Some comments on Lehrer semantics

Lehrer Semantics, as it was devised by Adrienne and Keith Lehrer, is imbedded in a comprehensive web of thought and observations of language use and development, communication, and social interaction, all these as empirical phenomena. Rather than for a theory, I take it for a ??model?? of the kind which gives us guidance in how to organize linguistic and language-related phenomena. My comments on it are restricted to three aspects: In 2 I deal with the question of how Lehrerian sense can be empirically distinguished from Lehrerian reference as a precondition for the claim that sense relationships are in general more stable than reference relations. It seems that this very claim must already be presupposed for doing the respective empirical investigation. But in 3, I argue for the option to interpret the Lehrers?? concept of sense resp. sense vectors as intension concepts, by which move one may gain a generalized concept, so-to-say ??graded analyticity??, containing Carnapian strict analyticity for language systems as the extreme case of sense vectors with maximum value. Such graded sense may also be empirically investigated in the case of normal languages. In 4, I plead for my view that what the Lehrers take for communal languages are really collections of family-resembling idiolects of individual speakers and hypotheses of individual speakers about the idiolects of their fellow speakers. This move should free us from the fiction of, and sterile discussions about, the ??true?? meanings of words, but nevertheless keep normal language communication possible. As a concluding remark I propose in 5 to have both: normal languages from an empirical point of view, and codified languages from a logical reconstructionist one.     

Group risk-taking and group polarization

There are two aims to this paper; to report in brief preliminary form a number of studies on group risk-taking that have been carried out in Bristol in the past two years, and to relate these studies to an explanation of group risk-taking phenomena primarily in terms of group polarization. The paper has five sections. The first section supplies some background material regarding basic phenomena and previous attempts at explanations. The second section relates to initial individual decisions and the third section to decisions following group discussion and consensus. In the fourth section a tentative explanation of group risk-taking effects is proposed in terms of group polarization processes, together with something like an overall value for risk. Group polarization itself is discussed in terms of normative and informational aspects of social influence. The final section deals with two implications of the proposed explanation, one relating to the role of individual familiarization and the other to the generality of group polarization processes.     

DNA patents and scientific discovery and innovation: Assessing benefits and risks

This paper focuses on the question of whether DNA patents help or hinder scientific discovery and innovation. While DNA patents create a wide variety of possible benefits and harms for science and technology, the evidence we have at this point in time supports the conclusion that they will probably promote rather than hamper scientific discovery and innovation. However, since DNA patenting is a relatively recent phenomena and the biotechnology industry is in its infancy, we should continue to gather evidence about the effects of DNA patenting on scientific innovation and discovery as well the economic, social, and legal conditions relating to intellectual property in biotechnology. We should give the free market, the courts, researchers, and patent offices a chance to settle issues related to innovation and discovery, before we seek legislative remedies, since new laws proposed at this point would lack adequate foresight and could do more harm than good. However, we should be open to new laws or regulations on DNA patents if they are required to in order to deal with some of the biases and limitations of the free market.     

A general connectionist model of attitude structure and change: the ACS (Attitudes as Constraint Satisfaction) model

A localist, parallel constraint satisfaction, artificial neural network model is presented that accounts for a broad collection of attitude and attitude-change phenomena. The network represents the attitude object and cognitions and beliefs related to the attitude, as well as how to integrate a persuasive message into this network. Short-term effects are modeled by activation patterns due to parallel constraint satisfaction processes, and long-term effects are modeled by weight changes due to the settling patterns of activation. Phenomena modeled include thought-induced attitude polarization, elaboration and attitude strength, motivated reasoning and social influence, an integrated view of heuristic versus systematic persuasion, and implicit versus explicit attitude change. Results of the simulations are consistent with empirical results. The same set of simple mechanisms is used to model all the phenomena, which allows the model to offer a parsimonious theoretical account of how structure can impact attitude change. This model is compared with previous computational approaches to attitudes, and implications for attitude research are discussed.     

