The Determinants of Happiness of China’s Elderly Population

“Three generations under one roof” is an old Chinese saying used to describe a desired living arrangement. The traditional concept of happiness for a Chinese elderly person is being able to “play with grandchildren with candy in mouth, enjoy life with no cares.” In a fast-changing economy like China, how does society, especially the elderly themselves, view these traditional values? Using the 2005 Chinese General Social Survey, we study the determinants of happiness of the Chinese elderly. We are particularly interested in whether living with their child and whether living with their grandchild affect the happiness of the elderly. An important empirical concern is that unobserved permanent income may affect both the living arrangements of the elderly and their level of happiness. We include property ownership variables as proxies and also adopt an instrument variable approach to identify the causal relationship between the elderly’s happiness and their living arrangements. We find that, conditional on living with a grandchild, living with one’s child has a negative effect on the elderly’s happiness. Furthermore, elderly Chinese who live with grandchildren are associated with a much higher degree of happiness than their counterparts.     

What Makes People Happy? Some Evidence from Northern Ireland

Using data on over 3000 individuals in Northern Ireland, this paper conducts an econometric investigation into what makes people happy. It draws a distinction between “objective” (income, marital status) and “subjective” (satisfaction with one’s standard of living (SoL); money worries; experience of poverty) factors determining happiness. In so doing, it takes a broader view of “economic status” than one defined solely by income: occupational class, mortgage status, financial worries, rural/urban residence, poverty experience, and, of course, income coalesce to form this, more complex, concept of economic status. Juxtaposed against this, is the concept of “context-free” and “context-specific” well-being. A particular example of the latter is the degree of satisfaction with one’s SoL and an important point of focus of the paper is the relationship between SoL satisfaction and happiness. A complementary point of focus is an analysis of the determinants of context-free and context-specific well-being. The paper also examines the effects of non-economic factors on happiness in particular on specific aspects of the ill-health of respondents and upon the quality of the areas in which they live. Having analysed these effects, it places a money value on each of the diversity of effects that act upon a person’s level of happiness.The analysis in this paper is based on the Poverty and Social Exclusion in Northern Ireland (PSENI) Project’s data and I am grateful to the Project leaders – Paddy Hillyard, Eithne McLaughlin and Mike Tomlinson – for permission to use these data. Thanks are due to Andrew Oswald, to one of the Editors of JOHS, and to two anonymous referees for their valuable comments. Needless to say, the usual disclaimer applies.     

Hedonia, eudaimonia, and well-being: an introduction

Research on well-being can be thought of as falling into two traditions. In one—the hedonistic tradition—the focus is on happiness, generally defined as the presence of positive affect and the absence of negative affect. In the other—the eudaimonic tradition—the focus is on living life in a full and deeply satisfying way. Recognizing that much recent research on well-being has been more closely aligned with the hedonistic tradition, this special issue presents discussions and research reviews from the eudaimonic tradition, making clear how the concept of eudaimonia adds an important perspective to our understanding of well-being.     

Happiness theories of the good life

The paper starts with a presentation of the pure happiness theory, i.e. the idea that the quality of a person’s life is dependent on one thing only, viz. how happy that person is. To find out whether this type of theory is plausible or not, I examine the standard arguments for and against this theory, including Nozick’s experience machine argument. I then investigate how the theory can be modified in order to avoid the most serious objections. I first examine different types of epistemic modifications of the theory (e.g. the idea that a person’s happiness is more valuable for her if it is based on a correct perception of her own life), and then turn to a number of modifications which all make the value of a person’s happiness depend on whether the evaluative standard on which her happiness is based satisfies certain requirements. In connection with this, I present and defend my own modified version of the happiness theory.     

Happiness,Rationality, Autonomy and the Good Life

The paper starts with a general discussion of the concepts of happiness and the good life. I argue that there is a conceptual core of happiness which has to do with one’s life as a whole. I discuss affective and attitude or life satisfaction views of happiness and indicate problems faced by those views. I introduce my own view, the life plan view, which sees happiness as the ongoing realizing of global desires of the person. I argue that on such a view one’s life could be happy without a high level of rationality or a high level of autonomy; such rationality and autonomy are not built into the concept of happiness. So while happiness is a final value, and good for the person, it is not the only final value. Rationality and autonomy are also final values and, where they exist, are good as ends for the person, part of the good life.     

