Emergent persons

Recent psychological theorizing about the emergence of persons makes a number of ontological claims that are not always explicit. A critical consideration of such claims reveals both considerable convergence and some points of disagreement across different psychological theories of emergent personhood. What is clear is that all such theories resist the reduction of persons to biophysical or sociocultural properties, conditions, and processes. In various ways, they each call for a nonreductionistic recognition of the sociocultural constitution of important aspects of personhood, without denying the necessity of biophysical requirements of personhood. Because standard emergentist positions in physical science and the philosophy of physical science mostly ignore the sociocultural level of reality, psychological theorizing about the emergence of persons requires an alternative ontological framework. It is proposed that an ontology of levels of reality that includes the physical, chemical, biological, sociocultural, and personal/psychological is appropriate for understanding how persons are both substantively and relationally emergent within the biophysical, sociocultural world. With such an ontological framework in place, it is possible to understand human activity in the world as the primary vehicle for both the phylogenetic evolution and ontogenetic development of persons.     

Studying persons in context: Taking social psychological reality seriously

Herein, I describe and illustrate the materiality and objectivity of sociocultural and psychological reality. I contend that many well-known problems in ensuring that psychological inquiry is obviously and properly connected to its primary subject matter, “persons in context,” may be understood as related to the apparent inability of many psychologists and schools of psychology to take historically-established sociocultural and psychological reality seriously. The example I use is a brief, joint biographical study of the sociocultural and psychological contexts within which Carl Rogers and B. F. Skinner were positioned and came to position themselves with respect to issues of freedom and control. This study provides a particular and concrete example of the sociocultural and psychological constitution of personhood, selfhood, and human agency as emergent and lived in particular lives. Throughout the article, the material, objective bases for social-cultural and psychological personhood are emphasized.     

Between the modern and the postmodern. The possibility of self and progressive understanding in psychology

Psychology assumes defensible notions of human subjectivity and understanding. Yet, some versions of postmodernism, including some of those currently influential within psychology, eschew the possibility of the kind of understanding-capable personhood on which modern psychology has depended. The authors argue for a skeptical, middle-ground position that might allow psychologists to resist a forced choice between modernism and postmodernism in their subject matter and understanding. The authors set up their argument with 2 stories of human development and change. These stories assume no fixed, essentialist foundations of the sort favored in classically modern psychologies, yet they maintain the possibility of both self and understanding within a real but contingent physical, biological, and sociocultural world. The authors then articulate a middle-ground position as one that avoids the fixed foundationalism, essentialism, and absolute certitude of modernity, without endorsing the radical arbitrariness, antisubjectivism, and anarchistic relativism of some versions of postmodernity.     

The explanatory significance of wholes: How exclusive reliance on antecedent-consequent models of explanation undermines the study of persons

Psychology has long labored under a mechanistic view of persons as reducible to parts (i.e., traits) that dictate human functioning. Efforts to study persons holistically—as embodied wholes embedded in the world—have resuscitated the study of personhood and its development, overhauling linear cause-effect models of psychological functioning in favor of emergence-focused, dynamic process alternatives rooted in the concept of persons as necessarily constituted within interactive context. Focused on agency and self-determination, the study of personhood also calls for an appreciation of the explanatory significance of persons as persons, as unified wholes who preserve their own organization in the face of ceaseless exchange with the world. Fully adopting this important vantage point for understanding persons, however, is only possible by expanding notions of scientific explanation beyond the temporal framework of antecedent-consequent, parts-to-whole relations in order to embrace a person's wholeness itself as a legitimate mode of explanation for understanding functioning.     

