Shortcuts to geographic profiling success: a reply to Rossmo (2005)

In ‘Geographic profiling: The fast, frugal, and accurate way’ (Applied Cognitive Psychology, 2004, vol. 18, pp. 105–121), we demonstrated that most people are able to predict the home location of a serial offender by using a simple prediction strategy that exploits patterns found in the offender's spatial behaviour. In this issue of Applied Cognitive Psychology, Rossmo challenges the validity of this research with respect to our data selection and methods of analysis. In response, we argue that: his proposed method for selecting data is unscientific; there is little evidence to support his claim that five crimes are required before profiles can be accurate; search area as a measure of profile accuracy has not yet been shown to be more useful than error distance; the heuristics we have examined are defined correctly and do lead to improvements in profile accuracy; and computerized geographic profiling is not a free service. Our comments aim to generate constraint in those intent on building confidence in computerized geographic profiling systems in the absence of strong empirical evidence to support their use. Copyright © 2005 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Bayesian eggs and Bayesian omelettes: reply to Stern (2005)

In this response to Stern's (2005) discussion of Klugkist, Laudy, and Hoijtink (2005), model inference based on posterior probabilities on the parameter space is discussed. Furthermore, the authors respond to Stern's example in which all possible orderings are included via a short discussion of exploratory versus theory-based modeling. Finally, the authors show that the Bayesian approach is flexible and can deal with many types of constraints. This is illustrated using a model with constraints on the differences between means.     

Inclusion of theory-relevant moderators yield the same conclusions as Sedikides, Gaertner, and Vevea (2005): A meta-analytical reply to Heine, Kitayama, and Hamamura (2007)

Heine, Kitayama and Hamamura (2007) attributed the Sedikides, Gaertner and Vevea (2005) findings to the exclusion of six papers. We report a meta-analysis that includes those six papers. The Heine et al . conclusions are faulty, because of a misspecified meta-analysis that failed to consider two moderators central to the theory. First, some of their effect sizes originated from studies that did not empirically validate comparison dimensions. Inclusion of this moderator evidences pancultural self-enhancement: Westerners enhance more strongly on individualistic dimensions, Easterners on collectivistic dimensions. Second, some of their effect sizes were irrelevant to whether enhancement is correlated with dimension importance. Inclusion of this moderator evidences pancultural self-enhancement: Both Westerners and Easterners enhance on personally important dimensions. The Sedikides et al . conclusions are valid: Tactical self-enhancement is pancultural.     

Testing self-enhancement and self-assessment theories of achievement motivation: A reply to Sohn's critique

Recently, Sohn (1984) published a critique of our research program on self-enhancement and self-assessment in achievement behavior (Trope, 1983; Trope & Brickman, 1975). The critique is mainly concerned with the information subjects receive about the diagnostic value of tasks regarding their ability. Sohn argues that diagnosticity information is extraneous to achievement motivation and that its presence creates an artificial situation that is irrelevant to extant achievement theories. Furthermore, he argues that our research program failed to separate informational value from affective value and that the two cannot be separated. Contrary to Sohn's criticism regarding task diagnosticity, our studies show that (1) the antecedents and consequences of perceived diagnosticity are the very same variables that serve to define the achievement domain in extant achievement theories, and (2) our experimental situations fulfill the assumption of extant achievement theories regarding the arousal of achievement motivation. Sohn's criticism regarding the inseparability of affective value and informational value is most clearly contradicted by research showing that the diagnostic value of failure increases informational value but decreases affective value. It is argued that Sohn's objection to the unconfounding of informational and affective value runs counter to the experimental method of theory testing. Finally, it is shown that Sohn's other, more specific criticisms either ignore or distort past research on self-enhancement and self-assessment.     

Confirming and disconfirming theories about ideomotor compatibility in dual-task performance: a reply to Greenwald (2005)

Because small dual-task costs with ideomotor-compatible tasks do not necessarily indicate the absence of a bottleneck, M.-C. Lien, R. S. McCann, E. Ruthruff, and R. W. Proctor (2005) considered additional sources of evidence regarding bottleneck bypass. This evidence argued against complete bottleneck bypass and, instead, supported an engage-bottleneck-later model in which early bottleneck substages are bypassed but late substages are not. A. G. Greenwald (2005), however, contended that M.-C. Lien et al. did not use the procedures needed to produce complete bottleneck bypass and that a complete bottleneck bypass hypothesis, combined with additional assumptions, could explain their data. The authors contend that this disagreement stems from Greenwald's focus on confirming predictions of complete bottleneck bypass (small dual-task costs) without disconfirming predictions of bottleneck presence. In particular, Greenwald neglects to consider the possibility that a latent bottleneck limitation could also produce small dual-task costs.     