Phenomenological immanence,normativity, and semantic externalism

This paper argues that transcendental phenomenology (here represented by Edmund Husserl) can accommodate the main thesis of semantic externalism, namely, that intentional content is not simply a matter of what is ‘in the head,’ but depends on how the world is. I first introduce the semantic problem as an issue of how linguistic tokens or mental states can have ‘content’—that is, how they can set up conditions of satisfaction or be responsive to norms such that they can succeed or fail at referring. The standard representationalist view—which thinks of the problem in first-person terms—is contrasted with Brandom’s pragmatic inferentialist approach, which adopts a third-person stance. The rest of the paper defends a phenomenological version of the representationalist position (seeking to preserve its first-person stance) but offers a conception of representation that does not identify it with an entity ‘in the head.’ The standard view of Husserl as a Cartesian internalist is undermined by rejecting its fundamental assumption—that Husserl’s concept of the ‘noema’ is a mental entity—and by defending a concept of ‘phenomenological immanence’ that has a normative, rather than a psychological, structure. Finally, it is argued that phenomenological immanence cannot be identified with ‘consciousness’ in Husserl’s sense, though consciousness is a necessary condition for it.     

Towards a Religiously Adequate Alternative to OmniGod Theism

Theistic religious believers should be concerned that the God they worship is not an idol. Conceptions of God thus need to be judged according to criteria of religious adequacy that are implicit in the ‘God-role’—that is, the way the concept of God properly functions in the conceptual economy and form of life of theistic believers. I argue that the conception of God as ‘omniGod’—an immaterial personal creator with the omni-properties—may reasonably be judged inadequate, at any rate from the perspective of a relationship ethics based on the Christian revelation that God is Love. I go on to suggest that a conception of God as the power of love within the natural universe might prove more adequate, with God’s role as creator understood in terms of final rather than efficient causation.     

In Search of Life-Wisdom: Ubuntu,EnvironmEntity and Technology

This article contends that technology has evolved into a fundamental theo-philosophical category. Acknowledging the intricacy of technology, it advocates for an exploration of indigenous philosophies to cultivate 'response-ability' wisdom. The concept of environmEntity is introduced as an alternative to the traditional understanding of the environment, representing a vibrant and living world. Rooted in ubuntu sensibilities, environmEntity becomes a multi-nature locus that fosters empathy and recognises inclusive differences as expressions of the same ultimate life. By integrating the wisdom from Christ's dual natures and ubuntu's relationality, the article proposes a comprehensive and empathic life wisdom to address contemporary challenges and promote a sustainable and interconnected future.     

Inequality-Adjusted Happiness in Nations Egalitarianism and Utilitarianism Married in a New Index of Societal Performance

According to the utilitarian creed, the quality of a society should be judged using the degree of happiness of its members, the best society being the one that provides the greatest happiness for the greatest number. Following the egalitarian principle, the quality of a society should rather be judged by the disparity in happiness among citizens, a society being better if differences in happiness are smaller. Performance on these standards can be measured using cross-national surveys, where degree of happiness is measured using the mean response to a question about happiness and disparity expressed as the standard deviation. In this paper we marry these measures together in an index of ‘Inequality-Adjusted Happiness’ (IAH) that gives equal weight to either criterion. It is a linear combination of the mean happiness value and the standard deviation and it is expressed as a number on a 0–100 scale. We applied this index to 90 nations for the 1990s and observed large and systematic differences, IAH being higher in rich, free and well-governed countries. We also considered the trend over time for 14 rich countries and found that IAH has increased over the last 30 years.     

Poor Little Ritz Boy David “Does” Hawaii or: Lucky Davy Salutes Lucky Lindy

In this article, David Bittner explodes the myth, restated in Brideshead Revisited (1945), that Polynesians are “happy and harmless.” He does so for the same reason that Evelyn Waugh does: “the grim invasion of trader, administrator, missionary, and tourist” has changed all that (p. 174). Touring Hawaii in July of ’09, Bittner was interested to discover some unusual bits of American heritage, but saddened to see how “civilization” and “Americanization” actually seem to have eroded the Hawaiian people’s rights to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness. Bittner’s dual religious heritage—Judaism by birth and upbringing and Catholicism by choice in mid-life—has given him the perspective to apply the lessons of Hawaiian history to his own personal issues, particularly forgiveness.     

