Structuring Ends

There is disagreement among contemporary theorists regarding human well-being. On one hand there are “substantive good” views, according to which the most important elements of a person’s well-being result from her nature as a human, rational, and/or sentient being. On the other hand there are “agent-constituted” views, which contend that a person’s well-being is constituted by her particular aims, desires, and/or preferences. Each approach captures important features of human well-being, but neither can provide a complete account: agent-constituted theories have difficulty accounting for the normativity of their claims, and substantive good theories have difficulty accounting for how a person’s actually adopted aims shape what is good for her and hence what she has reason to do. I articulate and defend a hybrid view that equals these approaches in systematicity and completeness of explanation yet seeks to surpass them in coherence with our ordinary judgments about what human well-being consists in. This hybrid view maintains, with agent-constituted theories, that a person’s well-being is (1) significantly constituted by her actually adopted aims; (2) deeply contingent; (3) agent-relative; (4) significantly dependent on spatially and temporally remote events; and (5) significantly independent of her experiences. The hybrid view also maintains, with substantive good theories, that a person’s well-being is (6) in part determined by facts independent of her aims, desires, and preferences; (7) such that all her aims are subject to critical evaluation and revision; and (8) constituted by her aims only if these aims are choiceworthy.     

Speaking of persons,human and divine

Christians commonly speak of and to God as ‘a person’. The propriety of such talk depends on how the concept of a person is being used and understood, and that concept is much contested in contemporary analytic philosophy. In this article, I note the presuppositions of one current debate about what it is to be a human person, and then propose an alternative approach to persons—both human and divine—that draws upon the Thomistic philosophical and theological tradition. In this tradition, ‘person’ is neither an essence-determining kind term, nor a merely nominal or functional kind term, but is applicable analogously to entities of various ‘kinds’ (e.g. humans, angels and God). The origins of this account in Aquinas’ theology of the Trinity will be examined, and I will conclude by noting a recent development of Thomas’ thought in relation to what it is to be a human person.     

A Big Five model of disposition and situation interaction: why a “helpful” person may not always behave helpfully

A “bottom-up” Big Five disposition-situation interaction model is introduced that highlights the interactive relation between an individual's behavioral trait tendencies and the different facets of a situation to which he or she may respond. In the proposed model, personality traits are considered markers for how an individual might interpret and respond to different facets of a situation. Given a complex situation with multiple response options, a person will respond to the part of the situation most salient to him or her at that time. The presented model illustrates how interactions between the trait dimensions of the Big Five model with the different facets of a situational context, as well as the intra-individual interactions between the different trait dimensions themselves, determine which facet of a situation will be salient. The model is expected to improve prediction of specific behaviors in specific situations using personality traits. Results from an illustrative study are presented.     

Is A Purely First Person Account Of Human Action Defensible?

There are two perspectives available from which to understand an agent's intention in acting. The first is the perspective of the acting agent: what did she take to be her end, and the means necessary to achieve that end? The other is a third person perspective that is attentive to causal or conceptual relations: was some causal outcome of the agent's action sufficiently close, or so conceptually related, to what the agent did that it should be considered part of her intention? Recent goods based views in ethics are divided as to whether only the first person perspective, or a mix of both perspectives, are necessary to understand intention and action. But resolution of the issue is necessary if goods based views are to be able to deploy to principle of double effect; for that principle requires an account of how to distinguish what is genuinely a matter of intention in human action from what is not. I argue that the pure first person account is better than the mixed account.     

Does Taves reconsider experience enough? A critical commentary on religious experience reconsidered

Three problems beset Ann Taves' thought-provoking book. The first is her failure to recognize that her focus on “experiences deemed religious” makes just as many metaphysical claims as does the focus on “religious experiences” that she seeks to replace. Second, her building-block definition of religion drops her into the middle of controversies over the nature of religion, rather than rescuing her from them. Third, her approach embodies a peculiarly North American cultural ambiguity about religion: on the one hand, it contains an abstract democratic affirmation of the importance of studying people's beliefs and practices on their own terms; on the other hand, it pairs to this a concrete sense of horror at what those beliefs and practices actually are.     

