A rational account of pedagogical reasoning: Teaching by,and learning from,examples

Much of learning and reasoning occurs in pedagogical situations—situations in which a person who knows a concept chooses examples for the purpose of helping a learner acquire the concept. We introduce a model of teaching and learning in pedagogical settings that predicts which examples teachers should choose and what learners should infer given a teacher’s examples. We present three experiments testing the model predictions for rule-based, prototype, and causally structured concepts. The model shows good quantitative and qualitative fits to the data across all three experiments, predicting novel qualitative phenomena in each case. We conclude by discussing implications for understanding concept learning and implications for theoretical claims about the role of pedagogy in human learning.     

Dialogue as Constructivist Pedagogy: Probing the Minds of Psychology's Greatest Contributors

In this article, I report on my use of dialogue as an exploratory teaching tool in an undergraduate colloquium titled Historical Foundations of Psychology. Students completed written assignments in which they identified the contributors to psychology associated with each of a series of position statements that capture the intellectual, philosophical, or theoretical views of these individuals. Students were not told in advance the identity of contributors relative to their respective position statements, which assumed the form of excerpts and quotations (direct or paraphrased) from original and secondary sources. As part of their written responses, students provided supporting rationale for their answers and discussed the truths and misconceptions inherent in each statement. Afterward, students engaged in class discussion involving peer critique of their written responses. Through qualitative assessment, the dialogue method was shown to advance critical thinking and participation in the learning process. Students generally described dialogue as challenging, helpful, and enjoyable in exploring the views of eminent thinkers throughout the history of psychology. Findings are discussed in light of constructivist pedagogy, in which students actively and interactively create their own conceptual understandings. In line with the conclusion that dialogue is a promising instructional technique, future classroom applications are also presented.     

Science,Scripture, and the Hermeneutics of Ascension

Abstract

From the perspective of the science–religion dialogue, the ascension of Jesus represents one of the most challenging of all Christian doctrines to negotiate. It necessitates, on the one hand, the interpretation of richly allusive and diverse biblical texts, and on the other hand, the resolution of scientific and theological paradoxes at the edge of conceptualization. I suggest a possible way forward which makes use of a conversational approach informed by Gadamerian hermeneutics. This keeps the peculiarities and particularities of individual texts foremost, and allows the perspectives of science, theology and biblical studies to engage at first hand over them.     

SIMPLIFYING ALETHIC PLURALISM

What is truth? What precisely is it that truths have that falsehoods lack? Pluralists about truth (or “alethic pluralists”) tend to answer these questions by saying that there is more than one way for a proposition, sentence, belief—or any chosen truth‐bearer—to be true. In this paper, I argue that two of the most influential formations of alethic pluralism, those of Wright (1992, 2003a ) and Lynch (2009 ), are subject to serious problems. I outline a new formulation, which I call “simple determination pluralism,” that I claim offers better prospects for alethic pluralism, with the potential to have applications for pluralist theories beyond truth.     

Toward a Militant Pedagogy in the Name of Love: On Psychiatrization of Indifference,Neurobehaviorism and the Diagnosis of ADHD—A Philosophical Intervention

(Neuro)psychiatric diagnoses such as attention deficit hyperactivity disorder (ADHD) is a rapidly growing and globally increasing phenomenon, not least in different educational contexts such as in family and in school. Children and youths labelled as ADHD are challenging normative claims in terms of nurturing and education, whereas those labelled as ADHD are considered a (future) risk for society to handle. The dominant paradigm regarding ADHD is biomedical, where different levels of attention and activity-impulsivity are perceived as neurobiological dys/functions within the brain best managed by means of an individual diagnosis and instrumental pedagogy. The majority of those labelled as having ADHD encounter a dominant educational model in the form of what is referred to in this article as neurobehaviorism, which is based on onto-epistemological violence. As opposed to this act of violence against being—and against the psychiatrized subject—a less violent educational model is proposed, based on French philosopher Alain Badiou’s ontological examination of being and his concept of love as a truth procedure. In terms of the latter, the focus is on the potential of the encounter as a ‘Two scene of love’. Here, the encounter is a place where it is possible to create new truths and subjects, instead of taking the individual diagnosis as an axiom which only leads to individuals having fixed identities codified in a hierarchical order. This argument is drawn from the ‘mathematical’ formula 1 + 1 = ?, which originates from an online forum for people who have come into contact with ADHD in one way or another.     