Speaking of persons,human and divine

Christians commonly speak of and to God as ‘a person’. The propriety of such talk depends on how the concept of a person is being used and understood, and that concept is much contested in contemporary analytic philosophy. In this article, I note the presuppositions of one current debate about what it is to be a human person, and then propose an alternative approach to persons—both human and divine—that draws upon the Thomistic philosophical and theological tradition. In this tradition, ‘person’ is neither an essence-determining kind term, nor a merely nominal or functional kind term, but is applicable analogously to entities of various ‘kinds’ (e.g. humans, angels and God). The origins of this account in Aquinas’ theology of the Trinity will be examined, and I will conclude by noting a recent development of Thomas’ thought in relation to what it is to be a human person.     

An Investigation of the Relationships Between Spirituality, Health Status and Quality of Life in Adolescents

This study examines the relationships between six spirituality-related attributes and quality of life (QOL) in adolescents, and the extent to which these relationships are mediated by perceived physical and mental health status and five important life domains (family, friends, living environment, school experiences, and perception of self). The data were obtained via a cross-sectional health survey of 8,225 adolescents in British Columbia, Canada. Structural equation modeling was used to test the hypothesized relationships. All spiritual attributes are significantly associated with three or more of the life domains, and four of the attributes significantly explain global QOL after controlling for the other variables in the multivariate model. The attributes indicative of adolescents’ feelings about their future and other existential matters were found to be relatively most explanatory with respect to global QOL. The predominant mediators include adolescents’ satisfaction with their family, their perceived self, and their perceived mental health status. Spirituality is important with respect to adolescents’ QOL. The multivariate model provides preliminary insights into the relevance of several attributes of spirituality and the possible mechanisms by which these attributes may contribute to adolescents’ QOL.     

Spirituality,Religiousness, and Happiness in Children Aged 8–12 Years

The relation between spirituality and happiness was assessed in 320 children aged 8–12 from public and private (i.e., faith-based) schools. Children rated their own spirituality using the Spiritual Well-Being Questionnaire and 11 items selected and modified from the Brief Multidimensional Measurement of Religiousness/Spirituality which reflected the children’s practices and beliefs. Children’s happiness was assessed using self-reports based on the Oxford Happiness Scale short form, the Subjective Happiness Scale, and a single-item measure. Parents also rated their children’s happiness. Children and parents rated the children’s temperament using the emotionality, activity, and sociability temperament survey. Children’s spirituality, but not their religious practices (e.g., attending church, praying, and meditating), was strongly linked to their happiness. Children who were more spiritual were happier. Spirituality accounted for between 3 and 26% of the unique variance in children’s happiness depending on the measures. Temperament was also a predictor of happiness, but spirituality remained a significant predictor of happiness even after removing the variance associated with temperament. The personal (i.e., meaning and value in one’s own life) and communal (quality and depth of inter-personal relationships) domains of spirituality were particularly good predictors of children’s happiness. These results parallel studies of adult happiness and suggest strategies to enhance happiness in children.     

Psychology is About Persons: On Brinkmann’s Expansion of Harré’s Hybrid Psychology

Brinkmann has recently put forward an integrative theory of the mind by expanding Harré’s hybrid psychology. The theory is integrative because it establishes that in order for one to gain a full understanding of the mind—which is represented as a set of dispositions—one has to take into account theories about the brain, the body, social practices, and technological artifacts. All of these are said to be ‘mediators’ upon which the mind depends. An important claim underlying the theory is that in psychology the basic ontological unit is the person. We agree with Brinkmann both on this and on the dispositional nature of the mind. Still, he does not make a strong case for the latter. Furthermore, we believe the concept of mediation is by no means helpful to produce an integrative view in psychology, not only because the theoretical job of such a concept is unclear but also because qua unifying concept it may end up undermining the ontological primacy of the person (in psychology). In this paper we refer to these issues and suggest some ideas that may help improve Brinkmann’s (and Harré’s) proposal.     

Societal QOL is More than the Sum of QOL of Individuals: The Whole is Greater than the Sum of the Parts

I submit that we are too focused on individual-level happiness research at the expense of societal level QOL research. That is, societal QOL cannot be simply treated as the sum of the happiness of individual citizens. In making this assertion I review and discuss Abott Ferris’ latest book: Approaches to Improving the Quality of Life (published by Springer, 2010).     

