Kierkegaard's Mirrors: The Immediacy of Moral Vision

This paper explores Kierkegaard's recurrent use of mirrors as a metaphor for various aspects of moral imagination and vision. While a writer centrally concerned with issues of self‐examination, selfhood and passionate subjectivity might well be expected to be attracted to such metaphors, there are deeper reasons why Kierkegaard is drawn to this analogy. The specifically visual aspects of the mirror metaphor reveal certain crucial features of Kierkegaard's model of moral cognition. In particular, the felicity of the metaphors of the “mirror of possibility” in Sickness Unto Death and the “mirror of the Word” in For Self‐Examination depend upon a normative phenomenology of moral vision, one in which the success of moral agency depends upon an immediate, non‐reflective self‐referentiality built into vision itself. To “see oneself in the mirror” rather than simply seeing the mirror itself is to see the moral content of the world as immediately “about” oneself in a sense that goes beyond the conceptual content of what is perceived. These metaphors gesture towards a model of perfected moral agency where vision becomes co‐extensive with volition. I conclude by suggesting directions in which explication of this model may contribute to discussions in contemporary moral psychology.     

Metastable attunement and real-life skilled behavior

In everyday situations, and particularly in some sport and working contexts, humans face an inherently unpredictable and uncertain environment. All sorts of unpredictable and unexpected things happen but typically people are able to skillfully adapt. In this paper, we address two key questions in cognitive science. First, how is an agent able to bring its previously learned skill to bear on a novel situation? Second, how can an agent be both sensitive to the particularity of a given situation, while remaining flexibly poised for many other possibilities for action? We will argue that both the sensitivity to novel situations and the sensitivity to a multiplicity of action possibilities are enabled by the property of skilled agency that we will call metastable attunement. We characterize a skilled agent’s flexible interactions with a dynamically changing environment in terms of metastable dynamics in agent-environment systems. What we find in metastability is the realization of two competing tendencies: the tendency of the agent to express their intrinsic dynamics and the tendency to search for new possibilities. Metastably attuned agents are ready to engage with a multiplicity of affordances, allowing for a balance between stability and flexibility. On the one hand, agents are able to exploit affordances they are attuned to, while at the same time being ready to flexibly explore for other affordances. Metastable attunement allows agents to smoothly transition between these possible configurations so as to adapt their behaviour to what the particular situation requires. We go on to describe the role metastability plays in learning of new skills, and in skilful behaviour more generally. Finally, drawing upon work in art, architecture and sports science, we develop a number of perspectives on how to investigate metastable attunement in real life situations.

     

Intersubjectivity and interaction in the analytic relationship: a mainstream view

The authors conceptualize intersubjectivity as a meta-theory that reflects the inherent nature of human relatedness and is conceptually independent of any particular theory of mind or school of psychoanalysis. Their view of intersubjectivity joins the emotional life of the analyst to that of the patient and places the analytic relationship at the center of the analytic process. They contrast intersubjectivity with traditional classical conflict theory so as to clarify the relevance of intersubjectivity for psychoanalytic clinical theory and therapeutic practice. In so doing, they hope to direct analysts more firmly toward the study of the unconscious dyadic contributions to the affective, inactive, and interactive dimensions of the analytic situation and their impact upon the patient's actions within and experience of the analytic relationship. To illustrate their thesis, two hours from an analysis are presented in detail.     

An Expanded View of Intersubjectivity in Infancy and its Application to Psychoanalysis

We consider the relevance of forms of intersubjectivity in infancy to the nonverbal and implicit dimension of intersubjectivity in psychoanalysis. The term forms of intersubjectivity, within the adult explicit and implicit modes and the infant presymbolic implicit mode, is offered to clarify the multiple meanings of intersubjectivity. The ideas of infant intersubjectivity of Meltzoff, Trevarthen, and Stern that have particular relevance for psychoanalysis are highlighted: the dialogic origin of mind, the role of correspondences, and the idea that symbolic forms of intersubjectivity are built on presymbolic forms. We build on their work to define a fourth position: that the full range of patterns of interactive regulation provides the broadest definition of the presymbolic origins of intersubjectivity, with correspondence being only one of many critical patterns. We additionally address the place of interactive regulation, problems with the concept of matching, the role of self-regulation, the role of difference, and the “balance model” of self- and interactive regulation. We take the position that all forms of interactive regulation are relevant to the possibility of perceiving and aligning oneself with the moment-by-moment process of the other. A broadened understanding of intersubjectivity in infancy sets the stage for a more fruitful exchange between infant researchers and psychoanalysts.     

