Effects of laboratory-induced controllable and uncontrollable stress on Rorschach variables m and Y.

The research literature regarding stress and the Rorschach has frequently produced contradictory results. A possible explanation for the lack of consensus may be that past research has failed to consider the nature of the stressor. A potentially important dimension is whether the stressor is perceived as controllable or uncontrollable, particularly because these two types of stressors invoke distinctive sets of biobehavioral reactions. We examined the effects of experimentally induced uncontrollable and controllable stress on m and Y Rorschach responses. Uncontrollable laboratory stress was associated with an increase in both m and Y variants, whereas controllable laboratory stress was associated with an increase only in m. Potential implications and directions for future research are discussed.     

Behavioral consequences of adaptation to controllable and uncontrollable noise

A laboratory experiment was conducted to investigate the behavioral consequences of adaptation to high-intensity aperiodic noise, under conditions where subjects believed or did not believe they had indirect control over termination of the noise. The findings showed that among a group of college males, the work of adapting to uncontrollable, in contrast to controllable noise resulted in heightened overall tension (tonic skin conductance) and impaired performance efficiency after termination of the noise. Several theoretical explanations of these results were discussed, including interruption-based helplessness. The relationship of the present experiment to previous noise research by the authors was also considered.     

Decision making under conflict: Decision time as a measure of conflict strength

Conflict and choice are closely related in that choice produces conflict and conflict is resolved by making a choice. Although conflict was invoked in psychological approaches to decision making early on (Lewin, 1931/1964), no generally accepted measure of conflict strength has been established (Tversky & Shafir, 1992). The present study introduces a model (multiattribute decision field theory) that predicts a decision time pattern depending on the conflict situation. In a risky decision-making experiment with multiattribute choice alternatives, decision time is investigated as a possible measure of conflict strength. It is shown that the model can be fitted to a complex choice pattern.     

Density,perceived choice,and response to controllable and uncontrollable outcomes

Two experiments were designed to consider the effects of chronic high residential density on responses to choice and controllable and uncontrollable outcomes. In the first study, children responded to obtain candy as reinforcement and, during certain phases of the procedure, were able to select a schedule, if they chose, which allowed them to pick their own candy rather than having the experimenter select candy for them. Children who lived in high residential density were significantly less likely than children from less dense homes to try to control the administration of available outcomes. In the second study, children were preexposed to a solvable or unsolvable cognitive learning task and tested for how well they subsequently learned a solvable problem. Children from high density homes did significantly more poorly than less crowded children when the first problem was unsolvable. It was suggested that chronic density limits prediction and control in the home environment and consequently leads to the development of decreased expectancies for contingency between response and outcome in other control-relevant situations.     

Making the uncontrollable seem controllable: The role of action in the illusion of control

It is well known that certain variables can bias judgements about the perceived contingency between an action and an outcome, making them depart from the normative predictions. For instance, previous studies have proven that the activity level or probability of responding, P(R), is a crucial variable that can affect these judgements in objectively noncontingent situations. A possible account for the P(R) effect is based on the differential exposure to actual contingencies during the training phase, which is in turn presumably produced by individual differences in participants' P(R). The current two experiments replicate the P(R) effect in a free-response paradigm, and show that participants' judgements are better predicted by P(R) than by the actual contingency to which they expose themselves. Besides, both experiments converge with previous empirical data, showing a persistent bias that does not vanish as training proceeds. These findings contrast with the preasymptotic and transitory effect predicted by several theoretical models.     

Making the uncontrollable seem controllable: the role of action in the illusion of control

It is well known that certain variables can bias judgements about the perceived contingency between an action and an outcome, making them depart from the normative predictions. For instance, previous studies have proven that the activity level or probability of responding, P(R), is a crucial variable that can affect these judgements in objectively noncontingent situations. A possible account for the P(R) effect is based on the differential exposure to actual contingencies during the training phase, which is in turn presumably produced by individual differences in participants' P(R). The current two experiments replicate the P(R) effect in a free-response paradigm, and show that participants' judgements are better predicted by P(R) than by the actual contingency to which they expose themselves. Besides, both experiments converge with previous empirical data, showing a persistent bias that does not vanish as training proceeds. These findings contrast with the preasymptotic and transitory effect predicted by several theoretical models.     

