Majority influence,minority influence and conversion behavior: A replication

A recent experiment by Moscovici and Personnaz (Journal of Experimental Social Psychology 1980, 16, 270–282) showed that whereas a majority produces merely compliance, or a change in the individual's verbal responses, a minority induces conversion, or a true change in one's subjective judgments. Because of the theoretical significance of these findings and because of their inconsistency with data from other experiments, an exact replication and extension of this experiment was performed. There was no evidence of compliance in any social influence condition. Instead, and in contrast to Moscovici and Personnaz, both a majority and a minority produced “conversion” behavior. Subjects' behavior is interpreted as the expression of an improved perception, resulting from a heightened level of attention to the object of judgment under social influence conditions.     

Studies in social influence III: Majority versus minority influence in a group

This experimental study was aimed at investigating the mechanisms of influence involved in the two functionally opposed phenomena of innovation and conformity. We have been concerned for several years with the former of these two phenomena because of its intrinsic importance and the limited amount of research devoted to it. In the present article we have attempted not only to analyse the position more thoroughly, but also to compare the effects of innovation with those of conformity. In particular, we have endeavoured to show that behavioural style acts as a general source of influence in the two phenomena under consideration, where manifest judgments are concerned. On the other hand, the latent effects of influence may be different in the two cases of innovation and conformity. To investigate these questions, we developed an experimental design consisting of three parts. The first part was intended to study manifest influence on a quasi-physical judgment based on a cultural truism. The second part was aimed at the study of latent modifications in the perceptual-cognitive code as a result of influence. The third, in the form of a postexperimental questionnaire, was intended to provide information about various aspects, including the perception of the agent of influence by subjects. The main function of the experimental manipulations was to vary the minority or majority relationship of the agent of influence within a group, and its behavioural style, consistent or inconsistent. Our main findings indicate that behavioural consistency is the main factor behind the influence exerted by both majority and minority. But whereas, in conformity, influence is limited to modifying manifest judgments, in innovation, it changes the perceptual-cognitive code underlying such judgments.     

Majority versus minority influence and prediction of behavioral intentions and behavior

Two experiments examined the effects of majority and minority influence on attitude-consistent behavioral intentions. In the first experiment, when attitudes were changed via minority influence there was a greater likelihood to engage in an attitude-consistent behavioral intention than when attitudes were changed via majority influence. This suggests that minority influence leads to stronger attitudes (based on systematic processing) that are more predictive of behavioral intentions, while attitude change via majority influence is due to compliance through non-systematic processing. Further support for this interpretation comes from the finding that the amount of message-congruent elaboration mediated behavioral intention. When there was no attitude change, there was no impact on behavioral intention to engage in an attitude-consistent behavior. Experiment 2 explored the role of personal relevance of the topic and also included a real behavioral measure. When the topic was of low personal relevance, the same pattern was found as Experiment 1. When the topic was of high personal relevance, thus increasing the motivation to engage in systematic processing, attitudes changed by both a majority and minority source increased behavioral intention and actual behavior. The results are consistent with the view that both majorities and minorities can lead to different processes and consequences under different situations.     

Majority and minority influence using the afterimage paradigm: A replication with an unambiguous blue slide

This study re-examines the afterimage paradigm which claims to show that a minority produces a conversion in a task involving afterimage judgements (more private influence than public influence) as opposed to mere compliance produced by a majority. Subsequent failures to replicate this finding have suggested that the changes in the afterimages could be attributed to increased attention due to an ambiguous stimulus coupled with subject suspiciousness. This study attempted to replicate the original experiment but with an unambiguous stimulus in order to remove potential biases. The results showed shifts in afterimages consistent with the increased attention hypothesis for a minority and majority and these were unaffected by the level of suspiciousness reported by the subjects. Additional data shows that no shifts were found in a no-influence control condition showing that shifts were related to exposure to a deviant source and not to response repetition.     

Interaction with a high-versus low-competence influence source in inductive reasoning

Literature on inductive reasoning shows that when testing hypotheses, people are biased toward the use of confirmatory strategies (P. C. Wason, 1960). In the present article, the authors presented 2 studies showing how people use confirmation and disconfirmation strategies during actual interaction in problem solving. Study 1 showed that participants were able to learn to use disconfirmation when confronted with a low-competence, nonthreatening partner. When the partner was high in competence (thereby threatening the participant's competence), participants used confirmation, even when the partner used disconfirmation. In Study 2, the authors aimed at generalizing the aforementioned results by exploring the hypothesis that disconfirmation stems from the possibility of diverging from norms. Participants who were confronted with the violation of a conversational norm used a high proportion of disconfirmation, whatever the source of influence. When there was no violation but there was a low-competence partner, the proportion of disconfirmation was high; when there was no violation but there was a high-competence partner, the proportion of disconfirmation was low. The authors discussed the interpersonal functions of confirmation and disconfirmation.     

