Consciousness: A neurobiological approach

Consciousness and the disorders of consciousness can be more fully understood once they are integrated with the neurobiology of mental events. After a review of animal and human research, we found several anatomical structures in the central nervous system are required for consciousness. Identification of the critical structures, however, depends on what is meant by consciousness. In the general sense of mental responsivity, the reticular activating system must be intact. Consciousness has also been defined as the awareness of the sights, sounds, and feelings of everyday experience. In this sense, the system of sensory inputs and outputs of the anterior temporal cortex, amygdala, and the hippocampus must be functional. There is no neural evidence for “higher” consciousness.     

From behaviour to consciousness: Translating what animals do to what animals think

Cognitive ethology, an interdisciplinary and comparative branch of zoology, is concerned with the influence of conscious awareness and intention on animal behaviour. It enquires into the evolutionary value of consciousness. However, consciousness is hard to define and any account of animal behaviour based on it will need to take into account both the physical mechanisms that allow for consciousness, and also consider whether we can have knowledge of the phenomenal experience of consciousness in other species. While the first consideration can be investigated scientifically, phenomenal experience needs to be inferred from behaviour, since most animals are not capable of communicating this experience directly. In fact, many accounts of animal behaviour, behavioural ecology in particular, argue that we cannot accurately explain animal behaviour with relation to thoughts or feelings and conscious awareness of them. Rather, we must concern ourselves with what can be objectively observed and measured. Cognitive ethology, however, argues that we cannot give accurate accounts of complex animal behaviour, for example social interactions or tool use, without taking consciousness into account. In this article I will argue that one can justifiably assign and study consciousness in animals through their behaviour, and that an account of certain animals’ behaviour is incomplete without reference to conscious awareness. In other words, behavioural ecology is essentially flawed as it gives, in certain cases, ultimately incorrect accounts of animal behaviour. Firstly it cannot distinguish between behaviour of more and less conscious animals, and secondly, by avoiding any mention of consciousness, it narrows its own scope, and finally cannot explain complex behaviours such as learning in any meaningful way.     

The role of self-esteem in the experience of envy

It is the thesis of this paper that although analysts have always recognized that narcissistic injury may trigger envious feelings, the significance of self-esteem as both a motivator and response to envious feelings has not yet been sufficiently explored. Traditional drive-defense or object instinctual explanations tend to diminish awareness of the importance of self-esteem in the experience of envy. The focus on drives or repetition of early patterns of object relations does not always take into account the significance of the cycle in which damaged self-esteem leads to envy, the component parts of which may cause further damage to self-esteem, leading to more envy, and so on. I am suggesting that it is often an attempt to avoid painful injury to one's self-esteem, as well as the related attempt to maintain a positively colored sense of self, and not a repression of drives or a repetition of some aspect of early object relationships which must be understood in order to fully comprehend both feelings of envy and the need to keep such feelings out of conscious awareness.     

Does any aspect of mind survive brain damage that typically leads to a persistent vegetative state? Ethical considerations

Recent neuroscientific evidence brings into question the conclusion that all aspects of consciousness are gone in patients who have descended into a persistent vegetative state (PVS). Here we summarize the evidence from human brain imaging as well as neurological damage in animals and humans suggesting that some form of consciousness can survive brain damage that commonly causes PVS. We also raise the issue that neuroscientific evidence indicates that raw emotional feelings (primary-process affects) can exist without any cognitive awareness of those feelings. Likewise, the basic brain mechanisms for thirst and hunger exist in brain regions typically not damaged by PVS. If affective feelings can exist without cognitive awareness of those feelings, then it is possible that the instinctual emotional actions and pain "reflexes" often exhibited by PVS patients may indicate some level of mentality remaining in PVS patients. Indeed, it is possible such raw affective feelings are intensified when PVS patients are removed from life-supports. They may still experience a variety of primary-process affective states that could constitute forms of suffering. If so, withdrawal of life-support may violate the principle of nonmaleficence and be tantamount to inflicting inadvertent "cruel and unusual punishment" on patients whose potential distress, during the process of dying, needs to be considered in ethical decision-making about how such individuals should be treated, especially when their lives are ended by termination of life-supports. Medical wisdom may dictate the use of more rapid pharmacological forms of euthanasia that minimize distress than the de facto euthanasia of life-support termination that may lead to excruciating feelings of pure thirst and other negative affective feelings in the absence of any reflective awareness.     

