Novel Colours and the Content of Experience

Abstract: I propose a counterexample to naturalistic representational theories of phenomenal character. The counterexample is generated by experiences of novel colours reported by Crane and Piantanida. I consider various replies that a representationalist might make, including whether novel colours could be possible colours of objects and whether one can account for novel colours as one would account for binary colours or colour mixtures. I argue that none of these strategies is successful and therefore that one cannot fully explain the nature of the phenomenal character of perceptual experiences using a naturalistic conception of representation.     

Ambiguous Figures and the Content of Experience

Representationalism is the position that the phenomenal character of an experience is either identical with, or supervenes on, the content of that experience. Many representationalists hold that the relevant content of experience is nonconceptual. I propose a counter‐example to this form of representationalism that arises from the phenomenon of Gestalt switching, which occurs when viewing ambiguous figures. First, I argue that one does not need to appeal to the conceptual content of experience or to judgements to account for Gestalt switching. I then argue that experiences of certain ambiguous figures are problematic because they have different phenomenal characters but that no difference in the nonconceptual content of these experiences can be identified. I consider three solutions to this problem that have been proposed by both philosophers and psychologists and conclude that none can account for all the ambiguous figures that pose the problem. I conclude that the onus is on representationalists to specify the relevant difference in content or to abandon their position.     

精神分析主要概念的经验实证状况

100多年来,精神分析理论所阐述的观念已渗透到心理学、文学、艺术和文化等广泛领域。尽管精神分析享有广泛声誉,但直到最近,它才得到经验实证的支持。通过对支持精神分析理论（无意识、驱力、防御机制、客体关系、恋母情结）和心理动力治疗（移情、反移情、解释、阻抗）几个主要概念的信度和效度的经验实证研究进行了回顾,也探讨了这些实证研究对心理治疗以及心理学未来的影响。     

Empirical Content and Rational Constraint

It is often thought that epistemic relations between experience and belief make it possible for our beliefs to be about or “directed towards” the empirical world. I focus on an influential attempt by John McDowell to defend a view along these lines. According to McDowell, unless experiences are the sorts of things that can be our reasons for holding beliefs, our beliefs would not be “answerable” to the facts they purportedly represent, and so would lack all empirical content. I argue that there is no intelligible conception of what it is for beliefs to be answerable to the facts that supports McDowell's claim that our empirical beliefs must be justified by experience.     

On the Content of Experience*

The intentionalist about consciousness holds that the qualitative character of experience, “what it’s like,” is determined by the contents of a select group of special intentional states of the subject. Fred Dretske (1995) , Mike Thau (2002) , Michael Tye (1995) and many others have embraced intentionalism, but these philosophers have not generally appreciated that, since we are intimately familiar with the qualitative character of experience, we thereby have special access to the nature of these contents. In this paper, we take advantage of this fact to show that intentionalism is incompatible with the idea that these contents are singular or general propositions, and thus that intentionalism is incompatible with one dominant trend in thinking about contents in general. In particular, there appear to be insoluble difficulties in explaining how the phenomenology of place and time can be explained by any intentionalist theory appealing to singular or general propositions.     

知觉经验与知觉内容

知觉(perception)是指我们通过视觉、听觉、触觉、嗅觉、味觉等感觉器官而获得的对事物以及外部世界的意识感知.知觉经验(perceptual experience)的一个显著的特点是它具有某种现象特征,即知觉者会体验到一种"那究竟像什么(what it is like)"的感觉.例如,一个人会从红色视觉经验中体验到"红色究竟像什么"的意识感受性(qualia).知觉内容(perceptual content)粗略地讲是指通过知觉经验向知觉者所传递的信息.关于知觉问题在哲学上的重要性,我们可以从以下几点来看:在形而上学方面,知觉是我们了解外部物理世界究竟存在什么的主要手段;在认识论方面,研究知觉是研究我们如何达到关于外部物理世界的知识的主要手段;在语言哲学方面,知觉内容是我们的心灵与外部物理世界的关联及互动在语言实践上的体现;在心灵哲学方面,知觉经验中的现象特征与意识及意向性之间存在着深层的内在联系.     

Two Versions of the Conceptual Content of Experience

ABSTRACT

In ‘Avoiding the Myth of the Given’, McDowell revisits the main themes of Mind and World in order to make two important corrections: first, he does not longer believe that the content of perceptual experience is propositional in character; second, he does not believe now that the content of an experience needs to include everything the experience enables us to know non-inferentially. In this article, I take issue with both retractions. My thesis is that McDowell’s first version of perceptual content is preferable to the latest one.     

Defending the Content Approach to Aesthetic Experience

This article defends the content approach to aesthetic experience. It begins by sketching this approach to aesthetic experience. It then rehearses certain recent criticisms of the view by Alan Goldman and attempts to rebut them. One of those criticisms raises a long‐standing concern about the author's account that has recently been called the “qua” problem. The article concludes by putting this issue to rest.     

On The Content and Character of Pain Experience

Tracking representationalism explains the negative affective character of pain, and its capacity to motivate action, by reference to the representation of the badness for us of bodily damage. I argue that there is a more fitting instantiation of the tracking relation – the badness for us of extremely intense stimuli – and use this to motivate a non‐reductive approach to the negative affective character of pain. The view of pain proposed here is supported by consideration of three related topics: the pain caused when the body is damaged, reparative pain and the messenger‐shooting objection to tracking representationalism.     