Encoding specificity: a reply to Croker (1981)

Crocker's (1981) comment on the Lee and Hirota (1980) paper essentially raises two issues. First, objection is made to the applicability of the encoding specificity principle to the resuits found in our study. Second, on a more general level, Crocker questions the heuristic value of utilizing theoretical issues in non-motor domains to guide scientific experimentation in the study of motor behavior. In this reply I posit that Crocker's reservations about encoding specificity are based upon improper theoretical and methodological considerations. Regarding the more philosophical issue however, I argue that Crocker's view may be counterproductive to progress in the area of memory research.     

Effects of syntactic features on sentence-picture matching in Broca's aphasics: a reply to Drai and Grodzinksy (2005)

We reanalyzed the data in , considering individual patients' responses to different sentence types to be non-independent events. The analyses revealed effects of two of the three factors identified by Drai and Grodzinsky--constituent movement and passive mood. The result is inconsistent with the trace deletion hypothesis; we conclude that features of syntactic structure other than constituent movement are relevant to understanding performance variation in patients with Broca's aphasia.     

The dynamic events that capture visual attention: A reply to Abrams and Christ (2005)

We recently demonstrated that, contrary to previous findings, some types of irrelevant motion are capable of capturing our attention (Franconeri & Simons, 2003). Strikingly, whereas sitmulated looming (a dynamic increase in object size) captured attention, simulated receding (a decrease in object size) did not. Abrams and Christ (2003, 2005) have provided a different interpretation of this evidence, arguing that in each case attention was captured by the onset of motion rather than by motion per se. They argued that the only published finding inconsistent with their motion onset account is our evidence that simulated receding motion failed to capture attention. Abrams and Christ (2005) presented a receding object stereoscopically and found that it did capture attention, leading them to conclude that the motion onset account explains existing data more parsimoniously than our account does. Our reply has three parts. First, we argue that evidence of capture by receding motion is interesting but irrelevant to the debate over whether capture by motion requires a motion onset. Second, we show that the original empirical evidence in support of the motion onset claim (Abrams & Christ, 2003) put the motion-only condition at a critical disadvantage. We present a new experiment that demonstrates strong capture by motion in the absence of a motion onset, showing that motion onsets are not necessary for attention capture by dynamic events. Finally, we outline what is known about the set of dynamic events that capture attention.     

Mystery and meaning: a reply to Green (2000)

In "George A. Miller, Language, and the Computer Metaphor of Mind" (see Note 1), I sought to explain how and why Miller invested the computer metaphor of mind with such strongly revolutionary, antibehaviorist meanings. In reply, Christopher Green (see Note 2) has argued that the answer to this question has to do with the importance of mental representation was an important issue to cognitivists. In response, I argue that, though mental representation was an important issue to cognitivists, there were several other factors of equal or greater importance: specifically, the fascination of Miller and his cohort with language and communication, their frustration with the narrowness of the disciplinary vision of the behaviorists, and their involvement in a different experimental program than that of mainstream behaviorists.     

An attentional learning account of the shape bias: reply to Cimpian and Markman (2005) and Booth, Waxman, and Huang (2005)

Recently, Developmental Psychology published 2 articles on the shape bias; both rejected the authors' previous proposals about the role of attentional learning in the development of a shape bias in object name learning. A. Cimpian and E. Markman (2005) did so by arguing that the shape bias does not exist but is an experimental artifact. A. E. Booth, S. R. Waxman, and Y. T. Huang (2005), in contrast, concluded that the shape bias (and its contextual link to artifact categories) does exist but that the mechanisms that underlie it are conceptual knowledge and not attentional learning. In response, in this article the authors clarify the claims of the Attentional Learning Account (ALA) and interpretations of the data under question. The authors also seek to make explicit the deeper theoretical divide: cognition as sequestered from processes of perceiving and acting versus as embedded in, and inseparable from, those very processes.     