Exploring the ethics of agency through the lens of Bildung

Experiencing something of a renaissance, the German pedagogical idea ‘Bildung’ has recently been reconsidered for contemporary education. Historically proposed by von Humboldt, Bildung’s interplay represents a relational movement between a learner and the world that aims for personal freedom and growth. It is also identified as a means by which learners might become aware of their personal capacity to develop responses to daily experiences. Thus, it attends to agency and has resonance with children’s spirituality. Whilst such a notion of learning might be promoted as an alternative to a functionalistic educational paradigm, this paper highlights ethical concerns regarding pedagogical freedom. It highlights philosophically the illusion of freedom and considers critically the place of power in learner-led methods. Finally, the paper proposes how a nuanced, Kierkegaardian application of Bildung might address the ethical concerns raised and proposes how a re-considered understanding of the notion might be valuable for education today.     

Plato and Socrates: From an Educator of Childhood to a Childlike Educator?

This paper deals with two forms of education—Platonic and Socratic. The former educates childhood to transform it into what it ought to be. The latter does not form childhood, but makes education childlike. To unfold the philosophical and pedagogical dimensions of this opposition, the first part of the paper highlights the way in which philosophy is presented indirectly in some of Plato’s dialogues, beginning with a characterisation that Socrates makes of himself in the dialogue Phaedrus. The second part details Plato’s condemnation of writing in the Phaedrus, and draws on the critique by Jacques Derrida and Gilles Deleuze to establish what is at stake in this condemnation. In the third part, the pedagogical and political implications of this condemnation are reviewed, and Plato is placed in a surprising position in relation to his own teacher, Socrates. Finally, through a comparison between childhood and philosophy, the educational value of putting childhood and philosophy together is questioned. Through a number of questions, the paper ends problematising the pedagogical, political and philosophical value of placing the practice of philosophy in the realm of childhood citizenship education. It also recovers the value of philosophy—as a form of questioning and unlearning what we know and affirming the value of not knowing—in a childlike education.     

Process-Product Dynamics: The Role of Otherness in Cultural Cultivation

Carriere (2013) presents a stimulating perspective on the cultural phenomena aiming to recover the role of the external products of culture to imbalance the currently popular emphasis on subject’s process of cultivation highlighted by semiotic developmental cultural psychology. The excessive focus on subject’s internal processes dismissing a better consideration of products of culture and the compelling objective realities of other dimensions of culture are pointed out. By this way the author’s proposes a better dialogue with others perspectives on (cross)cultural psychology. These arguments are analyzed through a closer consideration of I-Other perennial movement. A dialogical view of process-product dynamics is then proposed. The role of Otherness—the one that (partially)shares and the one as witness, approving or disapproving subject’s products of cultivation—is discussed through the analysis of a concrete episode of the cultivation of the subject. It is concluded that a semiotic developmental cultural psychology and (cross) cultural psychology have different objects of knowledge comprising distinct interests and research fields.     

Children’s attention to sample composition in learning,teaching and discovery

Two studies compared children’s attention to sample composition – whether a sample provides a diverse representation of a category of interest – during teacher‐led and learner‐driven learning contexts. In Study 1 (n = 48), 5‐year‐olds attended to sample composition to make inferences about biological properties only when samples were presented by a knowledgeable teacher. In contrast, adults attended to sample composition in both teacher‐led and learner‐driven contexts. In Study 2 (n = 51), 6‐year‐olds chose to create diverse samples to teach information about biological kinds to another child, but not to discover new information for themselves, whereas adults chose to create diverse samples for both teaching and information discovery. Results suggest that how children approach the interpretation and selection of evidence varies depending on whether learning occurs in a pedagogical or a non‐pedagogical context.     

Creating a dialogic space for prospective teacher critical reflection and transformative learning

This research highlights the pedagogical significance of dialogic spaces in supporting critical reflection and transformative learning among prospective teachers in the United States. It finds that, with elucidation of the multiple voices and texts from prospective teachers’ field experience, teacher educators can stimulate deep reflection to springboard transformative learning. It also finds that ePortfolios have strong potential to support a dialogic approach to reflection. However, it is also clear that, absent systematic observation and careful follow-up dialogue, the potential to move from reflection to transformative learning is limited. The findings will help teacher educators rethink the design and practice of supervision with ePortfolios, reinforcing that critical dialogue between the supervisor and the prospective teachers is key to supporting prospective teachers’ critical reflection and transformative learning, and to improving their teaching practice.     

