How people cope with uncertainty due to chance or deception

In making social judgments people process effects caused by humans differently from effects caused by non-human agencies. We assume that when they have to predict outcomes that are attributed to non-human causes, people acknowledge their ignorance and try to focus on what is most diagnostic. However, when events are attributed to human agency, they believe that nothing is arbitrary and that one can understand the decision situation well enough to eliminate error. If so, then people should behave differently when an uncertainty is attributed to chance (a non-human agency) or to deception (a human agency). We tested this prediction using the probability-matching paradigm and found reasonable support for our analysis in four experiments. Individuals who attributed uncertainty to deception were less likely to adopt the optimal rule-based strategy than those who attributed it to chance. Indeed, only when the former were prevented from thinking about and elaborating the outcomes (the high-interference condition in Experiment 3) was their performance comparable to the level of individuals in the chance condition.     

How people think about distributing aid

This paper examines how people think about aiding others in a way that can inform both theory and practice. It uses data gathered from Kiva, an online, non-profit organization that allows individuals to aid other individuals around the world, to isolate intuitions that people find broadly compelling. The central result of the paper is that people seem to give more priority to aiding those in greater need, at least below some threshold. That is, the data strongly suggest incorporating both a threshold and a prioritarian principle into the analysis of what principles for aid distribution people accept. This conclusion should be of broad interest to aid practitioners and policy makers. It may also provide important information for political philosophers interested in building, justifying, and criticizing theories about meeting needs using empirical evidence.     

How and why people accept personality feedback

The present experiment examined a model and a supplementary explanation of feedback acceptance. The model consisted of inventory responding under a yea-saying response set and the explanation stated that feedback is accepted because it is accurate and persuasive. "Neurotic" and stable undergraduates (n = 120) took several personality inventories and then rated the accuracies of personality "interpretations." As predicted, the model mirrored every detail of feedback acceptance; also, the accuracy of interpretations related most simply to their acceptance and the undergraduates changed their self-perceptions in the direction of the interpretations. Contrary to predictions, individual differences in persuasibility did influence feedback acceptance.     

Memory for time: How people date events

The effect of different formats on the accuracy of dating news and the distribution of personal events was examined in four conditions. In the first, participants had to date events in the absolute time format (e.g., "July 2004"), and in the second, they had to date events in the relative time format (e.g., "3 weeks ago"). In the other conditions, they were asked to choose between the two formats. We found a small backward telescoping effect for recent news events and a large forward telescoping effect for remote events. Events dated in the absolute time format were more accurate than those dated in the relative time format. Furthermore, participants preferred to date news events with the relative time format and personal events with the absolute time format, as well as preferring to date remote events in the relative time format and recent events in the absolute time format.     

依靠什么走向国家富强、人民幸福

“五星红旗迎风飘扬,胜利歌声多么嘹亮;歌唱我们伟大祖国,从今走向繁荣富强”,几十年来,是差不多每一个中国人都熟悉的歌词。这是我们全中国人民的共同理想和希望,也是一百多年来无数志士仁人、先烈前辈为之奋斗的目标。如何实现国家富强、人民幸福?几十年来,对于绝大多数新中国的公民,似乎也不成问题。有马克思列宁主义、毛泽东思想、邓小平理论和“三个代表”重要思想指导,有全心全意服务于人民的中国共产党的正确领导,有全国人民的共同努力、团结奋斗,这就是我们实现国家富强、人民幸福的依靠,难道还有什么问题吗?是的,这不应该有什么问…     

How people explain actions performed by groups and individuals.

The authors explore whether people explain intentional actions performed by groups differently from actions performed by individuals, A theoretical framework is offered that distinguishes between 2 modes of explanation: the agent's reasons (beliefs or desires in light of which the agent decided to act) and causal histories of reasons (CHRs; factors that preceded and brought about the agent's reasons). The authors develop the hypothesis that people use more CHR explanations when explaining group actions than when explaining individual actions. Study 1 demonstrates this asymmetry. Studies 2 and 3 explore 2 necessary conditions for the asymmetry: that the group be perceived as an aggregate of individual actors rather thin as a jointly acting group and that explainers have general information available about the group. Discussion focuses on people's perception of groups as entities and agents.     

