Inviting affordances and agency

Recently several authors have suggested that affordances are not mere possibilities for action but can also invite behavior. This reconceptualization of affordances asks for a reconsideration of the ecological approach to agency. After a portrayal of the role of agency in ecological psychology, we draw upon phenomenology to reveal what it means for an agent to be invited by affordances. We sketch a dynamical model of the animal-environment relationship that aims to do justice to this analysis. In the model, agency is conceptualized as the capacity to modulate the coupling strength with the environment—the agent can influence to what extent he or she is influenced by the different invitations. This account of agency keeps us far from the Cartesian idea that the agent imposes behavior. Indeed, by modulating the coupling strength, the agent simply alters the dynamics of the animal-environment interactions and thus the behavior that emerges.     

Perceiving Potentiality: A Metaphysics for Affordances

Topoi - According to ecological psychology, animals perceive not just the qualities of things in their environment, but their affordances: in James Gibson’s words, ’what things furnish,...     

Affordance Types and Affordance Tokens: Are Gibson’s Affordances Trustworthy?†

Late in their paper on hypersets, Chemero and Turvey characterize affordances as “quicksilvery,” prone to rapid appearance and disappearance. We contrast this view with Gibson’s emphasis on the stability of affordances. We argue that this apparent discrepancy can be resolved by appeal to the distinction between affordances as indefinite abstract types and definite affordance tokens (instances of the type that share the resemblance relation). These issues will be discussed in the context of their consistency with ecological realism, where Platonic idealism is eschewed in favor of a more Aristotelian process theory. These ideas will be examined in the broader context of the domain ontology to ensure that Gibson's seminal affordance concept has its greatest theoretical utility. Finally, we develop a process theory of ontological descent by which indefinite affordance possibilities become more definite affordance potentialities and these eventuate in the most definite affordance actualizing actions.     

动允直接知觉的共鸣原理

传统认知理论认为我们只能间接知觉动允,而生态认知心理学则认为对动允的知觉是个体与环境信息直接共鸣的过程。生态认知心理学首先判定动允并不是存在于我们头脑中的认识,而是实际存在于个体-环境系统中的事实,对动允的直接知觉就是对动允的检测而非推测,是对动允信息的拾取而非对记忆内容的提取。这种直接知觉表现为身体的相关动作机制（动作神经元、肌肉组织等）与环境中动允信息的共鸣。进化与学习在共鸣的形成与发展中具有重要作用。     

On the Utility of Virtuality for Relating Abilities and Affordances

This article introduces the concept of virtuality into the question of the ontological status of ability-affordance relations in ecological psychology. By differentiating concrete affordances and animal activities from the somatic-environmental networks they actualize, I argue that ecological-psychological thought is brought into a better position from which to think the ability-affordance relation as a ground for the developmental entanglements of organisms and their subjective environments (i.e., the affordances that constitute their niches). I begin by sketching the aporia to be filled in ecological psychology by an introduction of the virtual. Then, I turn toward a brief elucidation of the concept of virtuality. In the terms developed here, abilities and affordances together comprise a virtual meshwork or field of dynamically linked rates of change, capacities, and tendencies that are actualized or instantiated in terms of individual instances of organismic behavior, environmental configuration, and coevolution. Armed with these conceptual tools, I endeavor, in the article's final section, to provide in terms of virtuality a properly genetic analysis of the dynamic reciprocity between organismic abilities and the recursive configuration of their subjective worlds (or fields of affordances) without recourse to teleological functions, hylomorphic animal perception, or unknowable environments.     

Collective Affordances

Abstract

This article develops an ecological framework for understanding collective action. This is contrasted with approaches familiar from the collective intentionality debate, which treat individuals (with collective intentions) as fundamental units of collective action. Instead, we turn to social ecological psychology and dynamical systems theory and argue that they provide a promising framework for understanding collectives as the central unit in collective action. However, we submit that these approaches do not yet appreciate enough the relevance of social identities for collective action. To analyze this aspect, we build on key insights from social identity theory and synthesize it with embodied and ecological accounts of perception and action. This results in the proposal of two new types of affordances. For an individual who enacts her “embodied social identity” of being a member of a particular collective, there can be what we call embodied social identity affordances. Moreover, when several individuals dynamically interact with each other against the background of their embodied social identities, this might lead to the emergence of a collective, which we understand as a dynamically constituted and ecologically situated perception-action system consisting of several individuals enacting relevant embodied social identity affordances. Building on previous work in social ecological psychology, we suggest that there can be genuine collective affordances, that is, affordances whose subject is not an individual, but a collective.     

