Thinking the unthinkable: sacred values and taboo cognitions

Many people insist that their commitments to certain values (e.g. love, honor, justice) are absolute and inviolable - in effect, sacred. They treat the mere thought of trading off sacred values against secular ones (such as money) as transparently outrageous - in effect, taboo. Economists insist, however, that in a world of scarce resources, taboo trade-offs are unavoidable. Research shows that, although people do respond with moral outrage to taboo trade-offs, they often acquiesce when secular violations of sacred values are rhetorically reframed as routine or tragic trade-offs. The results reveal the peculiar character of moral boundaries on what is thinkable, alternately punitively rigid and forgivingly flexible.     

Taboo Trade‐Offs,Relational Framing,and the Acceptability of Exchanges

This article reports 4 experiments demonstrating the power of social‐relational framing to complicate superficially straightforward economic exchanges of goods and services. Drawing from Alan Fiske's theoretical framework as well as Tetlock's sacred value protection model, the experiments demonstrate (a) pricing distortions and refusals to answer certain questions when people contemplate buying or selling objects endowed with special relational significance; (b) moral outrage and cognitive confusion when people are asked whether they would allow market‐pricing norms to influence decisions that fall under the normative purview of communal‐sharing, authority‐ranking, and equality‐matching relationships; and (c) elements of tactical flexibility in how people respond to breaches of relational boundaries (a willingness to turn a blind eye to taboo trade‐offs when it is in their interest to do so). An agenda for future work is offered that explores how pragmatic, economic interests are balanced against the desire to be (or appear to be) the type of person who honors social–relational constraints on what should be considered fungible.     

Heterosexual displacements of homosexuality clinical implications

This article explores the possibilities for the relationship between various taboo heterosexual relationships and an underlying homosexual preference. The analytic literature has not explored the tendency for many suppressed or repressed homosexuals to marry in order to escape shame over their sexual feelings and to avoid the social rejection experienced by those who are openly gay. The hypothesis stated here is that persons who are unconsciously gay are more likely to incorporate an element of taboo in their heterosexual relationships. The taboo heterosexual relationship substitutes for the more verboten homosexual one and provides an element of “being different”; that may provide greater sexual arousal than a conventional relationship.     

Who rejects depathologization? Attitudes of Russian-speaking trans people toward revision of the International Classification of Diseases

Post-Soviet space is underrepresented in international discussions on trans depathologization, and voices of trans people (as distinct from activists and experts) are rarely heard. The article seeks to fill this gap by introducing debates on depathologization among trans activists and nonactivist trans people of post-Soviet countries. In order to take into account opinions of various groups of trans people, a survey was conducted concerning the revision of the International Classification of Diseases and various trans-related policies. Classification models were developed to find relationships between demographic data and answers to the questions about depathologization and legal gender recognition.     

共同冗思的概念、测量和理论解释

共同冗思指个体在双向关系中过度讨论个人问题的行为。共同冗思对个体产生适应权衡效应,即它不仅与积极的友谊属性有关,还与抑郁和焦虑等内化问题相关。以往研究主要分析共同冗思的性别差异、发展特点及其在不同亲密关系中的表现。结果发现共同冗思的适应权衡效应在女性群体中比在男性群体中更为突出,在青少年群体中比在儿童群体中更为突出。研究者主要从同伴传染、压力生成、共情痛苦以及生理机制等角度解释共同冗思与内化问题的关系。友谊等亲密关系中的共同冗思对个体适应的负面影响难以察觉,它可以作为个体抑郁和焦虑等内化问题的危险信号。后续研究可以从考察共同冗思的人格以及环境影响因素等角度深化对该主题的理解。     

The relationship superiority effect is moderated by the relationship context

Previous research has identified the perceived superiority effect, defined as the tendency to regard one's own relationship as better than other people's relationships, as a cognitive maintenance mechanism that supports commitment to close relationships. The present research was designed to test the hypothesis that the perceived superiority effect is moderated by the relationship context — that is, to whom one's relationship is being compared. Two different measures based on a spontaneous thought-listing procedure demonstrated that the perceived superiority effect is significantly stronger when comparing one's own relationship to the relationships of people in general than to the relationships of close friends. Correlational analyses suggested that this difference may reflect people's tendency to experience close friends' outcomes as personal outcomes.     

