The question of the other in French phenomenology

I would like to show how with Sartre, Merleau-Ponty, and Levinas, we have to do with three different ways of understanding the experience of the other. For Sartre it is a visual experience, the experience of being looked at by the other, so that the experience of the other is understood as a confrontation; for Merleau-Ponty, the experience of the other necessarily implies coexistence and what he calls “intercorporeality,” so that for him the other is never to be found in front, but instead beside me, in reciprocity with me; for Levinas, the experience of the other is the experience of a non-reciprocity, of an assymetrical relation, because the experience of the other is for him an ethical and not an ontological experience, and because this experience of the face of the other is the experience of a speaking and not in the first place corporeal presence. There are consequently three different ways of finding an access to the other : the look for Sartre, intercorporeality for Merleau-Ponty and the face for Levinas.     

ATTRIBUTIONS FOR THE POORLY PERFORMING BLACKJACK DEALER: IN THE CARDS OR INABILITY?

This study examined the effects of task and supervisory experience on causal attributions and recommendations for corrective action following poor performance. One hundred twenty subjects employed in a casino reviewed an evaluation form describing the poor performance of a blackjack dealer in the casino. Subjects included first-and second-level supervisors with task and supervisory experience, dealers with task experience only, and employees with neither task nor supervisory experience. Subjects were told that the dealer being evaluated had 2, 6, or 12 months of task experience. Results indicate that task and supervisory experience did affect attributions to specific causal factors; however, the effects were not consistently in the predicted direction. Specifically, supervisors viewed lack of effort and poor supervision as more important and task difficulty as less important causes of poor performance than did dealers. Subjects without task experience viewed poor work conditions and task difficulty as stronger causes of poor performance than did dealers. Task experience of the ratee interacted with rater task experience such that dealers and controls differed in their attributions for employees with 12 months' experience but did not differ if the ratee had 2 or 6 months' experience. Causal attributions for an employee's poor performance were related to subsequent corrective recommendations.     

体验的心理机制研究

体验是个体以身体为中介,以“行或思”为手段,以知情相互作用为典型特征,作用于人的对象对人产生意义时而引发的不断生成的居身状态。体验的心理机制研究一般包括对象的呈现、意义的建构、身体的变化、体验的形成,以及体验的延展五个环节。从存在的基本形态看,体验可分为外显体验和内隐体验两种。体验及其心理机制的深入研究,对未来的情绪心理学、认知心理学、文化心理学,以及本土心理学的进一步发展都有着重要的促进作用。     

OAKESHOTT ON THE CHARACTER OF RELIGIOUS EXPERIENCE: NEED THERE BE A CONFLICT BETWEEN SCIENCE AND RELIGION?

Michael Oakeshott reflected on the character of religious experience in various writings throughout his life. In Experience and Its Modes (1933) he analyzed science as a distinctive “mode,” or account of experience as a whole, identifying those assumptions necessary for science to achieve its coherent account of experience in contrast to other modes of experience whose quests for coherence depend on different assumptions. Religious experience, he thought, was integral to the practical mode. The latter experiences the world as interminable tension between what is and what ought to be. The question, Is there a conflict between science and religion? is, in Oakeshott's approach, the question, Is there a conflict between the scientific mode of experience and the practical mode? Insofar as we tend to treat every question as a practical one, these questions seem to make sense. But Oakeshott's analysis leads to the view that scientific experience and religious experience are categorically different accounts of experience abstracted from the whole of experience. They are voices of experience that may speak to each other, but they are not ordered hierarchically. Nor can either absorb the other without insoluble contradictions.     

顿悟体验的特性、结构和功能基础

顿悟体验是伴随顿悟问题解决过程的心理和现象学体验,主要包含伴随题解闪现的啊哈体验和因思维定势自动激活而催生的僵局阶段体验。现有研究显示,顿悟体验可能是多类认知与情绪要素构成,兼具认知和情绪加工特性的多维复合体。加工流畅性可部分解释顿悟体验的产生机制,杏仁核、眶额区和脑岛等情绪和奖赏加工的脑区则可能是其脑功能基础。未来须用多元方法从新旧交替视角深化两阶段顿悟体验的研究。     

Conceptualizing the role of early experience: Lessons from the Minnesota longitudinal study

We draw upon data from a prospective, longitudinal study to evaluate the role of typically occurring variations in early experience on development from birth to adulthood. Such an evaluation is complex for both methodological and conceptual reasons. Methodological issues include the need to control for both later experience and potentially confounding third variables, such as IQ or temperament. Conceptual complexity derives from the fact that the effects of early experience can be both direct and indirect, can interact with other factors, and because whether an effect is found depends on what early experience and what outcomes are assessed. Even direct effects are probabilistic and are more in evidence with cumulative than with single measures. Often early experience has its effect indirectly by initiating a chain of events, by altering the organism in some way, and/or by promoting the impact of later experience. We provide examples where early experience is moderated and mediated by other factors and where it shows latent effects following developmental change. We illustrate developmental processes through which early experience has its effect and conclude that despite the complexity of development variations in early experience retain a vital place in the study of development.     