Affordances,context and sociality

Affordances, i.e. the opportunity of actions offered by the environment, are one of the central research topics for the theoretical perspectives that view cognition as emerging from the interaction between the environment and the body. Being at the bridge between perception and action, affordances help to question a dichotomous view of perception and action. While Gibson’s view of affordances is mainly externalist, many contemporary approaches define affordances (and micro-affordances) as the product of long-term visuomotor associations in the brain. These studies have emphasized the fact that affordances are activated automatically, independently from the context and the previous intention to act: for example, affordances related to objects’ size would emerge even if the task does not require focusing on size. This emphasis on the automaticity of affordances has led to overlook their flexibility and contextual-dependency. In this contribution I will outline and discuss recent perspectives and evidence that reveal the flexibility and context-dependency of affordances, clarifying how they are modulated by the physical, cultural and social context. I will focus specifically on social affordances, i.e. on how perception of affordances might be influenced by the presence of multiple actors having different goals.

     

Metastable attunement and real-life skilled behavior

In everyday situations, and particularly in some sport and working contexts, humans face an inherently unpredictable and uncertain environment. All sorts of unpredictable and unexpected things happen but typically people are able to skillfully adapt. In this paper, we address two key questions in cognitive science. First, how is an agent able to bring its previously learned skill to bear on a novel situation? Second, how can an agent be both sensitive to the particularity of a given situation, while remaining flexibly poised for many other possibilities for action? We will argue that both the sensitivity to novel situations and the sensitivity to a multiplicity of action possibilities are enabled by the property of skilled agency that we will call metastable attunement. We characterize a skilled agent’s flexible interactions with a dynamically changing environment in terms of metastable dynamics in agent-environment systems. What we find in metastability is the realization of two competing tendencies: the tendency of the agent to express their intrinsic dynamics and the tendency to search for new possibilities. Metastably attuned agents are ready to engage with a multiplicity of affordances, allowing for a balance between stability and flexibility. On the one hand, agents are able to exploit affordances they are attuned to, while at the same time being ready to flexibly explore for other affordances. Metastable attunement allows agents to smoothly transition between these possible configurations so as to adapt their behaviour to what the particular situation requires. We go on to describe the role metastability plays in learning of new skills, and in skilful behaviour more generally. Finally, drawing upon work in art, architecture and sports science, we develop a number of perspectives on how to investigate metastable attunement in real life situations.

     

Pragmatism,enactivism, and ecological psychology: towards a unified approach to post-cognitivism

This paper argues that it is possible to combine enactivism and ecological psychology in a single post-cognitivist research framework if we highlight the common pragmatist assumptions of both approaches. These pragmatist assumptions or starting points are shared by ecological psychology and the enactive approach independently of being historically related to pragmatism, and they are based on the idea of organic coordination, which states that the evolution and development of the cognitive abilities of an organism are explained by appealing to the history of interactions of that organism with its environment. It is argued that the idea of behavioral or organic coordination within the enactive approach gives rise to the sensorimotor abilities of the organism, while the ecological approach emphasizes the coordination at a higher-level between organism and environment through the agent’s exploratory behavior for perceiving affordances. As such, these two different processes of organic coordination can be integrated in a post-cognitivist research framework, which will be based on two levels of analysis: the subpersonal one (the neural dynamics of the sensorimotor contingencies and the emergence of enactive agency) and the personal one (the dynamics that emerges from the organism-environment interaction in ecological terms). If this proposal is on the right track, this may be a promising first step for offering a systematized and consistent post-cognitivist approach to cognition that retain the full potential of both enactivism and ecological psychology.