Consciousness: The transcendentalist manifesto

Phenomenal consciousness, what it is like to have or undergo an experience, is typically understood as an empirical item – an actual or possible object of consciousness. Accordingly, the problem posed by phenomenal consciousness for materialist accounts of the mind is usually understood as an empirical problem: a problem of showing how one sort of empirical item – a conscious state – is produced or constituted by another – a neural process. The development of this problem, therefore, has usually consisted in the articulation of an intuition: no matter how much we know about the brain, this will not allow us to see how it produces or constitutes phenomenal consciousness. Developing a theme first explored by Kant, and then later by Sartre, this paper argues that the real problem posed by phenomenal consciousness is quite different. Consciousness, it will be argued, is not an empirical but a transcendental feature of the world. That is, what it is like to have an experience is not something of which we are aware in the having of that experience, but an item in virtue of which the genuine (non-phenomenal) objects of our consciousness are revealed as being the way they are. Phenomenal consciousness, that is, is not an empirical object of awareness but a transcendental condition of the possibility of there being empirical objects of awareness.     

The legal self: executive processes and legal theory

When laws or legal principles mention mental states such as intentions to form a contract, knowledge of risk, or purposely causing a death, what parts of the brain are they speaking about? We argue here that these principles are tacitly directed at our prefrontal executive processes. Our current best theories of consciousness portray it as a workspace in which executive processes operate, but what is important to the law is what is done with the workspace content rather than the content itself. This makes executive processes more important to the law than consciousness, since they are responsible for channelling conscious decision-making into intentions and actions, or inhibiting action. We provide a summary of the current state of our knowledge about executive processes, which consists primarily of information about which portions of the prefrontal lobes perform which executive processes. Then we describe several examples in which legal principles can be understood as tacitly singling out executive processes, including principles regarding defendants' intentions or plans to commit crimes and their awareness that certain facts are the case (for instance, that a gun is loaded), as well as excusatory principles which result in lesser responsibility for those who are juveniles, mentally ill, sleepwalking, hypnotized, or who suffer from psychopathy.     

Can Studies of Autism Teach us About Consciousness of the Physical and the Mental?

Abstract

Most scientists and theorists concerned with the problem of consciousness focus on our consciousness of the physical world (our sensations, feelings, and awareness). In this paper I consider our consciousness of the mental world (our thoughts about thoughts, intentions, wishes, and emotions).The argument is made that these are two distinct forms of consciousness, the evidence for this deriving from studies of autism. Autism is a severe childhood psychiatric condition in which individuals may be conscious of the physical world but not of the mental world. Relevant experimental evidence is described, including some recent neuroimaging studies pointing towards the neural basis of our consciousness of the mental.     

Language Matters: Competent Mental Health Treatment for Latina/Latino/Latinx Undocumented Immigrants—A Comment on Alfaro and Bui

Commenting on Alfaro and Bui’s article “Mental Health Professionals’ Attitudes, Perceptions, and Stereotypes Toward Latino Undocumented Immigrants,” this article explores and confirms the importance of continued and increased attention to language and word choice regarding Latina/Latino/Latinx immigrants as well a multicultural awareness and competence training for mental health professionals. Mental health professionals must be aware of connections between social determinants of health and well-being, as well as the impact of their own cultural awareness and language use, on their implicit bias and capacity for empathy with clients who they may perceive to be different than themselves. Ethical guidelines require mental health professionals to consistently seek learning opportunities to increase their cultural awareness in order to provide competent mental health services to Latina/Latino/Latinx undocumented immigrant clients that ameliorate suffering and facilitate flourishing.     

A Qualitative Exploration of Relational Consciousness in Christian Children

Nye's (1998) core construct of relational consciousness in child spirituality embraces a wider dialogue with social and personality psychology. Relatedness in spirituality implies the importance of language, mind, and the self as guideposts for development. In this research we seek to qualitatively expand our understanding of relational consciousness around recent work in these three domains. Twelve school-age children are given detailed interviews dealing with spirituality framed by the relational consciousness core construct. Transcribed responses are analysed using grounded theory methodology. Theoretical categories are assembled into a preliminary framework for relational consciousness as a social and contextual phenomenon. The relationships between categories in the framework are outlined in terms of mental representation and self/other orientation in the child. We conclude that relational consciousness and its social framework commends a pedocentric, community-based approach to religious education.     