I Feel Your Pain: Embodied Knowledges and Situated Neurons

The widely touted discovery of mirror neurons has generated intense scientific interest in the neurobiology of intersubjectivity. Social neuroscientists have claimed that mirror neurons, located in brain regions associated with motor action, facial recognition, and somatosensory processing, allow us to automatically grasp other people's intentions and emotions. Despite controversies, mirror neuron research is animating materialist, affective, and embodied accounts of intersubjectivity. My view is that mirror neurons raise issues that are directly relevant to feminism and cultural studies, but interventions are needed for the work to be compatible with nonreductionist critical thought. In this article I critique the dominant neuroscientific account of mirror neurons, called embodied simulation theory. I draw from feminist epistemologies as well as alternative interpretations of mirror neurons in cognitive science and philosophy of mind to consider mirroring as situated, embodied perception.     

Avoiding Circularities on the Empathic Path to Transcendental Intersubjectivity

The foundational status that Edmund Husserl envisages for phenomenology in relation to the sciences would seem to suggest that the successful unfolding of contemporary debates in the field of social cognition will be conditioned by progress in resolving certain central controversies in the phenomenology of intersubjectivity, notably in long-standing questions pertaining to the priority of subjectivity in relation to intersubjectivity, and the priority of empathy in relation to other forms of intersubjectivity. That such controversies are long-standing is in no small part attributable to the fact that the debate surrounding Husserl’s seminal attempts to elucidate these problems has placed his account, and certainly his published position, under a certain amount of pressure, pressure which stems from the suspicion that intentionality toward others may be more deeply embedded in subjectivity than the Husserl of Cartesian Meditations seems prepared to admit. Is the primordinally reduced solipsistic subject of the Fifth Meditation really capable of discovering intersubjectivity in the way that Husserl describes, or is such putative discovery (indeed, subjective transformation) already conditioned by a more primitive form of intersubjectivity? This paper investigates two ways in which this kind of “circularity” objection might arise. Firstly, it might be argued that Husserl presupposes an external perspective on one’s own body, a perspective which rationally would have to be correlated with an indeterminate foreign subjectivity. Secondly, the view has been advanced (Zahavi in Husserl and transcendental intersubjectivity: a response to the linguistic-pragmatic critique. Ohio University Press, Athens, OH, 2001b) that horizonal perceptual awareness of another spatio-temporal entity turns out to be essentially intersubjective, on the grounds that awareness of some of an object’s averted aspects commits one to positing the possibility in principle of those averted aspects being available to an indeterminate foreign subjectivity. Objections such as these seem to place the phenomenological enquiry into the encounter with another person at something of a crossroads. On the one hand, they have led some to argue that basic empathy, as Husserl conceives it, must indeed be conditioned by the anonymous constituting influence of a more primitive form of intersubjectivity. On the other hand, the option remains open to seek to defend Husserl’s published position against the charges of circularity. This paper pursues the latter alternative, and argues that, with appropriate clarification, the objections from circularity can be convincingly answered. It will be argued that the key to understanding why the standard Husserlian position can be sustained lies in recognising the centrality of the activity of the imagination as a condition for the possibility of intersubjectivity.     

Archetypes as action patterns1

Abstract: The discovery of mirror neurons by researchers at the University of Parma promises to radically alter our understanding of fundamental cognitive and affective states. This paper explores the relationship of mirror neurons to Jung's theory of archetypes and proposes that archetypes may be viewed as elementary action patterns. The paper begins with a review of a proposed interpretation of the fainting spells of S. Freud in his relationship with Jung as an example of an action pattern that also defines an archetypal image. The challenge that mirror neurons present to traditional views in analytical psychology and psychoanalysis, however, is that they operate without recourse to a cognitive processing element. This is a position that is gaining increasing acceptance in other fields as well. The paper therefore reviews the most recent claims made by the Boston Process of Change Study Group as well as conclusions drawn from dynamic systems views of development and theoretical robotics to underline the conclusion that unconscious agency is not a requirement for coherent action. It concludes with the suggestion that this entire body of research may lead to the conclusion that the dynamic unconscious is an unnecessary hypothesis in psychoanalysis and analytical psychology.     

Can transcendental intersubjectivity be naturalised?

I discuss Husserl’s account of intersubjectivity in the fifth Cartesian Meditation. I focus on the problem of perceived similarity. I argue that recent work in developmental psychology and neuroscience, concerning intermodal representation and the mirror neuron system, fails to constitute a naturalistic solution to the problem. This can be seen via a comparison between the Husserlian project on the one hand and Molyneux’s Question on the other.     