     

Gibson's Affordances and Turing's Theory of Computation

The concept of affordance is a central component of the ecological psychology of J. J. Gibson (1966, 1977, 1979/1986). Affordances are properties of the environment taken relative to an observer. Ecological theorists have developed formal models for the analysis of affordances. Models proposed by Shaw and Turvey (1981), Turvey (1992), and Greeno (1994) are described and evaluated, and another approach, using Turing's (1936-1937/1965) theory of computation, is outlined. Affordances are characterized as the configurations of Turing machines. It is shown that Turing's work provides a natural vehicle for exploring Gibson's ideas.     

von Uexküll’s Theory of Meaning and Gibson’s Organism–Environment Reciprocity

Abstract

Jakob von Uexküll is mostly known for his concept of Umwelt—the meaningful surrounding of animals. von Uexküll insisted vehemently on the fact that Umwelt vindicated Kant’s subjectivist epistemology in the biological domain. However, we argue that a crucial yet widely overlooked development in von Uexküll’s theory of meaning implies a more radical vision strikingly germane to J. J. Gibson’s own direct realist epistemology-ontology and in tension with his own subjectivist concept of Umwelt. Gibson argued that organism and environment are complementary and meaning is not constructed via a subjective act but is directly available in the world as opportunities for action, namely, affordances. We show that von Uexküll’s notion of “functional tone” is similar to Gibson’s concept of affordance in that it includes action in perception. More important, von Uexküll introduces the musical metaphor of harmony to characterize the relationship between animal and environment. Like Gibson’s reciprocity, harmony implies an unmediated isomorphism between the dispositions of the animal and those of the environment that allows for direct perceptual contact with the world and action upon it.     

Choosing and using tools: capuchins (Cebus apella) use a different metric than tamarins (Saguinus oedipus)

Cotton-top tamarins (Saguinus oedipus) selected canes positioned so that a straight inward pull brought food within reach (M. D. Hauser, 1997; see also record 1997-41347-003). Tamarins failed to retrieve food with canes in other positions, and they did not reposition these canes. In this study, tufted capuchin monkeys (Cebus apella) preferred canes they could pull straight in when these were present, but they also repositioned canes in individually variable ways, and their success at obtaining food with repositioned canes improved with practice. In accord with predictions drawn from ecological psychology, capuchins discovered affordances of canes through exploratory actions with these objects, whereas tamarins did not. Ecological theory predicts these differences on the basis of species-typical manipulative activity, and it provides a useful approach for the study of species differences in tool-using behavior.     

BEHAVIOR ANALYSIS AND ECOLOGICAL PSYCHOLOGY: PAST,PRESENT, AND FUTURE. A REVIEW OF HARRY HEFT'S ECOLOGICAL PSYCHOLOGY IN CONTEXT

Relations between behavior analysis and ecological psychology have been strained for years, notwithstanding the occasional comment on their affinities. Harry Heft's (2001) Ecological Psychology in Context provides an occasion for reviewing anew those relations and affinities. It describes the genesis of ecological psychology in James's radical empiricism; addresses Holt's neorealism and Gestalt psychology; and synthesizes Gibson's ecological psychology and Barker's ecobehavioral science as a means for understanding everyday human behavior. Although behavior analysis is excluded from this account, Heft's book warrants a review nonetheless: It describes ecological psychology in ways that are congruent and complementary with behavior analysis (e.g., nonmediational theorizing; the provinces of natural history and natural science). After introducing modern ecological psychology, I comment on (a) Heft's admirable, albeit selective, historiography; (b) his ecological psychology—past and present—as it relates to Skinner's science and system (e.g., affordances, molar behavior); (c) his misunderstandings of Skinner's behaviorism (e.g., reductionistic, mechanistic, molecular); and (d) the theoretical status of Heft's cognitive terms and talk (i.e., in ontology, epistemology, syntax). I conclude by considering the alliance and integration of ecological psychology and behavior analysis, and their implications for unifying and transforming psychology as a life science, albeit more for the future than at present.     

Conflict in the kitchen: Contextual modulation of responsiveness to affordances

Recently, human behavior has been considered the product of continuous interactions between perception, cognition and action in which “affordances” (action possibilities the environment has to offer) play an important role. Converging evidence suggests that multiple action possibilities simultaneously compete for further processing, while external and internal factors (e.g., incoming sensory information, predictions) bias this competition. In the present study we used a stop-task to investigate whether context is able to modulate the strength of the responsiveness to affordances. We therefore placed participants in an actual kitchen and workshop during electroencephalographic recordings. A faster response to context congruent objects demonstrated that the direct surrounding is able to affect responsiveness to affordances. In addition, when responses needed to be withheld, context congruent objects evoked greater response conflict as indicated by an enhanced N2 Event Related Potential (ERP) component.     

