Hope and cardiovascular health-promoting behaviour: Education alone is not enough

We investigated hope’s ability to predict cardiovascular disease (CVD) knowledge and health-promoting behaviours. Snyder defined hope as the combination of goal-directed planning and motivation, and theorised that high-hope people seek knowledge relevant to goal pursuits. We surveyed 391 Latino and Asian participants undergoing CVD risk screening, nearly all immigrants to the USA. This was a particularly important sample because, in general, these populations are considered underserved and under-researched. Pre-screening hope levels were measured. After screening and education, participants rated perceived importance of behaviour change. Behaviour change (salt/fat intake, exercise, CVD information-seeking and visiting a physician) and CVD knowledge were assessed one month later by telephone. Unexpectedly, hope did not predict knowledge. However, hope predicted self-reported behaviour change, though results differed by ethnicity. Among Asian individuals, hope?×?knowledge predicted reduced salt/fat, CVD information-seeking and physician visits. Among Latino individuals, hope?×?perceived importance of diet change predicted reduced salt/fat and hope?×?perceived importance of exercise change predicted increased exercise.     

Larger reward values alone are not enough to entice more cooperation

Two experiments using an iterated prisoner's dilemma game examined under which conditions participants' cooperation rates would either change due to monetary value changes (e.g., 3 cents to 3 dollars) or not change due to numeric value changes (e.g., 3 dollars to 300 cents). A total of 102 university students played the game against a computer that employed one of four strategies across blocks. Results showed high rates of cooperation when participants played against a tit-for-tat strategy and low rates of cooperation against a random strategy. There was no change in cooperation rates due to changes in numeric value alone and a decrease in cooperation rates when large monetary values were at stake. Cooperation rates were higher and cooperation responses slower at earlier stages of the game. I argue that people's ability to strategize plays a key role in the changing rates and speed of cooperative behaviour in the prisoner's dilemma.     

Doing well enough: Toward a logic for common-sense morality

On the traditional deontic framework, what is required (what morality demands) and what is optimal (what morality recommends) can't be distinguished and hence they can't both be represented. Although the morally optional can be represented, the supererogatory (exceeding morality's demands), one of its proper subclasses, cannot be. The morally indifferent, another proper subclass of the optional-one obviously disjoint from the supererogatory-is also not representable. Ditto for the permissibly suboptimal and the morally significant. Finally, the minimum that morality allows finds no place in the traditional scheme. With a focus on the question, “What would constitute a hospitable logical neighborhood for the concept of supererogation?”, I present and motivate an enriched logical and semantic framework for representing all these concepts of common sense morality.     

Family therapy alone is not enough or the dirty story of Dorian

When serious malfunctioning of an individual occurs in a secondary system (school, hospital, rehabilitation center, dormitory setting), the tendency often is to focus on the family as both the cause of the malfunctioning and the arena of intervention. Many times, family therapy alone is not enough because a parallel destructive constellation has formed around the Identified Patient in the secondary system as well and the symptoms catalyze that system's own maladaptive patterns. Often the IP is caught in the web of rigid pathological patterns of interactions between the two systems. A unique model of conjoined intersystemic intervention for dealing with such resistance to change is presented.     

Inaugural lecture: Philosophy enough

Abstract

This inaugural lecture was delivered at the Howard College Campus of UKZN on 2 April 2008. In it I do three things. First I sketch some arguments in favour of a naturalist conception of philosophy. The conclusions that I’m after are that philosophy is not an autonomous enterprise, so that it had better be continuous with scientific enquiry if it is to get anywhere. A supplementary claim I defend briefly is that the natural and social sciences should be viewed as more integrated than they usually are. Second, I offer some reasons for rejecting all identifiable forms of social constructivism about knowledge. Finally, I say something about what ‘African Scholarship’ might mean, given the preceding considerations. There I briefly defend the claim that there is no epistemically interesting sense in which there is such a thing as African knowledge.     

Are generic predictions enough?

Summary and conclusions I have argued not that economics has no predictive content, but that it is limited, or at least has so far been limited to generic predictions. Now this is an important kind of prediction, and almost certainly a necessary preliminary to specific or quantitative predictions. But if the sketch of an important episode in the twentieth century history of the subject I have given is both correct and representative, then economics seems pretty well stuck at the level of generic prediction. And at least some influential economists and philosophers of economics seem well satisfied with stopping at the point of generic prediction. Or at least they give no other reason than its power to produce such predictions as a justification for the character of economic theory. But this leads to the question that is the title of my paper, is generic prediction enough?     

When 'knowing how' is not enough

Two cases are described of students with a common presenting problem — an inability to concentrate while studying. The factors contributing to poor concentration are explored. Some conclusions are drawn about the types of counsellor interventions which might be useful when working with such students.     

A green Augustine: On learning to love nature well

Augustine of Hippo has expressed a vision of beauty in nature that could, if better known, encourage traditional Christians and secular ecologists to affirm the ground they have in common. For Augustine the ideal would be to see nature as God sees it, feeling deeply both its beauty and its impermanence, loving nature without clinging to it. With such clear seeing would come love and the motivation for sustained and skillful action. This paper discusses Augustine's paradigm and what blocks us from seeing it, and then frames principles for an authentically Augustinian response.     

Epistemic norms: truth conducive enough

Synthese - Epistemology needs to account for the success of science. In True Enough (2017), Catherine Elgin argues that a veritist epistemology is inadequate to this task. She advocates shifting...     

Luminous enough for a cognitive home

In this paper I argue that there is no viable alternative to construing our knowledge and justified belief as resting on a foundation restricted to truths about our internal states. Against Williamson and others I defend the claim that the internal life of a cognizer really does constitute a special sort of cognitive home that is importantly different from the rest of what we think we know and justifiably believe.