Intentional and identity processes: A social constructionist investigation using student journals

In contrast to traditional theories of career development that focus on decision-making processes in relation to market work, [Richardson, M. S. (2004). The emergence of new intentions in subjective experience: A social/personal constructionist and relational understanding. Journal of Vocational Behavior, 64, 485-498], informed by social constructionism and considering both work and relationships, suggests that the process of emerging intentional states or intentional process is central to the broader task of constructing a life. This study was designed to investigate this process. The research situation consisted of three structured group discussions with students in a graduate class. Journals written after the group discussions constituted the data for the study. Based on the first stage of data analysis, the scope of investigation was expanded to include emerging identity states or identity process and the emotional experience of the group discussions. In the second phase of data analysis, intentional process and identity process data were analyzed for themes and the emotional experience data were coded. Results of both phases of data analysis are discussed in relation to future research and implications for practice.     

Intentional Binding is independent of the validity of the action effect's identity

When an action produces an effect, both events are perceived to be shifted in time toward each other. This shift is called Intentional Binding (IB) effect. First evidence shows that this shift does not depend on the statistical predictability of the produced effect's identity (Desantis, Hughes, & Waszak, 2012). We confirm this result by comparing the perceived duration of action–effect intervals before valid and invalid action effects using the method of constant stimuli. The perceived duration of action–effect intervals did not differ for valid and invalid effects. This result was true for different durations of the action–effect interval (Experiments 1–4: 250 ms, Experiments 1 & 2: 400 ms), different effect modalities (Experiments 1 & 3: visual, Experiments 2–4: auditive), and two types of validity variations (Experiments 1 & 2: 80% valid, Experiments 3 & 4: 100% valid vs. random). We validated our results by using a clock paradigm and a numerical duration estimation task (Experiment 4). We conclude that the IB effect is not the result of internal prediction due to action–effect bindings, but might rely on higher-order processes.     

Intentional Objects

The idea of an intentional object, or an object of thought, gives rise to a dilemma for theories of intentionality. Either intentional objects are existing objects, in which case it is impossible, contrary to appearances, to think about something which does not exist. Or some intentional objects are non-existent real objects. But this requires an obscure and implausible metaphysics. I argue that the way out of this dilemma is to deny that being an intentional object is being an entity of any kind. 'Object' here does not mean thing or entity. Rather, to say that something is an intentional object is just to say that it is an object of thought (or other intentional state or act) for a subject. It is further argued that theories of intentionality should not dispense with the idea of an intentional object.     

Intentional and Skillful Neurons

Abstract

In the mid-1990s, there was a major neuroscientific discovery which might drastically alter sport science in general and philosophy of sport in particular. The discovery of mirror neurons by Giacomo Rizzolatti and colleagues in Parma, Italy, is a substantial contribution to understanding brains, movements, and humans. Famous neuroscientist V. S. Ramachandran believes the discovery of mirror neurons ‘will do for psychology what DNA did for biology’ (http://www.edge.org/3rd_culture/ramachandran/ramachandran_p1.html). Somehow mirror neurons have not received the deserved attention in the philosophy of sport, but perhaps now is the time to reflect on some implications and consequences. The discovery of mirror neurons may increase our insights about our ability to learn, understand, intend, and produce skillful motor actions. In this article I will first examine what mirror neurons are and how they function in monkeys and humans. Second, I will review some objections to the so-called mirror neuron theory of action understanding, and try to reconcile some of these objections. Third, I will inquire into some implications for philosophy, which I believe are also fundamental to several topics in the philosophy of sport. I will then try to relate some of the most interesting aspects of mirror neurons to recent debates in the philosophy of sport. Finally, I will speculate on what further neuroscientific research might teach us about the nature of being a moving subject.     

Intentional transaction

The second person is often set in contrast to the first person. And there is a contrast. It does not reside in a difference of what is thought as I from what is thought as you. For that is not different. The contrast is that of monadic and dyadic predication, action and transaction. It is the contrast, not of I and You, but of I and I–You. The second person does not add a You to an I. It divides the I and makes it a relation. We consider, first, the form of predication that is common to first- and second-person thought. Then, we define the second person as a species of this form of thought. Last, we find the source and condition of this form of thought in a thought of this very form. This thought, being the source of its own form, is one of which one cannot be conscious from outside it. It is a last word, or, better, a first word.¹1. Compare Thomas Nagel's notion of a last word (Nagel 2001 Nagel, Thomas. 2001. The Last Word. Oxford: Oxford University Press. [Google Scholar]). Nagel's development of the notion reveals no reason why he should call what is last a word. From what he writes in the book, one would think its title to be “The Last Thought”. (Indeed, chapter 2 bears the title “Why We Can't Understand Thought from the Outside”.) However, if the last thought is I–You, then the last thought is a word; indeed, it is the word. In reaching for “The Last Word”, Nagel may express an inchoate appreciation of this.     