Embodied Experience in Educational Practice and Research

The intention of this article is to make an educational analysis of Merleau-Ponty??s theory of experience in order to see what it implicates for educational practice as well as educational research. In this way, we can attain an understanding what embodied experience might mean both in schools and other educational settings and in researching educational activities. The analysis will take its point of departure in Merleau-Ponty??s analysis and criticism of empiricist and neokantian theories of experience. This will be followed up by an introduction of some central concepts in Merleau-Ponty??s own understanding of experience with emphasis on their relevance for educational analysis. This way of presenting the theory of embodied experience has the advantage of being able to indicate the difference it makes in the field of theories of experience.     

Aha! Insight experience correlates with solution activation in the right hemisphere

In one experiment, we tested for an association between semantic activation in the right hemisphere (RH) and left hemisphere (LH) and the Aha! experience when people recognize solutions to insight-like problems. The compound remote associate problems used in this experiment sometimes evoke an Aha! experience and sometimes do not. On each trial, participants (N = 44) attempted to solve these problems and, after 7 sec, named a target word, made a solution decision, and rated their insight experience of recognizing the solution. As in prior studies, the participants demonstrated more solution priming for solutions presented to the left visual field-RH (lvf-RH) than for solutions presented to the right visual field-LH (rvf-LH). As was predicted, following unsolved problems the participants showed greater priming for solutions that they rated as evoking an insight experience on the subsequent solution decision than for solutions that did not evoke an insight experience. This association was stronger for solutions presented to the lvf-RH than for those presented to the rvf-LH. These results tie the subjective experience of insight to an objective measure-semantic priming-and suggest that people have an Aha! experience in part because they already had semantic activation that could lead them to recognize the solution quickly. We believe semantic activation in both hemispheres cooperatively contributes to problem solving, but weak solution activation that contributes to the Aha! experience is more likely to occur in the RH than in the LH.     

Iterated Non‐Refutation: Robert Lockie on Relativism 1

Abstract

I argue that an experience’s sensuous elements play an ineliminable role in our being intentionally directed upon an entity through perception. More specifically, I argue that whenever we appreciate a sensuous element in experience, we appreciate an intrinsic and irreducibly phenomenal aspect of experience that I call phenomenal presence – an aspect of experience that I show is central to its presentational character – and that the appreciation of phenomenal presence is necessary for perceptual intentionality. If an experience is to possess intentionality, the experience itself must make an entity available as an object of perceptually-based singular beliefs and the experiencing subject, by virtue of undergoing the experience, must in some sense be able to appreciate that it has done so. Phenomenal presence is necessary for perceptual intentionality because it plays an ineliminable role in making an entity available to its subject in this way.     

The joint role of trained,untrained, and observed actions at the origins of goal recognition

Recent findings across a variety of domains reveal the benefits of self-produced experience on object exploration, object knowledge, attention, and action perception. The influence of active experience may be particularly important in infancy, when motor development is undergoing great changes. Despite the importance of self-produced experience, we know that infants and young children are eventually able to gain knowledge through purely observational experience. In the current work, three-month-old infants were given experience with object-directed actions in one of three forms and their recognition of the goal of grasping actions was then assessed in a habituation paradigm. All infants were given the chance to manually interact with the toys without assistance (a difficult task for most three-month-olds). Two of the three groups were then given additional experience with object-directed actions, either through active training (in which Velcro mittens helped infants act more efficiently) or observational training. Findings support the conclusion that self-produced experience is uniquely informative for action perception and suggest that individual differences in spontaneous motor activity may interact with observational experience to inform action perception early in life.     

Making sense of the libertarian’s semantic claim about agential phenomenology

Libertarians about free will sometimes argue for their position on the grounds that our phenomenology of action is such that determinism would need to be false for it to be veridical. Many, however, have thought that it would be impossible for us to have an experience that is in contradiction with determinism, since this would require us to have perceptual experience of metaphysical facts. In this paper I show how the libertarian claim is possible. In particular, if experience depicts the world such that there is more than one physically possible future, then determinism would need to be false for that experience to be veridical. I show that we have experiences, or perceptual episodes, of this kind on the basis of recent work in the study of perception. Theorists in this area have argued that we have vision-for-action, and that what we visually perceive are not just objects but also possibilities for action. If we experience that it is possible that we ?, then we also experience that it is possible that we not ?. Furthermore, we probably experience more than one possibility for action at any one moment. I argue that these are physical possibilities, and therefore that we experience the world such that there is more than one physically possible future. So the libertarian claim about the semantics of agential phenomenology is highly plausible, even if this does not entail libertarianism.     