The Metabolic Core of Environmental Education

I consider the case of the “simplest” living beings—bacteria—and examine how their embodied activity constitutes an organism/environment interaction, out of which emerges the possibility of learning from an environment. I suggest that this mutual co-emergence of organism and environment implies a panbiotic educational interaction that is at once the condition for, and achievement of, all living beings. Learning and being learned from are entangled in varied ways throughout the biosphere. Education is not an exclusively human project, it is part of the ancient evolutionary process of elaborating and diversifying the relational possibilities inherent in metabolism that has brought forth our diverse and flourishing world. Abstracted from context, “education” appears as a set of ways in which humans actively engage and take responsibility for the learning outcomes of relationships with each other. Insofar as we consider this distinction absolute rather than a performed construct to be assessed by its consequences, we blind ourselves to the educative dimension of other species as well as our many miseducative engagements with them. If learning processes are inherent and constitutive of ecological communities, education theorists should devote their pedagogical sensitivities and insights to the crucial challenge of developing educative sustainable human–nature relations.     

Is there None Left to Say Anything?

Abstract. Remarks made by Lutheran leaders in Africa indicate that the churches have not been responding to the crisis of the HIV/AIDS pandemic sufficiently. In this essay I ask how the churches would be better prepared to act and also, more broadly, how the churches act to begin with. The dialogue between religion and science can assist us with both tasks as we consider the challenge of HIV/AIDS as a focus for this dialogue. First, analysis by social scientists can uncover what problems face any effort to motivate churches to act—and, for that matter, any individual member of a church group. I argue, further, that we can discover the difficulties associated with producing action by religious communities by looking not at abstract theological ideas but by investigating the way those ideas are conveyed in worship. I explore the worship patterns of Lutherans to show what sort of view is actually produced by the week‐to‐week messages of liturgical texts. I contend that a different approach both to worship and to action can be produced by reconsidering our views of reality as seen through the eyes of contemporary science.     

A reinforcement learning approach to personalized learning recommendation systems

Personalized learning refers to instruction in which the pace of learning and the instructional approach are optimized for the needs of each learner. With the latest advances in information technology and data science, personalized learning is becoming possible for anyone with a personal computer, supported by a data-driven recommendation system that automatically schedules the learning sequence. The engine of such a recommendation system is a recommendation strategy that, based on data from other learners and the performance of the current learner, recommends suitable learning materials to optimize certain learning outcomes. A powerful engine achieves a balance between making the best possible recommendations based on the current knowledge and exploring new learning trajectories that may potentially pay off. Building such an engine is a challenging task. We formulate this problem within the Markov decision framework and propose a reinforcement learning approach to solving the problem.     

Just do it? When to do what you judge you ought to do

While it is generally believed that justification is a fallible guide to the truth, there might be interesting exceptions to this general rule. In recent work on bridge-principles, an increasing number of authors have argued that truths about what a subject ought to do are truths we stand in some privileged epistemic relation to and that our justified normative beliefs are beliefs that will not lead us astray. If these bridge-principles hold, it suggests that justification might play an interesting role in our normative theories. In turn, this might help us understand the value of justification, a value that’s notoriously difficult to understand if we think of justification as but a fallible means to a desired end. We will argue that these bridge-principles will be incredibly difficult to defend. While we do not think that normative facts necessarily stand in any interesting relationship to our justified beliefs about them, there might well be a way of defending the idea that our justified beliefs about what to do won’t lead us astray. In turn, this might help us understand the value of justification, but this way of thinking about justification and its value comes with costs few would be willing to pay.     

Against Limited Foreknowledge

Theological fatalists contend that if God knows everything, then no human action is free, and that since God does know everything, no human action is free. One reply to such arguments that has become popular recently— a way favored by William Hasker and Peter van Inwagen—agrees that if God knows everything, no human action is free. The distinctive response of these philosophers is simply to say that therefore God does not know everything. On this view, what the fatalist arguments in fact bring out is that it was logically impossible for God to have known the truths about what we would freely do in the future. And this is no defect in God’s knowledge, for infallible foreknowledge of such truths is a logical impossibility. It has commonly been assumed that this position constitutes an explanation of where the fatalist argument goes wrong. My first goal is to argue that any such assumption has in fact been a mistake; Hasker and van Inwagen have in effect said only that something does go wrong with the argument, but they have not explained what goes wrong with it. Once we see this result, we’ll see, I think, that they need such an account—and that no such account has in fact been provided. The second goal of this paper is therefore to develop— and to criticize— what seems to be the most promising such account they might offer. As I see it, this account will in fact highlight in an intuitively compelling new way what many regard to be the view’s chief liability, namely, that the truths about the future which God is said not to know will now appear even more clearly (and problematically)‘ungrounded’.     