Introspection, consciousness, and human information processing

The paper tries, on rational and empirical grounds, to sketch a theory of introspective awareness, considered as an essential aspect of what is usually talked about in terms of "consciousness". The main thesis is that introspective awareness has an important role of play in human information processing. An attempt is made to clarify the connections between introspective awareness, selective attention, and short-term memory. A lot of human information processing goes on pre-attentively, "automatically", without the involvement of introspective awareness. What is introspectively attended to enters short-term memory, where it remains available for various kinds of mental operations; certain kinds of such operations are themselves introspectively accessible, and may become contents of short-term memory, where they in turn can be operated upon, and hence be modified voluntarily by the subject. Finally, various kinds of limitations to introspective awareness are discussed.     

Environmental Consciousness,Sustainability, and the Character of Philosophy of Education

This paper argues that education itself, properly understood, is intimately concerned with an individual’s being in the world, and therefore is ineluctably environmental. This is guaranteed by the ecstatic nature of consciousness. Furthermore, it is argued that a central dimension of this environment with which ecstatic human consciousness is engaged, is that of nature understood as the ‘self-arising’. Nature, so conceived, is essentially other and is epistemologically mysterious, possessing its own normativity, agency, and intrinsic value. As such, engagement with nature presents opportunities for consciousness quintessentially to go beyond itself, to be inspired and refreshed, and to receive non-anthropogenic standards in the form of intimations of what is fitting and what is not. It will be argued that these are fundamental to the orientation of human being, providing primordial intimations of the nature of reality and truth. Given their centrality to the idea of a person’s becoming educated, the elucidation of these and the issues to which they give rise must be central to the philosophy of education and in this sense it becomes deeply ecological.     

Predicting feelings of cognitive competence in head start preschoolers

Little is known about what predicts the budding sense of self-competence in preschoolers. This is particularly true of cognitive competence, which may have implications for later schooling. Based on previous research with older children, it was expected that feelings of self-competence would be influenced by attitudes of significant others as well as intrapersonal dispositions. Forty-five Head Start preschoolers (M age = 4.36 years) served as participants. As expected, high effortful control and language competence, as well as teachers' ratings of competence, predicted positive feelings about cognitive competence in children. Further analysis revealed that the teachers' ratings were predicted by maternal education and language competence. The findings suggest that the development of cognitive self-concept in preschoolers is predicted by contextual and constitutional factors.     

What is Literature? Revisited: Sartre on the Language of Literature

This article argues that Sartre's distinction in What Is Literature? between prose and poetry should be understood in the light of his earlier distinction in The Imaginary between two kinds of meaning. Sartre argues against the “Cartesian picture” of consciousness in The Imaginary, specifically concerning our experience of images. Not only is a mental image not an “inner object” mediating between consciousness and the world, even a picture drawn on paper should not be understood as an object standing between the viewer and what this picture represents. Our experience, Sartre argues, is that of seeing things in a picture rather than seeing through it, such that the meaning of pictures and images in general is embodied in them and cannot be separated from them. He then goes on to contrast this kind of embodied meaning (which he calls “sense”) with a kind of meaning that can be completely grasped independently of its expression (which he calls “signification”) and identify the two with painting and language respectively. It is for this reason, this article argues, that Sartre later sees poetry as a deviation from language's proper function. This rigid distinction is maintained by Sartre until the end of his career, and the change that some commentators found in him are its outcome rather than a revolt against it. In contrast, Merleau-Ponty has demonstrated more convincingly that sense and signification are both essential aspects of linguistic meaning, and their relation is much more dynamic and complimentary than Sartre would have allowed.     

Corporate consciousness: Defining the paradigm

The concept of corporate consciousness is defined and discussed. In response to Campion and Palmer (1996), it is asserted that corporate consciousness is not a construct related to conscientiousness or moral responsibility, but an entirely new paradigm, related to awareness and information processing; the concept is cognitive, not metaphysical. Corporate consciousness serves as a framework for understanding the current trend within organizations toward greater awareness of societal realities, and of the organization's impact within larger systems. This framework borrows heavily from the cognitive, social, and organizational psychological literature and can be understood from both micro and macro levels of analysis. Also discussed are the issues of why and how to study corporate consciousness, as well as implications for the organizational practitioner.     