Persons as Sui Generis Ontological Kinds: Advice to Exceptionists

Many metaphysicians tell us that our world is one in which persisting objects are four‐dimensionally extended in time, and persist by being partially present at each moment at which they exist. Many normative theorists tell us that at least some of our core normative practices are justified only if the relation that holds between a person at one time, and that person at another time, is the relation of strict identity. If these metaphysicians are right about the nature of our world, and these normative theorists are right about what justifies our normative practices, then we should be error theorists about the justification of at least some of our core normative practices and in turn, arguably we should eliminate those practices for which justification is lacking. This paper offers a way of resolving the tension between these two views that does not lead into the grips of error theory. It is a way that is amenable to “exceptionists” about persons: those who think there is something special about persons and the first‐person perspective; that personhood cannot be explained naturalistically, and the first‐person perspective is naturalistically irreducible. The conclusion is thus a conditional: given that one is an exceptionist, an attractive way to resolve this tension is to embrace the view that persons are sui generis ontological kinds.     

Personhood: An activist project of historical becoming through collaborative pursuits of social transformation

The goal of this paper is to contribute to recent scholarship that pursues radical revision of prevalent models of personhood mired in outdated notions of human development and its foundational principles. To achieve this goal, I revisit and expand Vygotsky's project of cultural historical psychology to offer a dialectical framework that encompasses but is not limited to relational ontology. Premised on the notion of collaborative transformative practice as the grounding for human Being and Becoming,¹ my proposal is that at the core of human nature and development lies an ineluctably activist stance vis-à-vis the world; it is the realization of this stance through answerable deeds composing one unified life project that forms the path to personhood. The ethical dimension appears as foundational to Being and Becoming because it is integral to actions through which we become who we are while changing the world in collaborative pursuits of social transformation. From an activist transformative stance persons are agents not only for whom “things matter” but who themselves matter in history, culture, and society and, moreover, who come into Being as unique individuals through and to the extent that they matter in these processes and make a contribution to them.     

The Middle-Class Nature of Identity and its Implications for Education: A Genealogical Analysis and Reevaluation of a Culturally and Historically Bounded Concept

We consider identity as a historically emerging discourse that requires genealogical analysis ― not to discover the roots of our identity but to commit [ourselves] to its dissipation (Foucault 1977, p. 162). We suggest analyzing identity through the history of socio-economic classes, their life struggles, ambitions, development, and reproduction. We see learning not as a project of transformation of identity, but rather as developing access to socially valuable practices and developing one‘s own voice within these practices (through addressing and responding to other voices). The access and voice projects free agents from unnecessary finalization and objectivization by oneself and others (Bakhtin 1999; Bakhtin 1990). In education, we should develop indigenous discourses of learning and develop a conceptual framework that makes analysis of diverse discourses possible. We argue that learning, as transformation of participation in a sociocultural practice to gain more access, is a better conceptual framework than learning as transformation of identity.     

Categorizing coordination from the perception of joint actions

The ability to perceive others’ actions and coordinate our own body movements accordingly is essential for humans to interact with the social world. However, it is still unclear how the visual system achieves the remarkable feat of identifying temporally coordinated joint actions between individuals. Specifically, do humans rely on certain visual features of coordinated movements to facilitate the detection of meaningful interactivity? To address this question, participants viewed short video sequences of two actors performing different joint actions, such as handshakes, high fives, etc. Temporal misalignments were introduced to shift one actor’s movements forward or backward in time relative to the partner actor. Participants rated the degree of interactivity for the temporally shifted joint actions. The impact of temporal offsets on human interactivity ratings varied for different types of joint actions. Based on human rating distributions, we used a probabilistic cluster model to infer latent categories, each revealing shared characteristics of coordinated movements among sets of joint actions. Further analysis on the clustered structure suggested that global motion synchrony, spatial proximity between actors, and highly salient moments of interpersonal coordination are critical features that impact judgments of interactivity.     

Modal Personhood and Moral Status: A Reply to Kagan's Proposal

Kagan argues that human beings who are neither persons nor even potential persons — if their impairment is independent of genetic constitution — are modal persons: individuals who might have been persons. Moreover, he proposes a view according to which both (actual) personhood and modal personhood are sufficient for counting more, morally, than nonhuman animals. In response to this proposal, I raise one relatively minor concern about Kagan's reasoning — that he judges too quickly that insentient beings can have interests — before engaging the appeal to modal personhood. I challenge the thesis that modal personhood is relevant to one's moral status, first, by way of analogy to a kicker who misses a field goal though he might have made it; second, by casting doubt on implications for two impaired infants (only one of whom might have been a person); and, finally, by examining implications for dogs who would count as modal persons when genetic enhancements are capable of transforming them into persons.     

