Affordances and infant learning: A reply to Horowitz

We reply to three major points made by F. Horowitz (1983, Developmental Review, 3, 405–409) in her commentary on the ecological approach to infant knowing presented by E. Goldfield (1983, Developmental Review, 3, 371–404). We first clarify the relation between perceiving and acting from an ecological perspective, and distinguish between affordances as environmental properties scaled to the perceiver/performer and representations as mental structures. We then present a critique of the process of association offered by Horowitz as an explanation of infant learning. Association fails to specify the constraints on what is learned, while the ecological process of noticing affordances, presented by Goldfield, considers such constraints. We conclude by presenting operational criteria for measuring affordances and evidence that perception is scaled to the perceiver/performer.     

Marx on the compatibility of freedom and necessity: A reply to David James

In a recent paper, David James argues for a new understanding of the compatibility of freedom and necessity in Marx's idea of a communist society. According to James, such compatibility has less to do with anything distinctive about the nature of labour and more to do with how communist producers organize the sphere of material production. In this paper, I argue that James provides a nuanced and plausible account of one part of Marx's story of the compatibility of freedom and necessity in communist society but that his account misses another, and, in my view, more fundamental part of the story. The part I have in mind centres on Marx's claim that communist producers achieve their freedom through the performance of necessary labour—by helping others to satisfy their needs. I argue that Marx is committed to a stronger claim than James wishes to make, namely, that freedom and necessity are not merely compatible but that participation in the realm of necessity is required for human freedom.     

Still no evidence for visual discrimination learning: A reply to Lett

Neither of the points made by Lett (1977) regarding the data from my experiments (Roberts, 1976) can be taken as evidence of visual discrimination learning with a 1-min delay of reward. If it is concluded that the Lett Group of my second experiment improved over blocks of trials but the other three groups tested in my experiments did not, this can lead only to the conclusion that rats in my Lett Group and in Lett's original experiment (Lett, 1974) improved on the basis of odor cues and not associations between chamber brightness and reward. The significantly higher frequency of initial choices of the black chamber found for black-rewarded animals over white-rewarded animals is shown to result from differential rates of stimulus satiation for animals whose initial chamber preferences agree or disagree with their designated S+.     

The role of necessity in cognitive development

There seem to be two kinds of nonconservers—those who think their response might change on another occasion and those who think their response would always be the same. After training in conservation, the former (called nonconservers without necessity) show no detectable gains in conservation, while the latter (called nonconservers with necessity), surprisingly, show significant gains in conservation.In the present study, nonconservers with necessity were more likely than the nonconservers without necessity to think the classic conservation arguments (e.g., identity, negation, and compensation) were good and correct reasons and that the typical nonconservation reasons were poor and wrong.In sum, the nonconservers who can support their conclusions with the deductive force of necessity, even though they are wrong in their conclusion, appear to be more developmentally advanced than other nonconservers who do not offer necessity as part of the justification for their nonconservation conclusion.     

On familiarity deficits in mild cognitive impairment: A reply to Migo and Westerberg

In this brief response to Migo and Westerberg we explain why we think that their criticism of our previous research showing familiarity deficits in mild cognitive impairment patients (MCI) is not sound. More concretely, we have replicated the effect several times previously, and we justify statistically the fact that in the previous paper we had to combine two MCI samples to demonstrate a reliable familiarity deficit. We note that there are several studies showing conflicting results. However, although the basis for these discrepancies remains uncertain, a new report has replicated the presence of deficits in familiarity, and more importantly, demonstrated its correlation with structural imaging biomarkers of Alzheimer’s disease.     

The cognitive model of depression and mood-induction procedures: A reply to Clark (1983)

In a recent article on mood-induction procedures, Clark (1983) concluded that the Velten Mood Induction Procedure (VMIP; Velten, 1968) produces a good analog state of mild, naturally occurring, retarded depression that is not explicable in terms of experimental demand characteristics. Clark concluded, however, that it is erroneous to view the relative success of the VMIP in simulating the effects of depression as support for cognitive theories of depression. While we agree with the first of Clark's conclusions, we disagree with his second conclusion that the VMIP is not a cognitive manipulation. The purpose of the present article is to argue that his ideas regarding the impact of the VMIP on mood and behavior are not supported by the existing data. Therefore, the VMIP results can be used to support Beck's (1976) cognitive theory of depression.     

When category learning is holistic: A reply to Ward and Scott

A reply is presented to Ward and Scott’s (1987) recent reservations about the evidence for Kemler Nelson’s (1984) claims about when category learning is likely to be holistic. Focusing on the effect of intention, this paper suggests that: (1) contrary to Ward and Scott’s contention, a reanalysis of a critical set of original data continues to support Kemler Nelson’s claim of more holistic learning under unintentional conditions; (2) there is converging evidence for that claim; (3) Ward and Scott’s incidental learning data may diverge because of the inclusion of many weak learners; (4) Ward and Scott’s counterproposal makes some implausible and unsupported predictions; and (5) some of Ward and Scott’s reaction-time data are difficult to interpret. Still, a final discussion identifies some significant points of agreement with Ward and Scott.     

