Agreements between neighbours. The ‘ugody’ as a source on Jewish-Christian relations in early modern Poland

The following essay studies the importance of formal agreements (ugody or kontrakty) between representatives of Jewish communities and Christian burghers in early modern Poland. As a specific genre of legal document, these agreements, or contracts, are a unique source for understanding Jewish-Christian relations and the integration of Jews into local social fabrics. These contracts also reflect the importation and continuity of legal traditions that originated in German territories and arrived in Eastern Central Europe, and they corroborate suggestions that there was significant improvement in the legal status of the Jews in Eastern Europe as opposed to that under which they previously had lived in the West. The ugody document, finally, the emergence of what I have called elsewhere the contractual character of Polish-Jewish relations in the early modern period. (See François Guesnet, “Politik der Vormoderne—Shtadlanut am Vorabend der polnischen Teilungen,” Jahrbuch des Simon-Dubnow-Instituts 1 (2002), pp. 235–255, and more recently idem, “Political Culture of Polish Jewry: A Tour d’Horizon,” Report of the Oxford Centre for Hebrew and Jewish Studies 2007–2008, pp. 61–76, 67–68.)     

When will is not the same as should: The role of modals in reasoning with legal conditionals

Naïve reasoners reject logically valid conclusions from conditional rules if they can think of exceptions in which the antecedent is true, but the consequent is not. However, when reasoning with legal conditionals (e.g., “If a person kills another human, then this person should be punished for manslaughter”) people hardly consider exceptions but evaluate conclusions depending on their own sense of justice. We show that participants’ reluctance to consider exceptions in legal reasoning depends on the modal auxiliary used. In two experiments we phrased legal conditionals either with the modal “should” (i.e., “ . . . then this person should be punished”), or with “will” (i.e., “ . . . then this person will be punished”) and presented them as modus ponens or modus tollens inferences. Participants had to decide whether the offender should or will be punished (modus ponens) or whether the offender indeed committed the offence (modus tollens). For modus ponens inferences phrased with “should” we replicate previous findings showing that participants select conclusions on the basis of their own sense of justice (Experiments 1 and 2). Yet, when the legal conditional is phrased with the modal “will” this effect is attenuated (Experiments 1 and 2), and exceptions are considered (Experiment 1). The modal auxiliary did not affect modus tollens inferences.     

Responsabilité Sociale, Gestion de la Diversité et Lutte Contre les Discriminations: Des Perspectives Convergentes

Signatory States of international agreements have to report regularly to international bodies on the measures and monitoring they apply to comply with and enforce their commitments on human rights and the fight against racism and discrimination. All the same, national governments do not always adequately assess the prevailing measures and practices in organisations in all sectors of society within their jurisdiction. This article discusses the accountability and social responsibility of organisations in terms of non-discrimination, which are rarely questioned despite legal obligations to comply with charters and legislation on employment equality and equity, as in Canada. The issue of the current effectiveness of rights, which underlines the legitimacy and “ethics” of institutions, companies and governments, requires that obligation in the strict legal sense fits in with a broader and normative perspective, approach and discussion. Today, this issue is prominent at both national and international levels in the social and scientific debate on “citizen companies”, indicators of respect for human rights, social and environmental reports, “ethical” investments, diversity management, equity and access to equality, and the fight against systemic discrimination.     

Being Emotional about the Past: On the Nature and Role of Past‐Directed Emotions*

We sometimes experience emotions which are directed at past events (or situations) which we witnessed at the time when they occurred (or obtained). The present paper explores the role which such “autobiographically past‐directed emotions” (or “APD‐emotions”) play in a subject's mental life. A defender of the “Memory‐Claim” holds that an APD‐emotion is a memory, namely a memory of the emotion which the subject experienced at the time when the event originally occurred (or the situation obtained) towards which the APD‐emotion is directed. On this view, APD‐emotions might play an important role in our acquiring knowledge about our own past emotions, which renders the view rather attractive. However, as I show in the present paper, none of the various possible versions of the Memory‐Claim are tenable. This leaves us with the “Universal‐New‐Emotion‐Claim”, according to which all APD‐emotions are new emotional responses to the past events (or situations) towards which the relevant APD‐emotions are directed. Further consideration of the “Universal‐New‐Emotion‐Claim” shows that while APD‐emotions do not play the epistemological role they could have played had some version of the Memory‐Claim turned out to be true, a subject's APD‐emotions nevertheless do play a vital role in a subject's mental life: they help the subject to develop a balanced sense of self.     

Is guilt an emotion?