Counterfactual thinking about actions and failures to act

When people think counterfactually about how a situation could have turned out differently, they mentally undo events in regular ways (e.g., they focus on actions not failures to act). Four experiments examine the recent discovery that the focus on actions in the short term switches to inactions in the long term. The experiments show that this temporal switch occurs only for particular sorts of situations. Experiment 1 showed no temporal pattern to the agency effect when 112 participants judged emotional impact and frequency of "if-only" thoughts from both short- and long-term perspectives for an investment scenario. Experiment 2 showed no temporal pattern when 190 participants considered a college choice scenario with a good outcome. Experiment 3 showed no temporal pattern when 131 participants considered an investment scenario even when the situation for the actor and nonactor was bad from the outset. Experiment 4, with 113 participants, showed a focus on actions even when the investment loss was equal for both the actor and nonactor. The implications of the results are discussed in terms of what is explicitly available in the mental representation of actions and inactions.     

自我表征的可塑性:基于橡胶手错觉的研究

自我识别是人类自我觉知的行为标记。传统方法认为稳定的自我表征是自我识别的基础。随着对橡胶手错觉及一系列自我表征和自我识别错觉的揭示,这一能让人将外部客体感知为自身一部分的错觉研究使得我们能够以多感官整合的方式来研究自我表征和自我识别。拥有感和自主感被认为是我们进行自我识别的两类基本体验,本文对一系列橡胶手错觉范式研究的系统回顾表明,拥有感和自主感会发生改变,这说明人的自我表征是可变的和可塑的。     

Encoding the goal of an object-directed but uncompleted reaching action in 6- and 9-month-old infants

Infants start to interpret completed human actions as goal-directed in the second half of the first year of life. In a series of three studies, the understanding of a goal-directed but uncompleted action was investigated in 6- and 9-month-old infants using a preferential looking paradigm. Infants saw the video of an actor's reaching movement towards one of two objects. This reaching movement was only presented until the hand passed the midpoint between the starting position and the position of the target object. Subsequently, two final states of the reaching movement were presented simultaneously. In the plausible final state, the hand grasped the object to which the reaching movement was geared; in the implausible final state, the hand grasped the other object. In Studies 1 and 3, infants watched the actor from an allocentric perspective, and in Studies 2 and 3 from an egocentric perspective. Results indicate a discrimination of the two final states if the scene was presented from an allocentric perspective: both 6- and 9-month-olds looked longer at the implausible final state. This was not the case if infants saw the action from an egocentric perspective. The presented findings show that using this paradigm, 6-month-olds are already able to infer the goal of an uncompleted action without seeing the achievement of the goal itself. However, they encoded the goal of the reaching action only when it was presented from an allocentric perspective but not from an egocentric perspective.     

The interplay between early social interaction,language and executive function development in deaf and hearing infants

In this article, we review the influence of early social interaction on the development of executive function and language in infants. We first define social interaction, executive function and language and show how they are related in infant development. Studies of children born deaf are used to illustrate this connection because they represent cases where there has been a disruption to early social interaction and the development of intersubjectivity. Unlike other groups, the disturbance to development is known to be largely environmental rather than neuro-biological. This enables us to more accurately tease apart those impacts on EF that are associated with social interaction and language, since the potential confounds of disordered cognitive development are largely controlled for. The review offers a unifying model for how social, cognitive and linguistic development work together in early human development.     

The rubber hand illusion in a mirror

In the rubber hand illusion (RHI) one’s hand is hidden, and a fake hand is visible. We explored the situation in which visual information was available indirectly in a mirror. In the mirror condition, compared to the standard condition (fake hand visible directly), we found no reduction of the RHI following synchronised stimulation, as measured by crossmanual pointing and by a questionnaire. We replicated the finding with a smaller mirror that prevented visibility of the face. The RHI was eliminated when a wooden block replaced the fake hand, or when the hand belonged to another person or mannequin. We conclude that awareness of the reflection is the critical variable, despite the distant visual localisation of the hand in a mirror and the third-person perspective. Stimuli seen in a mirror activate the same response as stimuli seen in peripersonal space, through knowledge that they are near one’s body.     

The Venus effect: people's understanding of mirror reflections in paintings

We propose the term 'Venus effect' for a common phenomenon in picture perception. It occurs when a picture shows an actor and a mirror that are not placed along the observer's line of sight, for instance a Venus admiring herself in a small mirror, and when the actor's reflection in the mirror is visible to the observer. In this situation, observers tend to report, incorrectly, that Venus is also seeing herself in the mirror in the same location as the observer. We discuss this using famous paintings as examples.     

