Routes to Triviality

It is known that a number of inference principles can be used to trivialise the axioms of naïve comprehension – the axioms underlying the naïve theory of sets. In this paper we systematise and extend these known results, to provide a number of general classes of axioms responsible for trivialising naïve comprehension.     

Attributing the sources of accuracy in unequal-power dyadic communication: Who is better and why?

A study was conducted to assess accuracy of deliberate nonverbal communication of affective messages between individuals assigned to different power roles within dyads. In phase 1, participants (N = 158) were assigned to unequal- or to equal-power roles and asked to send positive, negative, and neutral messages to their partner using nonverbal cues while the partner guessed which kind of message it was. In phase 2, naïve decoders (N = 294) made judgments of the videotapes from phase 1 to resolve the confounding of sender and decoder factors in the within-dyad communication paradigm. Results showed that subordinates were more accurate at decoding superiors than vice versa, and that this difference was due to subordinates sending less clear messages to superiors than superiors sent to subordinates. Comparison with the equal-power group’s expressions revealed that the subordinates’ expressions were also less clear than those sent by the equal-power group.     

Familiarity effects on categorization levels of faces and objects

It is well established that faces, in contrast to objects, are categorized as fast or faster at the individual level (e.g., Bill Clinton) than at the basic-level (e.g., human face). This subordinate-shift from basic-level categorization has been considered an outcome of visual expertise with processing faces. However, in the present study we found that, similar to familiar faces, categorization of individually-known familiar towers is also faster at the individual level than at the basic-level in naïve participants. In addition, category-verification of familiar stimuli, at basic and superordinate levels, was slower and less accurate compared to unfamiliar stimuli. Thus, the existence of detailed semantic information, regardless of expertise, can induce a shift in the default level of object categorization from basic to individual level. Moreover, the individually-specific knowledge is not only more easily-retrieved from memory but it might also interfere with accessing more general category information.     

When the expectations from a message will not be realized: Naïve theories can eliminate expectation-congruent judgments via correction

Research typically reveals that individuals like an object more when a persuasive message convinces them that this object is pleasant. In this paper, two experiments were conducted to understand the influence of such message-induced affective-expectations on judgments of experienced affect following direct encounter with an alcohol type of drink. As predicted, before trying the drink, recipients of the positive-expectation message had more positive expectations than recipients of the negative-expectation message. After drinking, participants judged the beverage to elicit affect congruent with message-induced expectations to the extent they did not endorse a naïve theory that their affective expectations congruently influence their experienced affect. In contrast, after drinking, the effect of the message disappeared when participants did endorse this naïve theory. Moderation of these effects, as well as theoretical and practical implications, are addressed.     

Naïve Comprehension and Contracting Implications

In his paper [6], Greg Restall conjectured that a logic supports a naïve comprehension scheme if and only if it is robustly contraction free, that is, if and only if no contracting connective is definable in terms of the primitive connectives of the logic. In this paper, we present infinitely many counterexamples to Restall's conjecture, in the form of purely implicational logics which are robustly contraction free, but which trivialize naïve comprehension.     

Quantum realism: Naïveté is no excuse

Conclusions The work of Gleason and of Kochen and Specker has been thought to refute a naïve realist approach to quantum mechanics. The argument of this paper substantially bears out this conclusion. The assumptions required by their work are not arbitrary, but have sound theoretical justification. Moreover, if they are false, there seems no reason why their falsity should not be demonstrable in some sufficiently ingenious experiment. Suitably interpreted, the work of Bell and Wigner may be seen to yield independent arguments for the falsity of naïve realistic approach to quantum mechanics. Quantum mechanics is no more like classical statistical mechanics than its creators thought it was.Many of the ideas in this paper have been distilled from a Ph.D. thesis presented to the Harvard Philosophy Department in December 1977. I wish to thank Michael Friedman and Hilary Putnam for helpful discussions and constructive criticism of my work; Arthur Fine for stimulating my interest in this topic by his writings; and the Thyssen Foundation for support of research.     

Cultural differences in self-verification: The role of naïve dialecticism

This research presents the first evidence of cultural differences in self-verification and the role of naïve dialecticism in mediating these differences. Chinese, Asian-American, and non-Asian American students completed a series of personality tests, and were presented with bogus feedback that was either self-consistent or self-discrepant, and either positive or negative. Whereas non-Asians self-verified (i.e., tended to exhibit resistance), mainland Chinese and Asian-American participants tended to adjust their self-views when they received (either positive or negative) feedback that contradicted their prevailing self-conceptions. Mediated moderation analyses showed that naïve dialecticism, mediated cultural differences in self-verification.     