How people interpret conditionals: shifts toward the conditional event

We investigated how people interpret conditionals and how stable their interpretation is over a long series of trials. Participants were shown the colored patterns on each side of a 6-sided die and were asked how sure they were that a conditional holds of the side landing upward when the die is randomly thrown. Participants were presented with 71 trials consisting of all combinations of binary dimensions of shape (e.g., circles and squares) and color (e.g., blue and red) painted onto the sides of each die. In 2 experiments (N? = 66, N? = 65), the conditional event was the dominant interpretation, followed by conjunction, and material conditional responses were negligible. In both experiments, the percentage of participants giving a conditional event response increased from around 40% at the beginning of the task to nearly 80% at the end, with most participants shifting from a conjunction interpretation. The shift was moderated by the order of shape and color in each conditional's antecedent and consequent: Participants were more likely to shift if the antecedent referred to a color. In Experiment 2 we collected response times: Conditional event interpretations took longer to process than conjunction interpretations (mean difference = 500 ms). We discuss implications of our results for mental models theory and probabilistic theories of reasoning.     

How people see others is different from how people see themselves: a replicable pattern across cultures

Consensus studies from 4 cultures--in Belgium, the Czech Republic, Estonia, and Germany--as well as secondary analyses of self- and observer-reported Revised NEO Personality Inventory (NEO PI-R) data from 29 cultures suggest that there is a cross-culturally replicable pattern of difference between internal and external perspectives for the Big Five personality traits. People see themselves as more neurotic and open to experience compared to how they are seen by other people. External observers generally hold a higher opinion of an individual's conscientiousness than he or she does about him- or herself. As a rule, people think that they have more positive emotions and excitement seeking but much less assertiveness than it seems from the vantage point of an external observer. This cross-culturally replicable disparity between internal and external perspectives was not consistent with predictions based on the actor-observer hypothesis because the size of the disparity was unrelated to the visibility of personality traits. A relatively strong negative correlation (r = -.53) between the average self-minus-observer profile and social desirability ratings suggests that people in most studied cultures view themselves less favorably than they are perceived by others.     

Why preschoolers are reluctant to count spontaneously

Two experiments are reported which examine children's counting and its role in reasoning about the relative numerosity of two arrays. In the first experiment, children's number judgements were compared under different conditions designed to evaluate the importance of three different cues to number—length and density of rows, small number perception and counting. Children were found to count very rarely unless specifically asked to do so. Experiment 2 investigated some possible reasons why children who count readily in some situations are reluctant to count spontaneously in this number judgement task. Spontaneous counting in 4-year-olds increased in one condition only: when they were given feedback as to the correctness of their previous judgements. This feedback showed that basing judgements on number as counted was always correct whereas length and density judgements were only sometimes correct. Preschoolers' preference for length as a cue to number may therefore be due to their belief that length is a more reliable cue than counting, rather than to their ignorance about the link between counting and numerical reasoning.     

How does coping help people resist lapses during smoking cessation?

OBJECTIVES: To determine whether types of coping strategies have differential effects on preventing lapses and lowering urge levels and to investigate mechanisms by which coping strategies prevent lapses during smoking cessation. DESIGN: Sixty-one respondents performed ecological momentary assessment using palm-top computers and tape recorders to report their coping strategies and urge levels before and after temptations to smoke. Multilevel linear regression models were used to compare the effects of individual strategy types with the average strategy. MAIN OUTCOME MEASURES: Lapses versus resisted temptations and changes in urge levels. RESULTS: Number of strategies significantly predicted resisting smoking and change in urge levels. Compared with the effect of the average strategy, movement/exercise was marginally worse at preventing lapses, and food/drink was marginally related to higher postcoping urge levels. CONCLUSION: Although using multiple coping strategies helps people resist the urge to smoke, no particular coping strategy works better than any other. Coping strategies prevent lapses by reducing high urge levels during temptations.     

