Prototypes and conceptual analysis

In this paper, I explore the implications of recent empirical research on concept representation for the philosophical enterprise of conceptual analysis. I argue that conceptual analysis, as it is commonly practiced, is committed to certain assumptions about the nature of our intuitive categorization judgments. I then try to show how these assumptions clash with contemporary accounts of concept representation in cognitive psychology. After entertaining an objection to my argument, I close by considering ways in which conceptual analysis might be altered to accord better with the empirical work.Thanks are due to John Bickle, Marian David, Terence Horgan, Stephen Stich, John Tienson, Paul Weithman and an anonymous referee for several helpful comments and suggestions. Earlier versions of this paper were presented at Central Michigan University, The University of Memphis, The University of Mississipi and The Second International Conference on Cognitive Science at San Sebastian, Spain. A great deal of useful feedback was provided by these audiences.     

Optimization and simplicity: Computational vision and biological explanation

David Marr's theory of vision has been a rich source of inspiration, fascination and confusion. I will suggest that some of this confusion can be traced to discrepancies between the way Marr developed his theory in practice and the way he suggested such a theory ought to be developed in his explicit metatheoretical remarks. I will address claims that Marr's theory may be seen as an optimizing theory, along with the attendant suggestion that optimizing assumptions may be inappropriate for cognitive mechanisms just as anti-adaptationists have argued they are inappropriate for other physiological mechanisms. I will discuss the nature of optimizing assumptions and theories. Considering various difficulties in identifying and assessing optimizing assumptions, I will suggest that Marr's theory is not purely an optimizing theory and that reaction to Marr on this issue prompts interesting considerations for the development of inter-disciplinary constraints in the cognitive and brain sciences.Thanks are due to Ron McClamrock for his comments on previous drafts of this material. Also, early versions of some of the material in this paper were presented at LMPS '91 and at a Cognitive Studies Colloquium at Penn State University in 1992. Thanks to those in attendance, especially to Rich Carlson and Mark Detweiler, for their comments. Thanks, too, to an anonymous referee for suggesting several useful references.     

A future for community psychology practice

Community psychology has never really looked at its practice as a profession, though many of us as students came to the field with high expectations that we could learn how to make a difference in communities. This article discussed what I think about community psychology practice and how I have tried to approach it. I thank and recognize several people: Paul Florin for his colleagueship, friendship and his contributions to what I have done in the field; Tom Wolff for never letting me give up on the field; Bob Newbrough for his consistent support, encouragement and as my teacher; and Julian Rappaport for his comments on an earlier draft. I thank my colleagues at Rutgers for helping make the dream come true. This article is dedicated to students, past, present, and future.     

Commentary for special issue of Applied Cognitive Psychology in honor of Alan Scoboria

The world would be a better place if there were more people like Alan. What an extraordinary convergence of kindness, reflectiveness, persistence, ethics, breadth of knowledge, and raw smarts! He positively and substantially contributed to cognitive, clinical, and social psychology, and to the lives of his students and collaborators. This collection carries that legacy forward. Alan would have relished reading every one of these articles. I am honored by the opportunity to comment. I hope to do so in a way that Alan would approve. I begin with a brief reflection on one of the “big picture” ideas in Alan's work. Then I discuss several issues that I know were near and dear to Alan and that have also occupied my own thinking for years. In addition to scientific accounts of true and false beliefs and memories, my comments are informed by the methodological reform movement. As an oldster, I also take this opportunity to mention a few earlier issues/findings that relate to current controversies.     

Persistence,change, and explanation

I would like to express my deepest gratitude to George Myro for his wonderful insight, advice, and support, in writing this paper. I would also like to thank Ermanno Bencivenga, John Broome, Janet Broughton, Alan Code, Paul Grice, Mark Johnston, David Lewis, Paul Kube, Dugald Owen, Steve Yablo, and Colloquium participants at University of Virginia and Ohio State University for their very helpful discussions.     

The duality of non-conceptual content in Husserl’s phenomenology of perception

Recently, a number of epistemologists have argued that there are no non-conceptual elements in representational content. On their view, the only sort of non-conceptual elements are components of sub-personal organic hardware that, because they enjoy no veridical role, must be construed epistemologically irrelevant. By reviewing a 35-year-old debate initiated by Dagfinn Følledal, I believe Husserlian phenomenology can be updated to offer an important contribution to this discussion. On my interpretation, what Husserl calls “hyletic data” may be read as that subjective quality of experience inarticulable as a propositional attitude – and, thus, hyletic data are non-conceptual. In anticipation of the recent conceptualist position, Føllesdal and his adherents argued that what Husserl had called “noema” or representational content is, however, entirely conceptual. A closer inspection of the relevant texts, however, reveals that Husserl admits non-conceptual elements into his characterization of the noema. If that is correct, then Husserl must have been a dualist about non-conceptual content. In turn, I believe what explains this dualism is a non-foundationalist reconstruction of Husserl’s phenomenological reduction.An earlier version of this paper was delivered at Fordham University on the occasion of the 33rd Annual Meeting of the Husserl Circle. I am grateful to Prof. Steven Crowell who, in his capacity as respondent, offered incisive and helpful commentary. I also thank Prof. John J. Drummond for organizing the meeting, and all those present during my talk; as well as two anonymous reviewers for Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences, who offered helpful questions and comments.     