Let me read your mind: Personality judgments based on a person’s natural stream of thought

Past research on the accuracy of personality judgments has largely focused on person perception scenarios that are public in nature (e.g., face-to-face interactions, personal websites). This study investigated the accuracy of personality judgments on the basis of highly private information: a person’s natural stream of thought. Nine naïve judges rated the personality of 90 targets on the basis of their 20-min stream-of-consciousness essays. Judges’ level of accuracy was significant and substantial for all Big Five dimensions. The substantial and relatively uniform accuracy across all Big Five dimensions suggests that a person’s moment-to-moment thoughts provide good information for the accurate judgment of personality in general rather than specific diagnostic information for the accurate judgment of private traits such as Neuroticism.     

When sad is better than happy: Negative affect can improve the quality and effectiveness of persuasive messages and social influence strategies

Based on recent affect-cognition theories and research on social influence strategies, four experiments predicted and found that people in negative mood produced higher quality and more effective interpersonal persuasive messages than did people in positive mood. This effect was obtained for messages advocating both popular and unpopular positions (Experiments 1 and 2), and arguments produced in negative mood actually induced greater attitude change in naïve recipients (Experiment 3). Experiment 4 replicated these effects in an interactive situation, and mediational analyses showed that mood influenced processing style, resulting in the production of more concrete and thus more effective messages when in a negative mood. The role of negative affect in information processing and the production of interpersonal influence strategies in particular is discussed, and the implications of these findings for everyday interaction strategies, and for contemporary affect—cognition theorizing are considered.     

When one cue is not enough: combining fast and frugal heuristics with compound cue processing

One-reason decision-making heuristics as proposed by Gigerenzer, Todd, and the ABC Research Group (1999) have been shown to perform accurately. However, such strategies cannot deal with compound cues. We propose the Take The Best Configural Cue (TTB-Configural) as a fast and frugal heuristic that processes compound cues. In a series of three experiments, we analysed whether participants used this heuristic when making cue-based inferences on which of two alternatives had a higher criterion value. In two of the experiments, two cues were amalgamated into a valid compound cue by applying the AND or the OR logical rule, respectively. In the third experiment, there was no valid compound cue. Within each experiment, we also manipulated causal mental models through instructions. In the configural causal model, cues were said to act through the same causal mechanism. In the elemental causal model, cues were said to act through different causal mechanisms. In the neutral causal model, the causal mechanism was not specified. When a highly valid compound existed, and participants had a configural causal model, for the majority of them the strategy that could best account for their choices was TTB-Configural. Otherwise, the strategy that best predicted their choices was the Take The Best (TTB) heuristic.     

Detection of Feigned Psychosis with the Structured Inventory of Malingered Symptomatology (SIMS): A Study of Coached and Uncoached Simulators

The aim of the present study was to investigate the efficacy of the Structured Inventory of Malingered Symptomatology (SIMS) to detect feigned psychosis in naïve, informed, and coached participants. Sixty undergraduate students were administered the SIMS and a number of filler questionnaires and asked to fill out the questionnaire honestly (controls; n = 15) or instructed to malinger psychosis because they were standing trial for a serious offense. Before they completed the SIMS, instructed malingerers either received no further information (naïve malingerers; n = 15), some information about psychotic symptoms (informed malingerers; n = 15), or some information about psychosis and a warning not to exaggerate symptoms (coached malingerers; n = 15). Even in the group of coached malingerers, the SIMS had acceptable sensitivity and specificity rates. These findings suggest that the SIMS may be of value in forensic assessments.     

Role of mothers in the acquisition of tool-use behaviours by captive infant chimpanzees

This article explores the maternal role in the acquisition of tool-use behaviours by infant chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes). A honey-fishing task, simulating ant/termite fishing found in the wild, was introduced to three dyads of experienced mother and naïve infant chimpanzees. Four fishing sites and eight sets of 20 objects to be used as tools, not all appropriate, were available. Two of the mothers constantly performed the task, using primarily two kinds of tools; the three infants observed them. The infants, regardless of the amount of time spent observing, successfully performed the task around the age of 20–22 months, which is earlier than has been recorded in the wild. Two of the infants used the same types of tools that the adults predominantly used, suggesting that tool selectivity is transmitted. The results also show that adults are tolerant of infants, even if unrelated; infants were sometimes permitted to lick the tools, or were given the tools, usually without honey, as well as permitted to observe the adult performances closely.Electronic Supplementary Material Supplementary material is available in the online version of this article at     

The Price of Innocent Millianism

According to the view I call `innocent Millianism', that-clauses differing only for occurrences of co-referential names provide the same contribution to the intensional profile of a belief report. It is widely believed by friends and foes of innocent Millianism alike that this approach entails either the denial of what I label a `naïve' account ofbelief reports, or a dismissive attitude towards our semantic intuitions. In this essay, I counter that the conjunction of innocent Millianism and the naïve view of belief reports is compatible with our intuitions of truth-conditions. In order to defend this conclusion, I defend an independently motivated approach, in which utterances endowed of the same intension may nevertheless differ in truth-conditions.     

