in the execution of attentional goals?

Heightened anxiety vulnerability is characterised by an attentional bias that favours the processing of negative information. However, this anxiety-linked attentional bias is amenable to two quite different explanations. One possibility is that it reflects anxiety-linked bias in the setting of attentional goals that favours setting the goal of attending towards negative information over the alternative goal of attending away from such information. Another possibility is that it reflects anxiety-linked bias in the execution of attentional goals that enhances the execution of the former attentional goal compared to the latter. The present study introduces a novel methodology designed to discriminate the validity of these competing hypotheses, by examining anxiety-linked attentional bias under two conditions. One condition left attentional goals unconstrained. The other condition imposed the attentional goal of either attending towards more negative or more benign emotional stimuli. The finding that anxiety-linked attentional bias was observed only under the former condition supported the hypothesis that anxiety is characterised by a bias favouring the setting attentional goals involving vigilance rather than avoidance of negative information, while giving no support to the hypothesis that anxiety is characterised by a bias reflecting enhanced execution of the former attentional goal compared to the latter.     

Is racial bias malleable? Whites' lay theories of racial bias predict divergent strategies for interracial interactions

How do Whites approach interracial interactions? We argue that a previously unexamined factor-beliefs about the malleability of racial bias-guides Whites' strategies for difficult interracial interactions. We predicted and found that those who believe racial bias is malleable favor learning-oriented strategies such as taking the other person's perspective and trying to learn why an interaction is challenging, whereas those who believe racial bias is fixed favor performance-oriented strategies such as overcompensating in the interaction and trying to end the interaction as quickly as possible. Four studies support these predictions. Whether measured (Studies 1, 3, and 4) or manipulated (Study 2), beliefs that racial bias is fixed versus malleable yielded these divergent strategies for difficult interracial interactions. Furthermore, beliefs about the malleability of racial bias are distinct from related constructs (e.g., prejudice and motivations to respond without prejudice; Studies 1, 3, and 4) and influence self-reported (Studies 1-3) and actual (Study 4) strategies in imagined (Studies 1-2) and real (Studies 3-4) interracial interactions. Together, these findings demonstrate that beliefs about the malleability of racial bias influence Whites' approaches to and strategies within interracial interactions.     

Hindsight bias and outcome bias in judging directors’ liability and the role of free will beliefs

Following a corporate disaster such as bankruptcy, people in general and damaged parties, in particular, want to know what happened and whether the company's directors are to blame. The accurate assessment of directors’ liability can be jeopardized by having to judge in hindsight with full knowledge of the adverse outcome. The present study investigates whether professional legal investigators such as judges and lawyers are affected by hindsight bias and outcome bias when evaluating directors’ conduct in a bankruptcy case. Additionally, to advance our understanding of the mechanisms underlying these biases, we also examine whether free will beliefs can predict susceptibility to hindsight bias and outcome bias in this context. In two studies (total N = 1,729), we demonstrate that legal professionals tend to judge a director's actions more negatively and perceive bankruptcy as more foreseeable in hindsight than in foresight and that these effects are significantly stronger for those who endorse the notion that humans have free will. This contribution is particularly timely considering the many companies that are currently going bankrupt or are facing bankruptcy amidst the COVID-19 pandemic.     

How do ordered questions bias eyewitnesses?

ABSTRACT

Background: Suggestive techniques can distort eyewitness memory (Wells & Loftus, 2003, Eyewitness memory for people and events. In A. M. Goldstein (Ed.), Handbook of psychology: Forensic Psychology, Vol. 11 (pp. 149–160). Hoboken, NY: John Wiley & Sons Inc). Recently, we found that suggestion is unnecessary: Simply reversing the arrangement of questions put to eyewitnesses changed what they believed (Michael & Garry, 2016, Ordered questions bias eyewitnesses and jurors. Psychonomic Bulletin & Review, 23, 601–608. doi:10.3758/s13423-015-0933-1). But why? One explanation might be that early questions set an anchor that eyewitnesses then adjust away from insufficiently. Methods: We tracked how eyewitness beliefs changed over the course of questioning. We then investigated the influence of people’s need to engage in and enjoy effortful cognition. This factor, “Need for Cognition,” (NFC) affects the degree to which people adjust (Cacioppo, Petty, & Feng Kao, 1984, The efficient assessment of need for cognition. Journal of Personality Assessment, 48, 306–307. doi:10.1207/s15327752jpa4803_13; Epley & Gilovich, 2006, The anchoring-and-adjustment heuristic: Why the adjustments are insufficient. Psychological Science, 17, 311–318. doi:10.1111/j.1467-9280.2006.01704.x). Results: In our first two experiments we found results consistent with an anchoring-and-adjustment account. But in Experiments 3 and 4 we found that NFC provided only partial support for that account. Conclusions: Taken together, these findings have implications for understanding how people form beliefs about the accuracy of their memory.     