Situating Culturally Embodied Play Ecologies of Preschool Children: Lost in Transition

This article contributes as a commentary to Min’s critical evaluation of the challenges and resistances that have presented themselves during the recent process of changing the pedagogical practices ofChinese preschools to more closely resemble those seen in Scandinavian. The focus is on how decisions of how to structure the particular environment in preschool settings have direct and indirect implications for children’s learning and learning possibilities, and the importance of understanding these as mediated signifiers of the particular culture values. The discussions stress the importance of weighing cross-cultural pedagogical practices in terms of the functions they each serve in themselves, and in regard to the sociocultural history from which they have emerged and serve within. This means enculturation of new didactic practices should be understood as a gradual, smooth processes that allows itself to merge useful aspects of new educational models and practices with existing practices and cultural values.     

The force and the content of judgment

This essay explores what it means to reject Frege's distinction of force and content: the rejection completes Frege's anti‐psychologism as it leaves no space for a psychological concept of judgment distinct from the logical concept, which is the concern of no empirical science, but of logic. It emerges that logic, as the science of judgement, is — not a metaphysics of judgement, but — metaphysics. And it emerges that the opposition of subject to subject — the elementary nexus of thinker to thinker in dialogue — is contained within the logical concept of judgment.     

Whitehead's doctrine of objectification and Yogācāra Buddhism's theory of the three natures

IntroductionNa¯ga¯rjuna, the most well-known Buddhist thinker after the Buddha himself, points out in his famous Mu¯lamadhyamakaka¯rika¯ that ‘The Buddha's teachings of the Dharma is based on the two truths: a truth of worldly conventions and an ultimate truth’ (XXIV:8). This doctrine of the two truths does indeed lie at the very heart of Buddhism. More particularly, the phenomenological and soteriological discourses in the Ma¯dhyamika tradition revolve around ideas concerning the two truths. Central to the doctrine is the concept that all phenomena possess dual characteristics—conventional and ultimate. The former, defined as the mode of phenomenal appearance, is the conventional truth; while the latter, defined as the ultimate mode of being, is the ultimate truth. This paper examines the ways in which these two truths are related from the Tibetan Pra¯sangika Ma¯dhyamika perspective, and argues that there are two radically distinct Tibetan ways of reading and interpreting the issues surrounding them. It does so by comparing the ccounts of Tsong khapa Blo bzang Grags pa (hereafter Tsong khapa, 1357–1423 A.D.) and Go rampa bSod nams Senge's (hereafter Go rampa 1429-1489 A.D.), and focuses on the way in which the two truths are related. It will be argued that, for Tsong khapa, the two truths constitute a ‘single ontological identity’ (ngo bo gcig) with ‘different conceptual identities’ (ldog pa tha dad), whereas for Go rampa, the truths are separate in a way that is ‘incompatible with their unity’ (gcig pa bkag pa'i tha dad) or identity.     

Imprints in time: towards a moderately robust past

Presentism says that only present objects exist (timelessly). But the view has trouble grounding past-tensed truths like “dinosaurs existed”. Standard Eternalism grounds those truths by positing the (timeless) existence of past objects—like dinosaurs. But Standard Eternalism conflicts with the intuition that there is genuine change—the intuition that there once were dinosaurs and no longer are any. I offer a novel theory of time—‘The Imprint’—that does a better job preserving both the grounding and genuine change intuitions. The Imprint says that the past and present exist (in the timeless sense), but where the present exhibits mass-energy, the past only consists of curved empty regions of spacetime. We therefore avoid saying that there are dinosaurs, since there is no mass-energy in the past; but the curvature of the past gives us a way to ground the truth that “dinosaurs existed”.     

The Epistemic Challenge of Hearing Child’s Voice

Classical conceptual distinctions in philosophy of education assume an individualistic subjectivity and hide the learning that can take place in the space between child (as educator) and adult (as learner). Grounded in two examples from experience I develop the argument that adults often put metaphorical sticks in their ears in their educational encounters with children. Hearers’ prejudices cause them to miss out on knowledge offered by the child, but not heard by the adult. This has to do with how adults view education, knowledge, as much as child, and is even more extreme when child is also black. The idea is what Miranda Fricker calls ‘epistemic injustice’ which occurs when someone is wronged specifically in their capacity as a knower. Although her work concerns gender and race, I extrapolate her radical ideas to (black) child. Awareness of the epistemic injustice that is done to children and my proposal for increased epistemic modesty and epistemic equality could help transform pedagogical spaces to include child subjects as educators. A way forward is suggested that involves ‘cracking’ the concept of child and a different non-individualised conception of education.