Reflections of an eclectic skeptic

Following primary and secondary education in Europe, I came to the United States for further education. After majoring in engineering, I shifted to liberal arts and social sciences. I minored in mathematics, philosophy, and education at the undergraduate level and physiology at the graduate level, ultimately obtaining a PhD in personality psychology. My interests were primarily academic, but I did not neglect the emerging field of clinical psychology. After working in hospitals for 9 years, I joined the faculty of Michigan State University where I established the psychological clinic and served as its director for 13 years. Subsequently, during 2 sabbaticals in Israel, I researched personality development in unconventional family settings (the kibbutz). I also studied such diverse issues as motivation for parenthood, time perception and time perspective, and cognition in psychopathology. After editing several textbooks on assessment techniques, I initiated the series of triennial Murray lectures that highlighted the dynamic approach to the study of personality.     

Cultural Complexities and Scientific Development

Methodological issues in psychology consist of a key aspect for the scientific development of the discipline. In this paper I elaborate on the reasons why I partially agree with Toomela's ideas, and why I also disagree with some of his arguments. The convergence refers to the need for a radical change concerning the widespread use of methodologies that has been typical of mainstream psychology, which still flavors too positivist and pseudo-quantitative, overlooking the central relevance of theory for scientific development. The divergence resides in Toomela's insistence to oppose what he designates as "the North American" to "the German-Austrian" scientific thinking: from my perspective, the misuse of cultural categories can only lead to misguided and unconstructive dichotomies that entails a naive concept of culture, and do not contribute to scientific development. From a contemporary systemic approach, complex issues deserve more sophisticated analysis.     

‘So you did what you wanted then’: Discourse analysis,personal agency,and psychotherapy

This paper explores issues concerning personal agency in discursive psychology and discourse analysis, with a particular emphasis on agency in terms of motivational accounts of the person. Issues are discussed in relation to the efficacy, acceptability, and accessibility of discourse analytic research for the practising psychotherapist. We suggest that such an approach may raise problems in four areas. First, we argue that without explicit theorization of the subject as language user, discourse analysis may be vulnerable to the charge of determinism. Second, theorization of the subject as language user may be required to account successfully for individual consistency and continuity of identity. Third, although claiming to critique commonsense notions of subjectivity, implicit dualist assumptions facilitate a reading of discursive psychology that is compatible with a motivational model of the person. Finally, we argue that discursive psychology itself implies a particular model of the strategically motivated language user. We conclude that, although these issues require clarification, discursive psychology and discourse analysis have much to offer psychotherapy research.     

JUSTICE AS INHERENT RIGHTS: A RESPONSE TO MY COMMENTATORS

The critical comments by my fellow symposiasts on my book, Justice: Rights and Wrongs , have provided me with the opportunity to clarify parts of my argument and to correct some misunderstandings; they have also helped me see more clearly than I did before the import of some parts of my argument. In his comments, Paul Weithman points out features of the right order conception of justice that I had not noticed. They have also prodded me to clarify in what way rights are trumps; and both his comments and Bernstein's have prodded me to clarify certain aspects of the theistic account of human rights that I offered. Attridge's comments lead me to see that I was perhaps over-zealous in emphasizing the objective aspects of the semantic range of dikaiosunê as used in the New Testament and downplaying the subjective aspects. And O'Donovan's comments have provided me with the opportunity to make clear that my account of rights is not an immunities account that presupposes nominalism, and to emphasize the ways in which it is not an asocial individualistic account.     

Psychological empowerment: Issues and illustrations

Discussed several issues related to psychological empowerment. The thesis of this paper is that the development of a universal and global measure of psychological empowerment may not be a feasible or appropriate goal. I begin by distinguishing between empowerment processes and outcomes. Underlying assumptions are discussed including the notion that empowerment differs across people, contexts, and times. A nomological network that includes intrapersonal, interactional, and behavioral components is also presented. Two examples of psychological empowerment for voluntary service organization members and members of a mutual help organization are described to help illustrate differences in the specific variables that may be used to measure psychological empowerment in different populations and settings. I thank Deborah A. Salem for her thoughtful comments on earlier drafts of this paper and for her persistence in pushing me to strengthen the ideas presented. I also thank Douglas Perkins, Julian Rappaport, David Altman, and James G. Kelly for their very helpful comments. They helped me articulate my ideas more carefully and clearly.     