Majority and minority influence in group negotiation: the moderating effects of social motivation and decision rules

In organizational groups, often a majority has aligned preferences that oppose those of a minority. Although such situations may give rise to majority coalitions that exclude the minority or to minorities blocking unfavorable agreements, structural and motivational factors may stimulate groups to engage in integrative negotiation, leading to collectively beneficial agreements. An experiment with 97 3-person groups was designed to test hypotheses about the interactions among decision rule, the majority's social motivation, and the minority's social motivation. Results showed that under unanimity rule, minority members block decisions, thus harming the group, but only when the minority has proself motivation. Under majority rule, majority members coalesce at the minority's expense, but only when the majority has a proself motivation. Implications for negotiation research and group decision making are discussed.     

Recruitment of the pre-motor area in human inductive reasoning: An fMRI study

Recent studies indicated that the pre-motor area may be recruited in human higher level cognitive functions, including inductive reasoning. In the present study, a typical task of inductive reasoning, function-finding, was explored using functional MRI. fMRI results showed the significant activation of bilateral pre-motor cortex (BA 6), and its left lateralization. Taking together the previous studies and the present experimental design, we concluded that the left pre-motor cortex in the present study may associate with implicit relation synthesis, while the right pre-motor cortex may reflect spatial information processing involved in arithmetic rules.     

Broadening the study of inductive reasoning: Confirmation judgments with uncertain evidence

Although evidence in real life is often uncertain, the psychology of inductive reasoning has, so far, been confined to certain evidence. The present study extends previous research by investigating whether people properly estimate the impact of uncertain evidence on a given hypothesis. Two experiments are reported, in which the uncertainty of evidence is explicitly (by means of numerical values) versus implicitly (by means of ambiguous pictures) manipulated. The results show that people’s judgments are highly correlated with those predicted by normatively sound Bayesian measures of impact. This sensitivity to the degree of evidential uncertainty supports the centrality of inductive reasoning in cognition and opens the path to the study of this issue in more naturalistic settings.     

归纳推理和演绎推理的关系理论及其模型

推理是人类高级认知过程的一种,相关的心理学研究一般将其分为归纳推理和演绎推理两个方面。归纳推理是从特殊到一般的推理过程,与之相对的演绎推理则是从一般到特殊的过程。归纳推理和演绎推理的关系问题是当前心理推理研究领域的一个重点问题。这一问题主要有两种理论解释：一种是单过程理论,该理论认为归纳推理和演绎推理本质上是同一个认知过程,以单过程理论为基础构建的推理模型称为单维模型;另一种是双过程理论,认为归纳推理和演绎推理是两个不同的认知过程,并不同程度地受到启发和分析过程的影响。未来研究可多关注推理的时间进程,以及采用不同的研究方法对各自理论提供数据支持。     

Indirect majority and minority influence: An exploratory study

In a 2 × 2 design, 85 subjects were asked to estimate the size of angles (direct influence) that were either 90 or 85°, after being confronted with incorrect judgements of a majority (88 per cent) or a minority (12 per cent) of people estimating the angles at 50°. Additionally, pre- and post-test measures were used to establish indirect influence on subjects' judgements pertaining to acute angles (i.e. on the estimation of the length of lines constituting the angles, and on the imaginary weight of figures represented by these angles). Overall, little direct influence is observed. This may partly be due to the introduction of a denial of the credibility of the source in all conditions. In fact, some evidence of direct influence is only found in the majority–85° angles condition. An instance of indirect influence (on the estimation of length of lines) appeared as the result of a majority stance when the angles in the experimental phase were 90°. When these angles were 85°, indirect minority influence (on the estimation of weight of figures) was observed. These effects had been predicted on the basis of the hypothesis stating that indirect majority influence would be possible when subjects expected consensus on the correct response (in the 90° angles condition), without being able to reach consensus at the manifest level (because of the denial and the restriction imposed by the clear shape of 90° angles). Indirect minority influence was hypothesized to be stronger in a situation that allows for diverse responses (i.e. for 85° angles).     

Majority versus minority influence: the role of message processing in determining resistance to counter‐persuasion

Two experiments examined the extent to which attitudes changed following majority and minority influence are resistant to counter‐persuasion. In both experiments participants' attitudes were measured after being exposed to two messages, delayed in time, which argued opposite positions (initial message and counter‐message). In the first experiment, attitudes following minority endorsement of the initial message were more resistant to a second counter‐message only when the initial message contained strong versus weak arguments. Attitudes changed following majority influence did not resist the second counter‐message and returned to their pre‐test level. Experiment 2 varied whether memory was warned (i.e., message recipients expected to recall the message) or not, to manipulate message processing. When memory was warned, which should increase message processing, attitudes changed following both majority and minority influence resisted the second counter‐message. The results support the view that minority influence instigates systematic processing of its arguments, leading to attitudes that resist counter‐persuasion. Attitudes formed following majority influence yield to counter‐persuasion unless there is a secondary task that encourages message processing. Copyright © 2007 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Majority versus minority influence: when,not whether,source status instigates heuristic or systematic processing