Representationalism and the phenomenology of mental imagery

This paper sketches a phenomenological analysis of visual mental imagery and uses it to criticize representationalism and the internalist-versus-externalist framework for understanding consciousness. Contrary to internalist views of mental imagery imagery experience is not the experience of a phenomenal mental picture inspected by the mind’s eye, but rather the mental simulation of perceptual experience. Furthermore, there are experiential differences in perceiving and imagining that are not differences in the properties represented by these experiences. Therefore, externalist representationalism, which maintains that the properties of experience are the external properties represented by experience, is an inadequate account of conscious experience.     

Critique,Ethics, and the Apparatus of Experience: A Foucauldian Framework

The paper explores examples of contemporary experience in order to demonstrate the moralisation of new areas of behaviour (especially in relation to environmental issues).It sketches a Foucauldian framework for understanding the historical transformation of experience,in terms of the "apparatus of experience." On that basis,it presents a novel account of critique,in which critique is seen as the potentially transformational,experiential practice of re-experiencing the contemporary apparatuses of experience.In other words,critique is "experience squared." It is this re-experiencing of our everyday experience that permits us,to a certain extent,to "get over ourselves" and thus to reflect critically on the processes of moralisation and de-moralisation in which we participate.     

TOWARD AN INTEGRATED MODEL OF WORK EXPERIENCE

Work experience and related concepts such as tenure and seniority have been and continue to be used extensively in a variety of human resource functions. However, research on experience has proceeded without a clear theoretical orientation, adequate consideration of contextual and individual factors, and appropriate attention to measurement and design. These issues are addressed and a model of the work experience construct is offered. Work experience is described as consisting of qualitative and quantitative components that exist at different levels of specification and which interact and accrue over time. The model provides a nomological net for the experience construct linking it to contextual and individual factors critical for the development of experience and its translation into immediate outcomes of work-based knowledge, skills, attitudes, and motivation, and secondary outcomes such as performance. The model provides a basis for specific research propositions and human resource applications that consider work experience as a multidimensional, multilevel, and temporally dynamic construct.     

Near-death experience as mystical experience

Near-death experience exhibits many attributes of mystical awareness. Assessing the mystical quality of psychedelic experience, Walter Pahnke identified a nine-category typology of mystical experience. It is used here to illustrate the mystical nature of near-death experience. The typology also describes the self-transformation which follows the mystical state of consciousness. Self-transformation results from near-death experience. Pahnke's mystical typology characterizes the near-death experience and allows for a definition of near-death experience as a mystical state.     

目标取向和工作经验对绩效的效应

通过两个样本调查,对目标取向和工作经验量表进行了结构检验,并探讨了目标取向和工作经验对个体绩效的效应模式。结果表明：学习目标取向和工作经验定性成份与绩效间存在中等程度相关;在控制了人口统计学变量的效应后,学习目标取向对绩效具有显著的预测效应;工作经验定性成份与绩效间的关系受到学习目标取向缓冲,在学习目标取向低分组,工作经验定性成份对个体绩效更具预测力     

Emotional experience in everyday life across the adult life span

Age differences in emotional experience over the adult life span were explored, focusing on the frequency, intensity, complexity, and consistency of emotional experience in everyday life. One hundred eighty-four people, age 18 to 94 years, participated in an experience-sampling procedure in which emotions were recorded across a 1-week period. Age was unrelated to frequency of positive emotional experience. A curvilinear relationship best characterized negative emotional experience. Negative emotions declined in frequency until approximately age 60, at which point the decline ceased. Individual factor analyses computed for each participant revealed that age was associated with more differentiated emotional experience. In addition, periods of highly positive emotional experience were more likely to endure among older people and periods of highly negative emotional experience were less stable. Findings are interpreted within the theoretical framework of socioemotional selectivity theory.     

Spatial location in color vision

Ross argues that the location problem for color-the problem of how it is represented as occupying a particular location in space-constitutes an objection to color subjectivism. There are two ways in which the location problem can be interpreted. First, it can be read as a why-question about the relation of visual experience to the environment represented: Why does visual experience represent a patch of color as located in this part of space rather than that? On this interpretation, the subjectivist can answer Ross's objection by appealing to the physical location of reflectance rather than color. Second, it can be read as a how-question about visual representation itself: How does visual experience put together the experience of a color with the experience of its being located in space? This version makes the location problem a problem about visual experience itself and renders the ontology of color irrelevant to its solution. The location problem is thus no more a problem for the color subjectivist than for the color realist.