从本体-历史的观点看

一、科学哲学的岔路半个多世纪前问世的奎因的那本《从逻辑的观点看》(1953),至今还影响着我们:从整体主义的观点出发启迪了诸多后实证主义的灵感。与奎因的本体-逻辑的与认识-逻辑的观点不同,本文想要阐述的是一种本体-历史的观点。这是两类不同性质的理论。我认为,本体-历史的观点同样也适     

Resolving the emergence-reduction debate

The debate between emergentists and reductionists rests on the observation that in many situations, in which it seems desirable to work with a coherent and unified discourse, key predicates fall into different groups, such that pairs of members one taken from each group, cannot be co-predicated of some common subject. Must we settle for ‘island’ discourses in science and human affairs or is some route to a unified discourse still open? To make progress towards resolving the issue the conditions under which such segregations of predicates seem inexorable must be brought out. The distinction between determinable and determinate properties throws light on some aspects of this problem. Bohr’s concept of complementarity, when combined with Gibson’s idea of an affordances as a special class of dispositional properties is helpful. Several seeming problems melt away, for example, how it is possible for a group of notes to become hearable as a melody. The mind-body problem and the viability of the project of reducing biology to chemistry and physics are two issues that are more difficult to deal with. Are mental phenomena, such as feelings and memories emergent from material systems or are they actually material properties themselves? Are the attributes of living beings emergent from certain accidental but long running collocations of chemical reactions, or are they nothing but chemical phenomena? If emergent, in what way are they distinctive from that from which they emerge?     

Emergentism by default: A view from the bench

For the last 50 years the dominant stance in experimental biology has been reductionism in general, and genetic reductionism in particular. Philosophers were the first to realize that the belief that the Mendelian genes were reduced to DNA molecules was questionable. Soon, experimental data confirmed these misgivings. The optimism of molecular biologists, fueled by early success in tackling relatively simple problems has now been tempered by the difficulties encountered when applying the same simple ideas to complex problems. We analyze three examples taken from experimental data that illustrate the shortcomings of this sort of reductionism. In the first, alterations in the expression of a large number of genes coexist with normal phenotypes at supra-cellular levels of organization; in the second, the supposed intrinsic specificity of hormonal signals is negated; in the third, the notion that cancer is a cellular problem caused by mutated genes is challenged by data gathered both from the reductionist viewpoint and the alternative view proposing that carcinogenesis is development gone awry. As an alternative to reductionism, we propose that the organicist view is a good starting point from which to explore these phenomena. However, new theoretical concepts are needed to grapple with the apparent circular causality of complex biological phenomena.     

“All You Need is Holt”—Is the Socio-cultural Phenomenon a Problem for a Neorealist Ecological Psychology?

The aim of this paper is to discuss Charles’s (2011) attempt to turn E.B. Holt’s theoretical approach into the only possible bridge to connect Gibsonian ecological psychology with social psychology. Criticism of Charles’s claims is carried out at four different conceptual levels: historiographical, logico-epistemological, methodological, and theoretical. From this critical perspective, Charles’s resort to Holt’s ideas is viewed as an effort to legitimate Charles’s own line of work. Moreover, far from being this the only possible approach to the subject, many other rich alternatives to the application of Gibsonian principles to the explanation of socio-cultural phenomena already exist. In fact, it is questionable whether Holt’s behavioral neorealism allows dealing with many of the most complex socio-cultural issues, particularly those related to purposive behavior and intersubjective contexts. In order to address these questions from a Holtian point of view, Charles is forced to make a number of argumentative leaps and epistemological transgressions. In the last analysis, his insistence on keeping to the Holtian stance leads him to lose sight of the Gibsonian framework and to modify the very nature of his object of study, the social phenomenon—which, along the lines of classic neorealist behaviorism, becomes reduced to a simple consideration of behavioral purposiveness.     

Attention between phenomenology and experimental psychology

It is possible to consider attention as the modulating dimension of consciousness. Understood in this sense, attention can be a privileged theme for relating the first person point of view (conceived as a psycho-phenomenology inspired by the work of Husserl) to the experimental sciences (e.g. psychology, neuropsychology, etc.), which have done a great deal of work on attention. This article will take up in succession some different points of view regarding the status of attention and its structure (e.g. static aspects). It will also consider the dynamic of attention from a micro-genetic point of view as well as a functional point of view. The final section will seek to show not only the unique and original contributions of each perspective, but also each perspective's limitations and biases.     

