Analytic thinking reduces belief in conspiracy theories

Belief in conspiracy theories has been associated with a range of negative health, civic, and social outcomes, requiring reliable methods of reducing such belief. Thinking dispositions have been highlighted as one possible factor associated with belief in conspiracy theories, but actual relationships have only been infrequently studied. In Study 1, we examined associations between belief in conspiracy theories and a range of measures of thinking dispositions in a British sample (N = 990). Results indicated that a stronger belief in conspiracy theories was significantly associated with lower analytic thinking and open-mindedness and greater intuitive thinking. In Studies 2–4, we examined the causational role played by analytic thinking in relation to conspiracist ideation. In Study 2 (N = 112), we showed that a verbal fluency task that elicited analytic thinking reduced belief in conspiracy theories. In Study 3 (N = 189), we found that an alternative method of eliciting analytic thinking, which related to cognitive disfluency, was effective at reducing conspiracist ideation in a student sample. In Study 4, we replicated the results of Study 3 among a general population sample (N = 140) in relation to generic conspiracist ideation and belief in conspiracy theories about the July 7, 2005, bombings in London. Our results highlight the potential utility of supporting attempts to promote analytic thinking as a means of countering the widespread acceptance of conspiracy theories.     

Evidence that phenomenal olfactory content exceeds what can later be accessed

Visual experience is information rich, but only a small proportion is available for later access. We tested for this distinction in olfaction. In two experiments (E1&2), participants undertook trials rating an odor’s features (e.g., how banana-like?), the during-smelling-profile, followed by an after-smelling-profile, upon the odor’s removal. On some trials during and after-smelling-profiles were identical and on others they were different. Each trial with a particular odor was repeated. For half the odors both trials were identical (congruent) and for the remainder, one was different and the other identical (incongruent). Crucially, the after-smelling-profile was always the same for each odor, allowing reliability to be measured. E1&2 revealed that incongruent profiles were the least reliable. Attempting to access particular odor features in an odor’s absence is harder if those features were not attended during smelling. This suggests more information is available during smelling, than can be accessed after the odors removal.     

Dispositional factors predicting Chinese students’ critical thinking performance

Dispositional factors have been suggested to affect individuals’ critical thinking performance. The relative and combined effects of thinking dispositions and cognitive ability on the critical thinking performance of a group of 137 Chinese undergraduates were examined. Participants were administered the Need for Cognition Scale, Openness to Experience and Conscientiousness Subscales of the NEO Five Factor Inventory as well as the Concern for Truth Scale. Cognitive ability and critical thinking performance were respectively estimated with the WAIS-III Verbal Comprehension Index and the Halpern Critical Thinking Assessment Using Everyday Situations. Hierarchical regression analysis showed that only the disposition of concern for truth accounted for unique additional variance in critical thinking beyond that explained by cognitive ability. The findings are discussed in the light of cultural factors affecting critical thinking in the Chinese context.     

Implicit measurement of positive and negative future thinking as a predictor of depressive symptoms and hopelessness

Research using explicit measures has linked decreased positive future thinking, but not increased negative future thinking, with clinical depression. However, individuals may be unable or unwilling to express thoughts about the future, and can be unaware of implicit beliefs that can influence their behavior. Implicit measures of cognition may shed light on the role of future thinking in depression. To our knowledge, the current study presents the first implicit measure of positive and negative future thinking. A sample of 71 volunteers (38 healthy; 33 with sub-clinical depression) completed both implicit and explicit measures of positive and negative future thinking. The findings indicate differences in the evaluation of both positive and negative future events between the two groups. However, group differences were more pronounced on the implicit measure. These findings point to the potential utility of an implicit measure of future thinking in mental health research and clinical practice.     

Access is mainly a second-order process: SDT models whether phenomenally (first-order) conscious states are accessed by reflectively (second-order) conscious processes

Access can either be first-order or second-order. First order access concerns whether contents achieve representation in phenomenal consciousness at all; second-order access concerns whether phenomenally conscious contents are selected for metacognitive, higher order processing by reflective consciousness. When the optional and flexible nature of second-order access is kept in mind, there remain strong reasons to believe that exclusion failure can indeed isolate phenomenally conscious stimuli that are not so accessed. Irvine’s [Irvine, E. (2009). Signal detection theory, the exclusion failure paradigm and weak consciousness—Evidence for the access/phenomenal distinction? Consciousness and Cognition.] partial access argument fails because exclusion failure is indeed due to lack of second-order access, not insufficient phenomenally conscious information. Further, the enable account conforms with both qualitative differences and subjective report, and is simpler than the endow account. Finally, although first-order access may be a distinct and important process, second-order access arguably reflects the core meaning of access generally.     

Shifting goal posts: First and second order access

Snodgrass et al.’s (2009) commentary makes explicit one of the major problems in consciousness research; that there seem to be just as many definitions of basic terms are there are people in the field. Although Snodgrass et al.’s position appears at odds with the views expressed in Irvine (2009), many of their arguments are actually consistent with the proposed views, or else fail to engage with them as a consequence of the shifting goal posts of what basic terms mean.     