Social Affordances and the Possibility of Ecological Linguistics

This paper includes an effort to extend the notion of affordance from a philosophical point of view the importance of ecological approach for social psychology, ethics, and linguistics. Affordances are not always merely physical but also interpersonal and social. I will conceptualize affordance in general and social affordance in particular, and will elucidate the relation between intentional action and affordances, and that between affordances and free will. I will also focus on the relation between social institution and affordance. An extended theory of affordances can provide a way to analyze in concrete ways how social institution works as an implicit background of interpersonal interactions. Ecological approach considers social institution as the producer and maintainer of affordances. Social institutions construct the niches for human beings. Finally, I will argue the possibility of the ecological linguistics. Language is a social institution. The system of signs is the way to articulate and differentiate interpersonal affordances. Language acquires its meaning, i.e. communicative power in the interpersonal interactions, and interpersonal interactions, in turn, develop and are elaborated through the usage of signs. Communication is seen as never aimed to transmit inner ideas to others, but to guide and adjust the behaviors of others thorough articulating the affordance of responsible-ness.     

行动语义、客体背景和判断任务对客体动作承载性的影响

客体动作承载性指人们知觉客体时同时激活的针对客体的行动。当Gibson最初提出动作承载性概念时, 他认为客体的这种属性是可以自动激活的。然而近年来越来越多的证据显示, 在知觉和行动的关系中, 行动语义知识和客体所处背景对客体动作承载性具有调节作用, 表现在人们可以根据这些自上而下的信息选择针对客体的适当的行动。此外, 不同的判断任务在引发客体动作承载性效应上具有特异性, 表现在若判断任务仅需知觉客体表层属性时, 不能激活对客体的动作, 进而不能产生客体动作承载性; 若判断任务需要对客体进行深层加工时, 才会激活对客体的动作。未来研究还需要进一步探究行动语义知识和客体所处背景影响客体动作承载性发生的原因和机制, 以及不同判断任务中出现结果特异性的原因。     

1966 and All That: James Gibson and Bottom-Down Theory

ABSTRACT

The “later” James Gibson is widely misrepresented as an extreme stimulus–response theorist. In fact, Gibson's 1966 book presents a radical alternative to stimulus–response theory. “Perceptual systems” are not passive and receptive but “organs of active attention” (1966/1968, p. 58). Perceivers “reach out” into the world. This commentary examines some of the implications of Gibson's systems-cum-functionalist-cum-ecological approach, including the relations between the senses; the concept of “sensationless” perception; and most fundamentally, the nature of perceptual systems as extending beyond the body. I conclude that an adequate understanding of perception cannot be limited to the already severely limited domain of psychology. If Gibson is right, “ecological psychology” is a contradiction in terms.     

Perceiving affordances for joint actions

Two individuals acting together to achieve a shared goal often have an emergent set of afforded behavioral possibilities that may not easily reduce to either acting alone. In a series of experiments we examined the critical boundaries for transitions in behavior for individuals walking through an aperture alone or alongside another actor as a dyad. Results from experiment 1 indicated that an intrinsically scaled critical boundary for behavioral transitions was different in individuals than in dyads performing a similar task. Experiment 2 demonstrated that observers are perceptually sensitive to the difference in action parameters for the dyad, while still maintaining perceptual sensitivity about the boundaries of action relative to individuals. In experiment 3, we determined that observers' perception of critical action boundaries for individuals and dyads has a similar informational basis (eye-height scaling). In experiment 4, we demonstrated that observers were able to perceive critical action boundaries for other dyads independently of membership. Together, these results suggest that individuals are sensitive to the affordances related to a joint action, and that this process may not entirely reduce to the perception of the affordances for each individual.     

Theoretical Hubris and the Willingness To Be Radical: An Open Letter to James J. Gibson

J.J. Gibson's direct perception thesis is the cornerstone of ecological psychology. Not to understand this is not to understand ecological psychology. Beginning in the summer of 1968, when I first met Gibson, and after working with him for the next year at Cornell, I underwent a conversion crisis. I came to appreciate his thesis through a few philosophical insights that I here share with the reader through an open letter to Gibson, where I seek to illuminate the reasons for my conversion from being a Miller-Chomsky psycholinguist and a Piaget devotee to a radical Gibsonian. This conversion has influenced my work even until the present. Indeed, I am still working through its implications in all that I attempt. I share this intimate portrait of my relationship to Gibson and his profound ideas in hope that others who have struggled with his thesis might be helped along their way as I was.