Who is My Neighbor?: The Good Samaritan as a Source for Theological Anthropology

As the title of this essay suggests, the author's aim is to offer a reading of Jesus' parable of the Good Samaritan in the context of contemporary debates over the nature of personhood. The essay argues that our identity as persons is bound up with our relationship with Jesus in whose life is disclosed both the identity of the three divine persons of the Trinity and the form of human personhood they make possible. To know what it means to be a person, one needs to look to Jesus who provides, through the parable of the Good Samaritan, both the model and the source of our own personhood. [Editors]     

Who Gets a Place in Person-Space?

We notice a number of interesting overlaps between the views on personhood of Ifeanyi Menkiti and Marya Schechtman. Both philosophers distance their views from the individualistic ones standard in western thought and foreground the importance of extrinsic or relational features to personhood. For Menkiti, it is ‘the community which defines the person as person’; for Schechtman, being a person is to have a place in person-space, which involves being seen as a person by others. But there are also striking differences. Schechtman sees this aspect as expanding the scope of personhood to infants and those who are severely mentally disabled. Menkiti thinks that there is a line to be drawn at some point between those humans that are persons and those who are not. We consider the cases offered in questioning how the dispute between the two views should be resolved.     

Who is umuntu in Umuntu ngumuntu ngabantu? Interrogating moral issues facing Ndau women in polygyny

Discussions on the African communitarian idea of personhood have generated several debates among African philosophers about how it is conceived and perceived. While scholars like Wiredu and Gyekye maintain that personhood is gender-neutral, others such as Oyowe suggest that personhood is gendered. The position that African communitarian personhood is gendered is the basis for the argument in this article. Defenders of this notion argue that the gender-neutral conception of personhood has created situations where gender issues have been glossed over, thereby perpetuating gender inequality in African communities. It is within this context that we take the argument further by interrogating the word umuntu in the popular southern African maxim on personhood, Umuntu ngumuntu ngabantu. We ask the question: if personhood is gendered, then who is umuntu in this aphorism? In an attempt to answer this question, we advance two important claims. First, we claim that umuntu refers to a person whose interest is upheld in the community as well as those who are able to determine their own interest. Second, we also say that this concept of umuntu has perpetuated cultural practices that adversely impact women and girls in most African rural communities. Although some scholars might object to these claims, in this article we will not be addressing those objections, but rather we argue that umuntu is gendered male in the aphorism.     

Reconsidering Relational Anthropology: A Critical Assessment of John Zizioulas's Theological Anthropology

Abstract:  There has been an increasing emphasis in theological anthropology on the constitution of the person through their relation to God, others, self and the world. In focusing on the relational dimensions of personhood other important facets have not received sufficient attention: the doctrine of sin, the discontinuity between divine and human persons and human embodiment in the world. This article offers a critical assessment of John Zizioulas's anthropology which can be considered a paradigmatic example of a relational anthropology. Although the concerns raised are in relation to Zizioulas's work, many of them are instructive for relational anthropologies more generally.     

The Social Constitution of Perceiver-Environment Reciprocity

Although animal—environment reciprocity is central to ecological psychology, one facet of this viewpoint remains underappreciated: organisms alter environments so as to better function in them. In many species this activity of “niche construction” includes coordinated actions by individuals jointly working toward common ends. Mounting paleontological and archeological evidence indicates that human evolution should be viewed in the light of such social considerations. The environment of our immediate human ancestors was marked by, among other things, group settlements, manufactured stone tools, and extensive migration. An emerging species such as ours, whose distinctive psychological qualities offered a selective advantage relative to these conditions, would flourish particularly if it could preserve the gains of prior generations even as its members continued to transform econiche features in functionally significant ways. This evolutionary perspective, with its due recognition of sociocultural processes, highlights 3 factors of importance for ecological psychology: (1) the history of person-environment reciprocity results in human environments whose natural and sociocultural factors are inextricably intertwined. (2) developing individuals enter human environments not as solitary explorers but through the guidance of more experienced persons with the result that much development takes shape through social mediation; and (3) a distinguishing and ubiquitous feature of human environments that is a product of collective human actions is places. Nearly all human activity, including most psychological research, occurs in places, and owing to their psychological significance, it would seem impossible to disentangle psychological and social processes. These 3 factors illuminate that a fully-realized ecological psychology will be one that includes recognition of the constitutive role played by social processes.     