Signal detection theory,the exclusion failure paradigm and weak consciousness—Evidence for the access/phenomenal distinction?

Block [Block, N. (2005). Two neural correlates of consciousness. Trends in Cognitive Science, 9, 46–52] and Snodgrass (2006) claim that a signal detection theory (SDT) analysis of qualitative difference paradigms, in particular the exclusion failure paradigm, reveals cases of phenomenal consciousness without access consciousness. This claim is unwarranted on several grounds. First, partial cognitive access rather than a total lack of cognitive access can account for exclusion failure results. Second, Snodgrass’s Objective Threshold/Strategic (OT/S) model of perception relies on a problematic ‘enable’ approach to perception that denies the possibility of intentional control of unconscious perception and any effect of following different task instructions on the presence/absence of phenomenal consciousness. Many of Block’s purported examples of phenomenal consciousness without cognitive access also rely on this problematic approach. Third, qualitative difference paradigms may index only a subset of access consciousness. Thus, qualitative difference paradigms like exclusion failure cannot be used to isolate phenomenal consciousness, any attempt to do so still faces serious methodological problems.     

No watershed for overflow: Recent work on the richness of consciousness

A familiar and enduring controversy surrounds the question of whether our phenomenal experience “overflows” availability to cognition: do we consciously see more than we can remember and report? Both sides to this debate have long sought to move beyond naïve appeals to introspection by providing empirical evidence for or against overflow. Recently, two notable studies—Bronfman, Brezis, Jacobson, and Usher (2014) and Vandenbroucke, Sligte, Fahrenfort, Ambroziak, and Lamme (2012)—have purported to provide compelling evidence in favor of overflow. Here I explain why the data from both studies are wholly consistent with a “no overflow” interpretation. Importantly, when framed purely in representational or informational terms, this “no overflow” interpretation agrees with the interpretations respectively offered by both Bronfman et al. (2014) and Vandenbroucke et al. (2012). The difference only emerges when additional assumptions are made concerning which representations correspond to elements in conscious experience. The assumptions made by overflow theorists are contentious and poorly motivated. However, challenging them simply reopens the original controversy. The upshot is a sobering moral: we still do not know how to move beyond appeals to naïve introspection in establishing the nature and limits of our ordinary experience.     

《易经》是否属于原始思维

有学者依据列维·布留尔的原始思维理论,认为《易经》属于原始思维。但事实上,《易经》无论从创作时代还是思维内容上都与原始思维有着本质上不同,《易经》包含着原始思维所不具备的理性思维。之所以误解《易经》为原始思维,主要是投有真正理解《易经》的“立象以尽意”的思维表达方式。《易经》以其意象表达了辩证、整体的宇宙观,并以此指导现实的人世生活,开创了中国人“推天道以明人事”的形而上学。     

Boo! The consciousness problem in emotion

ABSTRACT

This paper will examine the conscious aspects of emotion (i.e. emotional experience), arguably the defining features of emotion. I will argue that emotion IS emotional experience and, consequently, that emotion researchers rarely study emotion itself. I will suggest a research agenda for examining the conscious aspects of emotion and end with a consideration of appraisal theory and how it can be made more relevant to the study of emotion by treating appraisals as components of a pre-reflective perceptual process rather than as causal antecedents of a cognitive process that can be self-reported on.     

Systema Temporis: A time-based dimensional framework for consciousness and cognition

This study uses a combined categorical-dimensional approach to depict a hierarchical framework for consciousness similar to, and contiguous with, factorial models of cognition (cf., intelligence). On the basis of the longstanding definition of time consciousness, the analysis employs a dimension of temporal extension, in the same manner that psychology has temporally organised memory (i.e., short-term, long-term, and long-lasting memories). By defining temporal extension in terms of the structure of time perception at short timescales (<100 s), memory and time consciousness are proposed to fit along the same logarithmic dimension. This suggests that different forms of time consciousness (e.g., experience, wakefulness, and self-consciousness) are embedded within, or supported by, the ascending timescales of different modes of memory (i.e., short-term, long-term, etc.). A secondary dimension is also proposed to integrate higher-order forms of consciousness/emotion and memory/cognition. The resulting two-dimensional structure accords with existing theories of cognitive and emotional intelligence.     

禅修对创造性思维的影响

禅修是一种能够对人类心理有广泛影响的训练工具。作为两种重要、相似但又不同的禅修方式, 冥想和正念对创造性思维中的发散思维和聚合思维产生了不同影响。在发散思维方面, 冥想主要通过对注意调控和无意识激活影响以及对解题动机和情绪的有效调控两方面显著增强了发散思维, 尤其是认知灵活性; 在聚合思维方面, 正念和冥想的影响相当复杂, 主要是通过聚合思维所需的执行功能和可能涉及表征重构来促进定势转移或功能固着的消除。就机制而言, 禅修对创造性思维的影响总体上不仅得益于走神时的无意识关联加工, 而且受禅修中诱发的情绪效应的调节。基于这些, 对未来研究的趋势进行了展望。     

Structure in the stream of consciousness: Evidence from a verbalized thought protocol and automated text analytic methods