Gender effects on reaction time variability and trial-to-trial performance: reply to Deary and Der (2005)

Deary and Der (2005) reported significant gender effects on intraindividual variability in choice reaction time (CRT), and suggested several potential causes. In their procedure it was not possible to examine RTs on a trial-to-trial basis. We therefore investigate an additional possible cause: that men and women differ in their rate of performance improvement across trials, creating an apparent difference in variability. Using data from a large online CRT study, we replicate the finding that women are more variable in RT than men. However, we also demonstrate an interaction between gender and trial number for RT: women were initially slower than men, but became faster than men across a block. When the first two trials of the block are excluded, the gender effects on RT variability disappear.     

Accountability as a deterrent to self-enhancement: the search for mechanisms

Although self-enhancement is linked to psychological benefits, it is also associated with personal and interpersonal liabilities (e.g., excessive risk taking, social exclusion). Hence, structuring social situations that prompt people to keep their self-enhancing beliefs in check can confer personal and interpersonal advantages. The authors examined whether accountability can serve this purpose. Accountability was defined as the expectation to explain, justify, and defend one's self-evaluations (grades on an essay) to another person ("audience"). Experiment 1 showed that accountability curtails self-enhancement. Experiment 2 ruled out audience concreteness and status as explanations for this effect. Experiment 3 demonstrated that accountability-induced self-enhancement reduction is due to identifiability. Experiment 4 documented that identifiability decreases self-enhancement because of evaluation expectancy and an accompanying focus on one's weaknesses.     

Further evidence that rats rely on local rather than global spatial information to locate a hidden goal: reply to Cheng and Gallistel (2005)

Naive male Hooded Lister rats (Rattus norvegicus) were required to find a submerged platform in a right-angled corner between a long and a short wall of a pool in the shape of an irregular pentagon. Tests in a rectangular pool revealed a preference for the corners that corresponded with the correct corner in the pentagon. These findings indicate that rats identified the correct corner in the pentagon by local cues. They contradict the suggestion that rats navigate by moving in a particular direction relative to the principal axis of the shape of their environment.     

Jealousy reconsidered: A reply to DeSteno (2010)

In a recent commentary, DeSteno (2010) critiqued the work of Levy and Kelley (2010) which investigated the relationship of attachment style to the sex difference in jealousy. This commentary addresses the concerns raised by DeSteno; I briefly review some of the literature that was not addressed by DeSteno's commentary and discuss directions that future research may take.     

Transient covert attention does alter appearance: a reply to Schneider (2006)

We recently demonstrated that transient covert attention increases the apparent contrast of a stimulus (Carrasco, Ling, & Read, 2004). Schneider (2006) proposes that the observed increase in apparent contrast is largely due to sensory interactions occurring between the precue a nd stimulus,rather than to attention. Specifically, hereports that cuing effects only occur at contrasts ne ar detection threshold, and that there a re confounding sensoryinteractions between the cue and stimulus at suprathreshold detection contrasts. Our response is twofold. First, we outline the key methodological differences between our original study and Schneider's that are likely to account for the different results, and explain how we had ruled out the sensory interaction explanation of the cue. Second, we directly test the prediction put forth by Schneider. If the effects were due to sensory interactions, reversing the luminance polarity of the precue in our paradigm should lead to differential cuing effects. We replicate one of the experiments of our original study and add a condition in which the cue luminance is either black or white. Our results replicated our previous findings-they showed an increase in apparent contrast to a high-contrast stimulus when it was precued. Moreover, we found that the black cue and the white cue had the same effect, thus ruling out the alternative explanation proposed by Schneider. Transient attention does alter contrast appearance.     

Assessing the validity of implicit egotism: a reply to Gallucci (2003)

B. W. Pelham, M. C. Mirenberg, and J. T. Jones (2002) argued that most people prefer stimuli that are associated with the self, a preference they called implicit egotism. In support of implicit egotism, Pelham et al presented evidence from 10 archival studies showing that people gravitate toward careers and places of residence that resemble their names or birthday numbers. M. Gallucci (2003) argued that alternate analyses of the same data provide strong evidence against implicit egotism. Whereas Gallucci was correct that Pelham et al's original analyses were flawed, their results remain significant even when more conservative tests are used. The authors also present new data in support of implicit egotism, including exhaustive studies of (a) common surnames and US city names and (b) common surnames and street names. The new studies also revealed that as sample sizes grow larger, studies are more likely to produce evidence of implicit egotism.