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1.
One of the fundamental properties in classical equational reasoning is Leibniz's principle of substitution. Unfortunately, this property does not hold in standard epistemic logic. Furthermore, Herbrand's lifting theorem which is essential to the completeness of resolution and Paramodulation in the classical first order logic (FOL), turns out to be invalid in standard epistemic logic. In particular, unlike classical logic, there is no skolemization normal form for standard epistemic logic. To solve these problems, we introduce an intensional epistemic logic, based on a variation of Kripke's possible-worlds semantics that need not have a constant domain. We show how a weaker notion of substitution through indexed terms can retain the Herbrand theorem. We prove how the logic can yield a satisfibility preserving skolemization form. In particular, we present an intensional principle for unifing indexed terms. Finally, we describe a sound and complete inference system for a Horn subset of the logic with equality, based on epistemic SLD-resolution. 相似文献
2.
This paper contains a formal treatment of the system of quantified epistemic logic sketched in Appendix II of Carlson (1983). Section 1 defines the syntax and recapitulates the model set rules and principles of the Appendix system. Section 2 defines a possible worlds semantics for this system, and shows that the Appendix system is complete with respect to this semantics. Section 3 extends the system by an explicit truth operator T it is true that and considers quantification over nonexistent individuals. Section 4 formalizes the idea of variable identity criteria typical of Hintikkian epistemic logic. 相似文献
6.
This paper aims to extend in two directions the probabilistic dynamic epistemic logic provided in Kooi’s paper (J Logic Lang
Inform 12(4):381–408, 2003) and to relate these extensions to ones made in van Benthem et al. (Proceedings of LOFT’06. Liverpool,
2006). Kooi’s probabilistic dynamic epistemic logic adds to probabilistic epistemic logic sentences that express consequences
of public announcements. The paper (van Benthem et al., Proceedings of LOFT’06. Liverpool, 2006) extends (Kooi, J Logic Lang
Inform 12(4):381–408, 2003) to using action models, but in both papers, the probabilities are discrete, and are defined on
trivial σ-algebras over finite sample spaces. The first extension offered in this paper is to add a previous-time operator to a probabilistic
dynamic epistemic logic similar to Kooi’s in (J Logic Lang Inform 12(4):381–408, 2003). The other is to involve non-trivial
σ-algebras and continuous probabilities in probabilistic dynamic epistemic logic. 相似文献
7.
Theories of epistemic justification are commonly assessed by exploring their predictions about particular hypothetical cases—predictions as to whether justification is present or absent in this or that case. With a few exceptions, it is much less common for theories of epistemic justification to be assessed by exploring their predictions about logical principles. The exceptions are a handful of ‘closure’ principles, which have received a lot of attention, and which certain theories of justification are well known to invalidate. But these closure principles are only a small sample of the logical principles that we might consider. In this paper, I will outline four further logical principles that plausibly hold for justification and two which plausibly do not. While my primary aim is just to put these principles forward, I will use them to evaluate some different approaches to justification and (tentatively) conclude that a ‘normic’ theory of justification best captures its logic. 相似文献
10.
Recent work on analyticity distinguishes two kinds, metaphysical and epistemic. This paper argues that the distinction allows for a new view in the philosophy of logic according to which the claims of logic are metaphysically analytic and have distinctive modal profiles, even though their epistemology is holist and in many ways rather Quinean. It is argued that such a view combines some of the more attractive aspects of the Carnapian and Quinean approaches to logic, whilst avoiding some famous problems. 相似文献
11.
Epistemic two-dimensional semantics is a theory in the philosophy of language that provides an account of meaning which is sensitive to the distinction between necessity and apriority. While this theory is usually presented in an informal manner, I take some steps in formalizing it in this paper. To do so, I define a semantics for a propositional modal logic with operators for the modalities of necessity, actuality, and apriority that captures the relevant ideas of epistemic two-dimensional semantics. I also describe some properties of the logic that are interesting from a philosophical perspective, and apply it to the so-called nesting problem. 相似文献
12.
This paper discusses the possibility of modelling inductive inference (Gold 1967) in dynamic epistemic logic (see e.g. van
Ditmarsch et al. 2007). The general purpose is to propose a semantic basis for designing a modal logic for learning in the
limit. First, we analyze a variety of epistemological notions involved in identification in the limit and match it with traditional
epistemic and doxastic logic approaches. Then, we provide a comparison of learning by erasing (Lange et al. 1996) and iterated
epistemic update (Baltag and Moss 2004) as analyzed in dynamic epistemic logic. We show that finite identification can be
modelled in dynamic epistemic logic, and that the elimination process of learning by erasing can be seen as iterated belief-revision
modelled in dynamic doxastic logic. Finally, we propose viewing hypothesis spaces as temporal frames and discuss possible
advantages of that perspective. 相似文献
14.