Searching beneath the shelf in macaque monkeys: evidence for a gravity bias or a foraging bias?

The reasons underpinning search biases in 2 species of macaque monkeys (Macaca mulatta and Macaca arctoides) were explored over the course of 3 experiments requiring monkeys to search for a hidden food reward. The results reveal that monkeys are adept at exploiting perceptual cues to locate a food reward but are unable to use physical constraints such as solidity as cues to the reward's location. Monkeys prefer to search for a food reward beneath a solid shelf, not because they have an expectation that the reward should be there, but rather because, in the absence of usable cues, this bias emerges as a default search option. It is hypothesized that this bias may have its roots in a history of competition for food resources.     

Emotion-induced modulation of recognition memory decisions in a Go/NoGo task: Response bias or memory bias?

In recognition memory tests for words, items with negative emotional meaning are more often classified as “old” compared to neutral items, whether or not they are in fact old. Two accounts for this bias have been offered: One proposes that emotions disrupt retrieval and response monitoring processes (executive control account), the other proposes that emotions cause illusory feelings of remembering (memory bias account). We addressed this issue by varying the target signal in a Go/NoGo variant of a recognition memory task for negative, neutral, and positive words and faces: One group of participants was asked to respond to old items whereas the other group was asked to respond to new items. Results showed that the “Go-for-old” group showed the typical emotion-induced response bias shift for both positive and negative words, while the “Go-for-new” group showed the opposite pattern. Results were nonsignificant for faces, but went into the same direction. The findings are clearly inconsistent with the executive control account and speak for a genuine memory illusion induced by emotional arousal.     

Is egocentric bias evidence for simulation theory?

Revised simulation theory (Goldman 2006) allows mental state attributions containing some or all of the attributor’s genuine, non-simulated mental states. It is thought that this gives the revised theory an empirical advantage, because unlike theory theory and rationality theory, it can explain egocentric bias (the tendency to over attribute ones’ own mental states to others). I challenge this view, arguing that theory theory and rationality theory can explain egocentricity by appealing to heuristic mindreading and the diagnosticity of attributors’ own beliefs, and that these explanations are as simple and consistent as those provided by revised simulation theory.     

What's in a name? Attachment-related attentional bias

Participants completed a dot probe task that presented pairs of first names: the participant's own name and a neutral name (Experiments 1-4), the name of their attachment figure and a neutral name (Experiments 1-4), or the name of a known person and a neutral name (Experiments 2-4). A significant attentional bias effect was found for the attachment name in attachment-related contexts, whether they were threatening or positive. The results of Experiments 2 and 4 showed that the attentional bias effects for the attachment name were not driven by familiarity effects and could not be interpreted in terms of salience. Attachment anxiety was associated with hypervigilance toward the attachment name in threatening and positive attachment contexts. Attachment avoidance was unrelated to any attentional bias effects.     

Hindsight bias: a by-product of knowledge updating?

With the benefit of feedback about the outcome of an event, people's recalled judgments are typically closer to the outcome of the event than their original judgments were. It has been suggested that this hindsight bias may be due to a reconstruction process of the prior judgment. A model of such a process is proposed that assumes that knowledge is updated after feedback and that reconstruction is based on the updated knowledge. Consistent with the model's predictions, the results of 2 studies show that knowledge after feedback is systematically shifted toward feedback, and that assisting retrieval of the knowledge prior to feedback reduces hindsight bias. In addition, the model accounts for about 75% of cases in which either hindsight bias or reversed hindsight bias occurred. The authors conclude that hindsight bias can be understood as a by-product of an adaptive process, namely the updating of knowledge after feedback.     

What mediates gender bias in work behavior ratings?

This study explored possible mediators of gender bias in work behavior ratings. However, we believed it important to do so by first attempting to create a decision-making environment that better reflected the cognitive demands imposed on raters in work settings. Accordingly, 74 participants, mostly White and middle class students, read a vignette that depicted the work behavior of a male or female police officer. All participants attended to another task while reading the vignette and did so while under a perceived time limit; then, immediately or 5 days later, they completed a work behavior questionnaire. As expected, more effective work behaviors were attributed to men than women—but only when ratings were delayed. Further analyses revealed that a systematic response bias was responsible, whereas selective memory played no role. Specifically, participants adopted a more liberal decision criterion when attributing effective work behaviors to men than women. These results help to illuminate the dynamics of discrimination and provide direction for future research efforts.     