Conscience: Aquinas — With a hint of aristotle

The paper presents Aquinas’s account of conscience, and argues that key elements of this account are key elements too of Aristotle’s moral theory. The paper’s purpose is to encourage debate over conscience as not only a Stoic/Christian concept but one with deeper— and more widespread—roots in western ethical tradition.     

Subjective Wellbeing and its Influence on Consumer Sentiment Towards Marketing: A New Zealand Example

Consumption is a central component of many peoples’ lives. Providing satisfaction and happiness with the products and services we buy and with the institutions that supply them is a fundamental part of marketing (Wilkie and Moore in J Macromark 26(2):224–232, 2006). Many studies investigate the influence of various microaspects of products/services—or of specific situational customer characteristics—on satisfaction evaluations. This study examines how a macro-variable, Subjective Wellbeing (SWB), relates to consumer satisfaction and illustrates the importance of SWB in studies examining determinants of the concept. Using the idea of spill-over effects, a well established concept in psychology and marketing that has received little attention in the area of consumer satisfaction research, it investigates whether attitudes towards marketing activities, measured by the Index of Consumer Sentiment Towards Marketing, are influenced by SWB. The research finds that Subjective Wellbeing, as determined by the International Wellbeing Index, contributes significantly to the explanation of consumer sentiment and makes a case for its inclusion in more consumer satisfaction studies.     

Expressivity and performativity: Merleau-Ponty and Butler

Until now post-structuralism and phenomenology are widely regarded as opposites. Contrary to this opinion, I am arguing that they have a lot in common. In order to make my argument, I concentrate on Judith Butler’s poststructuralist concept of performativity to confront it with Maurice Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenological concept of expressivity. While Butler claims that phenomenological theories of expression are in danger of essentialism and thus must be replaced by non-essentialist theories of performativity, I hold that Merleau-Ponty’s concept of expressivity must strictly be understood in anti-essentialist terms. Following this line of interpretation, “expressivity” and “performativity”—as well as phenomenology and post-structuralism—are not opposites but partners in the search for an anti-essentialist gender concept. Consequently, feminist phenomenology turns out to be a non-essentialist approach that combines phenomenological and post-structural insights.     

Pastoral Care for Shame-Based Perfectionism

While perfectionism has been associated with guilt dynamics, the form of perfectionism that is most frequently discussed by psychologists is connected to self-condemnation for perceived failures to reach the high standard set for personal achievement. There is therefore a strong link between perfectionism and inferiority shame. Psychotherapists have given quite a bit of attention to shame-based perfectionism; it has been largely neglected by pastoral psychologists. Three approaches to the pastoral care of shame-based perfectionism are developed. The first approach is based in cognitive therapy. It is argued that perfectionism is grounded in a faulty core belief about the self—namely, “I am what I achieve.” The second method makes use of strategies developed by John Bradshaw for accepting and affirming all one’s sub-selves. Bradshaw’s approach is critiqued, however, for the way in which shame-based and guilt-based perfectionism are confused. The third method is a modification and adaptation of Heinz Kohut’s strategy of “mirroring” (empathy, admiration, and approval) that he developed for use in work with clients with narcissistic personality disorder.     

Teaching and Truthfulness

Some tendencies in modern education—the stress on ‘performativity’, for instance, and ‘celebration of difference’—threaten the value traditionally placed on truthful teaching. In this paper, truthfulness is mainly understood, following Bernard Williams, as a disposition to ‘Accuracy’ and ‘Sincerity’—hence as a virtue. It is to be distinguished from truth (a property of beliefs), and current debates about the nature of truth are not relevant to the issue of the value of truthfulness. This issue devolves into the question of whether truthfulness is a distinctive virtue of teachers, which they have a special obligation to exercise in the face of competing aims. This paper defends the idea of distinctive professional duties and considers two conceptions of teaching which ascribe a central place to truthfulness. The first conceives of teaching as a personal relationship within which trust, and hence, it is claimed, truthfulness, are paramount. This claim is challenged, and the paper concludes by sympathetically considering a second conception of teaching, articulated by Oakeshott and Heidegger. In this conception, teaching is a ‘releasement’ from ‘the daily flux’ of pupils’ lives through a truthful initiation into the alternatives to this ‘daily flux’ found within ‘the civilized inheritance of mankind’.