INFANT MACAQUE MONKEYS RESPOND TO PICTORIAL DEPTH

Abstract— The studies described here are the first to demonstrate that a nonhuman primate species is capable of responding to pictorial depth information during infancy. In two experiments, pigtailed macaque (Macaca nemestrina) infants were tested for responsivity to the pictorial depth cites of texture gradient/linear perspective and relative size. The procedures were adapted from human studies and are based on the proclivity of infants to reach more frequently to closer objects than to objects that are farther away. The stimulus displays included two equidistant objects that, when viewed monocularly, appear separated in space because of an illusion created by pictorial depth cues. When presented with these displays, animals reached significantly more often to the apparently closer objects under monocular conditions than under binocular conditions. These findings suggest that infant macaques are sensitive to pictorial depth information, the implication being that this ability has ancient phytogenetic origins and ix not learned from exposure to the conventions of Western art.     

Rats form cognitive maps from spatial configurations of proximal arm cues in an enclosed 4-arm radial maze

Rats were trained to select a final, remaining baited arm following a 6- to 10-min delay following their entries into three experimenter-selected baited arms in an enclosed 4-arm radial maze containing different proximally cued arms. Rats’ accuracy in selecting the remaining baited arm was disrupted when the spatial configuration of arm cues was randomly varied over trials following initial training with one configuration in Experiment 1. In Experiment 2, the same rats acquired this task with the original and a new configuration of the same arm cues when each consistently occurred at a specific time of day (one in the morning, the other in the afternoon). Randomly varying the temporal presentations of these configurations following acquisition disrupted rats’ choice accuracy more within the new than the original configuration. Other rats in Experiment 3 learned this task with two configurations containing different types of arm cues (full arm inserts, objects at the arm entrances). When required to relearn this task with recombined configurations of pairs of arm cues from of each configuration, only rats presented pairs of arms arranged differently from that in their original configurations were unable to reacquire the task. Together these results support a cognitive map hypothesis more than a proximal arm cue list hypothesis. These findings were discussed in terms of recent versions of cognitive map theory (Benhamou, 1998; Poucet, 1993) and the possible limits of such processing (Roberts, 2001).     

Microcomputer-based estimation of psychophysical thresholds: The Best PEST

A new, maximally efficient technique for measuring psychophysical thresholds (Pentland, 1980) has been implemented on the microcomputer. This PEST (parameter estimation by sequential testing) technique is the most efficient sequential parameter estimation technique possible, given that the form of the psychometric function is known. The technique is similar to but faster and more accurate than other staircase procedures and may be applied whenever staircase techniques are applicable. The “Best PEST” is easily implemented on the micro-computer; a BASIC program for the Apple II which does so is presented. The Best PEST is compared with other staircase procedures, including one recently implemented on a micro-computer (Corwin, Kintz, & Beaty, 1979).     

Use of experimenter-given cues in visual co-orienting and in an object-choice task by a new world monkey species, cotton top tamarins (Saguinus oedipus)

Two methods assessed the use of experimenter-given directional cues by a New World monkey species, cotton top tamarins (Saguinus oedipus). Experiment 1 used cues to elicit visual co-orienting toward distal objects. Experiment 2 used cues to generate responses in an object-choice task. Although there were strong positive correlations between monkey pairs to co-orient, visual co-orienting with a human experimenter occurred at a low frequency to distal objects. Human hand pointing cues generated more visual co-orienting than did eye gaze to distal objects. Significant accurate choices of baited cups occurred with human point and tap cues and human look cues. Results highlight the importance of head and body orientation to induce shared attention in cotton top tamarins, both in a task that involved food getting and a task that did not.     

How to bereally contraction free

A logic is said to becontraction free if the rule fromA (A B) toA B is not truth preserving. It is well known that a logic has to be contraction free for it to support a non-trivial naïve theory of sets or of truth. What is not so well known is that if there isanother contracting implication expressible in the language, the logic still cannot support such a naïve theory. A logic is said to berobustly contraction free if there is no such operator expressible in its language. We show that a large class of finitely valued logics are each not robustly contraction free, and demonstrate that some other contraction free logics fail to be robustly contraction free. Finally, the sublogics of (with the standard connectives) are shown to be robustly contraction free.