Stimulus perseveration in a water maze following exposure to controllable and uncontrollable shock

When placed in a water-filled maze, mice display a pronounced preference for the illuminated over the nonilluminated arm of the maze. Exposure to inescapable shock increased the time spent in the illuminated arm of the maze, and decreased the frequency of entries into the nonilluminated arm. When animals that had received shock entered the nonilluminated arm they exhibited more activity per second than nonstressed animals. Controllability over the stressor enhanced the preference for the illuminated arm; however, the contribution of this variable was dependent on the number of shock trials mice received. Following 180 escapable or inescapable shock presentations the preference for the illuminated arm was enhanced. The propensity to approach the illuminated arm declined following a greater number (360) of escapable shock trials, while the preference for the illuminated arm did not decline in mice that received inescapable shock. Both escapable and inescapable shock were also found to produce a transient disruption of discrimination performance in a task where animals were required to emit a contraprepared response (swim to dark), whereas these treatments were without effect on performance of the highly prepared response of approaching the illuminated arm. It is provisionally suggested that enhancement of the perseveration represents an innate response to stressful stimuli, but as animals learn mastery over the response contingencies, the persistence in adopting such a response strategy wanes. Moreover, despite the differential effects of escapable and inescapable shock on the perseverative tendency, discrimination accuracy may not be differentially affected by these treatments in a task where acquisition progresses quickly and where explicit cues are associated with the correct and incorrect arms of the maze.     

Decision making and equilibria

In economics and in the social sciences, the study of decision making of the single individual is an important preliminary step to provide a sound foundation for the analysis of equilibria in economic and social systems. Neuroeconomic analysis of the process has been a recent fruitful development in this direction. In the more recent past a new direction of research has emerged, studying the interplay of the decision making of the single individual with the economic and social environment that surrounds him. We review some of the results in this field, both theoretical and experimental, and suggest that a closer development of these two methods of research will be necessary in the future.     

Decision making and neuropsychiatry

Abnormal decision making is a central feature of neuropsychiatric disorders. Recent investigations of the neural substrates underlying decision making have involved qualitative assessment of the cognition of decision making in clinical lesion studies (in patients with frontal lobe dementia) and neuropsychiatric disorders such as mania, substance abuse and personality disorders. A neural network involving the orbitofrontal cortex, ventral striatum and modulatory ascending neurotransmitter systems has been identified as having a fundamental role in decision making and in the neural basis of neuropsychiatric diseases. This network accounts for the dissociations among decision-making deficits in different clinical populations. Ultimately, a more refined and sophisticated characterization of such deficits might guide the early diagnosis and cognitive and therapeutic rehabilitation of these patients.     

Decision making under time pressure: An independent test of sequential sampling models

Choice probability and choice response time data from a risk-taking decision-making task were compared with predictions made by a sequential sampling model. The behavioral data, consistent with the model, showed that participants were less likely to take an action as risk levels increased, and that time pressure did not have a uniform effect on choice probability. Under time pressure, participants were more conservative at the lower risk levels but were more prone to take risks at the higher levels of risk. This crossover interaction reflected a reduction of the threshold within a single decision strategy rather than a switching of decision strategies. Response time data, as predicted by the model, showed that participants took more time to make decisions at the moderate risk levels and that time pressure reduced response time across all risk levels, but particularly at the those risk levels that took longer time with no pressure. Finally, response time data were used to rule out the hypothesis that time pressure effects could be explained by a fast-guess strategy.     