It Takes Two: The Interplay of Individual and Group Theology on Social Embeddedness

Prior research argues that religious homophily in social networks is a product of overlapping interests and activities unintentionally leading to relationships or the intentional seeking of relationships with people of similar religious beliefs. This article advances research on religious homophily by including the role that exclusive theological beliefs play in explaining religious homophily among friends. We lay out three propositions for individual-, congregational-, and cross-level effects on the relationship between exclusive theology and embeddedness within one's congregation. Using multilevel models and data from the U.S. Congregational Life Survey (USCLS), we find support for our three propositions. We discuss our findings in terms of how exclusive theologies may contribute to bonding forms of social capital, but limit exposure to diverse social perspectives and bridging forms of social capital.     

The psychology of the unthinkable: taboo trade-offs, forbidden base rates, and heretical counterfactuals

Five studies explored cognitive, affective, and behavioral responses to proscribed forms of social cognition. Experiments 1 and 2 revealed that people responded to taboo trade-offs that monetized sacred values with moral outrage and cleansing. Experiments 3 and 4 revealed that racial egalitarians were least likely to use, and angriest at those who did use, race-tainted base rates and that egalitarians who inadvertently used such base rates tried to reaffirm their fair-mindedness. Experiment 5 revealed that Christian fundamentalists were most likely to reject heretical counterfactuals that applied everyday causal schemata to Biblical narratives and to engage in moral cleansing after merely contemplating such possibilities. Although the results fit the sacred-value-protection model (SVPM) better than rival formulations, the SVPM must draw on cross-cultural taxonomies of relational schemata to specify normative boundaries on thought.     

Further Notes on Feminist Ethics and Pluralism: A Reply to Lindgren

In a comment on my paper, “Moral Understandings: Alternative Epistemology for a Feminist Ethics” (1989) Ralph Lindgren questions the wisdom of confronta' tional rhetoric in my paper and much feminist moral philosophy, and the consistency of this stance with pluralism about ethics. I defend both the rebellious rhetoric and the inclusivity of my own approach, but suggest that pluralism in moral philosophy is harder to define than Lindgren's comments suggest.     

Explanations in cognitive science: unification versus pluralism

The debate between the defenders of explanatory unification and explanatory pluralism has been ongoing from the beginning of cognitive science and is one of the central themes of its philosophy. Does cognitive science need a grand unifying theory? Should explanatory pluralism be embraced instead? Or maybe local integrative efforts are needed? What are the advantages of explanatory unification as compared to the benefits of explanatory pluralism? These questions, among others, are addressed in this Synthese’s special issue. In the introductory paper, we discuss the background of the questions, distinguishing integrative theorizing from building unified theories. On the one hand, integrative efforts involve collaboration between various disciplines, fields, approaches, or theories. These efforts could even be quite temporary, without establishing any long-term institutionalized fields or disciplines, but could also contribute to developing new interfield theories. On the other hand, unification can rely on developing complete theories of mechanisms and representations underlying all cognition, as Newell’s “unified theories of cognition”, or may appeal to grand principles, as predictive coding. Here, we also show that unification in contemporary cognitive science goes beyond reductive unity, and may involve various forms of joint efforts and division of explanatory labor. This conclusion is one of the themes present in the content of contributions constituting the special issue.

     

Hating the Ahmadiyya: the place of “heretics” in contemporary Indonesian Muslim society