Dissociating linguistic and non-linguistic gesture processing: electrophysiological evidence from American Sign Language

A fundamental advance in our understanding of human language would come from a detailed account of how non-linguistic and linguistic manual actions are differentiated in real time by language users. To explore this issue, we targeted the N400, an ERP component known to be sensitive to semantic context. Deaf signers saw 120 American Sign Language sentences, each consisting of a “frame” (a sentence without the last word; e.g. BOY SLEEP IN HIS) followed by a “last item” belonging to one of four categories: a high-close-probability sign (a “semantically reasonable” completion to the sentence; e.g. BED), a low-close-probability sign (a real sign that is nonetheless a “semantically odd” completion to the sentence; e.g. LEMON), a pseudo-sign (phonologically legal but non-lexical form), or a non-linguistic grooming gesture (e.g. the performer scratching her face). We found significant N400-like responses in the incongruent and pseudo-sign contexts, while the gestures elicited a large positivity.     

Personhood: What's in a name?

Although there are persistent metaphysical challenges to the notion of “natural kinds” of entities that are what they are essentially, all developed and useful taxonomies are based on just such notions. “Persons,” if they are to be distinguished from other kinds of things, must possess unique properties or the potential for acquiring such properties. Reductive strategies, far from locating these properties, ignore them and thus render the concept of “person” either ambiguous or unintelligible. The properties that count, it is argued here, are those associated with moral and civic forms of life.     

The Late Life Reconstruction of Selfhood Analyzed in Peter Hall's Film She's Been Away

The film She's Been Away tells the story of an old woman who had been locked in a mental asylum while a teenager, for willfully violating repressive sexual codes. Sixty years later her ward is closed and she moves in with her nephew and his wife. Faced with what appears to be a hopeless situation, she manages to forge a sense of a meaningful closure to a misspent life. Through narrative, story structure, and characterization the film throws into focus coping mechanisms and ego strategies deployed by a triple disadvantaged person (woman, old, and mad) in her ascent to a reconstructed selfhood. As the protagonist ties both ends of her life, and faces the abyss in between she makes genuine adaptive use of so-called regressive, late-life development assets (available to a lesser degree to elderly people in normal life circumstances), primarily the abolition of linear time. Through this abolition she makes reminiscing an actual reality while still maintaining a functional separation between the real and the remembered. Her portrayal is a valuable document for gerontologists as it explores, through artistic imagination and intuition, the workings of an aging mind in search for a meaningful sense of closure.     

The protean career: A quarter-century journey

This is a review of the development of the author’s ideas on the protean career. The origins include both personal experience and scholarly inquiry. I first applied the adjective “protean” to careers in 1976, in Careers in organizations. It described a career orientation in which the person, not the organization, is in charge, where the person’s core values are driving career decisions, and where the main success criteria are subjective (psychological success). This paper traces the link between the protean concept and the context of growing organizational restructuring, decentralization, and globalization. Current research related to the protean concept is discussed, and quandaries to guide future research are presented. The paper concludes with a suggestion for examining situations where people are pursuing their “path with a heart” with the intensity of a calling, along with some questions to help researchers self-assess their own career direction, with an assist from Yogi Berra.     

PERSONS AND RELICS

We describe a number of puzzling phenomena and use them as evidence for a hypothesis about why bodily continuity matters for personal identity. The phenomena all belong to a particular kind of symbolisation: each of them illustrates how an entity (object or person) sometimes acquires symbolic significance in virtue of a material link with the symbolised entity. Relics are the most obvious example of what happens here: they are cherished, desired or respected, not because of their intrinsic features, but because of their material link with some significant individual person. Crucial for the hypothesis we wish to defend, is the fact that a human being can in some cases and for some others function as a relic of what she used to be; in these cases a human individual has a specific significance in virtue of a material link (bodily continuity) with her own past. We argue that this phenomenon can be extended and that the importance of bodily continuity for personal identity is constituted by the kind of symbolisation upon which the existence of relics is based. 1     