Decision making under uncertainty: a comparison of simple scalability, fixed-sample, and sequential-sampling models

The purpose of this article is to investigate the learning and memory processes involved in decision making under uncertainty. In two different experiments, subjects were given a choice between a certain alternative that produced a single known payoff and an uncertain alternative that produced a normal distribution of payoffs. Initially this distribution was unknown, and in the first experiment it was learned through feedback from past decisions, whereas in the second experiment it was learned by observing sample outcomes. In the first experiment, a response deadline was used to limit the amount of time available for making a decision. In the second experiment, an observation cost was used to limit the number of samples that could be purchased. The mean and variance of the uncertain alternative and the value of the certain alternative were factorially manipulated to study their joint effects on choice probability, choice response time (Experiment 1), and number of observations purchased (Experiment 2). Algebraic-deterministic theories developed for decision making with simple gambles fail to explain the present results. Two new models are developed and tested--fixed- and sequential-sampling models--that attempt to describe the learning and memory processes involved in decision making under uncertainty.     

Specific predictive power of automatic spider-related affective associations for controllable and uncontrollable fear responses toward spiders

This study examined the predictive power of automatically activated spider-related affective associations for automatic and controllable fear responses. The Extrinsic Affective Simon Task (EAST; De Houwer, 2003) was used to indirectly assess automatic spider fear-related associations. The EAST and the Fear of Spiders Questionnaire (FSQ) were used to predict fear responses in 48 female students from Maastricht University with varying levels of spider fear. Results showed that: (i) the EAST best predicted automatic fear responses, whereas (ii) the FSQ best predicted strategic avoidance behavior. These results suggest that indirect measures of automatic associations may have specific predictive power for automatic fear responses.     

Decision making styles and progress in occupational decision making

This study provides a reexamination of the role of different decisional strategies in facilitating progress in occupational decision making. Although the assumptions that a rational decision making style is the preferred mode of vocational functioning has been endorsed in a variety of career theories and interventions, there has been conflicting evidence about the validity of this assumption. To examine the role of different decisional approaches in the progress of making an occupational decision, the rational, intuitive, and dependent decision making style scores of 71 undergraduate students were used to predict progress in occupational decision making. The results of the regression analyses failed to provide support for the assumption that a rational style is the most effective in accomplishing this careerrelated task, but indicated strong support for the conclusion that the use of dependent decisional strategies is damaging, particularly in early stages of the decisional process.     

Decision making under internal uncertainty: the case of multiple-choice tests with different scoring rules

This paper assesses framing effects on decision making with internal uncertainty, i.e., partial knowledge, by focusing on examinees' behavior in multiple-choice (MC) tests with different scoring rules. In two experiments participants answered a general-knowledge MC test that consisted of 34 solvable and 6 unsolvable items. Experiment 1 studied two scoring rules involving Positive (only gains) and Negative (only losses) scores. Although answering all items was the dominating strategy for both rules, the results revealed a greater tendency to answer under the Negative scoring rule. These results are in line with the predictions derived from Prospect Theory (PT) [Econometrica 47 (1979) 263]. The second experiment studied two scoring rules, which allowed respondents to exhibit partial knowledge. Under the Inclusion-scoring rule the respondents mark all answers that could be correct, and under the Exclusion-scoring rule they exclude all answers that might be incorrect. As predicted by PT, respondents took more risks under the Inclusion rule than under the Exclusion rule. The results illustrate that the basic process that underlies choice behavior under internal uncertainty and especially the effect of framing is similar to the process of choice under external uncertainty and can be described quite accurately by PT.     