Religious diversity and pluralism is commonly understood within the context of the relation between various religious traditions, not within a single religious tradition. This limitation of the boundary of religious pluralism could overlook the fact that conflict within a single tradition can be bitterer and more disastrous than conflict with other religions. In the last decade, for instance, the Ahmadis in Indonesia have become victims of constant attacks. This article, therefore, intends to study the place of the Ahmadiyya in the context of religious pluralism in Indonesia by answering the following questions: Why was the treatment of the Ahmadis in recent years by Muslims more vitriolic than their treatment of non-Muslims? What is the nature and quality of life for people who have been excluded from a ‘normal’ religious identity in a time when religious attachment is a necessary fact for that society? Why did the attacks on the Ahmadiyya occur in the present regime, not during the past authoritarian one? This article argues that the charge of heresy issued by Muslim institutions put the Ahmadiyya in liminal status; they are in the zone of indistinction between Muslims and non-Muslims. This makes them vulnerable to persecution since they have been deprived of their rights as Muslims, while their rights as non-Muslims are still suspended. Non-Muslims, particularly ahl al-kitāb (People of the Book), have been accepted theologically in Muslim society, but there is no place of tolerance for heretics. The rise of intolerance in Indonesia parallels the rise of religious conservatism after the fall of Suharto in 1998.     

BEYOND FORMAL EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN: TOWARDS AN EXPANDED VIEW OF THE TRAINING EVALUATION PROCESS

Textbook treatments of training evaluation typically equate evaluation with the measurement of change and focus on formal experimental design as the mechanism for controlling threats to the inference that the training intervention produced whatever change was observed. This paper notes that two separate questions may be of interest: How much change has occurred? and, Has a target performance level been reached? We show that the evaluation mechanisms needed to answer the two types of questions are markedly different, and discuss circumstances under which an evaluator's interests will focus on one, the other, or both of these questions. We then discuss alternatives to formal design as mechanisms for reducing various threats to validity, and discuss trade-offs between internal validity and statistical conclusion validity.     

The positive and negative framing of affirmative action: a group dominance perspective

Using a sample of 328 White, Latino, and Black Los Angeles County adults, the authors examined the tendency to employ various affirmative action "frames" (e.g., affirmative action as a "tie-breaking" device or as a quota-based policy). All three groups agreed about which frames cast affirmative action in a positive light and which cast it in a negative light. Although minorities had a tendency to frame affirmative action in terms that most people find morally acceptable, Whites had a tendency to frame affirmative action in terms most people find unacceptable. In addition, compared to minorities, Whites were less supportive of affirmative action regardless of how it was framed. LISREL modeling also was employed to test two competing models regarding predictors of the tendency to use frames that one personally finds to be relatively negative versus positive. Consistent with the expectations of social dominance theory and a motivated cognition perspective, the authors found that social dominance orientation (SDO) had significant net direct and indirect effects on one's framing of affirmative action.     

Do people need self-esteem? Comment on Pyszczynski et al. (2004)

In spite of impressive empirical evidence consistent with aspects of terror management theory (TMT) reviewed by T. Pyszczynski, J. Greenberg, S. Solomon, J. Arndt, and J. Schimel (2004), several fundamental assumptions of the theory remain untested or lack support. Specifically, Pyszczynski et al. (2004) have not demonstrated that (a) people need self-esteem, (b) pursuing self-esteem is an effective means for reducing anxiety, (c) pursuing self-esteem helps people achieve their important goals, (d) having or pursuing self-esteem is the only way to deal with anxiety to achieve important goals, or (e) death is the real issue driving the pursuit of self-esteem. The authors suggest there is a different paradigm for thinking about death, one in which awareness of one's mortality serves as a precious reminder of the limited time one has to accomplish one's most important goals. All of these questions can be addressed with empirical research.     

On Being Lutheran In A Religiously Plural World

Abstract : For those of us who are self‐consciously Lutheran, the reality of contemporary religious pluralism engenders important theological questions. The thesis of this essay is that “being Lutheran” within the context of contemporary religious pluralism requires the creation of “Lutheran identity” that is pluralistic in structure, while simultaneously avoiding either theological exclusivism or theological inclusivism. The implications of this thesis are that (1) dialogue with the religious traditions of the world is of primary importance for thinking Lutherans, and (2) the church's witness and mission needs to be reconfigured in light of the practice of interreligious dialogue.     