Inductive logic admits a variety of semantics (Haenni et al. (2011) [7, Part 1]). This paper develops semantics based on the norms of Bayesian epistemology (Williamson, 2010 [16, Chapter 7]). Section 1 introduces the semantics and then, in Section 2, the paper explores methods for drawing inferences in the resulting logic and compares the methods of this paper with the methods of Barnett and Paris (2008) [2]. Section 3 then evaluates this Bayesian inductive logic in the light of four traditional critiques of inductive logic, arguing (i) that it is language independent in a key sense, (ii) that it admits connections with the Principle of Indifference but these connections do not lead to paradox, (iii) that it can capture the phenomenon of learning from experience, and (iv) that while the logic advocates scepticism with regard to some universal hypotheses, such scepticism is not problematic from the point of view of scientific theorising. 相似文献
16.
There are three theories in the epistemology of modality that have received sustained attention over the past 20 years (1998–2018): conceivability-theory, counterfactual-theory, and deduction-theory. In this paper we argue that all three face what we call the problem of modal epistemic friction (PMEF). One consequence of the problem is that for any of the three accounts to yield modal knowledge, the account must provide an epistemology of essence. We discuss an attempt to fend off the problem within the context of the internalism versus externalism debate about epistemic justification. We then investigate the effects that the PMEF has on reductive and non-reductive theories of the relation between essence and modality. 相似文献
17.
This paper explores some of the constructive dimensions and specifics of human theoretic cognition, combining perspectives from (Husserlian) genetic phenomenology and distributed cognition approaches. I further consult recent psychological research concerning spatial and numerical cognition. The focus is on the nexus between the theoretic development of abstract, idealized geometrical and mathematical notions of space and the development and effective use of environmental cognitive support systems. In my discussion, I show that the evolution of the theoretic cognition of space apparently follows two opposing, but in truth, intrinsically aligned trajectories. On the epistemic plane, which is the main focus of Husserl??s genetic phenomenological investigations, theoretic conceptions of space are progressively constituted by way of an idealizing emancipation of spatial cognition from the concrete, embodied intentionality underlying the human organism??s perception of space. As a result of this emancipation, it ultimately becomes possible for the human mind to theoretically conceive of and posit space as an ideal entity that is universally geometrical and mathematical. At the same time, by synthesizing a range of literature on spatial and mathematical cognition, I illustrate that for the theoretic mind to undertake precisely this emancipating process successfully, and further, for an ideal and objective notion of geometrical and mathematical space to first of all become fully scientifically operative, the cognitive support provided by a range of specific symbolic technologies is central. These include lettered diagrams, notation systems, and more generally, the technique of formalization and require for their functioning various cognitively efficacious types of embodiment. Ultimately, this paper endeavors to understand the specific symbolic-technological dimensions that have been instrumental to major shifts in the development of idealized, scientific conceptions of space. The epistemic characteristics of these shifts have been previously discussed in genetic phenomenology, but without devoting sufficient attention to the constructive role of symbolic technologies. At the same time, this paper identifies some of the irreducible phenomenological and epistemic dimensions that characterize the functioning of the historically situated, embodied and distributed theoretic mind. 相似文献
19.
van Bentham et al. (Merging frameworks for interaction: DEL and ETL, 2007) provides a framework for generating the models
of Epistemic Temporal Logic ( ETL: Fagin et al., Reasoning about knowledge, 1995; Parikh and Ramanujam, Journal of Logic, Language, and Information, 2003)
from the models of Dynamic Epistemic Logic ( DEL: Baltag et al., in: Gilboa (ed.) Tark 1998, 1998; Gerbrandy, Bisimulations on Planet Kripke, 1999). We consider the logic
TDEL on the merged semantic framework, and its extension with the labeled past-operator “ P
ϵ” (“The event ϵ has happened before which. . .”). To axiomatize the extension, we introduce a method for transforming a given
model into a normal form in a suitable sense. These logics suggest further applications of DEL in the theory of agency, the theory of learning, etc. 相似文献
20.
Relativized common knowledge is a generalization of common knowledge proposed for public announcement logic by treating knowledge update as relativization. Among other things relativized common knowledge, unlike standard common knowledge, allows reduction axioms for the public announcement operators. Public announcement logic can be seen as one of the simplest special cases of action model logic (AML). However, so far no notion of relativized common knowledge has been proposed for AML in general. That is what we do in this paper. We propose a notion of action model relativized common knowledge for action model logic, and study expressive power and complete axiomatizations of resulting logics. Along the way we fill some gaps in existing expressivity results for standard relativized common knowledge. 相似文献
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