Communal Behaviors and Psychological Adjustment of Family Caregivers and Persons With Spinal Cord Injury

OBJECTIVE: Examined the influence of mutual communal behaviors on the adjustment reported by persons with spinal cord injury (SCI) and their family caregivers. Previous research has found that persons who have a history of mutually communal behaviors in relationships may react differently to relationship changes after an acquired physical disability than dyads with few communal behaviors. METHOD: Family caregivers and persons with SCI were administered measures of mutual communal behaviors, depression, and life satisfaction. Structural equation modeling was used to test the relations among caregivers' communal behaviors and care recipients' communal behaviors, depression, and life satisfaction. RESULTS: Caregiver and care recipient reports of communal behaviors were not significantly correlated. Significant paths indicated that care recipients' communal behavior scores were positively associated with their life satisfaction, and care recipients' depression was inversely associated with their life satisfaction. Caregivers' communal behavior scores were unrelated to their self-reported adjustment. CONCLUSIONS: Caregiver-care recipient dyads may differ in their perceptions of communal behaviors in their relationships. Although care recipient reports of communal behavior may be related to their life satisfaction, communal behaviors may not serve a similar function among caregivers of persons with SCI.     

Some reflections on potential abuses of psychology’s knowledge and practices

This article identifies ten implicit and explicit assumptions of Western psychology that are rooted within its cultural history, traditions, and values. Unfortunately, these assumptions have informed and dominated the knowledge and practice of psychology across the world because of historic, cultural, political, and economic reasons. It is now clear, however, that the indiscriminate acceptance and application of Western psychological knowledge and practices constitutes a serious abuse for non-Western people and for ethnic/racial minorities in Western nations. This abuse is often transmitted and exacerbated via the training of international and ethnic minority students who learn to accept Western psychology as universal. In a global community in which all our lives have become interdependent, it is essential Western psychology be re-considered as a “cultural construction” with all the ethnocentric limitations this implies. As a counter, efforts must be made to acknowledge, develop, and transmit the diverse indigenous/national psychologies from across the world.     

Resistance to Pragmatic Tendencies in the World of Working in the Religious Finite Province of Meaning

This essay describes some of the basic pragmatic tendencies at work in the world of working and then shows how the finite provinces of meaning of theoretical contemplation and literature act against those pragmatic tendencies. This analysis prepares the way to see how the religious province of meaning in a similar but also distinctive way acts back against these pragmatic tendencies. These three finite provinces of meaning make it possible to see the world from another center of orientation than that of the ego agens and its proclivity to bring transcendences within reach, thereby freeing oneself to a degree from the fundamental anxiety and revealing the uniqueness of oneself and others, who are no longer subjected to working’s pragmatic imperatives.     

MOVERS AND SHAKERS: HOW AND WHY WOMEN BECOME AND REMAIN ENGAGED IN COMMUNITY LEADERSHIP

This research examines women's narratives regarding the experiences that lead to becoming, sustaining, and challenging active community leaders. Seventeen women neighborhood leaders, age 28 to 73 years, completed in-depth interviews. Qualitative thematic content analyses identified prominent themes in participants' responses that were subsequently linked to a generativity framework. Analyses revealed that leaders reported circuitous rather than linear paths of emerging community participation and growing up among others who demonstrated an ethos of care in informal as well as formal community practices. Women's initial community engagement was most often in response to invitations to address community needs. Both communal and agentic rewards and challenges to community involvement were identified. Based upon the findings, strategies for promoting and sustaining women's community leadership are identified.