Capturing and holding attention: The impact of emotional words in rapid serial visual presentation

When two masked, to-be-attended targets are presented within approximately 500 msec of each other, accurate report of the second target (T2) suffers more than when targets are presented farther apart in time--an attentional blink (AB). In the present study, the AB was found to be larger when taboo words were presented as a first target (T1), as compared with the AB found when emotionally neutral, negative, or positive words were presented as T1, suggesting that taboo words received preferential attentional processing. Comparable results were also obtained when taboo words were presented as to-be-ignored distractors in single-target rapid serial visual presentation (RSVP). Arousal, but not valence, ratings of the emotional words predicted accuracy on subsequent targets in both dual- and single-task RSVP. Recognition memory for taboo words accounted fully for the negative relationships between arousal ratings and accuracy on subsequent targets, suggesting that arousal-triggered changes in attentional allocation influenced encoding of taboo words at the time they were encountered.     

Religion and Decisions About Marriage,Residence, Occupation,and Children

Using data from the first wave of the Portraits of American Life Study (PALS), we consider the extent to which people report that religious factors influence their decisions about career choice, marriage, residency, and number of children. We find significant positive relationships between the importance of religion or religious faith and the perceived influence of religious factors on one's choice of occupation, decision about whether or whom to marry, decision about where to live, and decision about how many children to have. We also observe significant interactions between the importance of religion or religious faith and religious tradition, but we find no consistent patterns across our decision‐making outcomes. Our preliminary conclusions raise significant questions about the broader relationship between religion, perception, and decision making.     

Motivational pursuits in the context of human sexual relationships

The current article examines how close relationships combine with individual differences in sex motives (Cooper, Shapiro, & Powers, 1998) to shape sexual experience. We first provide an overview of the motivational approach as it relates to sexual behavior and then describe 2 broad mechanisms (1 transactional, the other interactional) by which motives and relational context combine to shape behavior. Drawing on our past research, we review evidence showing that people select relationship contexts based partly on their motives and that these contexts in turn shape future motives and behavior; that partner motives shape sexual experience above and beyond one's own motives; and that both the broader relationship context and partner motives moderate the effects of one's own motives on sexual experience. We conclude that the nature of motivational pursuits cannot be adequately understood in the abstract, but rather we must take into account the relational context in which one's needs are pursued.     

Relations between emotion,memory, and attention: Evidence from taboo Stroop,lexical decision,and immediate memory tasks

This article reports five experiments demonstrating theoretically coherent effects of emotion on memory and attention. Experiments 1-3 demonstrated three taboo Stroop effects that occur when people name the color of taboo words. One effect is longer color-naming times for taboo than for neutral words, an effect that diminishes with word repetition. The second effect is superior recall of taboo words in surprise memory tests following color naming. The third effect is better recognition memory for colors consistently associated with taboo words rather than with neutral words. None of these effects was due to retrieval factors, attentional disengagement processes, response inhibition, or strategic attention shifts. Experiments 4 and 5 demonstrated that taboo words impair immediate recall of the preceding and succeeding words in rapidly presented lists but do not impair lexical decision times. We argue that taboo words trigger specific emotional reactions that facilitate the binding of taboo word meaning to salient contextual aspects, such as occurrence in a task and font color in taboo Stroop tasks.     

Ambiguity Aversion,Comparative Ignorance,and Decision Context

People typically find bets less attractive when the probability of receiving a prize is more vague or ambiguous (Ellsberg, 1961). According to Fox and Tversky's (1995) comparative ignorance hypothesis, ambiguity aversion is driven by the comparison with more familiar events or more knowledgeable individuals, and diminishes or disappears in the absence of such a comparison. In this paper we emphasize that “comparative ignorance” refers to the state of mind of the decision maker. We extend the comparative ignorance hypothesis by documenting four new ways in which decision context can affect willingness to act under uncertainty that do not rely on the comparative-noncomparative evaluation paradigm used in previous studies. First, people find uncertain bets more attractive when preceded by questions about less familiar items than when preceded by questions about more familiar items. Second, the preference to bet on more familiar domains is less pronounced for the first domain evaluated on a survey than for later domains. Third, people find bets less attractive when they are provided with diagnostic information that they do not know how to use, compared to when they are provided with no such information. Finally, people are sensitive to the relative competence of their counterpart when playing a simple competitive (matching pennies) game, but not when playing a noncompetitive (coordination) game that has the same mixed strategy Nash equilibrium.