Towards a Consensus About the Role of Empathy in Interpersonal Understanding

In recent years, there has been a great deal of controversy in the philosophy of mind, developmental psychology and cognitive neuroscience both about how to conceptualize empathy and about the connections between empathy and interpersonal understanding. Ideally, we would first establish a consensus about how to conceptualize empathy, and then analyze the potential contribution of empathy to interpersonal understanding. However, it is not at all clear that such a consensus will soon be forthcoming, given that different people have fundamentally conflicting intuitions about the concept of empathy. Thus, instead of trying to resolve this controversy, I will try to show that a fair amount of consensus is within reach about how empathy can be a source of interpersonal understanding even in the absence of a consensus about how to conceptualize empathy. As we shall see, the main controversy concerns a few phenomena that some researchers view as necessary conditions of empathy, but which others view either as merely characteristic features or as consequences of empathy. My strategy will be to try to show how empathy can generate interpersonal understanding by virtue of these phenomena—regardless of whether one chooses to conceptualize them as necessary conditions of empathy.     

心理时间的分割与整合

在心理时间的研究中存在两种观点。一种观点认为,心理时间是以整合的方式呈现,心理时间的整合是对各种实验结果所得出的时间经验的概括与综合。另一种观点将心理时间进行分割,时序信息加工通过知觉重组和外部计数操作反映出来,这些活动受一个目标间隔内发生的事件结构的层次性所支配,分割心理时间的观点强调时距估计中期望的作用,但它不能解释非时序信息加工路径的影响。     

The Theory of Transformations and Autistic States Autistic Transformations: A Proposal1

This work integrates two areas of thinking: one in which the author develops considerationsregardingobservationmethodsofmentalphenomenainpsychoanalysis according to Bion's theory of transformations; the other in which she is concerned with the investigation of primitive mental states‐protomental states‐more specifi cally, the autistic states of neurotic patients, described by Tustin. Some ideas on the ‘philosophical’ position underlying transformations theory are elaborated, particularly emphasizing the idea that the same phenomenon in psychoanalysis may be considered from different perspectives, as long as it is situated within the theoretical reference frame to which it belongs. The author considers the idea that this method of phenomenon observation is part of a wider context of general human knowledge, in which uncertainty and relativity of concepts are the main components. By adopting transformations theory as a perspective of phenomena observation that pervades the analytical meeting, the author questions whether it is possible to include other groups of transformation of emotional experiences in this theory, which shows particular phenomena with specifi c qualities, distinct from those emphasized by Bion. She hypothesizes that autistic phenomena present in neurotic patients, characterizing autistic states, may be considered and detached, making up a particular group of transformation of emotional experience, which analysts often face in their daily practice. She names this group ‘autistic transformations’.     

Special issue on radical views on cognition: introduction

In this paper we present the results of a simulation study of credence developments in groups of communicating Bayesian agents, as they update their beliefs about a given proposition p. Based on the empirical literature, one would assume that these groups of rational agents would converge on a view over time, or at least that they would not polarize. This paper presents and discusses surprising evidence that this is not true. Our simulation study shows that these groups of Bayesian agents show group polarization behavior under a broad range of circumstances. This is, we think, an unexpected result, that raises deeper questions about whether the kind of polarization in question is irrational. If one accepts Bayesian agency as the hallmark of epistemic rationality, then one should infer that the polarization we find is also rational. On the other hand, if we are inclined to think that there is something epistemically irrational about group polarization, then something must be off in the model employed in our simulation study. We discuss several possible interfering factors, including how epistemic trust is defined in the model. Ultimately, we propose that the notion of Bayesian agency is missing something in general, namely the ability to respond to higher-order evidence.

     

PLURALISM, TOLERATION, AND ETHICAL PROMISCUITY

This paper argues that from an ethical point of view tolerance, which is simply one of a number of possible responses to ethical pluralism, is not an acceptable ideal. It fails to acknowledge and appreciate the good in other forms of life and thereby does not adequately respect the people who live these lives. Toleration limits the range of goods we might appreciate in our own lives and in the lives of those we care most about, and it tends to lead to a number of deformations or personal failures of character. In place of tolerance, we should embrace ethical promiscuity—a view that not only acknowledges ethical pluralism but also offers good reasons to celebrate this state of affairs.     

Smith on Indexicals

In this paper, I advance a new view of the semantics of indexicals, using a paper by Quentin Smith as my starting point. I make use of Smith’s examples, refined and expanded upon by myself to argue, as Smith does, that the standard view, that indexicals refer to some prominent features of the context according to an invariant rule called the character, does not agree with a wide range of phenomena. I depart from Smith, however, in denying that we need more complex rules, which he does not give, called metacharacters to account for all the deviations, and instead argue for a view of indexicals as just being special cases of demonstratives. I show how demonstratives can be substituted for indexicals to support this view, and I adduce recent work in the semantics of demonstratives to explain how it can work.     