Forms of logic in faith development theory

A fundamental characteristic of structural-developmental psychology is that development is governed by a logico-mathematical, hence scientific, principle of equilibrium. In this article I examine James Fowler's proposal for a metaphorical interpretation of logic in his theory of faith development. I intend to argue that a metaphorical understanding of logic radically shifts the theory of faith development away from Piagetian structuralism and towards dialectical psychology. A metaphorical reading of stages and their transformation raises serious questions about the attempt to define faith in terms of stages of individual psychological development. A secondary proposal to be considered is the relevance of metaphorical theology to faith development theory.An earlier version of this paper was read at the Annual Meeting of the Society for the Scientific Study of Religion and the Religious Research Association in Salt Lake City, Utah, October 29, 1989. I am indebted to Professor Brown from the University of New South Wales, Australia for his helpful comments on an earlier draft of this paper.     

Perception,meaning, and mind

Earlier versions of this paper were read in the Philosophy department at the University of Helsinki, in the Institute for Advanced Studies in the Humanities at the University of Edinburgh, at Vanderbilt University, at the Indiana Philosophical Association, and at the Institute for Logic and Cognitive Science at the University of Houston. I am grateful for very helpful comments on each of these occasions, and I am especially appreciative to John Haugeland, Mark Johnson, and George McClure for their comments and suggestions. Thanks, too, to Robert Solomon who urged me to amplify my claims about perceptual meaning.     

Intuition and the socratic method: Two opposed ways of knowing?

Socratic method and intuition are two ways of knowing commonly thought as opposed. The author shows how both ways of knowing can be linked in an education that has philosophy as its armature.An earlier version of this paper was presented at theWays of Knowing conference at Appalachian State University, and published in the proceedings of that conference. Lee S. Shulman's helpful comments at that time led to this revised version. I would like to thank Jim Garrison for comments and conversation on this topic. Any errors remain my own.     

On the function of weak phantasmata in perception: Phenomenological,psychological and neurological clues for the transcendental function of imagination in perception

Weak phantasmata have a decisive and specifically transcendental function in our everyday perception. This paper provides several different arguments for this claim based on evidence from both empirical psychology and phenomenology.I would like to express my gratitude to Bill McKenna for his help with the English text and his critical remarks. This paper was presented in the Cork Roundtable for Philosophy in March 2003, at University College, Cork, and I would like to thank Julia Jansen, Tony O’Connor and the other participants for their constructive critique.     

Mind,consciousness, and cognition: Phenomenology vs. cognitive science

I would like to thank Steven Crowell from Rice University (Philosophy Department) for helpful comments and suggestions about my discussion of Husserl and other phenomenologists, and Edouard Philippe, also from Rice University (Electrical Engineering Department), for offering me the opportunity to formulate my views on cognitive science and artificial intelligence.     

COMPARATIVE ETHICS,IDEOLOGIES, AND CRITICAL THOUGHT1

After the publication of my book and various articles about comparative religious ethics, obstacles in the field's further development seemed to mount as swiftly as practical issues seemed to trumpet the need for global ethics more loudly. Driven by impatience, I wondered if I were fiddling in unending discussion while the planet burned. As others persevered and evolved productively in addressing developmental issues in the field directly, I began to work through the lens of a less direct, but complementary, perspective: ideologies and critical thought. The following essay seeks to connect my parallel approach to ongoing obstacles and solutions within the prolific development of comparative religious ethics, especially its urgent pursuit of common moral grounds sufficient to support peaceful coexistence and living.     

The self in Kierkegaard's pseudonyms

Conclusion This is essentially what I take to be Kierkegaard's ontological foundation of human existence. It is the structure which both makes possible and unifies the different modes of existing which he so fully describes in his pseudonyms. The further task is one of demonstrating concretely the relation of these modes (stages) of existing to his ontology.This essay will appear in my book, Being and Existence in Kierkegaard's Pseudonyms, to be published by Princeton University Press in 1975. I would like to thank the Princeton University Pres for permission to publish a portion of the book in this journal. I would also like to acknowledge my colleagues' helpful criticisms of the original draft of this paper which I read in a departmental seminar at Iowa State University last fall. Some of their suggestions were incorporated in the final draft.     

The Legacy of Lawrence Kohlberg: Implications for Counseling and Human Development

Despite the great contribution by Lawrence Kohlberg to our understanding of moral development, counselors are only beginning to appreciate fully the implications of his developmental psychology for the practice of counseling and human development. Drawing on the collective body of Kohlberg's work, seven basic assumptions are shown to have direct relevance for conceptualizing counseling from a constructivist developmental approach.