Two experiments investigated the extent of message processing of a persuasive communication proposed by either a numerical majority or minority. Both experiments crossed source status (majority versus minority) with message quality (strong versus weak arguments) to determine which source condition is associated with systematic processing. The first experiment showed a reliable difference between strong and weak messages, indicating systematic processing had occurred, for a minority irrespective of message direction (pro‐ versus counter‐attitudinal), but not for a majority. The second experiment showed that message outcome moderates when a majority or a minority leads to systematic processing. When the message argued for a negative personal outcome, there was systematic processing only for the majority source; but when the message did not argue for a negative personal outcome, there was systematic processing only for the minority source. Thus one key moderator of whether a majority or minority source leads to message processing is whether the topic induces defensive processing motivated by self‐interest. Copyright © 2002 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Deductive and inductive conditional inferences: Two modes of reasoning

A number of single- and dual-process theories provide competing explanations as to how reasoners evaluate conditional arguments. Some of these theories are typically linked to different instructions—namely deductive and inductive instructions. To assess whether responses under both instructions can be explained by a single process, or if they reflect two modes of conditional reasoning, we re-analysed four experiments that used both deductive and inductive instructions for conditional inference tasks. Our re-analysis provided evidence consistent with a single process. In two new experiments we established a double dissociation of deductive and inductive instructions when validity and plausibility of conditional problems were pitted against each other. This indicates that at least two processes contribute to conditional reasoning. We conclude that single-process theories of conditional reasoning cannot explain the observed results. Theories that postulate at least two processes are needed to account for our findings.     

Causal relations and feature similarity in children's inductive reasoning

Four experiments examined the development of property induction on the basis of causal relations. In the first 2 studies, 5-year-olds, 8-year-olds, and adults were presented with triads in which a target instance was equally similar to 2 inductive bases but shared a causal antecedent feature with 1 of them. All 3 age groups used causal relations as a basis for property induction, although the proportion of causal inferences increased with age. Subsequent experiments pitted causal relations against featural similarity in induction. It was found that adults and 8-year-olds, but not 5-year-olds, preferred shared causal relations over strong featural similarity as a basis for induction. The implications for models of inductive reasoning and development are discussed.     

Context,visual salience,and inductive reasoning

An important debate in the reasoning literature concerns the extent to which inference processes are domain-free or domain-specific. Typically, evidence in support of the domain-specific position comprises the facilitation observed when abstract reasoning tasks are set in realistic context. Three experiments are reported here in which the sources of facilitation were investigated for contextualised versions of Raven's Progressive Matrices (Richardson, 1991) and non-verbal analogies from the AH4 test (Richardson & Webster, 1996). Experiment 1 confirmed that the facilitation observed for the contextualised matrices was in part due to extraneous aspects of commentaries originally intended to activate domainspecific processes. Experiments 2 and 3 indicated that the remainder of the facilitation for the matrices, and all of the facilitation for the analogies, could be explained by visual salience: Converting the item elements into realistic objects had enabled them and their transitions to be identified more easily. Hence, performance at simplified abstract items was as good as, or better than, at contextualised items. It is concluded that facilitation effects cannot be interpreted as showing that domain-specific processes constitute a self-contained system separate from domain-free processes. In turn, this means that domain-free processes cannot be dismissed as being unimportant for reasoning.     

Culture,category salience,and inductive reasoning

The role of category salience in category-based induction was demonstrated in two ways: (i) temporarily increasing category salience facilitated category-based induction, and (ii) this effect was moderated by cultural differences that we predicted would be related to chronic category salience. Subjects for whom categories were presumed to be more accessible (Americans) were not as much influenced by manipulations to increase category salience as subjects who were presumed to have lower chronic accessibility of categories (Koreans). However, as anticipated, this pattern was reversed for inferences about behavioral properties of social categories. Due to the `interdependent' nature of their culture, Koreans presumably have relatively higher chronic accessibility for social categories than do relatively `independent' Americans, and hence were not influenced as much by increasing category salience.     

Theory-based Bayesian models of inductive learning and reasoning

Inductive inference allows humans to make powerful generalizations from sparse data when learning about word meanings, unobserved properties, causal relationships, and many other aspects of the world. Traditional accounts of induction emphasize either the power of statistical learning, or the importance of strong constraints from structured domain knowledge, intuitive theories or schemas. We argue that both components are necessary to explain the nature, use and acquisition of human knowledge, and we introduce a theory-based Bayesian framework for modeling inductive learning and reasoning as statistical inferences over structured knowledge representations.     

Sample diversity and premise typicality in inductive reasoning: evidence for developmental change

Evaluating whether a limited sample of evidence provides a good basis for induction is a critical cognitive task. We hypothesized that whereas adults evaluate the inductive strength of samples containing multiple pieces of evidence by attending to the relations among the exemplars (e.g., sample diversity), six-year-olds would attend to the degree to which each individual exemplar in a sample independently appears informative (e.g., premise typicality). To test these hypotheses, participants were asked to select between diverse and non-diverse samples to help them learn about basic-level animal categories. Across various between-subject conditions (N=133), we varied the typicality present in the diverse and non-diverse samples. We found that adults reliably selected to examine diverse over non-diverse samples, regardless of exemplar typicality, six-year-olds preferred to examine samples containing typical exemplars, regardless of sample diversity, and nine-year-olds were somewhat in the midst of this developmental transition.