Abstract

When unequivocal examples of emotion adjectives occur in the linguistic context of “being” (e.g. being angry) they can be seen to refer to emotions as readily as when they occur in the linguistic context of “feeling” (e.g. feeling angry). This is not true of poor 'or non-examples of emotion words. A psycholinguistic analysis of this phenomenon is proposed, in the light of which it is suggested that words such as “abandoned” and “guilty” do not refer to emotions. The possibility that the word “guilty” has a distinct emotional sense meaning “feeling guilty” is discussed, and the implications of this proposal for theories of emotions are examined. Also discussed are the implications of the inclusion of poor or non-examples of emotions in lists of “basic” emotions. Data are presented indicating that many of the states that emotion theorists have included as emotions, and in some cases as “basic” emotions, are not generally rated as such, and that they fail to exhibit the patterns using the feel-be test that characterise unequivocal examples. It is suggested that a problem in delimiting the domain of theories of emotions may reside in a confusion between emotions on the one hand, and their typical causes and concomitants on the other.     

Young Children's Reports of When Events Occurred: Do Event Type and Assessment Method Matter?

Studying young children's reporting about when various events occurred informs about the development of episodic memory and metacognition. In two experiments, 55 3‐ to 5‐year‐old children participated in two activity sessions, a week apart. During the activity sessions, they learned novel animal facts and body movements, and they coloured animal pictures and posed for body movement photos. Immediately after the second activity session, children were interviewed about when they experienced the various events. Overall, children were as accurate about learning events as physical events, but they were more accurate when asked temporal distance (e.g. ‘Which did you learn a longer time ago, “X” or “Y”?’) than temporal location questions (e.g. ‘Which did you learn before today, “X” or “Y”?’). The results suggest that young children's apparent difficulty recognizing new learning is not due to a rapid ‘remember‐to‐know shift’. Rather, the way we ask young children about when they experienced various events determines their accuracy. Copyright © 2016 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Symptom Bearer as Marital Distance Regulator: Clinical Implications

Certain families experience conflict in regulating their interpersonal distance because they are afraid of separation and intimacy. A couple that lives in the shadow of this double-ended catastrophe may triangle in a “go-between” to bring them together if they get too far apart, or separate them when they are too close. Ambivalence about the couple's relationship predisposes a family member, often an in-law or child, to be recruited to this role. The “go-between's” ambivalence then becomes the couple's homeostat, and symptoms are likely to appear in this individual. Implications for family therapy are illustrated by the through a full-length case study.     

Law,social science and the “brainwashing” exception to the first amendment

Litigation in the “cult wars” has shifted from “deprograming” cases to civil suits by ex-converts based on “brainwashing” claims, and to criminal defenses claiming incapacity due to cultic brainwashing. Early cases were decided on the basis of first amendment derivations barring judicial inquiries into conversion processes and religious authenticity. In 1988 the California Supreme Court carved out a narrow exception to this doctrine to be applied to circumstances where “coercive persuasion” is combined with concealment of a group's identity. The Court's opinion entailed characterizations of the process and consequences of brainwashing which are problematic from the standpoint of social science. Several key questions must be resolved before brainwashing theories can make a constructive contribution to litigation involving religious groups. These questions relate to broader issues involving the nature, causes and indicators of involuntariness, and the closely related problem of drawing the line or identifying the exact point on a continuum beyond which the means or intensity of indoctrination becomes incapacitating. Although the 1988 California decision did not resolve these issues, they were considered from 1988-91 by several courts making procedural rulings on the admissibility of “expert” testimony on brainwashing/psychologicd coercion. A concluding section relates this legal to the duality of ‘soft’ vs. ‘hard’ determinism in social science.     

“Be careful what you wish for…”: A quantitative and qualitative investigation of “fata1 attractions”

This study uses questionnaire data from 301 terminated romantic relationships to investigate hypotheses concerning the conditions under which a quality that is initially appealing in a partner is later disliked (i.e., a “fatal attraction”). Individuals are expected to be prone to fatal attractions when they are attracted to a quality in a romantic partner that is “different” in any of three ways: (1) different from the individual's own qualities (i.e., dissimilar); (2) different from average (i.e., extreme, or unique); or (3) different from normative expectations (i.e., gender atypical). Such attractions are less likely, however, when individuals are drawn to similarity in another. Findings from a logistic regression analysis provide support for four of the five hypotheses. Fatal attractions are significantly more likely when an individual is drawn to partner characteristics seen either as “dissimilar” from her or his own, as “unique,” or as “extreme” in nature. When these characteristics are viewed as “similar,” disenchantment is less likely. Fatal attractions are neither more, nor less, probable, however, when partner qualities contradict gender stereotypes. A qualitative analysis of open-ended questionnaire responses provides further support for these attraction patterns. The findings have implications for diverse theories, including those of mate selection and dialectics.     