The benefits of knowing what you know (and what you don’t): How calibration affects credibility

People tend to believe, and take advice from, informants who are highly confident. However, people use more than a mere “confidence heuristic.” We believe that confidence is influential because—in the absence of other information—people assume it is a valid cue to an informant’s likelihood of being correct. However, when people get evidence about an informant’s calibration (i.e., her confidence-accuracy relationship) they override reliance on confidence or accuracy alone. Two experiments in which participants choose between two opposing witnesses to a car accident show that neither confidence nor accuracy alone explains judgments of credibility; rather, whether a person is seen as credible ultimately depends on whether the person demonstrates good calibration. Credibility depends on whether sources were justified in believing what they believed.     

Conversations on contexts and meanings: On understanding therapeutic change from a contextual viewpoint

Recent developments within family therapy theory, often referred to as the Post-Milan Movement, have once again stressed the therapeutic encounter'squality of conversation. When therapy is looked upon as conversation, attention is not only paid to the fact that most of what happens in a session is talking. Rather, a more fundamental stance towardshuman life as basically meaning- making is taken. This is one of the essential premises of the contextualist approach to the social sciences.When applied to human problems this approach claims that symptoms evolve when (1) a person gives meaning to and performs a social act within a context inappropriate to the socially shared meaning of that act, and (2) the behavior of the person is accepted as a symptom by him/herself and the observing community. The therapeutic conversation establishes an exclusive context within which the domains of discourse of the client's life can be accounted for and renegotiated. With the acceptance of these accounts, changes evolve in the context-act relationships (i.e. meanings) construed by the client. This appears to be the basis for the self-healing aspects of psychotherapy.     

When what you say about others says something about you: Language abstraction and inferences about describers’ attitudes and goals

According to the linguistic category model ( [Semin and Fiedler, 1988] and [Semin and Fiedler, 1991]), a person’s behavior can be described at varying levels of abstraction from concrete (e.g., “Lisa slaps Ann”) to abstract (e.g., “Lisa is aggressive”). Research has shown that language abstraction conveys information about the person whose behavior is described (Wigboldus, Semin, & Spears, 2000). However to date, little research has examined the information that language abstraction may convey about describers themselves. In this paper, we report three experiments demonstrating that describers who use relatively abstract language to describe others’ behaviors are perceived to have biased attitudes and motives compared with those describers who use more concrete language.     

Returning a favor and retaliating harm: The effects of stated intentions and actual behavior

Two studies were carried out to determine the joint effects of an-other's stated intentions toward helping a person, and the amount of help the other actually gives a person, on the reciprocation of help. In Study I (n = 120) another person stated she intended to either help, not help, or did not state her intent; this person actually helped the subject a great deal or very little. The data showed subjects reciprocated solely on amount of actual help received (p < .001); however, questionnaire data revealed that when the past helper stated her intentions, regardless of whether the intent was to help or not to help, subjects showed less involvement with the situation. It was hypothesized that knowledge of the past helper's intent threatened the subject's freedom of choice with regard to reciprocation, which led subjects to ignore the intent in order to restore their freedom. Study II (n = 60) was a replication of Study I with the exception that the helper's intent, while stated, was discovered by subjects in such a way that they believed the helper unaware of the subject's knowledge. Both the other person's intent (p < .10) and her actual helping behavior (p < .001) were related to reciprocation. The results were interpreted in terms of Brehm's reactance theory, although other potential explanations were also explored.     