A cheat in our midst: How people evaluate and respond to fellow group members who cheat

Having a group cheat within a group can violate group trust and reduce the benefits gained from group membership. However, group members will sometimes cheat to get an advantage over other in‐group members. In two experiments, the present research investigated how group members evaluate and respond to fellow group members who cheat, and whether group prototypicality or evaluators’ group identification moderate evaluations and behavioral recommendations toward group cheats. In Study 1 (N = 146 undergraduate students), group members evaluated group cheats more negatively than a comparable group deviant. However, highly identified group members would spare a cheat who had high group prototypicality. In Study 2 (N = 227 undergraduate students), highly identified group members rated a one‐time cheat with high prototypicality more favorably than a one‐time cheat with low prototypicality. However, prototypicality did not moderate evaluations toward a multiple time group cheat. In both studies, target evaluations were associated with changes in behavioral recommendations. Overall, results indicate a pattern similar to research on transgression or deviance credit: having group prototypicality can save a group cheat from an initial negative evaluation from highly identified group members, but prototypicality does not buffer against negative evaluations toward multiple time group cheaters.     

Opposition to immigration: How people who identify with far-right discourses legitimize the social exclusion of immigrants

This study sought to develop our understanding of how people legitimize opposition to immigration. Thirty-eight interviews were conducted with people who self-identified with far-right anti-immigration discourses, in Italy (N = 23) and Portugal (N = 15). Using reflexive thematic analysis, we developed four related themes. In the first theme, ‘They're guests’: Legitimizing exclusion by differentiating (non-) immigrants, we discuss how despite differentiating between types of immigrants, participants support their social exclusion and always perceive them as guests. In the second theme, ‘White people exist’: Multiple and intersected identity threats, we identify how anti-immigration is legitimized by recurring multiple group threats including ownership, economic, security, cultural, and existential threats. In the third theme, ‘It's like your home’: Justifying exclusionary solidarity based on ownership rights, we illustrate how collective ownership is used to justify practices of exclusionary solidarity. In the fourth theme ‘This is me’: Being born and becoming anti-immigration, we discuss how opposition to immigration was constructed and influenced by contextual conditions as well as international sources of information. The implications of these findings are discussed while considering how participants' experiences and social contexts shape how they perceive immigration and legitimize the social exclusion of immigrants.     

Becoming irreplaceable: How comparisons to the partner’s alternatives differentially affect low and high self-esteem people

It is proposed that people are motivated to feel hard to replace in romantic relationships because feeling irreplaceable fosters trust in a partner’s continued responsiveness. By contrast, feeling replaceable motivates compensatory behavior aimed at strengthening the partner’s commitment to the relationship. A correlational study of dating couples and two experiments examined how satiating/thwarting the goal of feeling irreplaceable differentially affects relationship perception and behavior for low and high self-esteem people. The results revealed that satiating the goal of feeling irreplaceable increases trust for people low in self-esteem. In contrast, thwarting the goal of feeling irreplaceable increases compensatory behaviors meant to prove one’s indispensability for people high in self-esteem.     

How people make support judgments: individual differences in the traits used to infer supportiveness in others.

Social support and other social judgments are composed of several distinct components, of which relationship effects are an important part. With regard to support judgments, relationship effects refer to the fact that when judging the same targets, people differ systematically in whom they see as supportive. One explanation for this effect is that people differ in how they combine information about targets to judge supportiveness. Participants rated the supportiveness of hypothetical targets and targets from their own social networks. Multilevel modeling identified the traits participants used to make support judgments. There were significant differences in the extent to which participants used different target personality traits to judge supportiveness. In addition, participant neuroticism predicted the extent to which participants used target neuroticism and agreeableness to judge supportiveness.     

How people make decisions about predictive genetic testing: An analogue study

Abstract

Persons scoring high on negative affectivity (NA) have more subjective health complaints. In this study, we tested the hypothesis that high NA persons are more likely to experience internal sensations as threatening signs of health problems. Low and high NA participants (N=44) were given four breathing trials: one room air trial followed by three trials containing 5.5% CO₂ which induced transient low intensity somatic sensations. Prior to each CO₂ trial, participants received either positive, negative or uncertain labelings of the sensations that might occur. Participants rated the (un)pleasantness of the experienced somatic sensations and the perceived intensity. Also respiratory responses were measured. During CO₂ trials, reliable main effects of information were found but no effects involving NA were observed, neither on pleasantness ratings nor on respiratory responses. However, during room air breathing, high NA participants reported more intense somatic sensations than low NA participants. Post-experimental data suggested that high NA participants had more negative meanings and worries about the consequences of the physical sensations. It is concluded that interpretational biases in high NA is situated at the level of attributional processes.