Third-Party Consent Searches: Legal vs. Social Perceptions of “Common Authority”1

We investigate the degree of correspondence between legal concepts underpinning third-party consent searches (a co-resident permits police search of shared living space and belongings) and laypersons' sociocultural expectations. In accord with the legal concepts, we hypothesized that laypersons would be able to distinguish between authority over (1) exclusive-use vs. common-use areas, and (2) personal effects in exclusive-use vs. common-use areas. But, we also expected that (3) the interpretation of “common authority” would be influenced by the presence vs. absence of the co-resident, and (4) the type of intruder (social, commercial, civil authority, or criminal justice authority) would influence responses to requests for entry. These hypotheses were tested using a fully between-subjects, factorial design (N= 160). Results supported our first three hypotheses. Subjects understood the concept of a warrantless search and distinguished between “exclusive use” areas and “common authority” areas at the level of rooms within the shared residence. Subjects' interpretation of “common authority” for third-party consent purposes was influenced by physical presence of the co-resident. If the co-resident was absent, “common authority” was interpreted as independent consent power. There was no consensual interpretation of “common authority” when the co-resident was present and protested the proposed search. Results suggest situational dependence of lay understandings of “common authority” over jointly used areas.     

Roasting Ethics

What are the rules of the comedic roast? Initially, there might seem to be a tension between “the comedic” and “roasting” or “insult.” The comedic is concerned with the funny or mirth while insults are mean-spirited in nature, tools of injury. So how can the two be combined to produce something fun? In this article, I entertain a few views that attempt a resolution of this apparent tension. I conclude with a proposal that suggests when they are successful, roasts employ mechanisms that redirect attention from the joke's content to its formal properties; it is when those mechanisms fail that roasting becomes disagreeable.     

Andisp: A Turbo pascal program to analyze and display sampled data

ANDISP is a Turbo Pascal program that analyzes, displays, and manipulates sampled data recorded with a PC-compatible data-acquisition system The data analysis routines include “integrate/differentiate a channel”, “rectify,” “smooth,” “filter,” and “add/sub/mult/div a channel by a constant, ” as well as a routine that gives some basic statistics. The data manipulation routines are “copy a channel” or “copy the data buffer to a file.” The versatile display routine can give either oscilloscope-type displays of a data channel or plots of pubUshable quality. Hardware requirements are an IBM-compatible microcomputer and an EGA color monitor.     

Slavoj Žižek and the Real Subject of Politics

Slavoj ?i?ek's refusal to sketch an alternative to the global liberal-capitalist order, combined with his claim that there is an urgent need for a repolitization of, most of all, the economy, raises the question of the possibility of radical political thought and action. Considering fundamentalisms and politically correct multiculturalism not as oppositional, but as correlative to the “depolitization” of post-modern societies, ?i?ek invokes the emancipatory legacy of Europe in an attempt to reinvent Marxism in a way similar to what Lenin, thrown into an open situation, had to do in 1917 between the revolutions. A single question confronts political philosophy today: is liberal-capitalist democracy the ultimate horizon of our political practice, or is it possible to open up the space for another political articulation? The key to a repolitization is to identify with the “symptom” of the existing global order's false claim to Universality, with the excluded “part of no part” who politicizes it's predicament by claiming to stand for the real universal. In order not to discard political struggle as “unrealistic”, today's cynical “realist” consensus must be broken. Taking things as they “really are” has become the dominant ideological mode that keeps people from thinking about alternatives. The remedy is to show that things never are “really” as they are.

     

On the perception of symmetrical and repeated patterns

Four experiments investigated rapid perceptual judgments about tachistoscopically presented patterns that were either symmetrical about or repeated across a vertical axis. The same patterns were presented under two different instructional conditions; some Ss were to judge the two halves of each pattern “same” or “mirror,” others were to judge each pattern as a whole “symmetrical” or “asymmetrical.” With dot patterns, RTs were faster for symmetrical than for repeated patterns when the two halves were close together, but not when they were separated, regardless of instructions. With simpler patterns made up of arrowheads and C-shapes, however, “same” RTs were faster than “mirror,” but “asymmetrical” RTs were marginally slower than “symmetrical,” regardless of spatial separation. The advantage of “same” over “mirror” did not seem to be simply a labeling effect. The results suggest that left-right symmetry is perceptually more salient than left-right repetition when the patterns are perceived holistically. By contrast, distinct patterns can be matched more rapidly when they are the same than when they are left-right mirror images.     