Decision making under risk condition in patients with Parkinson's disease: a behavioural and fMRI study

We aimed to study whether previously described impairment in decision making under risky conditions in patients with Parkinson's disease (PD) is affected by deficits in using information about potential incentives or by processing feedback (in terms of fictitious gains and losses following each decision). Additionally, we studied whether the neural correlates of using explicit information in decision making under risk differ between PD patients and healthy subjects. We investigated ten cognitively intact PD patients and twelve healthy subjects with the Game of Dice Task (GDT) to assess risky decision making, and with an fMRI paradigm to analyse the neural correlates of information integration in the deliberative decision phase. Behaviourally, PD patients showed selective impairment in the GDT but not on the fMRI task that did not include a feedback component. Healthy subjects exhibited lateral prefrontal, anterior cingulate and parietal activations when integrating decision-relevant information. Despite similar behavioural patterns on the fMRI task, patients exhibited reduced parietal activation. Behavioural results suggest that PD patients' deficits in risky decision making are dominated by impaired feedback utilization not compensable by intact cognitive functions. Our fMRI results suggest similarities but also differences in neural correlates when using explicit information for the decision process, potentially indicating different strategy application even if the interfering feedback component is excluded.     

Decision making and free will: a neuroscience perspective

A thorough analysis of the question of whether we possess "free will" requires that we take into account the process of exercising that will: that is, the neural mechanisms of decision making. Much of what we know about these mechanisms indicates that decision making is greatly influenced by implicit processes that may not even reach consciousness. Moreover, there exist conditions, for example certain types of brain injury or drug addiction, in which an individual can be said to have a disorder of the will. Examples such as these demonstrate that the idea of freedom of will on which our legal system is based is not supported by the neuroscience of decision making. Using the criminal law as an example, we discuss how new discoveries in neuroscience can serve as a tool for reprioritizing our society's legal intuitions in a way that leads us to a more effective and humane system.     

Decision making under time pressure, modeled in a prospect theory framework

The current research examines the effects of time pressure on decision behavior based on a prospect theory framework. In Experiments 1 and 2, participants estimated certainty equivalents for binary gains-only bets in the presence or absence of time pressure. In Experiment 3, participants assessed comparable bets that were framed as losses. Data were modeled to establish psychological mechanisms underlying decision behavior. In Experiments 1 and 2, time pressure led to increased risk attractiveness, but no significant differences emerged in either probability discriminability or outcome utility. In Experiment 3, time pressure reduced probability discriminability, which was coupled with severe risk-seeking behavior for both conditions in the domain of losses. No significant effects of control over outcomes were observed. Results provide qualified support for theories that suggest increased risk-seeking for gains under time pressure.     

Controlling the uncontrollable: effects of stress on illusory perceptions of controllability.

Individuals' failure to exercise actual control over an event might be compensated for by trying to bolster a generalized, subjective sense of control. Control might then be sought by undertaking acts the effect of which on the environment is illusory. This observation led to the hypothesis that stress, which undermines persons' sense of control, would engender illusory perceptions of controllability. The hypothesis was tested in 3 experiments that required Ss to choose between 2 gambling forms. Although the 2 forms were essentially identical, 1 was designed to instill an illusion of control. The results showed that highly stressed Ss, compared with those who experienced low stress, preferred gambling forms that heightened perceptions of controllability.     

Interference with judgments of control and attentional shift as a result of prior exposure to controllable and uncontrollable feedback

The experiment was carried out to determine whether exposure to an uncontrollable relationship between an action and its outcome during a non-aversive pretreatment phase would affect subsequent ratings of perceived control emitted by human participants. Its other aim was to investigate the effect of such pre-exposure on the attentional focus of humans on internal and external cues. Participants were assigned to one of three groups; an uncontrollable pretreatment, a controllable pretreatment, and no pretreatment. Participants exposed to uncontrollable outcomes (unsolvable problems) gave lower ratings of control over a produced outcome than the other two groups, indicating the interference with subsequent judgments of control. The exposure to uncontrollable outcomes also increased levels of distraction produced by an external cue in a reaction time experiment. Such an effect was not found in the groups who had not been exposed to uncontrollable outcomes. These dual effects are similar to those noted in non-humans subjected to uncontrollable outcomes.