Preattentive bias for snake words in snake phobia?

Stroop interference and skin conductance responses (SCRs) for words related to snakes, spiders, flowers, and mushrooms were studied in a group of women (n=40) with snake phobia who were randomised to a stress or no-stress condition. The 21 low-stress snake phobics showed Stroop interference for unmasked (but not for masked) snake words, compared with 21 age- and sex-matched controls. Stroop interference was not significantly different between high-stress and low-stress snake phobics. No support for stronger SCRs for masked snake words was found in snake phobics in a lexical decision task with masked presentations of the same words. The lack of a masked Stroop interference in snake phobics suggests a possible difference in cognitive-emotional mechanisms underlying specific phobia vs. other anxiety disorders that deserves further investigation.     

Configurality in judgment: Is it a bias?

Past research has shown that the relationship between cue and judgment often depends on the level of other cues (configural relationship). It is not clear, however, if this relationship is environmentally appropriate. To examine this issue, I compare configural models of the judgment with configural models of the criterion associated with this judgment. Two databases are analyzed. In one, the cues are the parents’ educational level, the judgment is the educational expectations of the child, and the criterion is the actual educational achievement. In the other, the cues are the MMPI scores of psychiatric patients, the judgment is the clinical psychologists’ estimation of the degree of pathology, and the criterion is the actual pathology. The analysis of both databases revealed that configurality characterizes the judgment but not the criterion.     

Interpretation bias and social anxiety: does interpretation bias mediate the relationship between trait social anxiety and state anxiety responses?

Two studies aimed to examine whether high socially anxious individuals are more likely to negatively interpret ambiguous social scenarios and facial expressions compared to low socially anxious individuals. We also examined whether interpretation bias serves as a mediator of the relationship between trait social anxiety and state anxiety responses, in particular current state anxiety, bodily sensations, and perceived probability and cost of negative evaluation pertaining to a speech task. Study 1 used ambiguous social scenarios and Study 2 used ambiguous facial expressions as stimuli to objectively assess interpretation bias. Undergraduate students with high and low social anxiety completed measures of state anxiety responses at three time points: baseline, after the interpretation bias task, and after the preparation for an impromptu speech. Results showed that high socially anxious individuals were more likely to endorse threat interpretations for ambiguous social scenarios and to interpret ambiguous faces as negative than low socially anxious individuals. Furthermore, negative interpretations mediated the relationship between trait social anxiety and perceived probability of negative evaluation pertaining to the speech task in Study 1 but not Study 2. The present studies provide new insight into the role of interpretation bias in social anxiety.     

Structuring decision problems and the ‘bias heuristic’

This paper examines our understanding of the decomposition of immediate acts when structuring decision problems. Seven different types of uncertainties are identified, and four of these are shown to be taken explicitly into account in models within the province of decision theory, described in terms of four interlocking systems interfaced with semantic memory (a core act-event system, and systems buffering utilities, probabilities and events, respectively). Requisite decision modeling is shown to require that the remaining three types of uncertainty (procedural uncertainty; how the decision maker will feel about subsequent acts; agency for changing subsequent states of the world) are also resolved. Methods for ‘fixing’ structure are discussed in terms of aiming at a common understanding about the ‘small world’ in which a decision problem is located. Difficulties in resolving uncertainties in doing this are described. An alternative approach, common in studies invoking ‘behavioural decision theory’ is contrasted: imposing structure, assuming common understanding. The latter approach is shown to involve (i) the ‘naturalisation’ of the small world in which the decision problem is located, and (ii) the utilisation of normative models as ‘ideal types’, leading to the use of the ‘bias’ argument in discussing subjects' performance in decision tasks. Using this argument reflexively, the operation of the ‘bias heuristic’ is identified in a survey of published papers referencing this approach to the study of decision making. Effects identified are: availability of tasks, subjects and explanations; representativeness of findings; and anchoring and adjustment of explanations. Implications for practice are discussed throughout the paper.     

Monitoring in clinical trials: benefit or bias?

Monitoring ongoing clinical trials for early signs of effectiveness is an option for improving cost-effectiveness of trials that is becoming increasingly common. Alongside the obvious advantages made possible by monitoring, however, there are some downsides. In particular, there is growing concern in the medical community that trials stopped early for benefit tend to overestimate treatment effect. In this paper, I examine this problem from the point of view of statistical methodology, starting from the observation that the overestimation is caused by the statistical method adopted. Consequently, I argue that some modifications can and should be made to the present statistical framework in order not to miss the advantages the possibility of monitoring can grant.