Towards a General Model of Applying Science

How is scientific knowledge used, adapted, and extended in deriving phenomena and real‐world systems? This paper aims at developing a general account of ‘applying science’ within the exemplar‐based framework of Data‐Oriented Processing (DOP), which is also known as Exemplar‐Based Explanation (EBE). According to the exemplar‐based paradigm, phenomena are explained not by deriving them all the way down from theoretical laws and boundary conditions but by modelling them on previously derived phenomena that function as exemplars. To accomplish this, DOP proposes to maintain a corpus of derivation trees of previous phenomena together with a matching algorithm that combines subtrees from the corpus to derive new phenomena. By using a notion of derivational similarity, a new phenomenon can be modelled as closely as possible on previously explained phenomena. I will propose an instantiation of DOP which integrates theoretical and phenomenological modelling and which generalises over various disciplines, from fluid mechanics to language technology. I argue that DOP provides a solution for what I call Kuhn’s problem and that it redresses Kitcher’s account of explanation.     

Sculpting Present and Future: A Systemic Intervention Model Applied to Psychosomatic Families

We present a therapeutic intervention model for use with psychosomatic families. This method, the result of our extensive research on various psychosomatic disorders, uses family sculptures of the "present" and "future": each family member is requested to represent the family as it now "is," and how it "will be" in the future. We discuss the theoretical reasons for our choice of this method: (a) the opportunity to use a therapeutic language that is similar to the nonverbal language of the psychosomatic symptom, and (b) the usefulness of reinserting temporal dimensions into family systems that seem to have lost their evolutionary potential and to be in a sort of "time lock." Two clinical cases are discussed (a child with chronic asthma and an anorexic adolescent); the use of sculptures in both cases revealed the underlying problems and made positive therapeutic interventions possible. Finally, we point out how the use of sculpture as a therapeutic technique enables therapists to deal with multiple systemic levels.     

An experimental analogue study into the role of abstract thinking in trauma-related rumination

Trauma-related rumination has been shown to predict the maintenance of posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD). However, it is still unclear how rumination can be distinguished from functional forms of thinking about traumatic events. The current study used an analogue design to experimentally test the hypothesis that the abstractness of thinking is responsible for the dysfunctional effects of trauma-related rumination. Eighty-three healthy university students first watched a distressing video and were then randomly assigned to abstract ruminative thinking, concrete thinking or distraction. Abstract thinking was found to lead to a significantly longer maintenance of negative mood and arousal than both concrete thinking and distraction. These results are in line with earlier findings in the context of excessive worry and depressive rumination and support the view that abstractness is a critical factor for the dysfunctional effects of trauma-related rumination. However, results regarding intrusive memories were not supportive of the hypotheses. Unexpectedly, the distraction group showed the highest number of intrusions, whereas the abstract and concrete conditions did not significantly differ. Implications for theoretical models of trauma-related rumination and possible clinical implications are discussed.     

Evolution and learning: An epistemological perspective

The deep formal and conceptual link existing between artificial life and artificial intelligence can be highlighted using conceptual tools derived by Karl Popper's evolutionary epistemology. Starting from the observation that the structure itself of an organism embodies knowledge about the environment which it is adapted to, it is possible to regard evolution as a learning process. This process is subject to the same rules indicated by Popper for the growth of scientific knowledge: causal conjectures (mutations) and successive refutations (extinction). In the field of machine learning such a paradigm is represented by genetic algorithms that, simulating biological processes, emulate cognitive processes. From a practical viewpoint, that perspective allows to identify the two different kinds of learning considered by artificial intelligence, knowledge acquisition and skill improvement, and to get a different view of the problem of heuristic knowledge in learning systems. From a theoretical point of view, these considerations can shade a new light on an old epistemological problem: why do we live in a learnable world?     

The brain may know more than cognitive theory can tell us: a reply to Ted Parks.

In reply to Parks' interpretation of Rock's cognitive theory of illusory figures, we maintain our point of view that such a theory has limited heuristic and explanatory power because it fails to predict subjects' responses in psychophysical tasks. As a result, the theoretical framework defended by Parks is not appropriate for suggesting candidate mechanisms of brain-behaviour function that could underly the phenomenal emergence of such figures.