Intentional Contents and Self-Control

Conventional research programs adopt efficient cause as a metaphor for how mental events affect behavior. Such theory-constitutive metaphors usefully restrict the purview of research programs, to define the space of possibilities. However, conventional research programs have not yet offered a plausible account of how intentional contents control action, and such an account may be beyond the range of its theoretical possibilities. Circular causality supplies a more inclusive metaphor for how mental events might control behavior. Circular causality perpetuates dynamic structures in time. Mental contents are seen as emergent dynamic constraints perpetuated in time and vertically coupled across their multiple timescales. Intentional contents are accommodated as extraordinary boundary conditions (constraints) that evolve on timescales longer than those of motor coordination (Kugler & Turvey, 1987). Intentional contents, on their longer timescales, are thus available to control embodied processes on shorter timescales. One key assumption-that constraints are vertically coupled in time-is motivated empirically by correlated noise, long-range correlations in the background variability of measured laboratory performances.     

Intentional psychologism

In the past few years, a number of philosophers (notably, Siewert, C. (The significance of consciousness. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1998); Horgan and Tienson (Philosophy of mind: Classical and contemporary readings, Oxford University Press, 2002, pp. 520–533); Pitt 2004) have maintained the following three theses: (1) there is a distinctive sort of phenomenology characteristic of conscious thought, as opposed to other sorts of conscious mental states; (2) different conscious thoughts have different phenomenologies; and (3) thoughts with the same phenomenology have the same intentional content. The last of these three claims is open to at least two different interpretations. It might mean that the phenomenology of a thought expresses its intentional content, where intentional content is understood as propositional, and propositions are understood as mind-and language-independent abstract entities (such as sets of possible worlds, functions from possible worlds to truth-values, structured n-tuples of objects and properties, etc.). And it might mean that the phenomenology of a thought is its intentional content—that is, that the phenomenology of a thought, like the phenomenology of a sensation, constitutes its content. The second sort of view is a kind of psychologism. Psychologistic views hold that one or another sort of thing—numbers, sentences, propositions, etc.—that we can think or know about is in fact a kind of mental thing. Since Frege, psychologism has been in bad repute among analytic philosophers. It is widely held that Frege showed that such views are untenable, since, among other things, they subjectivize what is in fact objective, and, hence, relativize such things as consistency and truth to the peculiarities of human psychology. The purpose of this paper is to explore the consequences of the thesis that intentional mental content is phenomenological (what I call “intentional psychologism”) and to try to reach a conclusion about whether it yields a tenable view of mind, thought and meaning. I believe the thesis is not so obviously wrong as it will strike many philosophers of mind and language. In fact, it can be defended against the standard objections to psychologism, and it can provide the basis for a novel and interesting account of mentality.     

Inverting Intentional Content

Critics of wide functionalism havetraditionally sought to attack the theory byexposing weaknesses in its account of the qualitative content of experience. Widefunctionalist theories of intentionalcontent, however, were spared philosophicalscrutiny. I propose that wide functionalistaccounts of the intentional content are equallysusceptible to attack. I will attempt todemonstrate this by enlisting thefunctionalist's old foe from the qualia wars –the inverted spectrum hypothesis – in a newway. If the argument is sound, not only will Ihave shown that the inverted spectrumhypothesis may have more use than philosophicalliterature recognizes, I will have also exposeda weakness in a dominant philosophical theory:the wide functionalist theory of intentionalcontent.     

Intentional action first

The paper motivates a novel research programme in the philosophy of action parallel to the ‘Knowledge First’ programme in epistemology. It is argued that much of the grounds for abandoning the quest for a reductive analysis of knowledge in favour of the Knowledge First alternative is mirrored in the case of intentional action, inviting the hypothesis that intentional action is also, like knowledge, metaphysically basic. The paper goes on to demonstrate the sort of explanatory contribution that intentional action can make once it is no longer taken to be a target for reductive analysis, in explaining other, non-intentional kinds of action and voluntariness.