公正世界信念对记忆偏差的影响

公正世界信念指人们需要相信他们所处的世界是一个公正有序的世界。本研究考察的是公正世界信念是否影响人们的记忆,让人产生记忆偏差。实验一中,被试首先阅读一则彩票中奖的新闻,然后阅读关于中奖者人品的描述,最后被试需要回忆中奖金额。结果发现,中奖者的个性品质影响对奖金数额的记忆。实验二中,两组被试分别阅读一则维护公正世界信念或威胁公正世界信念的无关故事,接下来程序与实验一相同。结果发现,预先激活的公正世界信念状态与中奖者个性品质在记忆结果上存在显著的交互效应。结果表明,公正世界信念能够导致记忆偏差。     

The Talking Platypus Phenomenon: Competency Ratings as a Function of Sex and Professional Status

Ratings of vocational competence, marriageability, and interpersonal success were made by male and female subjects of a stimulus person described in a one-page, single-spaced biography. The sex and status of the stimulus person in the biography were manipulated such that for each biography half the subjects were led to believe it was about a male, half were led to believe it was about a female, half were led to believe that the individual was an attorney, and half were led to believe that the individual was a paralegal worker. The results indicated that both men and women perceived the female attorney as being the most vocationally competent. It was proposed that the increased ratings of vocational competency for the female attorney were a function of her performance being perceived as having occurred within a context replete with the types of constraints that usually obviate the degree of success she achieved. It was also suggested that the finding concerning vocational competence exemplifies the talking platypus phenomenon; that is, when an individual achieves a level of success not anticipated, his/her achievement tends to be magnified rather than diminished. After all, it matters little what the platypus says, the wonder is that it can say anything at all.     

Self-Constitution in the Ethics of Plato and Kant

Plato and Kant advance a constitutional model of the soul, in which reason and appetite or passion have different structural and functional roles in the generation of motivation, as opposed to the familiar Combat Model in which they are portrayed as independent sources of motivation struggling for control. In terms of the constitutional model we may explain what makes an action different from an event. What makes an action attributable to a person, and therefore what makes it an action, is that it issues from the person's constitution, and therefore from the person as a whole, rather than from some force working on or in the person. This in turn implies an account of what makes an action good: what makes an action good is that it is deliberated upon and chosen in a way that unifies the person into a constitutional system. Through deliberative action we constitute ourselves as unified agents. Platonic justice and Kant's categorical imperative are shown to be normative standards for action because they are principles of self-constitution.     

The perfectionism of Nussbaum's adaptive preferences

Although the problem of adaptiveness plays an important motivating role in her work on human capabilities, Martha Nussbaum never gives a clear account of the controversial concept of adaptive preferences on which she relies. In this paper, I aim both to reconstruct the most plausible account of the concept that may be attributed to Nussbaum and to provide a critical appraisal of that account. Although her broader work on the capabilities approach moves progressively towards political liberalism as time passes, I aim to show that her account of adaptive preferences continues to maintain her earlier commitment to perfectionism about the good. I then distinguish between two obligatory kinds of respect for persons, which I call, respectively, primary and secondary recognition respect. This distinction allows us to see that her perfectionist account of adaptive preferences allows her to show persons primary but not secondary recognition respect. Ultimately, I claim that an acceptable account of adaptive preferences must succeed in showing persons both types of respect. I conclude with some preliminary remarks on what such an account might look like.     

When global structure "Explains Away" local grammar: a Bayesian account of rule-induction in tone sequences

While many constraints on learning must be relatively experience-independent, past experience provides a rich source of guidance for subsequent learning. Discovering structure in some domain can inform a learner’s future hypotheses about that domain. If a general property accounts for particular sub-patterns, a rational learner should not stipulate separate explanations for each detail without additional evidence, as the general structure has “explained away” the original evidence. In a grammar-learning experiment using tone sequences, manipulating learners’ prior exposure to a tone environment affects their sensitivity to the grammar-defining feature, in this case consecutive repeated tones. Grammar-learning performance is worse if context melodies are “smooth” — when small intervals occur more than large ones — as Smoothness is a general property accounting for a high rate of repetition. We present an idealized Bayesian model as a “best case” benchmark for learning repetition grammars. When context melodies are Smooth, the model places greater weight on the small-interval constraint, and does not learn the repetition rule as well as when context melodies are not Smooth, paralleling the human learners. These findings support an account of abstract grammar-induction in which learners rationally assess the statistical evidence for underlying structure based on a generative model of the environment.