Helping Children Enter Into Another's Experiences: The Look and Feel of It

The role of focusing 4-year-olds' attention on “feeling” or “looking” was examined in three experiments by testing predictions about children's memory for their interactions with an adult partner as they engaged in a collaborative task. Children made collages with an adult partner, and they were later asked to remember who placed the pieces on the collage. Children were more likely to claim they placed pieces actually placed by their partner (Experiments 1, 2, and 3), unless directed to think about how their partner looked when placing the partner's pieces (Experiments 1 and 3). False claims were observed after children were directed to think about how it would “feel” to perform the actions, whether motoric instructions were focused on the self (Experiment 2, N = 48) or partner (Experiment 1, N = 40, and Experiment 3, N = 24). Furthermore, false claims (referred to as I did it errors) were positively associated with accurate collage memory (Experiment 3). These findings suggest that adopting a perspective during encoding that involves “feeling” movements—whether focused on the self or partner—plays an important role in children's memory for collaboration (in this context, memory for contributions made by children or their adult partners to the completion of a collage). A focus on “feeling” may be a way to “enter into” the experiences of another, promoting anticipation and recoding, which may lead to better learning in both collaborative and non-collaborative contexts.     

Self as a second-order object: Reinterpreting the Jamesian “Me”

Existing definitions of the self can be lumped into three groups: self as self-reflectivity, self as self-concept, and self as the individual. This article traces current disagreements over the definition of the self to a crucial ambiguity in William James's original delineation of the “Me.” Implicit in James's delineation was a distinction between first-order objects and second-order objects: while first-order objects are things as they are, independent of the perception of a knowing subject, second-order objects are things as perceived by a knowing subject. This article makes this distinction explicit and argues that the self is a second-order object associated with the first-person or “emic” perspective. Defined as the empirical existence of the individual (first order) perceived by the individual as “me” or “mine” (second order), the self is distinguished from the “I” which is the mental capacity for self-reflection; the self-concept which is the mental representation of the individual's existence; and the individual which is the empirical referent of the self-concept. As a second-order object, the “Me,” i.e., the self, is the unity of the existence and perception of the individual.     

HOW TO CONFUSE ORGANISMS WITH MOUSETRAPS: MACHINE METAPHORS AND INTELLIGENT DESIGN

Why do design arguments—particularly those emphasizing machine metaphors such as “Organisms and/or their parts are machines”—continue to be so convincing to so many people after they have been repeatedly refuted? In this essay I review various interpretations and refutations of design arguments and make a distinction between rationally refuting such arguments (Refuting_R) and rendering them psychologically unconvincing (Refuting_P). Expanding on this distinction, I provide support from recent work on the cognitive power of metaphors and developmental psychological work indicating a basic human propensity toward attributing agency to natural events, to show that design arguments “make sense”unless one is cued to look more closely. As with visual illusions, such as the Müller‐Lyer arrow illusion, there is nothing wrong with a believer's cognitive apparatus any more than with their visual apparatus when they judge the lines in the illusion to be of unequal length. It takes training or a dissonance between design beliefs and other beliefs or experiences to play the role that a ruler does in the visual case. Unless people are cued to “look again” at what initially makes perfect sense, they are not inclined to apply more sophisticated evaluative procedures.     

New sexual mores and their effect on psychotherapy

This article covers first, the “new” sexual mores, to the extent that they effect psychoanalytic psychotherapy. The socio-historic aspects are discussed. Secondly, it evaluates the more profound meaning of the “sexual” therapies and the “new” sexual mores. What does this mean for the practicing psychotherapist and how does it effect everyday practice and the patient's expectations? What is the responsibility of the psychotherapist when narcissism is stressed as a goal, and mutualismshould be the goal? Finally, it is the position of the author that we should declare our opposition to the new worship of eros as the substance of life. Techniques will not help us develop mutualism.     

Inscrutability and its Discontents

That reference is inscrutable is demonstrated, it is argued, not only by W. V. Quine's arguments but by Peter Unger's “Problem of the Many.” Applied to our own language, this is a paradoxical result, since nothing could be more obvious to speakers of English than that, when they use the word “rabbit,” they are talking about rabbits. The solution to this paradox is to take a disquotational view of reference for one's own language, so that “When I use ‘rabbit,’ I refer to rabbits” is made true by the meaning of the word “refer.” The reference relation is extended to other languages by translation. The explanation for this peculiarly egocentric conception of semantics—questions of others’ meanings are settled by asking what I mean by words of my language—is to be found in our practice of predicting and explaining other people's behavior by empathetic identification. I understand other people's behavior by asking what I would do in their place.