A key question about the spontaneous stream of thought (SST), often called the stream of consciousness, concerns its serial structure: How are thoughts in an extended sequence related to each other? In this study, we used a verbalized thought protocol to investigate “clump-and-jump” structure in SST—clusters of related thoughts about a topic followed by a jump to a new topic, in a repeating pattern. Several lines of evidence convergently supported the presence of clump-and-jump structure: high interrater agreement in identifying jumps, corroboration of rater-assigned jumps by automated text analytic methods, identification of clumps and jumps by a data-driven algorithm, and the inferred presence of clumps and jumps in unverbalized SST. We also found evidence that jumps involve a discontinuous shift in which a new clump is only modestly related to the previous one. These results illuminate serial structure in SST and invite research into the processes that generate the clump-and-jump pattern.     

The role of dichotomous thinking and rigidity in perfectionism

Perfectionism is a complex psychological construct that has been defined in many different ways. Recent conceptualisations of perfectionism have involved dividing the construct into positive and negative components. Negative perfectionism is associated with high emotional distress whereas positive perfectionism is associated with positive affect and lower levels of distress. Although these distinctions have been made it remains unclear as to how distinct the two aspects of perfectionism are particularly in terms of their cognitive profiles. This study investigated two cognitive constructs that have been theoretically linked to perfectionism. Dichotomous thinking and rigidity were examined in three samples (40 clinical participants, 111 athletes, 101 students). As hypothesised, the clinical sample had the highest score on negative perfectionism, however, no differences were observed between groups on positive perfectionism. Dichotomous thinking emerged as the variable most predictive of negative perfectionism, and was less strongly related to positive perfectionism. These results highlight the importance of dichotomous thinking as a cognitive construct worthy of further research to understand negative perfectionism. Implications for the development of cognitive therapy interventions for negative perfectionism are discussed.     

A cognitive architecture for inner speech

A cognitive architecture for inner speech is presented. It is based on the Standard Model of Mind, integrated with modules for self-talking. Briefly, the working memory of the proposed architecture includes the phonological loop as a component which manages the exchanging information between the phonological store and the articulatory control system. The inner dialogue is modeled as a loop where the phonological store hears the inner voice produced by the hidden articulator process. A central executive module drives the whole system, and contributes to the generation of conscious thoughts by retrieving information from long-term memory. The surface form of thoughts thus emerges by the phonological loop. Once a conscious thought is elicited by inner speech, the perception of new context takes place and then repeating the cognitive loop. A preliminary formalization of some of the described processes by event calculus, and early results of their implementation on the humanoid robot Pepper by SoftBank Robotics are discussed.     

Convergent and divergent thinking in verbal analogy

Individual differences in convergent and divergent thinking may uniquely explain variation in analogical reasoning ability. Across two studies we investigated the relative influences of divergent and convergent thinking as predictors of verbal analogy performance. Performance on both convergent thinking (i.e., Remote Associates Test) and divergent thinking (i.e., Alternative Uses Task) uniquely predicted performance on both analogy selection (Studies 1 and 2) and analogical generation tasks (Study 2). Moreover, convergent and divergent thinking were predictive above and beyond creative behaviours in Study 1 and a composite measure of crystallised intelligence in Study 2. Verbal analogies in Study 2 also varied in semantic distance, with results demonstrating divergent thinking as a stronger predictor of analogy generation for semantically far than for semantically near analogies. Results thus further illuminate the link between analogical reasoning and creative cognition by demonstrating convergent and divergent thinking as predictors of verbal analogy.     

The contributions of convergent thinking,divergent thinking,and schizotypy to solving insight and non-insight problems

The ability to generate diverse ideas (divergent thinking) is valuable in solving creative problems (e.g., insight problems); yet, however advantageous, this ability is insufficient to solve the problem alone and requires the ability to logically deduce an assessment of correctness of each solution (convergent thinking). Positive schizotypy may help isolate the aspects of divergent thinking prevalent in insight problem solving. Participants were presented with a measure of schizotypy (Oxford-Liverpool Inventory of Feelings and Experiences), divergent and convergent thinking tasks, insight problems, and non-insight problems. We found no evidence for a relationship between schizotypy and insight problem solving. Relationships between divergent thinking and insight problem solving were also surprisingly weak; however, measures of convergent thinking had a stronger relationship with problem solving. These results suggest that convergent thinking is more important than divergent thinking in problem solving.     

Positive mood enhances divergent but not convergent thinking

A positive mood enhances creative performance. We examined which type of creativity, divergent or convergent thinking, was enhanced by a positive mood. Half of the participants listened to happy music and thought about happy events (positive group). The other half listened to the Japanese Constitution (neutral group). Participants' emotional valence and arousal were measured before and after mood induction. All participants then engaged in a creative activity involving the generation of new names for rice. The results indicated that the positive group produced more divergent ideas than did the neutral group. On the other hand, the two groups did not differ with respect to the number of convergent ideas that were generated. We suggest that being in a positive mood facilitates flexible thinking and consequently leads to production of unconventional and atypical ideas.