Constraining bridges between levels of analysis: A computational justification for locally Bayesian learning

Different levels of analysis provide different insights into behavior: computational-level analyses determine the problem an organism must solve and algorithmic-level analyses determine the mechanisms that drive behavior. However, many attempts to model behavior are pitched at a single level of analysis. Research into human and animal learning provides a prime example, with some researchers using computational-level models to understand the sensitivity organisms display to environmental statistics but other researchers using algorithmic-level models to understand organisms’ trial order effects, including effects of primacy and recency. Recently, attempts have been made to bridge these two levels of analysis. Locally Bayesian Learning (LBL) creates a bridge by taking a view inspired by evolutionary psychology: Our minds are composed of modules that are each individually Bayesian but communicate with restricted messages. A different inspiration comes from computer science and statistics: Our brains are implementing the algorithms developed for approximating complex probability distributions. We show that these different inspirations for how to bridge levels of analysis are not necessarily in conflict by developing a computational justification for LBL. We demonstrate that a scheme that maximizes computational fidelity while using a restricted factorized representation produces the trial order effects that motivated the development of LBL. This scheme uses the same modular motivation as LBL, passing messages about the attended cues between modules, but does not use the rapid shifts of attention considered key for the LBL approximation. This work illustrates a new way of tying together psychological and computational constraints.     

A cognitive probability model for learning

A quantitative model for the behavior of albino rats in choice-making situations is presented. The model, which is based upon a cognitive conceptualization of the learning process, is shown to yield predictions which are equivalent to those produced by the linear operator stochastic models at the asymptotic limit but which differ from these during early trials in the learning situation.     

Folk concepts and intuitions: from philosophy to cognitive science

Analytic philosophers have long used a priori methods to characterize folk concepts such as knowledge, belief and wrongness. Recently, researchers have begun to exploit social scientific methodologies to characterize such folk concepts. One line of work has explored folk intuitions with cases that are disputed within philosophy. A second approach, with potentially more radical implications, applies the methods of cross-cultural psychology to philosophical intuitions. Recent work in this area suggests that people in different cultures have systematically different intuitions surrounding folk concepts. A third strand of research explores the emergence and character of folk concepts in children. These approaches to characterizing folk concepts provide important resources that will supplement, and perhaps in some cases displace, a priori approaches.     

On the necessity of alignment: reply to Costello and Keane (2001)

In their article, "Testing two theories of conceptual combination: Alignment versus diagnosticity in the comprehension and production of combined concepts," F. J. Costello and M. T. Keane (2001) evaluate the role of alignment in the interpretation of noun-noun combinations. They found that participants were not strongly biased to prefer and produce interpretations with alignable differences. Instead, participants sometimes preferred and produced interpretations with nonalignable differences. These results are surprising given that most research has found advantages of alignable differences over nonalignable differences. Costello and Keane also found that feature diagnosticity better predicted their results, and they concluded that alignment does not play an important role in conceptual combination. However, drawing on recent work, the author of the present article gives an alternative interpretation of Costello and Keane's results, showing that alignment is crucial in conceptual combination. The author also shows that the dual-process model accounts for their results.     

Family patterns leading to learning disability: A cognitive approach

Traditional treatment of the learning disabled child seeks to offer an individualized remediation. The authors offer as an alternative the innovative use of the family therapy modality for treatment of the learning dysfunction. This approaches the source of the learning dysfunction embedded in the faulty communication patterns within the family. The child has the opportunity to experience and more accurately comprehend the communication patterns, become more adept at interpretation of implicit meanings, and to transfer these developing skills to the formal learning situation.     

Mental extrapolation and cognitive penetrability: reply to Ranney and proposals for evaluative criteria

We propose three criteria for establishing that mentally extrapolated motions are impenetrable with respect to one's knowledge, beliefs, or expectations about the nature of corresponding physical motions, and we review recent findings on mental extrapolation and representational momentum that appear to meet these criteria. We also respond to some arguments recently proposed by Ranney (1989) and Hubbard and Bharucha (1988) that representational momentum is cognitively penetrable. We conclude that mental extrapolations are governed to at least some extent by the inherent properties of the underlying internal mechanisms.     

From commonsense to science,and back: The use of cognitive concepts in neuroscience

Commonsense cognitive concepts (CCCs) are the concepts used in daily life to explain, predict and interpret behaviour. CCCs are also used to convey neuroscientific results, not only to wider audiences but also to the scientific inner circle. We show that translations from CCCs to brain activity, and from brain data to CCCs are made in implicit, loose and unsystematic ways. This results in hard to connect data as well as possibly unwarranted extrapolations. We argue that the cause of these problems is a covert adherence to a position known in philosophy of mind as ‘mental realism’. The most fruitful way forward to a clearer and more systematic employment of CCCs in cognitive neuroscience, we argue, is to explicitly adopt interpretivism as an alternative for mental realism. An interpretative stance will help to avoid conceptual confusion in cognitive science and implies caution when it comes to big conclusions about CCCs.