自闭症儿童是心灵盲吗?——Gallagher的互动理论述评

在自闭症研究领域占主导地位的心灵盲理论是建立在心灵主义假设和普遍性假设基础上的。这两个假设将他人的心理视为封闭的、隐藏在行为后面的,且我们主要使用读心的方式理解他人。互动理论拒绝这两个基本假设,并整合来自发展心理学和现象学的研究证据将人类社会互动的形式划分为三个层次:原初交互主体性、次级交互主体性与叙事能力。在个体发生学层面上三者前后相继,在成熟个体的社会互动层面上,三者互为补益,但基于感觉-运动的直觉式社会互动是理解他人心理的主要方式。自闭症儿童在原初与次级交互主体性上存在障碍。目前,互动理论既面临诸多挑战,也具有较大的发展与完善空间。     

PSYKOANALYTISKT ORIENTERAD PSYKOTERAPI

The increasing discourse of the concept of intersubjectivity in modern psychoanalysis has pushed the interest in the intrapsychic and its emphasis on drive and object into the background. Authors who wish to avoid a one-sided focus on intersubjectivity usually subscribe to a dual dimensional approach, taking both perspectives into account. In this article, the analytic situation is described not in two, but in three dimensions, the analytic function constituting a third dimension necessary for the interplay between the other two dimensions. Focusing on the analyst's position, the author presents a model that consists of (1) the-analyst-as-subject, (2) the-analyst-as-function, and (3) the-analyst-as-object. The analytic function is understood to be invested with a particular form of desire and it is argued that the asymmetry between this desire of the analyst and the desire of the analysand is a central characteristic of the analytic situation.     

It's not all about me: motivating hand hygiene among health care professionals by focusing on patients

Diseases often spread in hospitals because health care professionals fail to wash their hands. Research suggests that to increase health and safety behaviors, it is important to highlight the personal consequences for the actor. However, because people (and health care professionals in particular) tend to be overconfident about personal immunity, the most effective messages about hand hygiene may be those that highlight its consequences for other people. In two field experiments in a hospital, we compared the effectiveness of signs about hand hygiene that emphasized personal safety ("Hand hygiene prevents you from catching diseases") or patient safety ("Hand hygiene prevents patients from catching diseases"). We assessed hand hygiene by measuring the amount of soap and hand-sanitizing gel used from dispensers (Experiment 1) and conducting covert, independent observations of health care professionals' hand-hygiene behaviors (Experiment 2). Results showed that changing a single word in messages motivated meaningful changes in behavior: The hand hygiene of health care professionals increased significantly when they were reminded of the implications for patients but not when they were reminded of the implications for themselves.     

15-month-old infants detect violations in pretend scenarios

Are 15-month-old infants able to detect a violation in the consistency of an event sequence that involves pretense? In Experiment 1, infants detected a violation when an actor pretended to pour liquid into one cup and then pretended to drink from another cup. In Experiment 2, infants no longer detected a violation when the cups were replaced with objects not typically used in the context of drinking actions, either shoes or tubes. Experiment 3 showed that infants' difficulty in Experiment 2 was not due to the use of atypical objects per se, but arose from the novelty of seeing an actor appearing to drink from these objects. After receiving a single familiarization trial in which they observed the actor pretend to drink from either a shoe or a tube, infants now detected a violation when the actor pretended to pour into and to drink from different shoes or tubes. Thus, at an age (or just before the age) when infants are beginning to engage in pretend play, they are able to show comprehension of at least one aspect of pretense in a violation-of-expectation task: specifically, they are able to detect violations in the consistency of pretend action sequences.     

Locus of causality and the use of information in the development of causal attributions1

Two studies were conducted to examine whether attributions made about events may be influenced by individual assumptions regarding causation that are age related. In Study 1, 96 subjects at three age levels (four and five years, eight and nine years, and college students) observed a target actor on videotape select an item from an unseen array, and four other actors either agree (high consensus) or disagree (low consensus) with the choice. Subjects were asked to decide why the actor liked the chosen object best—because of something about the actor (person attribution) or because of something about the item (entity attribution). The results showed that perceived locus of causality shifted from entity to person attributions with age. In addition, subjects at all ages were able to utilize the consensus information when they had no opportunity to form their own impressions about the items in the array. In Study 2, 126 subjects at four age levels (five and six years, seven and eight years, nine and ten years, and high school students) chose an item from among an array for themselves and responded to a person (self)/entity attribution question regarding the locus of their own choice. The entity to person shift with age was again found and was supported by additional measures. The results are discussed in terms of children's causal reasoning capacities and social environmental factors affecting developmental change in social judgments.