The Difference Between Lonely Old Ladies and CCTV Cameras: A Response to Ryberg

This article considers the question of whether it is meaningful to speak of privacy rights in public spaces, and the possibility of such rights framing the basis for regulating or restricting the use of surveillance technologies such as closed circuit television (CCTV). In particular, it responds to a recent article by Jesper Ryberg that suggests that there is little difference between being watched by private individuals and CCTV cameras, and instead argues that state surveillance is qualitatively different from (and more problematic than) surveillance by ‘lonely old ladies’.

Male/Male Sex in Hong Kong: Privacy,Please?

In August 2005, the age of consent for male/male sexual activity in Hong Kong was held to be arbitrarily and discriminatorily targeting gay men and thus in violation of an individual’s right to privacy and his right of equality on the basis of sexual orientation. While the decision has since been affirmed on appeal, it has been argued that judicial recourse to equality rights where privacy rights would have sufficed for the provisions to be struck down was a misguided, if not mistaken, effort that merely reinforced the stereotype that gay men are “hypersexualized” and was a setback for the gay rights movement in Hong Kong. This article examines whether the argument is a well-founded one and discusses the implications of confining a man’s right to have consensual sex with another man to his privacy rights alone.

Public and Private Meaning in Hume: Comments on Ted Morris’ “Meaningfulness without Metaphysics: Another Look at Hume’s Meaning-Empiricism”

This paper raises questions concerning Ted Morris’ interpretation of Hume’s notion of meaning and investigates the private and public aspects of Hume’s notion of meaning.

A Further Reply to Beyer on Omniscience

I provide a further response to Jason A. Beyer’s objections to the alleged inconsistency between God’s omniscience and His other attributes.

An Unintentional Defense of the Indeterminacy of Meaning?

Markus Werning attempts to refute Quine’s thesis that meaning is indeterminate. To this purpose he employs Hodges’ theorem about extensions of cofinal meaning functions. But the theorem does neither suffice to solve Quine’s problem nor the problem Werning mistakenly identifies with Quine’s. Nevertheless it makes sense to employ the methods used in Werning’s paper with regard to Quine’s thesis, only that they tell in favour of the thesis instead of against it.

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Wittgenstein on Meaning and Life

This is a paper about the way language meshes with life. It focuses on Ludwig Wittgenstein’s later work, and compares it with Leo Tolstoy and Saint Augustine’s confessions. My aim is to better understand in this way what it means to have meaning in language, as well as meaning in life.

Remarks on Grandi’s Comments

This note is a reply to some of Giovanni Grandi’s comments on my paper “Berkeley’s Contingent Necessities.”

Are New Technologies the Enemy of Privacy?

Privacy is one good among other goods and should be weighed as such. The relationship between technology and privacy is best viewed as an arms race between advancements that diminish privacy and those that better protect it, rather than the semi-Luddite view which sees technology as one-sided development enabling those who seek to invade privacy to overrun those who seek to protect it. The merits or defects of particular technologies are not inherent to the technologies, but rather, depend on how they are used and above all, on how closely their use is monitored and accounted for by the parties involved. In order to reassure the public and to ensure accountability and oversight, a civilian review board should be created to monitor the government’s use of surveillance and related technologies. Proper accountability requires multiple layers of oversight, and should not be left solely in the hands of the government.

Knowledge as aptness

I raise several objections to Sosa’s account of knowledge as aptness. I argue that aptness is neither necessary nor sufficient for knowledge. I also raise some objection to Sosa’s treatment of dreaming skepticism.

Speaking to Pictures

A review of Peter Steele’s Plenty, a book in which each poem is faced by a colour plate of the painting or object which sparked it off. Hollander’s ecphrasis and Krieger’s ekphrasis are held in – possibly unresolvable – dialectic by Steele’s poems. The only resolution which one can find is one of wit rather than of philosophy.

Supernatural Miracles and Religious Inclusiveness

In this paper I shall assess Clarke’s assertion that all definitions of miracles that purport to satisfy the criterion of religious inclusiveness should substitute the term ‘supernatural’ for ‘non-natural’. In addition, I shall attempt to strengthen Clarke’s conception of the supernatural by offering an analysis of what it means for something to be ‘above’ nature. Lastly, I shall offer a new argument as to why Clarke’s intention-based definition of miracles is necessarily less religiously inclusive than Mumford’s causation-based definition.

On what will be: reply to Westphal

Jonathan Westphal’s recent paper attempts to reconcile the view that propositions about the future can be true or false now with the idea that the future cannot now be real. I attempt to show that Westphal’s proposal is either unoriginal or unsatisfying. It is unoriginal if it is just the well-known eternalist solution. It is unsatisfying if it is instead making use of a peculiar, tensed truthmaking principle.

Blair on Rodin: Rejoinder

The article is a brief response to Jacob Blair’s critique of David Rodin’s argument in War and Self-Defense that there are circumstances in which war conceivably could be justified not as self-defence, but as law enforcement or punishment. It argues that while Rodin’s position potentially is less dilemmatic than Blair suggests, Blair nevertheless usefully highlights tensions within it. Blair’s own argument in favour of ar as law-enforcement is suggestive, but in no way conclusive.

Anti-Autonomism Defended: A Reply to Hill

In the current issue of this journal, Scott Hill critiques some of my work on the “is”-“ought” controversy, the Hume-inspired debate over whether an ethical conclusion can be soundly, or even validly, derived from only non-ethical premises. I’ve argued that it can be; Hill is unconvinced. I reply to Hill’s critique, focusing on four key questions to which he and I give different answers.

The Subject of Pastoral Care: A Discussion Based on the Theology of Henning Luther

In this article the author discusses the differences between pastoral care and psycho-social therapy. She clarifies the specific identity of pastoral care on the basis of Henning Luther’s theology. He distinguishes different anthropological presuppositions in pastoral care and psycho-social therapy. Consequently, she demonstrates the relevancy of Luther’s theology for today’s Practical Theology.

Wayne Martin on judgment

Wayne Martin’s Theories of Judgment marks a significant advance in the philosophical analysis of judgment. He understands that the domain of judgment is so large that it allows only a selective treatment. We can expand Martin’s insight by acknowledging that this domain is, in fact, hypercomplex and therefore unsurveyable in Wittgenstein’s sense. Martin’s treatment of judgments can, however, be extended in a number of directions. Of particular importance is it to understand the linguistic aspect of theoretical judgments, the challenges to the synthetic conception of judgment constituted not only by existential, but also by impersonal and negative judgments, and the exploration of the links between the notions of judgment and truth.

Persisting problems for a quantificational theory of complex demonstratives

I criticized Jeffrey King’s theory of complex demonstratives in “Problems for a Quantificational Theory of Complex Demonstratives.” King replied in “Complex Demonstratives as Quantifiers: Objections and Replies.” I here comment on some of King’s replies.

On Hatzimoysis on Sentimental Value

Despite its apparent ubiquity, philosophers have not talked much about sentimental value. One exception is Anthony Hatzimoysis (The Philosophical Quarterly 53:373–379, 2003). Those who wish to take sentimental value seriously are likely to make use of Christine Korsgaard’s ideas on two distinctions in value. In this paper I show that Hatzimoysis has misrendered Korsgaard’s insight in his discussion of sentimental value. I begin by briefly summarising Korsgaard’s idea before showing how Hatzimoysis’ treatment of it is mistaken.

Trumping the causal influence account of causation

Here is a simple counterexample to David Lewis’s causal influence account of causation, one that is especially illuminating due to its connection to what Lewis himself writes: it is a variant of his trumping example