Higher-order theories of consciousness and what-it-is-like-ness

Ambitious higher-order theories of consciousness aim to account for conscious states when these are understood in terms of what-it-is-like-ness. This paper considers two arguments concerning this aim, and concludes that ambitious theories fail. The misrepresentation argument against HO theories aims to show that the possibility of radical misrepresentation—there being a HO state about a state the subject is not in—leads to a contradiction. In contrast, the awareness argument aims to bolster HO theories by showing that subjects are aware of all their conscious states. Both arguments hinge on how we understand two related notions which are ubiquitous in discussions of consciousness: those of what-it-is-like-ness and there being something it is like for a subject to be in a mental state. This paper examines how HO theorists must understand the two crucial notions if they are to reject the misrepresentation argument but assert the awareness argument. It shows that HO theorists can and do adopt an understanding—the HO reading—which seems to give them what they want. But adopting the HO reading changes the two arguments. On this reading, the awareness argument tells us nothing about those states there is something it is like to be in, and so offers no support to ambitious HO theories. And to respond to the misrepresentation understood according to the HO reading is to simply ignore the argument presented, and so to give no response at all. As things stand, we should deny that HO theories can account for what-it-is-like-ness.     

Acting out in the treatment situation

More and more frequently the deficiencies and deprivations of early life are seen in the inability of patients to utilize psychic process to ameliorate conflict and painful affect. As a result, the tendency to act out anger and violent feelings in the external world in ways that are destructive and damaging is a prominent symptom. In the course of therapy, this somatic expression enters the treatment situation itself, often directed to the person of the analyst as the transference object. Understanding dynamics of what is actually being reenacted and using this information to convert somatic language to psychic process is the central focus of this paper. Acting out is defined and what places it apart from other pathological symptoms is described, along with associated ego functions, triggering mechanisms, affects, narcissistic and preoedipal factors, speech and symbolization, and stability and quality of mental representations. Acting out has been linked to somatization in recent years, and is understood as a defense against hostile wishes and impulses in an attempt to eliminate internal dangers from awareness. Treatment focuses on moving acting out into the realm of talking out, free association, dream interpretation, and interpretation in general with the proper timing in assessing the patient's ability to transfer experiences with early objects onto the analyst.     

X—Knowledge of Action Without Observation

This paper argues that perception of one's body 'from the inside' provides one with an awareness of acting, and that this awareness explains a previously overlooked feature of one's knowledge of one's own actions. Actions are events: they occur during periods of time. Knowledge of such events must be sensitive to their course through time. Perception of one's body 'from the inside' allows one to monitor one's actions as they unfold, thereby sustaining one's knowledge of what one is doing over the period of time in which one is doing it.     

WHAT IS CONSCIOUSNESS AND HAS IT EVOLVED?

Research into consciousness has now become respectable, and much has been written about it. Is consciousness the exclusive property of human beings, or can it be found also in animals? Can machines become conscious? Is consciousness an illusion, and are all mental states ultimately reducible to the movement of molecules? If consciousness is other than matter, what connection does it have with matter? These and others like them are now serious scientific questions in the West. This article discusses consciousness within the frame of the following assertions: Consciousness has evolved from earlier states of awareness to be found in lower forms of life. The current scientific method is too restrictive for the study of conscience and its evolution. In particular classical logic leads scientists to ignore or reject consciousness as a legitimate field of study. Mind and matter, generalized as knowing and being, have equal status.     

简论里贝特的意识理论

里贝特是人类意识和自由意志的实验研究领域的一个卓越的、先驱性的神经科学家。里贝特的意识研究工作涉及如下四个方面：（1）关于意识研究的认识论原则;（2）对意识现象本性的界定;（3）意识机制的时控理论;（4）对自由意志的阐释和有意识的心智场理论。里贝特的意识研究独树一帜,其时控理论具有坚实可信的实验证据,它从时间维度揭示了有意识的主观体验以及无意识的心智功能与神经活动之间的时间机制。