Animal Concepts Revisited: the use of Self- Monitoring as an Empirical Approach

Many psychologists and philosophers believe that the close correlation between human language and human concepts makes the attribution of concepts to nonhuman animals highly questionable. I argue for a three-part approach to attributing concepts to animals. The approach goes beyond the usual discrimination tests by seeking evidence for self-monitoring of discrimination errors. Such evidence can be collected without relying on language and, I argue, the capacity for error-detection can only be explained by attributing a kind of internal representation that is reasonably identified as a concept. Thus I hope to have shown that worries about the empirical intractability of concepts in languageless animals are misplaced. This revised version was published online in July 2006 with corrections to the Cover Date.     

Is There Any Empirical Support for Bowen's Concepts of Differentiation of Self,

Murray Bowen's Family Systems Theory is considered by many to be the most thorough and thoughtful set of ideas that family therapy has created (Nichols & Schwartz, 1995). But does the literature support his concepts and ideas? This article reviewed eight empirical research articles published in the last decade or so in which Bowenian concepts were tested. The purpose was to determine whether there is any empirical support for Bowen's concepts of differentiation of self, triangulation, and fusion. Some of Bowen's notions were supported by empirical data and two valid and reliable instruments designed to test Bowenian concepts were created.     

The Given Regained. Reflections on the Sensuous Content of Experience

The major part of our beliefs and our knowledge of the world is based on, or grounded in, sensory experience. But, how is it that we can have perceptual beliefs that things are thus and so, and, moreover, be justified in having them? What conditions must experience satisfy to rationally warrant, and not merely to cause, our beliefs? Against the currently very popular contention that experience itself already has to be propositionally and conceptually structured, I will rehabilitate the claim that there is given element in experience which is independent of thought and which is possessed of a distinctive nonpropositional and nonconceptual content. Further, I will argue that this given element is indeed fit to play a significant evidential role in the justification of our beliefs about the world.     

Empirical Conditions for a Reidean Geometry of Visual Experience

Thomas Reid’s Geometry of Visibles, according to which the geometrical properties of an object’s perspectival appearance equal the geometrical properties of its projection on the inside of a sphere with the eye in its centre allows for two different interpretations. It may (1) be understood as a theory about phenomenal visual space—i.e. an account of how things appear to human observers from a certain point of view—or it may (2) be seen as a mathematical model of viewpoint-relative but mind-independent relational properties of objects. This paper makes a systematic and a historical claim. I shall argue, first, that given certain features of the human visual system phenomenal visual space differs in several aspects from Reidean visual space. Secondly, I suggest that, since Reid was aware of some of these empirical facts, we should interpret Reid as endorsing the second interpretation of the Geometry of Visibles.     

Information,Experience, and Divergent Thinking: An Empirical Test

ABSTRACT: Divergent thinking tests are often used to estimate the potential for creative problem solving. Scores on these tests may, however, reflect a kind of experiential bias. Similar biases once plagued IQ tests, the idea being that scores reflect the individual's background and information in long-term memory as much as ability per se. The investigation reported here attempted to assess the role of experience, knowledge, and memory in divergent thinking by comparing 2 kinds of tasks. One was a standard divergent thinking task (e.g., "list uses for a shoe," "uses for a brick," "uses for a newspaper"). The other allowed a number of responses but required that the examinee produce factual, knowledge- based responses. A second objective here was to compare standard- and knowledge-based ideation with tasks that shared 1 domain (e.g., transportation) with tasks that did not share a domain. Results indicated that there was a statistically significant correlation between the 2 types of tasks but only when they shared 1 domain. This was confirmed with product–moment correlations (r = .37, p = .025) and a canonical correlation (Rc = .69, p = 008). The correlations were not significant when the tasks represented different domains. It is interesting to note that both the knowledge-based and the standard divergent thinking tasks were unrelated to grade point average, which supports their discriminant validity. Limitations and directions for future research are suggested.     

Creativity,Schizotypicality, and Mystical Experience: An Empirical Study

This study examined the commonalities and the differences between creativity and the schizophrenia spectrum. The variables measured were creativity, schizotypy, absorption, mystical experiences, spatial ability, balance, positive and negative presence, and neuroticism. Three community groups were recruited: 31 artists, 10 people with schizophrenia, and 31 comparisons matched for gender and age with the artists. A larger student group, consisting of 102 students, was also recruited to examine the correlations among the same variables within a larger, more normative, group. The largest commonality between the artist and the schizophrenic groups was the propensity to mystical experiences. The greatest differences between them were that the artists were higher in creativity, had better spatial ability, had better balance, had more positive states of presence, and were lower in neuroticism. In the student group, creativity was positively correlated with positive schizotypy, impulsive nonconformity, spatial ability, positive presence, absorption, and mystical experiences, although in the student group, the relation between creativity and mystical experiences was completely mediated by absorption.     

情绪体验与认知负荷对工作记忆影响的实证研究

该研究以认知负荷为调节,探讨了不同的情绪体验对工作记忆的影响情况。采用2(认知负荷:低负荷;高负荷)×3(情绪刺激图片:愉快、厌恶、中性)两因素混合实验设计,对57名被试进行了单独实验。结果发现:(1)在低认知负荷上,被试在不同情绪体验下的反应时差异不显著,但在高认知负荷任务上,与中性情绪体验相比,被试在愉快情绪体验下的反应时显著增长,而在厌恶情绪体验下的反应时显著变短;(2)在低认知负荷上,被试在不同情绪体验下的正确率差异不显著,但在高认知负荷任务上,与中性情绪体验相比,被试在愉快情绪体验下的正确率显著提高,而在厌恶情绪体验下的正确率显著降低。该结果表明,在低认知负荷上,情绪体验对工作记忆的刷新功能不产生影响;在高认知负荷上,情绪体验对工作记忆的刷新功能影响显著,其中愉快体验具有显著的促进作用。